

This document contains a summary of the public comments<sup>1</sup> received in response to the recommendations issued by the Board Working Group on Nominating Committee (BWG-NomCom), with a view to facilitating the reading of the contributions provided by the Internet Community. The comments are summarized in order of submission for each recommendation as applicable. Themed comments – outside labeled recommendations – are also categorized. General comments are summarized in “general comments”. Even though this summary was drawn-up to reflect as accurately and objectively as possible the views expressed by participants, it does not substitute in any way the original contributions which are publicly available for full reference at: <https://www.icann.org/public-comments/bwg-nomcom-2014-08-21-en>

**Contributions provided by:**

[At Large Advisory Committee \(ALAC\)](#)

[Adam Peake \(AP\)](#)

[Business Constituency \(BC\)](#)

[Christopher Wilkinson \(CW\)](#)

[European Telecommunications Network Operators' Association \(ETNO\)](#)

[Generic Names Supporting Organization Council \(GNSO\)](#)

[Google \(GG\)](#)

[Intellectual Property Constituency \(IPC\)](#)

[Internet Service Providers and Connectivity Providers constituency \(ISPCP\)](#)

[Juhani Juselius \(JJ\)](#)

[Mathieu Weill \(MW\)](#)

[Registries Stakeholder Group \(RySG\)](#)

[Roberto Gaetano \(RG\)](#)

[Satish Babu \(SB\)](#)

[Spain, Paraguay, Chile, Uruguay, the European Union and Argentina \(S-P-C-U-EU-A\)](#)

[Stéphane Van Gelder \(SV\)](#)

[Vanda Scartzini \(VS\)](#)

**Comments on Specific Recommendations**

<p><b>Rec. 1</b> Enhancing Regional Representation and Diversity – ASO, ccNSO and ALAC</p>	<p><a href="#">JJ</a>: This might lead to overstressing the importance of diversity. Diversity should be a selection criterium among others. Note: 1) ALAC is already nominating representatives based on regions; 2) ccNSO Council is composed of Councilors from all regions; 3) GAC represents diversity; 4) NomCom has guidelines about maximum number of Board members that could be appointed from a certain region.</p> <p>---</p> <p><a href="#">ALAC</a>: Agrees; it enhances diversity and parity.</p> <p>---</p> <p><a href="#">ETNO</a>: Add efficiency as a working objective. To increase from 1 to 5 is inconsistent with objectives. Most of ccNSO and ASO's policies and issues are addressed at local or regional level and are out of ICANN scope. Representatives from these communities have technical profiles, well covered by RSSAC, SSAC and IAB. Geographic diversity is not an issue: it has been a long-standing objective.</p> <p>---</p> <p><a href="#">AP</a>: Current model is disproportionate: ccNSO is significantly under represented and should be represented by 5 delegates, one from each region. ALAC should continue to follow this model. There is no reason for 5 ASO delegates – the NomCom does not select any of ASO leadership. General lack of ASO interest. All selecting organizations should be reminded of importance of geographic and gender diversity.</p> <p>---</p> <p><a href="#">BC</a>: Disagrees: ASO and ccNSO seats should remain as they are. Reducing the participation of globally diverse commercial interest is cutting out diversity. Note: requests from Board to provide business-minded leadership. CSG should also be assigned 5 seats. Regional diversity must be cultivated in all constituencies. The current model strikes the appropriate balance between stakeholders and a diversity of viewpoints.</p> <p>---</p> <p><a href="#">RySG</a>: Does the new structure really provide broader geographical input if each member does not have a vote? Objects to proposed voting structure. Voting parity among GNSO, ccNSO and ALAC does not comport with ICANN's financial and operational realities.</p> <p>---</p> <p><a href="#">ISPCP</a>: Diversity and stability are important. Diversity is to be measured as regards to geography, gender and profile/skills. SO/ACs could be invited to take gender balance into account. Disagrees with rationale to increase ccNSO and ASO appointees: their policies and issues being addressed at national or regional level for a very large part and a large number of cctLDs are linked to governments. Does not accept that ASO be given a dominant voice. NomCom does not appoint ASO Council Members.</p> <p>---</p> <p><a href="#">IPC</a>: Opposed to this rec.: it would radically transform the NomCom – such drastic measures are not justified. If adopted, NomCom operations will be less accountable and more cumbersome. This proposal is not justified and overlooks the fact that substantive work of the Board is disproportionately directed to issues primarily of concern to the generic names space. It does not serve interests of increasing diversity: ccNSO and ASO are organized on geographical basis (as opposed to interests). Educate and encourage appointing organizations to select geographically diverse candidates; there should not be a quota for the NomCom.</p> <p>---</p> <p><a href="#">GNSO</a>: Increasing membership from other groups may be helpful, as long as those new members are able to contribute individually.</p>
<p><b>Rec. 2</b> Aligning with Organization Structure –</p>	<p><a href="#">CW</a>: It has always appeared anomalous that GNSO should hold largest number of seats.</p> <p>---</p>

