



# RISC-V Cryptography Extensions Volume I

## *Scalar & Entropy Source Instructions*

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# Colophon

This document describes the Scalar Cryptography extensions to the RISC-V Instruction Set Architecture.

This document is in the [Ratified state](#). No changes are allowed. Any desired or needed changes can be the subject of a follow-on new extension. Ratified extensions are never revised. For more information, see [here](#).



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*Document Version Information:*

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See [github.com/riscv/riscv-crypto](https://github.com/riscv/riscv-crypto) for more information.

# Acknowledgments

Contributors to all versions of the specification (in alphabetical order) include:

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We are all very grateful to the huge number of other people who have helped to improve this specification through their comments, reviews, feedback and questions.

# Changelog

Version	Changes
v1.0.1	Fix typos to show that <code>c.srli</code> , <code>c.srai</code> , and <code>c.slli</code> are Zkt instructions in RV64.
v1.0.0	Initial Release

# Chapter 1. Introduction

This document describes the *scalar* cryptography extension for RISC-V. All instructions described herein use the general-purpose *X* registers, and obey the 2-read-1-write register access constraint. These instructions are designed to be lightweight and suitable for 32 and 64 bit base architectures; from embedded IoT class cores to large, application class cores which do not implement a vector unit.

This document also describes the architectural interface to an Entropy Source, which can be used to generate cryptographic secrets. This is found in [Chapter 4](#).

It also contains a mechanism allowing core implementers to provide "*Constant Time Execution*" guarantees in [Chapter 5](#).

A companion document *Volume II: Vector Instructions*, describes instruction proposals which build on the RISC-V Vector Extension. The Vector Cryptography extension is currently a work in progress waiting for the base Vector extension to stabilise. We expect to pick up this work in earnest in Q4-2021 or Q1-2022.

## 1.1. Intended Audience

Cryptography is a specialised subject, requiring people with many different backgrounds to cooperate in its secure and efficient implementation. Where possible, we have written this specification to be understandable by all, though we recognise that the motivations and references to algorithms or other specifications and standards may be unfamiliar to those who are not domain experts.

This specification anticipates being read and acted on by various people with different backgrounds. We have tried to capture these backgrounds here, with a brief explanation of what we expect them to know, and how it relates to the specification. We hope this aids people's understanding of which aspects of the specification are particularly relevant to them, and which they may (safely!) ignore or pass to a colleague.

### **Cryptographers and cryptographic software developers**

These are the people we expect to write code using the instructions in this specification. They should understand fairly obviously the motivations for the instructions we include, and be familiar with most of the algorithms and outside standards to which we refer. We expect the sections on constant time execution ([Chapter 5](#)) and the entropy source ([Chapter 4](#)) to be chiefly understood with their help.

### **Computer architects**

We do not expect architects to have a cryptography background. We nonetheless expect architects to be able to examine our instructions for implementation issues, understand how the instructions will be used in context, and advise on how best to fit the functionality the cryptographers want to the ISA interface.

### **Digital design engineers & micro-architects**

These are the people who will implement the specification inside a core. Again, no cryptography expertise is assumed, but we expect them to interpret the specification and anticipate any hardware implementation issues, e.g., where high-frequency design considerations apply, or where latency/area tradeoffs exist etc. In particular, they should be aware of the literature around efficiently implementing AES and SM4 SBoxes in hardware.

### **Verification engineers**

Responsible for ensuring the correct implementation of the extension in hardware. No cryptography background is assumed. We expect them to identify interesting test cases from the specification. An understanding of their real-world usage will help with this. We do not expect verification engineers in this sense to be experts in entropy source design or certification, since this is a very specialised area. We do expect them however to identify all of the *architectural* test cases around the entropy source interface.



These are by no means the only people concerned with the specification, but they are the ones we considered most while writing it.

## 1.2. Sail Specifications

RISC-V maintains a [formal model](#) of the ISA specification, implemented in the Sail ISA specification language [1]. Note that *Sail* refers to the specification language itself, and that there is a *model of RISC-V*, written using Sail. It is not correct to refer to "the Sail model". This is ambiguous, given there are many models of different ISAs implemented using Sail. We refer to the Sail implementation of RISC-V as "the RISC-V Sail model".

The Cryptography extension uses inline Sail code snippets from the actual model to give canonical descriptions of instruction functionality. Each instruction is accompanied by its expression in Sail, and includes calls to supporting functions which are too verbose to include directly in the specification. This supporting code is listed in [Appendix D](#). The [Sail Manual](#) is recommended reading in order to best understand the code snippets.

Note that this document contains only a subset of the formal model: refer to the formal model Github [repository](#) for the complete model.

## 1.3. Policies

In creating this proposal, we tried to adhere to the following policies:

- Where there is a choice between: 1) supporting diverse implementation strategies for an algorithm or 2) supporting a single implementation style which is more performant / less expensive; the crypto extension will pick the more constrained but performant option. This fits a common pattern in other parts of the RISC-V specification, where recommended (but not required) instruction sequences for performing particular tasks are given as an example, such that both hardware and software implementers can optimise for only a single use-case.
- The extension will be designed to support *existing* standardised cryptographic constructs well. It will not try to support proposed standards, or cryptographic constructs which exist only in academia. Cryptographic standards which are settled upon concurrently with or after the RISC-V cryptographic extension standardisation will be dealt with by future additions to, or versions of, the RISC-V cryptographic standard extension. It is anticipated that the NIST Lightweight Cryptography contest and the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography contest may be dealt with this way, depending on timescales.
- Historically, there has been some discussion [39] on how newly supported operations in general-purpose computing might enable new bases for cryptographic algorithms. The standard will not try to anticipate new useful low-level operations which *may* be useful as building blocks for future cryptographic constructs.
- Regarding side-channel countermeasures: Where relevant, proposed instructions must aim to remove the possibility of any timing side-channels. For side-channels based on power or electro-magnetic (EM) measurements, the extension will not aim to support countermeasures which are implemented above the ISA abstraction layer. Recommendations will be given where relevant on how micro-architectures can implement instructions in a power/EM side-channel resistant way.

## Chapter 2. Extensions Overview

The group of extensions introduced by the Scalar Cryptography Instruction Set Extension is listed here.

Detection of individual cryptography extensions uses the unified software-based RISC-V discovery method.



At the time of writing, these discovery mechanisms are still a work in progress.

