
## Owned by an iPod

#### Maximillian Dornseif PacSec 2004



Laboratory for Dependable Distributed Systems





## Agenda

- Who we are and what we do
- Introduction to Firewire
- Demo
- Technical Details of hacking by FireWire
- Forensics by FireWire
- What to do about it





#### Who are we?

 RWTH Aachen University, Germany



Laboratory for Dependable
 Distributed Systems



Michael Becher, Maximillian
 Dornseif, Halvar Flake, Christian
 Klein



## Introduction into Firewire



#### What is Firewire?

- Developed by Apple Computers since 1985
- IEEE 1394 (1995), IEEE 1394a (2000),
   IEEE 1394b (2002).
- Marketed by Apple as Firewire or FireWire



Marketed by Sony as iLink





#### FireWire

- Serial bus, similar but more sophisticated than USB
  - Faster
  - Peer-to-Peer, needs no computer
  - More Power



## Marketplace

Apple - pushing FireWire hard:



- Since January 1999 in Desktops
- Since January 2000 in Notebooks



- September 2000 where the last non-FireWire machines shipped
- October 2001: iPod as FireWire killer-app



- Sony we'll come to that
- Others: most upper class systems come with FireWire





### FireWire by Sony

















#### Other FireWire







- GPIB-1394
- AITOURN AMERICAN AMER

- Audio
- Printers
- Scanners
- Cameras
- GPS
- Lab Equipment
- Industrial Control












## Things to come





#### Confusion









#### Demos

# Connecting different Systems

































#### Technical Details

## Unified Memoryspace

48'hFFFF_FFFF_FFFF 48'hFFFF_F000_00 <u>00</u>	CSR Space	} some Physical
48'hFFFF_EFFF_FFFF 48'hFFFF_0000_0000	Upper Address Space	
48'hFFFE_FFFF_FFFF  physicalUpperBound	Middle Address Space	
physicalUpperBound -1 48'h0000_0000_0000	Low Address Space	Physical Range

Figure 1-2 — Node Offset Map





#### OHCI

- Asynchronous functions
  - Can be used to access on-board RAM and RAM on extension cards (PCI)

physical requests - physical requests, including physical read, physical write and lock requests to some CSR registers (section 5.5), are handled directly by the Host Controller without assistance by system software." (OHCI Standard)



#### OHCI Filters

- "Asynchronous Request Filters"
   "The I394 Open HCI allows for selective access to host memory and the Asynchronous Receive Request context so that software can maintain host memory integrity. The selective access is provided by two sets of 64-bit registers: PhysRequestFilter and AsynchRequestFilter. These registers allow access to physical memory and the AR Request context on a nodeID basis." (OHCI Standard)
- PhysicalRequestFilter Registers (set and clear)
  "If an asynchronous request is received, passes the
  AsynchronousRequestFilter, and the offset is below PhysicalUpper-Bound
  (section 5.15), the sourceID of the request is used as an index into the
  PhysicalRequestFilter. If the corresponding bit in the PhysicalRequestFilter is
  set to 0, then the request shall be forwarded to the Asynchronous Receive
  Request DMA context. If however, the bit is set to 1, then the request shall be
  sent to the physical response unit." (OHCI Standard)





## Exploiting Reads

- We can read arbitrary memory locations.
   So we can:
  - Grab the Screen contents
  - Just search the memory for strings
  - Scan for possible key material
  - Parse the whole physical memory to understand logical memory layout.





## Exploiting Writes

- We can write arbitrary data to arbitrary memory location. So we can:
  - Mess up
  - Change screen content
  - Change UID/GID of a certain process
  - Inject code into a process
  - Inject an additional Process



## Forensics by Firewire



#### The forensics schism

- Unplug, do post-mortem disk-analysis
  - Misses Processes, open connections, etc.
- Gather information on the live system, afterwards do a clean shutdown and do afterwards disk-analysis
  - Contaminates evidence during the information gathering





## Live Memory Dumps

- Being able to dump the whole memory without software support would solve the schism
- Tribble is a specialized pice of hardware being able to dump physical memory via DMA transfers over the PCI bus
- If you can do the same via Firewire, you get away with a software only solution





## Forensics Challenges

- There is little experience in reconstructing logical/virtual memory from physical memory dumps
- To find open network connections etc. we have to parse a bunch of kernel structures

#### Conclusions



## Shields-Up!

- Ensure that only fully trusted devices are connected to your FireWire ports
- Press you driver/OS vendors about FireWire filtering



## Be Prepared for Forensics

- You might want to keep FireWire ports on incident prone systems at hand
  - Keep them physically secured
- Have some software ready to do memory dumps via FireWire