<sup>1</sup> The public comment period ran from 21 August 2014 to 9 January 2015.

<p>GNSO</p>	<p><a href="#">ALAC</a>: agrees; it enhances diversity and parity. ---</p> <p><a href="#">GG</a>: This will undermine diversity of the NomCom: the Commercial Stakeholder Group (CSG) encompasses a vast majority of divergent interests. Further consolidation of CSG representation will make it even more difficult for a wide range of interests to have a seat at the table when the ICANN Board is selected. This change is concerning in light of proposal to increase GAC, which dilutes private-sector representation in selection process. ---</p> <p><a href="#">ETNO</a>: Reducing CSG from 4 to 1 would be counterproductive. The value of the NomCom is diversity. The CSG’s ability to outreach to business community and to select Board members and leaders with appropriate skills is essential. It also helps ensure high quality candidates are elected. ---</p> <p><a href="#">AP</a>: Agrees. Realignment is required, current model is disproportionate and favors an outdated GNSO representation. Commercial and non Commercial Stakeholder Groups should provide 2 delegates each, 1 of the 2 must be from the Global South. Registry and Registrar Stakeholder Groups delegate 1 each. ---</p> <p><a href="#">BC</a>: Disagrees. It shrinks GNSO influence and gives more to governments through ccNSO and GAC. The business community is very diverse: each constituency brings differing perspectives and voices to the table. The GNSO division remains a good guide. The rec. does not capture diversity and does a disservice to the community at large. Supports adding a seat for the NPOC. ---</p> <p><a href="#">RySG</a>: Disagrees. Having fewer GNSO representatives does not make sense given ICANN’s business and policy-making realities. ---</p> <p><a href="#">ISPCP</a>: Disagrees with rec. GNSO issues represent the largest part of what Board members have to address. Technical competencies are widely covered by Board members appointed by ASO, SSAC etc. CSG represents a large set of actors and skills. Maintain CSG seats and increase GNSO by one to include NPOC. ---</p> <p><a href="#">IPC</a>: Opposed to this rec. - it would radically transform the NomCom – such drastic measures are not justified. If adopted, NomCom operations will be less accountable and more cumbersome. Concerned with rec.: it abolishes IPC’s authority to choose a member. Inability to recruit new and diverse members to participate because intellectual property interests are increasingly consigned to a marginal role. This severe reduction cannot be justified with the desire to align the structure with that of SO/ACs. Furthermore, Board already has strong technical expertise in areas. Add a seat for NPOC. <a href="#">GNSO</a>: Diversity is hampered, not aided by reducing role of GNSO. At a time when ICANN is increasingly in need of leadership skills, this is short-sighted and ignores existing groups’ ability to meet diversity goal.</p>
<p><b>Rec. 3</b> GAC Representation Capable of Increase at GAC Discretion</p>	<p><a href="#">JJ</a>: In favor – increased number would make it easier for GAC. ---</p> <p><a href="#">CW</a>: Ensure the proposed increase would effectively be filled. ---</p> <p><a href="#">ALAC</a>: Agrees; it enhances diversity and parity. ---</p> <p><a href="#">AP</a>: GAC has declined NomCom seat for a number of years. If GAC is willing, 5 might be more appropriate for regional representation. Discuss with GAC. Consider GAC observer who has access to shared information, agrees to confidentiality but not does participate in recruitment and selection. Observer might advise on characteristics of desirable profile and report to GAC that process is being followed. Improve engagement with GAC. ---</p> <p><a href="#">BC</a>: Disagrees. The seat is currently vacant because one government cannot speak for any other sovereign nation. Due to size of GAC, no expectation that confidential information would be sufficiently protected. Eliminate GAC seat and seek some other input into process from GAC that is consistent with GAC principles. ---</p> <p><a href="#">RySG</a>: This would contravene existing relationships between governments and ICANN. The existing non-voting slot has been unfilled since 2008. ---</p> <p><a href="#">ISPCP</a>: Objects - unfilled seat. What is the rationale? ---</p> <p><a href="#">S-P-C-U-EU-A</a>: 5 GAC representatives, in order to reflect regional diversity, and 3 delegation votes. This should be accompanied by other measures to ensure that criteria to identify candidates with broad public policy perspectives are taken into account. ---</p> <p><a href="#">GNSO</a>: Opposes. GAC members act as representatives of their governments, not as individual participants. GAC understands need to steer clear as it has not filled its one seat. The GNSO members of NomCom are free to look beyond affiliation in search of best candidates. By contrast, the proposed increase in the number of GAC seats would reduce individual insight in favor of institutional policy.</p>
<p><b>Rec. 4</b> Technical Entity Inputs Remain Unchanged</p>	<p><a href="#">AP</a>: Consider inviting IAB to provide a delegate. ---</p>