### *A note on extension rationale*



Specialist encryption and decryption instructions are separated into different functional groups because some use cases (e.g., Galois/Counter Mode in TLS 1.3) do not require decryption functionality.

The NIST and ShangMi algorithms suites are separated because their usefulness is heavily dependent on the countries a device is expected to operate in. NIST ciphers are a part of most standardised internet protocols, while ShangMi ciphers are required for use in China.

### 2.1. Zbkb - Bitmanip instructions for Cryptography

These are a subset of the Bitmanipulation Extension Zbb which are particularly useful for Cryptography.



Some of these instructions are defined in the first Bitmanip ratification package, and some are not ( [pack](#), [packh](#), [packw](#), [brev8](#), [zip](#), [unzip](#)). All of the instructions in Zbkb have their complete specification included in this document, including those *not* present in the initial Bitmanip ratification package. This is to make the present specification complete as a standalone document. Inevitably there might be small divergences between the Bitmanip and Scalar Cryptography specification documents as they move at different paces. When this happens, assume that the Bitmanip specification has the most up-to-date version of Bitmanip instructions. This is an unfortunate but necessary stop-gap while Scalar Cryptography and Bitmanip are being rapidly iterated on prior to public review.

RV32	RV64	Mnemonic	Instruction
✓	✓	ror	Rotate right (Register)
✓	✓	rol	Rotate left (Register)
✓	✓	rori	Rotate right (Immediate)
	✓	rorw	Rotate right Word (Register)
	✓	rolw	Rotate Left Word (Register)
	✓	roriw	Rotate right Word (Immediate)
✓	✓	andn	AND with inverted operand
✓	✓	orn	OR with inverted operand
✓	✓	xnor	Exclusive NOR
✓	✓	pack	Pack low halves of registers
✓	✓	packh	Pack low bytes of registers
	✓	packw	Pack low 16-bits of registers (RV64)

RV32	RV64	Mnemonic	Instruction
✓	✓	brev8	<a href="#">Reverse bits in bytes</a>
✓	✓	rev8	<a href="#">Byte-reverse register</a>
✓		zip	<a href="#">Zip</a>
✓		unzip	<a href="#">Unzip</a>

## 2.2. Zbkc - Carry-less multiply instructions

Constant time carry-less multiply for Galois/Counter Mode. These are separated from the [Zbkb](#) because they have a considerable implementation overhead which cannot be amortised across other instructions.



These instructions are defined in the first Bitmanip ratification package for the [Zbc](#) extension. All of the instructions in [Zbkc](#) have their complete specification included in this document, including those *not* present in the initial Bitmanip ratification package. This is to make the present specification complete as a standalone document. Inevitably there might be small divergences between the Bitmanip and Scalar Cryptography specification documents as they move at different paces. When this happens, assume that the Bitmanip specification has the most up-to-date version of Bitmanip instructions. This is an unfortunate but necessary stop-gap while Scalar Cryptography and Bitmanip are being rapidly iterated on prior to public review.

RV32	RV64	Mnemonic	Instruction
✓	✓	clmul	<a href="#">Carry-less multiply (low-part)</a>
✓	✓	clmulh	<a href="#">Carry-less multiply (high-part)</a>

## 2.3. Zbkx - Crossbar permutation instructions

These instructions are useful for implementing SBoxes in constant time, and potentially with DPA protections. These are separated from the [Zbkb](#) because they have an implementation overhead which cannot be amortised across other instructions.



All of these instructions are missing from the first Bitmanip ratification package. Hence, all of the instructions in [Zbkx](#) have their complete specification included in this document. This is to make the present specification complete as a standalone document. Inevitably there might be small divergences between the Bitmanip and Scalar Cryptography specification documents as they move at different paces. When this happens, assume that the Bitmanip specification has the most up-to-date version of Bitmanip instructions. This is an unfortunate but necessary stop-gap while Scalar Cryptography and Bitmanip are being rapidly iterated on prior to public review.

RV32	RV64	Mnemonic	Instruction
✓	✓	xperm8	<a href="#">Crossbar permutation (bytes)</a>
✓	✓	xperm4	<a href="#">Crossbar permutation (nibbles)</a>

## 2.4. Zknd - NIST Suite: AES Decryption

Instructions for accelerating the decryption and key-schedule functions of the AES block cipher.

RV32	RV64	Mnemonic	Instruction
✓		aes32dsi	AES final round decrypt (RV32)
✓		aes32dsmi	AES middle round decrypt (RV32)
	✓	aes64ds	AES decrypt final round (RV64)
	✓	aes64dsm	AES decrypt middle round (RV64)
	✓	aes64im	AES Decrypt KeySchedule MixColumns (RV64)
	✓	aes64ks1i	AES Key Schedule Instruction 1 (RV64)
	✓	aes64ks2	AES Key Schedule Instruction 2 (RV64)



The [AES Key Schedule Instruction 1 \(RV64\)](#) and [AES Key Schedule Instruction 2 \(RV64\)](#) instructions are present in both the [Zknd](#) and [Zkne](#) extensions.

## 2.5. Zkne - NIST Suite: AES Encryption

Instructions for accelerating the encryption and key-schedule functions of the AES block cipher.

RV32	RV64	Mnemonic	Instruction
✓		aes32esi	AES final round encrypt (RV32)
✓		aes32esmi	AES middle round encrypt (RV32)
	✓	aes64es	AES encrypt final round instruction (RV64)
	✓	aes64esm	AES encrypt middle round instruction (RV64)
	✓	aes64ks1i	AES Key Schedule Instruction 1 (RV64)
	✓	aes64ks2	AES Key Schedule Instruction 2 (RV64)



The [aes64ks1i](#) and [aes64ks2](#) instructions are present in both the [Zknd](#) and [Zkne](#) extensions.

## 2.6. Zknh - NIST Suite: Hash Function Instructions

Instructions for accelerating the SHA2 family of cryptographic hash functions, as specified in [49].

