

**This provides responses to comments JTC1 ballot of ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AC:2018/FDAmd 1 (IEEE Std 802.1ACct-2021)**

**The voting results on ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AC:2018/FDAmd 1 (IEEE Std 802.1ACct-2021) in SC6 N18055:**

- Support need for ISO standard? Passed 9/0/9
- 1 comment with the China NB NO vote.

The comments have been processed in a timely manner using the mechanisms defined and agreed in 6N15606. This document provides the responses from IEEE 802 to the comments by China NB on this ballot.

**China NB comment 1 on ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AC:2018/FDAmd 1 (IEEE Std 802.1ACct-2021):**

*IEEE 802.1Acct-2021 is an amendment to IEEE 802.1ACTM-2016 (was added to IEEE Std 802.15.3-2016 by the IEEE Std 802.15.3d-2017 amendment).*

*China has submitted comments on IEEE 802.1AC-2016 during both 60-day ballot and FDIS ballot object the references to IEEE 802.11 and IEEE 802.1AE (see 6N15494 and 6N15556).*

*We voted against 60-day ballot on 802.1ACct, but the comments were not properly addressed by IEEE. Therefore, we cannot support IEEE 802.1Acct-2021 as an international standard.*

*Up to now, there is no reasonable and appropriate disposition on the security problems in the base standard IEEE 802.1AC<sup>TM</sup>-2016 and this amendment neither gives solution to the security issues in IEEE 802.1AC<sup>TM</sup>-2016. IEEE 802.11 and IEEE 802.1AE are still the normative reference in IEEE 802.1AC-2016, see Clause 7.5, 13.2 etc.*

*Therefore, China cannot support this amendment to be published as an International Standard.*

*Proposed Change:*

*Please revise the referenced security mechanisms.*

**IEEE 802 response to CN.1 on ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AC:2018/FDAmd 1 (IEEE Std 802.1ACct-2021):**

The comment on IEEE Std 802.1ACct-2021 is beyond its scope.

IEEE Std 802.1ACct-2021 is an amendment to IEEE Std 802.1AC-2016 (ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AC:2018) and was developed to support the 100 Gb/s wireless switched point-to-point physical layer that was added to IEEE Std 802.15.3-2016 by the IEEE Std 802.15.3d-2017. As an amendment to IEEE Std 802.1AC-2016 (ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AC:2018), it does rely on that standard: it states that the *amendment is based on IEEE Std 802.1AC<sup>TM</sup>-2016 as amended by IEEE Std 802.1AC-2016/Cor 1-2018.* However, the amendment does not specify or refer to the use of IEEE Std 802.11 (ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-11:2018) or IEEE Std 802.1AE-2018 (ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AE:2020). As the amendment does not reference these standards, the China NB's ballot response is beyond scope and does not apply.

The documents referenced in the China NB ballot (6N15494 and 6N15556) date from 2012 and 2013 and responses to comments were submitted from IEEE 802 at that time. The general assertions raised in the China NB's ballot were discussed at length in 2013 at an IEEE 802 meeting in Geneva (with IEEE 802 and Switzerland NB representatives in attendance) and in both 2013 and 2014 at SC6 meetings in Seoul and Ottawa (with IEEE 802, China NB and Switzerland NB representatives in attendance). During those

meetings, IEEE 802 fully responded to all claims made by both the China NB and Switzerland NB representatives and also provided additional information about the design and specification of IEEE 802 technologies. Since that time, however, the China NB has failed to substantiate these assertions, despite numerous requests from IEEE 802.

The invitation for a representative of the China NB (as well as representative from other interested SC6 NBs) to attend an IEEE 802 Plenary session remains open.

IEEE 802 believes that the alleged security defects asserted by the China NB have all been shown to be not valid. Without technical substantiation of any related concerns, IEEE 802 cannot consider modification of the existing IEEE 802 or ISO standards.