	<p><a href="#">BC</a>: Supports.</p> <p>---</p> <p><a href="#">ISPCP</a>: Representation should be rotated within the membership after a maximum of three consecutive terms. If these representatives become voting members, their terms should be aligned with other members.</p>
<p><b>Rec. 5</b> Organization of NomCom by Delegation</p>	<p><a href="#">JJ</a>: Delegations must first find their own consensus before taking part in the discussion or voting. As opposed to current form (straightforward discussions) delegations would take more time. To guarantee efficiency of selection process, one person – one vote.</p> <p>---</p> <p><a href="#">MW</a>: Complex and a recipe for failure. Complex rules are contrary to principle of transparency and diminish accountability and efficiency. Costly to implement, they lead to gaming rather than performance.</p> <p>---</p> <p><a href="#">CW</a>: Disagrees and supports <a href="#">MW</a>'s statement on rec. 5. Delegation would lead to behind the scenes horse trading and a loss of influence of Chair and members.</p> <p>---</p> <p><a href="#">SB</a>: This would be a constraint to a transparent NomCom process. Individual members may be disempowered if they cannot agree on how to deploy their delegation vote. If discussions are held in delegations, delegations will be seen as black boxes by rest of NomCom.</p> <p>---</p> <p><a href="#">GG</a>: Voting by delegation will limit independence of Members selected to represent best interests of their specific constituency. It will discourage collegiality by working in silos rather than reaching across SO/ACs and taking advantage of varied expertise of all. It will create inefficiencies in the process by adding an unnecessary layer of consultation and consensus-building to the process.</p> <p>---</p> <p><a href="#">ETNO</a>: It would make the work complex and contradict spirit of a unified team and efficiency.</p> <p>---</p> <p><a href="#">AP</a>: Overcomplicated and unhelpful.</p> <p>---</p> <p><a href="#">BC</a>: Disagrees. "Voting blocks" runs contrary to ICANN openness and transparency. Concept of delegations eliminates progress towards today's collegial environment and invites politicking and gamesmanship.</p> <p>---</p> <p><a href="#">RySG</a>: Adds complexity: additional structure layer and structure to decision-making process, additional workload.</p> <p>---</p> <p><a href="#">ISPCP</a>: Disagrees. NomCom works by consensus. Working by delegation will introduce complexity.</p> <p>---</p> <p><a href="#">IPC</a>: Opposed to this rec. - it would radically transform the NomCom – such drastic measures are not justified. If adopted, NomCom operations will be less accountable and more cumbersome. This rec. will make NomCom more rigid, encourage silos and discourage fertilization that is one of the strengths of current system.</p>
<p><b>Rec. 6</b> NomCom Leadership Positions</p>	<p><a href="#">JJ</a>: agrees.</p> <p>---</p> <p><a href="#">AP</a>: Merits more time to see if Chair/Chair elect model is the best approach.</p> <p>---</p> <p><a href="#">SV</a>: No rec. on Associate Chair: length of term? Associate Chair provides crucial support to Chair and allows for experience built up in previous terms to serve the NomCom. Associate Chair serves as an anchor and its importance should not be underestimated. Recommends that the Associate Chair be the outgoing Chair, have same term length as Chair and give Chair prerogative to name a replacement.</p> <p>---</p> <p><a href="#">BC</a>: Disagrees. Keep current leadership model. "Chair in training" is one of the most mature leadership systems within ICANN: continuity and institutional memory.</p> <p>---</p> <p><a href="#">ISPCP</a>: It is one of the most advanced mechanism to provide stability and continuity.</p> <p>---</p> <p><a href="#">IPC</a>: Agrees.</p>
<p><b>Rec. 7</b> Removal of Non-Voting Member Roles</p>	<p><a href="#">JJ</a>: agrees.</p> <p>---</p> <p><a href="#">ALAC</a>: agrees; it enhances diversity and parity.</p> <p>---</p> <p><a href="#">AP</a>: agrees.</p> <p>---</p> <p><a href="#">BC</a>: Supports abolishing concept of non-voting members and maintaining current non-voting status of leadership.</p> <p>---</p> <p><a href="#">RySG</a>: Diminution in the GNSO role will be aggravated if existing non-voting seats are given voting rights.</p> <p>---</p> <p><a href="#">ISPCP</a>: Supports. It allows greater parity and is consistent with current working methods.</p> <p>---</p> <p><a href="#">IPC</a>: Agrees.</p>