RV32	RV64	Mnemonic	Instruction
✓	✓	sha256sig0	SHA2-256 Sigma0 instruction
✓	✓	sha256sig1	SHA2-256 Sigma1 instruction
✓	✓	sha256sum0	SHA2-256 Sum0 instruction
✓	✓	sha256sum1	SHA2-256 Sum1 instruction

RV32	RV64	Mnemonic	Instruction
✓		sha512sig0h	SHA2-512 Sigma0 high (RV32)
✓		sha512sig0l	SHA2-512 Sigma0 low (RV32)
✓		sha512sig1h	SHA2-512 Sigma1 high (RV32)
✓		sha512sig1l	SHA2-512 Sigma1 low (RV32)
✓		sha512sum0r	SHA2-512 Sum0 (RV32)
✓		sha512sum1r	SHA2-512 Sum1 (RV32)
	✓	sha512sig0	SHA2-512 Sigma0 instruction (RV64)
	✓	sha512sig1	SHA2-512 Sigma1 instruction (RV64)
	✓	sha512sum0	SHA2-512 Sum0 instruction (RV64)
	✓	sha512sum1	SHA2-512 Sum1 instruction (RV64)

## 2.7. Zksed - ShangMi Suite: SM4 Block Cipher Instructions

Instructions for accelerating the SM4 Block Cipher. Note that unlike AES, this cipher uses the same core operation for encryption and decryption, hence there is only one extension for it.

RV32	RV64	Mnemonic	Instruction
✓	✓	sm4ed	SM4 Encrypt/Decrypt Instruction
✓	✓	sm4ks	SM4 Key Schedule Instruction

## 2.8. Zksh - ShangMi Suite: SM3 Hash Function Instructions

Instructions for accelerating the SM3 hash function.

RV32	RV64	Mnemonic	Instruction
✓	✓	sm3p0	SM3 P0 transform
✓	✓	sm3p1	SM3 P1 transform

## 2.9. Zkr - Entropy Source Extension

The entropy source extension defines the `seed` CSR at address `0x015`. This CSR provides up to 16 physical `entropy` bits that can be used to seed cryptographic random bit generators.

See [Chapter 4](#) for the normative specification and access control notes. [Appendix B](#) contains design rationale and further recommendations to implementers.

## 2.10. Zkn - NIST Algorithm Suite

This extension is shorthand for the following set of other extensions:

Included Extension	Description
Zbkb	Bitmanipulation instructions for cryptography.
Zbkc	Carry-less multiply instructions.
Zbkx	Cross-bar Permutation instructions.
Zkne	AES encryption instructions.
Zknd	AES decryption instructions.
Zknh	SHA2 hash function instructions.

A core which implements **Zkn** must implement all of the above extensions.

## 2.11. Zks - ShangMi Algorithm Suite

This extension is shorthand for the following set of other extensions:

Included Extension	Description
Zbkb	Bitmanipulation instructions for cryptography.
Zbkc	Carry-less multiply instructions.
Zbkx	Cross-bar Permutation instructions.
Zksed	SM4 block cipher instructions.
Zksh	SM3 hash function instructions.

A core which implements **Zks** must implement all of the above extensions.

## 2.12. Zk - Standard scalar cryptography extension

This extension is shorthand for the following set of other extensions:

Included Extension	Description
Zkn	NIST Algorithm suite extension.
Zkr	Entropy Source extension.
Zkt	Data independent execution latency extension.

A core which implements **Zk** must implement all of the above extensions.

## 2.13. Zkt - Data Independent Execution Latency

This extension allows CPU implementers to indicate to cryptographic software developers that a subset of RISC-V instructions are guaranteed to be implemented such that their execution latency is independent of the data values they operate on. A complete description of this extension is found in [Chapter 5](#).











## 3.5. aes64ds

### Synopsis

AES final round decryption instruction for RV64.

### Mnemonic

aes64ds rd, rs1, rs2

### Encoding

31	30	29		25	24		20	19		15	14	12	11		7	6		0						
0	0	1	1	1	0	1		rs2		rs1		0	0	0		rd		0	1	1	0	0	1	1

### Description

Uses the two 64-bit source registers to represent the entire AES state, and produces *half* of the next round output, applying the Inverse ShiftRows and SubBytes steps. This instruction must *always* be implemented such that its execution latency does not depend on the data being operated on.

#### Note To Software Developers

The following code snippet shows the final round of the AES block decryption. `t0` and `t1` hold the current round state. `t2` and `t3` hold the next round state.



```
aes64ds t2, t0, t1
aes64ds t3, t1, t0
```

Note the reversed register order of the second instruction.

### Operation

```
function clause execute (AES64DS(rs2, rs1, rd)) = {
  let sr : bits(64) = aes_rv64_shiftrows_inv(X(rs2)[63..0], X(rs1)[63..0]);
  let wd : bits(64) = sr[63..0];
  X(rd) = aes_apply_inv_sbox_to_each_byte(wd);
  RETIRE_SUCCESS
}
```

### Included in

Extension	Minimum version	Lifecycle state
<a href="#">Zknd</a> (RV64)	v1.0.0	Frozen
<a href="#">Zkn</a> (RV64)	v1.0.0	Frozen
<a href="#">Zk</a> (RV64)	v1.0.0	Frozen

## 3.6. aes64dsm

### Synopsis

AES middle round decryption instruction for RV64.

### Mnemonic

aes64dsm rd, rs1, rs2

### Encoding

31	30	29		25	24		20	19		15	14	12	11		7	6		0						
0	0	1	1	1	1	1		rs2		rs1		0	0	0		rd		0	1	1	0	0	1	1

### Description

Uses the two 64-bit source registers to represent the entire AES state, and produces *half* of the next round output, applying the Inverse ShiftRows, SubBytes and MixColumns steps. This instruction must *always* be implemented such that its execution latency does not depend on the data being operated on.

#### Note To Software Developers

The following code snippet shows one middle round of the AES block decryption. **t0** and **t1** hold the current round state. **t2** and **t3** hold the next round state.



```
aes64dsm t2, t0, t1
aes64dsm t3, t1, t0
```

Note the reversed register order of the second instruction.

### Operation

```
function clause execute (AES64DSM(rs2, rs1, rd)) = {
  let sr : bits(64) = aes_rv64_shiftrows_inv(X(rs2)[63..0], X(rs1)[63..0]);
  let wd : bits(64) = sr[63..0];
  let sb : bits(64) = aes_apply_inv_sbox_to_each_byte(wd);
  X(rd) = aes_mixcolumn_inv(sb[63..32]) @ aes_mixcolumn_inv(sb[31..0]);
  RETIRE_SUCCESS
}
```

### Included in

Extension	Minimum version	Lifecycle state
<a href="#">Zknd</a> (RV64)	v1.0.0	Frozen
<a href="#">Zkn</a> (RV64)	v1.0.0	Frozen
<a href="#">Zk</a> (RV64)	v1.0.0	Frozen

## 3.7. aes64es

### Synopsis

AES final round encryption instruction for RV64.