<p><b>Rec. 8</b> Candidate Selection Voting by Delegation</p>	<p><a href="#">ALAC</a>: Destabilizing and complex. Defer this rec. and re-evaluate it in future review. ---</p> <p><a href="#">AP</a>: Overcomplicates internal organization. NomCom typically uses polling. Voting by delegation would introduce need to agree/implement rules on who will vote and on what basis they will cast vote. ---</p> <p><a href="#">BC</a>: Disagrees. See rec. 5. This is over-engineering a solution to a problem that does not exist. It does the opposite of enhancing smooth functioning of NomCom. ---</p> <p><a href="#">RySG</a>: This will result in increased factionalism. Model for voting is to be done on basis of what is best for ICANN. Analysis that a choice of a candidate by multiple constituencies will demonstrate broad community support falls short of justifying replacement of current broad consensus NomCom deliberation model with one focused on factions. Discussion should be qualification based. It will create partisanship and remove flexibility in the voting process. If it is adopted, clarify rules. ---</p> <p><a href="#">ISPCP</a>: What is the rationale? Dialogue on equal footing is more important than voting. This would be counterproductive. The goal of NomCom is to select people with the appropriate profile and skills according to needs of Board and councils, not to select people for the interest of a single community. ---</p> <p><a href="#">IPC</a>: Opposed to this rec. - it would radically transform the NomCom – such drastic measures are not justified. If adopted, NomCom operations will be less accountable and more cumbersome. Voting by delegation would unduly complicate a system that is working well. The rec. does not address the likelihood of disagreements or deadlocks in constituencies. ---</p> <p><a href="#">GNSO</a>: Opposes. Delegation procedures undercut the integrity of the current model. The strength of the NomCom comes from the background of the individual members drawn from those organizations, not that they be bound by them.</p>
<p><b>Rec. 9</b> Implement Two Year Terms for Voting Members</p>	<p><a href="#">JJ</a>: agrees. ---</p> <p><a href="#">ALAC</a>: agrees. Rec. should also state that appointing organizations may remove its representative according to rules and procedures. Rec. should cover transition situations where existing delegates have served 1 or 2 years. ---</p> <p><a href="#">ETNO</a>: agrees. This would allow NomCom members to build upon valuable experience and continuity. ---</p> <p><a href="#">AP</a>: Reasonable with a minimum two-year break between periods of service. ---</p> <p><a href="#">BC</a>: Supports two-year term rec. and resignations or removals rec. Longer term will engender deeper understanding of processes and more effective resolution of work at hand. ---</p> <p><a href="#">RySG</a>: Supports. It is a complex responsibility: the additional year will provide necessary experience and continuity. Agrees no representative should serve two consecutive terms in order to avoid allowing members to be involved in selection Board members over three consecutive cycles. ---</p> <p><a href="#">ISPCP</a>: Supports extension but not convinced it is necessary. Side effect could be to discourage possible candidates. ---</p> <p><a href="#">IPC</a>: Supports extension but believes members should be allowed to serve consecutive years. Opposes if rec. 2 adopted. Strongly supports staggering of terms to ensure continuity. Objects concept that members should be able to remove a members without a cause: the voting threshold needs to be a higher percentage than 2/3. ---</p> <p><a href="#">GNSO</a>: Two-year terms, likely staggered, would enhance stability and institutional memory. Adding an additional layer of stability seems a prudent move.</p>
<p><b>Rec. 10</b> Leadership of the NomCom</p>	<p><a href="#">SB</a>: If an outsider is brought in as Associate Chair, the Chair becomes solely responsible to decide the form of leadership. ---</p> <p><a href="#">ALAC</a>: agrees – it will expand pool of qualified candidates - but adds caution that bringing in someone with no ICANN NomCom experience and no substantive knowledge of ICANN might be counter-productive. ---</p> <p><a href="#">AP</a>: Merits more time to see if Chair/Chair elect model is the best approach. The 3-member leadership team is valuable. The Chair elect and associate Chair provide valuable support to the Chair. Why change? ---</p> <p><a href="#">SV</a>: Take the Board out of Chair selection and institute an ICANN community selection process where each ICANN group that has representation on NomCom votes through its delegation. Rec. to have each appointing entity suggest a candidate for Chair role. This is likely to make process more burdensome. ---</p> <p><a href="#">BC</a>: See rec. 6. Maintain leadership triumvirate. Does not accept notion of Chair from outside community: NomCom must have a Chair that is aware of nuances within community. Accepts rec. that the Board look to appointing entities</p>