### Mnemonic

aes64es rd, rs1, rs2

### Encoding

31	30	29		25	24		20	19		15	14	12	11		7	6		0						
0	0	1	1	0	0	1		rs2		rs1		0	0	0		rd		0	1	1	0	0	1	1

### Description

Uses the two 64-bit source registers to represent the entire AES state, and produces *half* of the next round output, applying the ShiftRows and SubBytes steps. This instruction must *always* be implemented such that its execution latency does not depend on the data being operated on.

#### Note To Software Developers

The following code snippet shows the final round of the AES block encryption. `t0` and `t1` hold the current round state. `t2` and `t3` hold the next round state.



```
aes64es t2, t0, t1
aes64es t3, t1, t0
```

Note the reversed register order of the second instruction.

### Operation

```
function clause execute (AES64ES(rs2, rs1, rd)) = {
  let sr : bits(64) = aes_rv64_shiftrows_fwd(X(rs2)[63..0], X(rs1)[63..0]);
  let wd : bits(64) = sr[63..0];
  X(rd) = aes_apply_fwd_sbox_to_each_byte(wd);
  RETIRE_SUCCESS
}
```

### Included in

Extension	Minimum version	Lifecycle state
<a href="#">Zkne</a> (RV64)	v1.0.0	Frozen
<a href="#">Zkn</a> (RV64)	v1.0.0	Frozen
<a href="#">Zk</a> (RV64)	v1.0.0	Frozen



## 3.9. aes64im


### Synopsis

This instruction accelerates the inverse MixColumns step of the AES Block Cipher, and is used to aid creation of the decryption KeySchedule.

### Mnemonic

aes64im rd, rs1

### Encoding



### Description

The instruction applies the inverse MixColumns transformation to two columns of the state array, packed into a single 64-bit register. It is used to create the inverse cipher KeySchedule, according to the equivalent inverse cipher construction in [47] (Page 23, Section 5.3.5). This instruction must *always* be implemented such that its execution latency does not depend on the data being operated on.

### Operation

```
function clause execute (AES64IM(rs1, rd)) = {
  let w0 : bits(32) = aes_mixcolumn_inv(X(rs1)[31.. 0]);
  let w1 : bits(32) = aes_mixcolumn_inv(X(rs1)[63..32]);
  X(rd) = w1 @ w0;
  RETIRE_SUCCESS
}
```

### Included in

Extension	Minimum version	Lifecycle state
Zknd (RV64)	v1.0.0	Frozen
Zkn (RV64)	v1.0.0	Frozen
Zk (RV64)	v1.0.0	Frozen

## 3.10. aes64ks1i


### Synopsis

This instruction implements part of the KeySchedule operation for the AES Block cipher involving the SBox operation.

### Mnemonic

aes64ks1i rd, rs1, rnum

### Encoding



### Description

This instruction implements the rotation, SubBytes and Round Constant addition steps of the AES block cipher Key Schedule. This instruction must *always* be implemented such that its execution latency does not depend on the data being operated on. Note that `rnum` must be in the range `0x0..0xA`. The values `0xB..0xF` are reserved.

### Operation

```
function clause execute (AES64KS1I(rnum, rs1, rd)) = {
  if(unsigned(rnum) > 10) then {
    handle_illegal(); RETIRE_SUCCESS
  } else {
    let tmp1 : bits(32) = X(rs1)[63..32];
    let rc    : bits(32) = aes_decode_rcon(rnum); /* round number -> round constant
    */
    let tmp2 : bits(32) = if (rnum == 0xA) then tmp1 else ror32(tmp1, 8);
    let tmp3 : bits(32) = aes_subword_fwd(tmp2);
    let result : bits(64) = (tmp3 ^ rc) @ (tmp3 ^ rc);
    X(rd) = EXTZ(result);
    RETIRE_SUCCESS
  }
}
```

### Included in

Extension	Minimum version	Lifecycle state
<a href="#">Zkne</a> (RV64)	v1.0.0	Frozen
<a href="#">Zknd</a> (RV64)	v1.0.0	Frozen
<a href="#">Zkn</a> (RV64)	v1.0.0	Frozen
<a href="#">Zk</a> (RV64)	v1.0.0	Frozen



## 3.11. aes64ks2

### Synopsis

This instruction implements part of the KeySchedule operation for the AES Block cipher.

### Mnemonic

aes64ks2 rd, rs1, rs2

### Encoding

31	30	29		25	24		20	19		15	14	12	11		7	6		0						
0	1	1	1	1	1	1		rs2		rs1		0	0	0		rd		0	1	1	0	0	1	1

### Description

This instruction implements the additional XOR'ing of key words as part of the AES block cipher Key Schedule. This instruction must *always* be implemented such that its execution latency does not depend on the data being operated on.

### Operation

```
function clause execute (AES64KS2(rs2, rs1, rd)) = {
  let w0 : bits(32) = X(rs1)[63..32] ^ X(rs2)[31..0];
  let w1 : bits(32) = X(rs1)[63..32] ^ X(rs2)[31..0] ^ X(rs2)[63..32];
  X(rd) = w1 @ w0;
  RETIRE_SUCCESS
}
```

### Included in

Extension	Minimum version	Lifecycle state
<a href="#">Zkne</a> (RV64)	v1.0.0	Frozen
<a href="#">Zknd</a> (RV64)	v1.0.0	Frozen
<a href="#">Zkn</a> (RV64)	v1.0.0	Frozen
<a href="#">Zk</a> (RV64)	v1.0.0	Frozen

## 3.12. andn


### Synopsis

AND with inverted operand

### Mnemonic

andn *rd*, *rs1*, *rs2*

### Encoding



### Description

This instruction performs the bitwise logical AND operation between *rs1* and the bitwise inversion of *rs2*.

### Operation

$$X(rd) = X(rs1) \& \sim X(rs2);$$

### Included in

Extension	Minimum version	Lifecycle state
Zbb ([zbb])	v1.0.0	Frozen
Zbkb (Zbkb)	v1.0.0-rc4	Frozen



## 3.14. ctmul


### Synopsis

Carry-less multiply (low-part)

### Mnemonic

ctmul *rd, rs1, rs2*

### Encoding



### Description

ctmul produces the lower half of the 2·XLEN carry-less product.

### Operation

```

let rs1_val = X(rs1);
let rs2_val = X(rs2);
let output : xlenbits = 0;

foreach (i from 0 to xlen by 1) {
    output = if ((rs2_val >> i) & 1)
        then output ^ (rs1_val << i);
        else output;
}

X[rd] = output

```

### Included in

Extension	Minimum version	Lifecycle state
Zbc ([zbc])	v1.0.0	Frozen
Zbkc (Zbkc)	v1.0.0-rc4	Frozen

## 3.15. ctmulh


### Synopsis

Carry-less multiply (high-part)

### Mnemonic

ctmulh *rd, rs1, rs2*

### Encoding



### Description

ctmulh produces the upper half of the 2·XLEN carry-less product.

### Operation

```

let rs1_val = X(rs1);
let rs2_val = X(rs2);
let output : xlenbits = 0;

foreach (i from 1 to xlen by 1) {
    output = if ((rs2_val >> i) & 1)
        then output ^ (rs1_val >> (xlen - i));
        else output;
}

X[rd] = output

```

### Included in

Extension	Minimum version	Lifecycle state
Zbc ([zbc])	v1.0.0	Frozen
Zbkc (Zbkc)	v1.0.0-rc4	Frozen

## 3.16. orn


### Synopsis

OR with inverted operand

### Mnemonic

orn *rd*, *rs1*, *rs2*

### Encoding



### Description

This instruction performs the bitwise logical OR operation between *rs1* and the bitwise inversion of *rs2*.

### Operation

$$X(rd) = X(rs1) \mid \sim X(rs2);$$

### Included in

Extension	Minimum version	Lifecycle state
Zbb ( <a href="#">[zbb]</a> )	v1.0.0	Frozen
Zbkb ( <a href="#">[zbkb]</a> )	v1.0.0-rc4	Frozen

## 3.17. pack


### Synopsis

Pack the low halves of *rs1* and *rs2* into *rd*.

### Mnemonic

pack *rd*, *rs1*, *rs2*

### Encoding



### Description

The pack instruction packs the XLEN/2-bit lower halves of *rs1* and *rs2* into *rd*, with *rs1* in the lower half and *rs2* in the upper half.

### Operation

```
let lo_half : bits(xlen/2) = X(rs1)[xlen/2-1..0];
let hi_half : bits(xlen/2) = X(rs2)[xlen/2-1..0];
X(rd) = EXTZ(hi_half @ lo_half);
```

### Included in

Extension	Minimum version	Lifecycle state
Zbkb ( <a href="#">Zbkb</a> )	v1.0.0-rc4	Frozen

## 3.18. packh


### Synopsis

Pack the low bytes of *rs1* and *rs2* into *rd*.

### Mnemonic

packh *rd*, *rs1*, *rs2*

### Encoding



### Description

And the packh instruction packs the least-significant bytes of *rs1* and *rs2* into the 16 least-significant bits of *rd*, zero extending the rest of *rd*.

### Operation

```
let lo_half : bits(8) = X(rs1)[7..0];
let hi_half : bits(8) = X(rs2)[7..0];
X(rd) = EXTZ(hi_half @ lo_half);
```

### Included in

Extension	Minimum version	Lifecycle state
Zbkb ( <a href="#">Zbkb</a> )	v1.0.0-rc4	Frozen



## 3.19. packw


### Synopsis

Pack the low 16-bits of *rs1* and *rs2* into *rd* on RV64.

### Mnemonic

packw *rd*, *rs1*, *rs2*

### Encoding



### Description

This instruction packs the low 16 bits of *rs1* and *rs2* into the 32 least-significant bits of *rd*, sign extending the 32-bit result to the rest of *rd*. This instruction only exists on RV64 based systems.

### Operation

```
let lo_half : bits(16) = X(rs1)[15..0];
let hi_half : bits(16) = X(rs2)[15..0];
X(rd) = EXTS(hi_half @ lo_half);
```

### Included in

Extension	Minimum version	Lifecycle state
Zbkb ( <a href="#">Zbkb</a> )	v1.0.0-rc4	Frozen

## 3.20. rev8


### Synopsis

Byte-reverse register


### Mnemonic

rev8 *rd, rs*

### Encoding (RV32)



### Encoding (RV64)



### Description

This instruction reverses the order of the bytes in *rs*.



This instruction is a specific encoding of a more generic instruction which was originally proposed as part of the RISC-V Bitmanip extension ([grevi](#)). Eventually, the more generic instruction may be standardised. Until then, only the most common instances of it, such as this, are being included in specifications.

### Operation

```
let input = X(rs);
let output : xlenbits = 0;
let j = xlen - 1;

foreach (i from 0 to (xlen - 8) by 8) {
    output[i..(i + 7)] = input[(j - 7)..j];
    j = j - 8;
}

X[rd] = output
```



#### Software Hint

The byte-reverse operation is only available for the full register width. To emulate word-sized and halfword-sized byte-reversal, perform a `rev8 rd,rs` followed by a `srai rd,rd`.

### Included in

Extension	Minimum version	Lifecycle state
Zbb ([zbb])	v1.0.0	Frozen
Zbkb (Zbkb)	v1.0.0-rc4	Frozen

## 3.21. rol


### Synopsis

Rotate Left (Register)

### Mnemonic

rol *rd*, *rs1*, *rs2*

### Encoding



### Description

This instruction performs a rotate left of *rs1* by the amount in least-significant  $\log_2(\text{XLEN})$  bits of *rs2*.

### Operation

```
let shamt = if xlen == 32
             then X(rs2)[4..0]
             else X(rs2)[5..0];
let result = (X(rs1) << shamt) | (X(rs1) >> (xlen - shamt));

X(rd) = result;
```

### Included in

Extension	Minimum version	Lifecycle state
Zbb ([zbb])	v1.0.0	Frozen
Zbkb (Zbkb)	v1.0.0-rc4	Frozen

## 3.22. rolw


### Synopsis

Rotate Left Word (Register)

### Mnemonic

rolw *rd*, *rs1*, *rs2*

### Encoding



### Description

This instruction performs a rotate left on the least-significant word of *rs1* by the amount in least-significant 5 bits of *rs2*. The resulting word value is sign-extended by copying bit 31 to all of the more-significant bits.