	<p>to put forward candidates for Chair-Elect.</p> <p>---</p> <p><u>RySG</u>: A person without experience will not have sufficient understanding of realities and needs that are essential when considering appointments. Suggest current or former NomCom members with individuals under consideration for Chair roles should be consulted during deliberations concerning their candidacies. This would entail changes to guidelines concerning confidentiality of NomCom deliberations.</p> <p>---</p> <p><u>ISPCP</u>: Surprised that do not already have criteria to select leadership. Leadership should be selected by ICANN community or representatives, not by Board. Chair and Chair Elect should be selected by NomCom.</p> <p>---</p> <p><u>IPC</u>: Agrees.</p>
<p><b>Rec. 11</b> Implement Two Year Term for Chair</p>	<p><u>AP</u>: Retain the Chair/Chair Elect model.</p> <p>---</p> <p><u>BC</u>: Supports.</p> <p>---</p> <p><u>RySG</u>: It adds a complication – it will be impossible to select a Chair who has immediate past experience. A transition period that creates staggered terms will have to be part of process if continuity advantage of two year terms is to exist.</p> <p>---</p> <p><u>IPC</u>: Agrees.</p>
<p><b>Rec. 12</b> Succession Planning for Chair</p>	<p><u>SB</u>: Removal of Chair Elect is the most crucial issue. This would have serious workload implications. Current system works well: leadership training and continuity. No sufficiently strong reasons to change it. Continue present formula. With respect to interim appointment, elevating delegation members may erode neutrality.</p> <p>---</p> <p><u>ALAC</u>: Chair-in-waiting or Chair-in-training is a compelling concept. The Associate-Chair should be a Board appointed position, a possible future Chair, but with no presumption of such succession. Clarify interim chair process i.e. meaning of delegation heads, use of “could” (it should be mandatory). Consider keeping three member NomCom Leadership Team.</p> <p>---</p> <p><u>ETNO</u>: Maintain Chair Elect position to allow for smooth transition so that leadership positions are selected by Committee, not by Board.</p> <p>---</p> <p><u>AP</u>: If a Chair Elect does not become Chair, then this is the process working.</p> <p>---</p> <p><u>SV</u>: No guidelines to replace learning role of Chair Elect position. Bylaws state that the Chair Elect is the only member of the leadership team who can chair meetings in Chair’s absence. The Associate Chair cannot chair. The rec. contains no direction on who could stand in as Chair when needed. If 2 year-term for Chair, maintain Chair Elect role as a one-year term serving for final year of the Chair’s terms, alongside, to learn, especially if rec. 10 (recruitment process outside of ICANN) is enacted. A one-year formative period is essential.</p> <p>---</p> <p><u>BC</u>: See rec. 6 – maintain Chair-Elect position. Doing a 360 review on Chair-Elect is a misuse of funds and redundant given learning mode position (as opposed to discussion). Chair-Elect creates a plan that provides surety. In the event of unforeseen vacancy, Chair-Elect could step up to meet Chair obligations supported by Associate Chair, removing need for Board to make interim appointment (institutional memory).</p> <p>---</p> <p><u>RySG</u>: The rec. does not provide a clear rationale to do away with Chair Elect position – no indication that current revised structure has not been effective in succession planning. The proposed setup will remove a mature process and add uncertainty.</p> <p>---</p> <p><u>ISPCP</u>: Objects to proposal to remove Chair Elect position.</p> <p>---</p> <p><u>IPC</u>: Objects to proposal to remove Chair Elect position: the key to any good organization is continuity.</p>
<p><b>Rec. 13</b> Regular Review of NomCom Chair Performance</p>	<p><u>AP</u>: It is being done for both Chair, Chair Elect and NomCom members (see 360 reviews).</p> <p>---</p> <p><u>BC</u>: Disagrees. Supports current 360 review of Chair and reiterates rec.12 comment. To ask that two performance reviews be done during course of year would add more workload with little benefit.</p> <p>---</p> <p><u>ISPCP</u>: Supports 360 review and possibility of publishing it if NomCom Chair agrees. Reviews can be extended to appointees.</p> <p>---</p> <p><u>IPC</u>: Agrees.</p>
<p><b>Rec. 14</b> Succession Planning</p>	<p><u>AP</u>: By a vote of all NomCom delegates, higher standard of three quarters of delegates.</p> <p>---</p> <p><u>BC</u>: Agrees with removal rec. but disagrees with notion of “delegations”. See rec. 12 Chair-Elect could step up to meet Chair obligations.</p>