### Operation

```
let rs1 = EXTZ(X(rs1)[31..0])
let shamt = X(rs2)[4..0];
let result = (rs1 << shamt) | (rs1 >> (32 - shamt));
X(rd) = EXTS(result);
```

### Included in

Extension	Minimum version	Lifecycle state
Zbb ([zbb])	v1.0.0	Frozen
Zbkb (Zbkb)	v1.0.0-rc4	Frozen

## 3.23. ror


### Synopsis

Rotate Right

### Mnemonic

ror *rd*, *rs1*, *rs2*

### Encoding



### Description

This instruction performs a rotate right of *rs1* by the amount in least-significant  $\log_2(\text{XLEN})$  bits of *rs2*.

### Operation

```
let shamt = if xlen == 32
             then X(rs2)[4..0]
             else X(rs2)[5..0];
let result = (X(rs1) >> shamt) | (X(rs1) << (xlen - shamt));

X(rd) = result;
```

### Included in

Extension	Minimum version	Lifecycle state
Zbb ([zbb])	v1.0.0	Frozen
Zbkb (Zbkb)	v1.0.0-rc4	Frozen

## 3.24. rori


### Synopsis

Rotate Right (Immediate)


### Mnemonic

*rori rd, rs1, shamt*

### Encoding (RV32)



### Encoding (RV64)



### Description

This instruction performs a rotate right of *rs1* by the amount in the least-significant  $\log_2(\text{XLEN})$  bits of *shamt*. For RV32, the encodings corresponding to *shamt*[5]=1 are reserved.

### Operation

```
let shamt = if xlen == 32
             then shamt[4..0]
             else shamt[5..0];
let result = (X(rs1) >> shamt) | (X(rs1) << (xlen - shamt));

X(rd) = result;
```

### Included in

Extension	Minimum version	Lifecycle state
Zbb ([zbb])	v1.0.0	Frozen
Zbkb (Zbkb)	v1.0.0-rc4	Frozen

## 3.25. roriw


### Synopsis

Rotate Right Word by Immediate

### Mnemonic

roriw *rd, rs1, shamt*

### Encoding



### Description

This instruction performs a rotate right on the least-significant word of *rs1* by the amount in the least-significant  $\log_2(\text{XLEN})$  bits of *shamt*. The resulting word value is sign-extended by copying bit 31 to all of the more-significant bits.

### Operation

```
let rs1_data = EXTZ(X(rs1)[31..0]);
let result = (rs1_data >> shamt[4..0]) | (rs1_data << (32 - shamt[4..0]));
X(rd) = EXTS(result[31..0]);
```

### Included in

Extension	Minimum version	Lifecycle state
Zbb ([zbb])	v1.0.0	Frozen
Zbkb (Zbkb)	v1.0.0-rc4	Frozen

## 3.26. rorw


### Synopsis

Rotate Right Word (Register)

### Mnemonic

rorw *rd, rs1, rs2*

### Encoding



### Description

This instruction performs a rotate right on the least-significant word of *rs1* by the amount in least-significant 5 bits of *rs2*. The resultant word is sign-extended by copying bit 31 to all of the more-significant bits.

### Operation

```
let rs1 = EXTZ(X(rs1)[31..0])
let shamt = X(rs2)[4..0];
let result = (rs1 >> shamt) | (rs1 << (32 - shamt));
X(rd) = EXTS(result);
```

### Included in

Extension	Minimum version	Lifecycle state
Zbb ( <a href="#">[zbb]</a> )	v1.0.0	Frozen
Zbkb ( <a href="#">Zbkb</a> )	v1.0.0-rc4	Frozen



## 3.27. sha256sig0

### Synopsis

Implements the Sigma0 transformation function as used in the SHA2-256 hash function [49] (Section 4.1.2).

### Mnemonic

sha256sig0 rd, rs1

### Encoding

31	30	29		25	24		20	19		15	14		12	11		7	6		0							
0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0		rs1		0	0	1		rd		0	0	1	0	0	1	1

### Description

This instruction is supported for both RV32 and RV64 base architectures. For RV32, the entire **XLEN** source register is operated on. For RV64, the low **32** bits of the source register are operated on, and the result sign extended to **XLEN** bits. Though named for SHA2-256, the instruction works for both the SHA2-224 and SHA2-256 parameterisations as described in [49]. This instruction must *always* be implemented such that its execution latency does not depend on the data being operated on.

### Operation

```
function clause execute (SHA256SIG0(rs1,rd)) = {
  let inb      : bits(32) = X(rs1)[31..0];
  let result   : bits(32) = ror32(inb, 7) ^ ror32(inb, 18) ^ (inb >> 3);
  X(rd)       = EXTS(result);
  RETIRE_SUCCESS
}
```

### Included in

Extension	Minimum version	Lifecycle state
<a href="#">Zknh</a>	v1.0.0	Frozen
<a href="#">Zkn</a>	v1.0.0	Frozen
<a href="#">Zk</a>	v1.0.0	Frozen

## 3.28. sha256sig1

### Synopsis

Implements the Sigma1 transformation function as used in the SHA2-256 hash function [49] (Section 4.1.2).

### Mnemonic

sha256sig1 rd, rs1

### Encoding

31	30	29		25	24		20	19		15	14	12	11		7	6		0								
0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1		rs1		0	0	1		rd		0	0	1	0	0	1	1

### Description

This instruction is supported for both RV32 and RV64 base architectures. For RV32, the entire **XLEN** source register is operated on. For RV64, the low **32** bits of the source register are operated on, and the result sign extended to **XLEN** bits. Though named for SHA2-256, the instruction works for both the SHA2-224 and SHA2-256 parameterisations as described in [49]. This instruction must *always* be implemented such that its execution latency does not depend on the data being operated on.

### Operation

```
function clause execute (SHA256SIG1(rs1,rd)) = {
  let inb      : bits(32) = X(rs1)[31..0];
  let result   : bits(32) = ror32(inb, 17) ^ ror32(inb, 19) ^ (inb >> 10);
  X(rd)       = EXTS(result);
  RETIRE_SUCCESS
}
```

### Included in

Extension	Minimum version	Lifecycle state
Zknh	v1.0.0	Frozen
Zkn	v1.0.0	Frozen
Zk	v1.0.0	Frozen

## 3.29. sha256sum0

### Synopsis

Implements the Sum0 transformation function as used in the SHA2-256 hash function [49] (Section 4.1.2).