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<p><b>Rec. 15</b> Maintain NomCom Appointments to Entities Other Than the Board</p>	<p><a href="#">AP</a>: Focusing on Board appointments would ensure NomCom performed better in recruitment and selection.</p> <p>---</p> <p><a href="#">BC</a>: Supports.</p> <p>---</p> <p><a href="#">RySG</a>: More attention needs to be directed toward the value of having NomCom make these appointments within the broader context of work demands on the Committee. A review of processes used in handling these responsibilities is appropriate in terms of judging whether function should remain part of NomCom mandate.</p> <p>---</p> <p><a href="#">ISPCP</a>: Suggests extending the selection to ASO Council.</p> <p>---</p> <p><a href="#">IPC</a>: Agrees.</p>

### General Comments

[VS](#): Supports recs.

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[MW](#): How will ICANN assess that these changes have improved if there is no preexisting agreement on definition of goals and outcomes? First define the value. It would be inappropriate to define this value in this process. The proposals remain too focused on internal ICANN politics and create unnecessary complexity.

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[SB](#): Dynamic of NomCom's internal process is fragile. NomCom in new proposal has been reduced to a mechanical group of delegations which may result in members feeling alienated and dissatisfied. Current NomCom dynamic needs to be preserved.

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[AP](#): The BWG-NomCom is correct. Current representational model is disproportionate.

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[SV](#): To be efficient, the NomCom must be able to fulfill outreach, recruitment and selection. Collegiality contributes greatly to success. If adopted, these recs. would make future NomComs less functional, less transparent, more adversarial and more political. Refine the recs. and increase communication between the BWG, current/past NomCom members and groups that select them.