### Mnemonic

sha256sum0 rd, rs1

### Encoding

31	30	29		25	24		20	19		15	14	12	11		7	6		0					
0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1		rd		0	0	1	0	0	1	1

### Description

This instruction is supported for both RV32 and RV64 base architectures. For RV32, the entire **XLEN** source register is operated on. For RV64, the low **32** bits of the source register are operated on, and the result sign extended to **XLEN** bits. Though named for SHA2-256, the instruction works for both the SHA2-224 and SHA2-256 parameterisations as described in [49]. This instruction must *always* be implemented such that its execution latency does not depend on the data being operated on.

### Operation

```
function clause execute (SHA256SUM0(rs1,rd)) = {
  let inb      : bits(32) = X(rs1)[31..0];
  let result   : bits(32) = ror32(inb,  2) ^ ror32(inb, 13) ^ ror32(inb, 22);
  X(rd)       = EXTS(result);
  RETIRE_SUCCESS
}
```

### Included in

Extension	Minimum version	Lifecycle state
Zknh	v1.0.0	Frozen
Zkn	v1.0.0	Frozen
Zk	v1.0.0	Frozen

## 3.30. sha256sum1

### Synopsis

Implements the Sum1 transformation function as used in the SHA2-256 hash function [49] (Section 4.1.2).

### Mnemonic

sha256sum1 rd, rs1

### Encoding

31	30	29		25	24		20	19		15	14	12	11		7	6		0								
0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1		rs1		0	0	1		rd		0	0	1	0	0	1	1

### Description

This instruction is supported for both RV32 and RV64 base architectures. For RV32, the entire **XLEN** source register is operated on. For RV64, the low **32** bits of the source register are operated on, and the result sign extended to **XLEN** bits. Though named for SHA2-256, the instruction works for both the SHA2-224 and SHA2-256 parameterisations as described in [49]. This instruction must *always* be implemented such that its execution latency does not depend on the data being operated on.

### Operation

```
function clause execute (SHA256SUM1(rs1,rd)) = {
  let inb      : bits(32) = X(rs1)[31..0];
  let result   : bits(32) = ror32(inb, 6) ^ ror32(inb, 11) ^ ror32(inb, 25);
  X(rd)       = EXTS(result);
  RETIRE_SUCCESS
}
```

### Included in

Extension	Minimum version	Lifecycle state
<a href="#">Zknh</a>	v1.0.0	Frozen
<a href="#">Zkn</a>	v1.0.0	Frozen
<a href="#">Zk</a>	v1.0.0	Frozen

## 3.31. sha512sig0h


### Synopsis

Implements the *high half* of the Sigma0 transformation, as used in the SHA2-512 hash function [49] (Section 4.1.3).

### Mnemonic

sha512sig0h rd, rs1, rs2

### Encoding



### Description

This instruction is implemented on RV32 only. Used to compute the Sigma0 transform of the SHA2-512 hash function in conjunction with the `sha512sig0l` instruction. The transform is a 64-bit to 64-bit function, so the input and output are each represented by two 32-bit registers. This instruction must *always* be implemented such that its execution latency does not depend on the data being operated on.

#### Note to software developers

The entire Sigma0 transform for SHA2-512 may be computed on RV32 using the following instruction sequence:



```
sha512sig0l    t0, a0, a1
sha512sig0h    t1, a1, a0
```

### Operation

```
function clause execute (SHA512SIG0H(rs2, rs1, rd)) = {
    X(rd) = EXTS((X(rs1) >> 1) ^ (X(rs1) >> 7) ^ (X(rs1) >> 8) ^
                (X(rs2) << 31) ^ (X(rs2) << 24) );
    RETIRE_SUCCESS
}
```

### Included in

Extension	Minimum version	Lifecycle state
<a href="#">Zknh</a> (RV32)	v1.0.0	Frozen
<a href="#">Zkn</a> (RV32)	v1.0.0	Frozen
<a href="#">Zk</a> (RV32)	v1.0.0	Frozen

## 3.32. sha512sig0l


### Synopsis

Implements the *low half* of the Sigma0 transformation, as used in the SHA2-512 hash function [49] (Section 4.1.3).

### Mnemonic

sha512sig0l rd, rs1, rs2

### Encoding



### Description

This instruction is implemented on RV32 only. Used to compute the Sigma0 transform of the SHA2-512 hash function in conjunction with the `sha512sig0h` instruction. The transform is a 64-bit to 64-bit function, so the input and output are each represented by two 32-bit registers. This instruction must *always* be implemented such that its execution latency does not depend on the data being operated on.

#### Note to software developers

The entire Sigma0 transform for SHA2-512 may be computed on RV32 using the following instruction sequence:



```
sha512sig0l    t0, a0, a1
sha512sig0h    t1, a1, a0
```

### Operation

```
function clause execute (SHA512SIG0L(rs2, rs1, rd)) = {
    X(rd) = EXTS((X(rs1) >> 1) ^ (X(rs1) >> 7) ^ (X(rs1) >> 8) ^
                (X(rs2) << 31) ^ (X(rs2) << 25) ^ (X(rs2) << 24) );
    RETIRE_SUCCESS
}
```

### Included in

Extension	Minimum version	Lifecycle state
<a href="#">Zknh</a> (RV32)	v1.0.0	Frozen
<a href="#">Zkn</a> (RV32)	v1.0.0	Frozen
<a href="#">Zk</a> (RV32)	v1.0.0	Frozen

## 3.33. sha512sig1h


### Synopsis

Implements the *high half* of the Sigma1 transformation, as used in the SHA2-512 hash function [49] (Section 4.1.3).

### Mnemonic

sha512sig1h rd, rs1, rs2

### Encoding



### Description

This instruction is implemented on RV32 only. Used to compute the Sigma1 transform of the SHA2-512 hash function in conjunction with the `sha512sig1l` instruction. The transform is a 64-bit to 64-bit function, so the input and output are each represented by two 32-bit registers. This instruction must *always* be implemented such that its execution latency does not depend on the data being operated on.