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[BC](#): The BWG is devoid of experience with today's NomCom. Surprising that this review was referred to BWG. BC is concerned: the Board chooses expediency over community's expectation that bottom up processes will be employed. Consultations with GNSO, ccNSO or GAC leadership, as well as participation from stakeholders, were not included before recommending drastic structural changes to composition. No direct observation of NomCom, no essential data for a NomCom analysis. The BWG failed in meeting its responsibilities and recs. are several steps backwards from where the NomCom stands. It will make future NomComs less functional, less transparent, more adversarial, more political.

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[RySG](#): Why are major structural changes thought to be necessary? The BWG methodology and report are insufficient for the level of revisions contemplated. More thorough analysis, including possibility of a cross-constituency working group, is needed. This process could benefit from open contribution rather than filtering.

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[ISPCP](#): What is the rationale for the review? NomCom is working well. Further consideration and input are needed.

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[RG](#): Before review functionality of NomCom, need to ask whether the very structure of ICANN is still adapted to maturity level it has reached and whether it is still well equipped to face challenges. Eliminate constituency-appointed directors and give to the NomCom the task of filling all positions on the Board. Liaisons from SOs might still be needed in same way there are non-voting liaisons from some ACs. Voting directors must be without conflict of interests related to roles with nominating organizations. The consequences would be: 1) size of the Board will be independent from changes in ICANN structure; 2) NomCom will be able to plan its yearly work from scratch; 3) NomCom will have a wider choice for balancing out different needs; 4) No structural conflict of interest for Directors appointed by single constituency or body. Recruitment and nomination process need to be separate from the election process i.e. a Nominating Committee who creates slate of candidates and a separate Selecting Committee who proceeds to appointment. Former would operate in definite time slot every year while latter will remain active. Suggests leaving the power of initiating a non-confidence procedure with the Board but to let the Selecting Committee make the final decision. Consider including participants from I\*, international bodies etc in the Nominating Committee.

### Comments on Size

[JJ](#): 18 is the optimal number of participants for effective decision-making.

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[MW](#): Extending the size is costly and inefficient: 23-27 people is an assembly of stakeholders. This would lead to inability to work efficiently as a group, costs, delays, alliances and politics over performance. At a time when resources are stretched, this proposal is inappropriate.

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[CW](#): Agrees with rebalancing of composition. To correct geographical and gender balance, NomCom needs to appoint larger number of Board members.

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[SB](#): Possible inability to provide equal opportunities to all members on account of time required for deliberations of a large NomCom.

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[ETNO](#): An increase would be detrimental to efficiency of committee. Maintain current number i.e. 21.

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[SV](#): Increasing the size to a potential 27 would render the committee unmanageable. Security of information will be harder to ensure if numbers go up quite substantially.

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[BC](#): Increasing the size of NomCom turns an already burdensome process into an unworkable one.

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[ISPCP](#): An efficient NomCom cannot be larger than existing one.

#### **Comments on NomCom Improvements**

[SV](#): Recs. should take into account work undertaken by the last two Committees to reinvent the process after a difficult 2012 term. The NomCom experimented with an internal review process. The dedication of NomCom members to improve Committee and the changes implemented since 2013 do not appear in the report.

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[BC](#): Improvements accomplished by 2013 and 2014 NomComs were not reflected.

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[GNSO](#): The ongoing evolution of the NomCom has been disregarded. The creation of the chair-elect, the increased openness of the process and engaging the entire community in the nomination period are all evidence of self-improvement. It should be applauded, not discouraged.

#### **Comments on Skills/Profile**

[VS](#): Add recommendation on NomCom profile requirements.

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[MW](#): Absence of consideration given to hiring skills.

#### **Comments on Timing**

[MW](#): Put process on hold until accountability process is over; NomCom could potentially strengthen ICANN's accountability. Risk of implementing a change in the NomCom which finds itself at odds with the global review.

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[BC](#): The GNSO is undergoing a review which may lead to house structure changes.

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[RySG](#): Shouldn't significant changes to the NomCom be considered after the ICANN Accountability work is finished? Is it possible that new Board accountability mechanisms could be proposed that would change the way directors are selected.