#### Note to software developers

The entire Sigma1 transform for SHA2-512 may be computed on RV32 using the following instruction sequence:

```
sha512sig1l    t0, a0, a1
sha512sig1h    t1, a1, a0
```

### Operation

```
function clause execute (SHA512SIG1H(rs2, rs1, rd)) = {
    X(rd) = EXTS((X(rs1) << 3) ^ (X(rs1) >> 6) ^ (X(rs1) >> 19) ^
                (X(rs2) >> 29) ^ (X(rs2) << 13) );
    RETIRE_SUCCESS
}
```

### Included in

Extension	Minimum version	Lifecycle state
<a href="#">Zknh</a> (RV32)	v1.0.0	Frozen
<a href="#">Zkn</a> (RV32)	v1.0.0	Frozen
<a href="#">Zk</a> (RV32)	v1.0.0	Frozen

## 3.34. sha512sig1l


### Synopsis

Implements the *low half* of the Sigma1 transformation, as used in the SHA2-512 hash function [49] (Section 4.1.3).

### Mnemonic

sha512sig1l rd, rs1, rs2

### Encoding



### Description

This instruction is implemented on RV32 only. Used to compute the Sigma1 transform of the SHA2-512 hash function in conjunction with the `sha512sig1h` instruction. The transform is a 64-bit to 64-bit function, so the input and output are each represented by two 32-bit registers. This instruction must *always* be implemented such that its execution latency does not depend on the data being operated on.

#### Note to software developers

The entire Sigma1 transform for SHA2-512 may be computed on RV32 using the following instruction sequence:



```
sha512sig1l    t0, a0, a1
sha512sig1h    t1, a1, a0
```

### Operation

```
function clause execute (SHA512SIG1L(rs2, rs1, rd)) = {
    X(rd) = EXTS((X(rs1) << 3) ^ (X(rs1) >> 6) ^ (X(rs1) >> 19) ^
                (X(rs2) >> 29) ^ (X(rs2) << 26) ^ (X(rs2) << 13) );
    RETIRE_SUCCESS
}
```

### Included in

Extension	Minimum version	Lifecycle state
<a href="#">Zknh</a> (RV32)	v1.0.0	Frozen
<a href="#">Zkn</a> (RV32)	v1.0.0	Frozen
<a href="#">Zk</a> (RV32)	v1.0.0	Frozen



## 3.35. sha512sum0r

### Synopsis

Implements the Sum0 transformation, as used in the SHA2-512 hash function [49] (Section 4.1.3).

### Mnemonic

sha512sum0r rd, rs1, rs2

### Encoding

31	30	29		25	24		20	19		15	14	12	11		7	6		0						
0	1	0	1	0	0	0		rs2		rs1		0	0	0		rd		0	1	1	0	0	1	1

### Description

This instruction is implemented on RV32 only. Used to compute the Sum0 transform of the SHA2-512 hash function. The transform is a 64-bit to 64-bit function, so the input and output is represented by two 32-bit registers. This instruction must *always* be implemented such that its execution latency does not depend on the data being operated on.

#### Note to software developers

The entire Sum0 transform for SHA2-512 may be computed on RV32 using the following instruction sequence:



```
sha512sum0r    t0, a0, a1
sha512sum0r    t1, a1, a0
```

Note the reversed source register ordering.

### Operation

```
function clause execute (SHA512SUM0R(rs2, rs1, rd)) = {
    X(rd) = EXTS((X(rs1) << 25) ^ (X(rs1) << 30) ^ (X(rs1) >> 28) ^
                (X(rs2) >> 7) ^ (X(rs2) >> 2) ^ (X(rs2) << 4) );
    RETIRE_SUCCESS
}
```

### Included in

Extension	Minimum version	Lifecycle state
<a href="#">Zknh</a> (RV32)	v1.0.0	Frozen
<a href="#">Zkn</a> (RV32)	v1.0.0	Frozen
<a href="#">Zk</a> (RV32)	v1.0.0	Frozen

## 3.36. sha512sum1r


### Synopsis

Implements the Sum1 transformation, as used in the SHA2-512 hash function [49] (Section 4.1.3).

### Mnemonic

sha512sum1r rd, rs1, rs2

### Encoding



### Description

This instruction is implemented on RV32 only. Used to compute the Sum1 transform of the SHA2-512 hash function. The transform is a 64-bit to 64-bit function, so the input and output is represented by two 32-bit registers. This instruction must *always* be implemented such that its execution latency does not depend on the data being operated on.

#### Note to software developers

The entire Sum1 transform for SHA2-512 may be computed on RV32 using the following instruction sequence:



```
sha512sum1r    t0, a0, a1
sha512sum1r    t1, a1, a0
```

Note the reversed source register ordering.

### Operation

```
function clause execute (SHA512SUM1R(rs2, rs1, rd)) = {
    X(rd) = EXTS((X(rs1) << 23) ^ (X(rs1) >> 14) ^ (X(rs1) >> 18) ^
                (X(rs2) >> 9) ^ (X(rs2) << 18) ^ (X(rs2) << 14) );
    RETIRE_SUCCESS
}
```

### Included in

Extension	Minimum version	Lifecycle state
Zknh (RV32)	v1.0.0	Frozen
Zkn (RV32)	v1.0.0	Frozen
Zk (RV32)	v1.0.0	Frozen

## 3.37. sha512sig0

### Synopsis

Implements the Sigma0 transformation function as used in the SHA2-512 hash function [49] (Section 4.1.3).

### Mnemonic

sha512sig0 rd, rs1

### Encoding

31	30	29		25	24		20	19		15	14	12	11		7	6		0									
0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0		rs1		0	0	1		rd		0	0	1	0	0	1	1

### Description

This instruction is supported for the RV64 base architecture. It implements the Sigma0 transform of the SHA2-512 hash function. [49]. This instruction must *always* be implemented such that its execution latency does not depend on the data being operated on.

### Operation

```
function clause execute (SHA512SIG0(rs1, rd)) = {
    X(rd) = ror64(X(rs1), 1) ^ ror64(X(rs1), 8) ^ (X(rs1) >> 7);
    RETIRE_SUCCESS
}
```

### Included in

Extension	Minimum version	Lifecycle state
<a href="#">Zknh</a> (RV64)	v1.0.0	Frozen
<a href="#">Zkn</a> (RV64)	v1.0.0	Frozen
<a href="#">Zk</a> (RV64)	v1.0.0	Frozen

## 3.38. sha512sig1

### Synopsis

Implements the Sigma1 transformation function as used in the SHA2-512 hash function [49] (Section 4.1.3).

### Mnemonic

sha512sig1 rd, rs1

### Encoding

31	30	29		25	24		20	19		15	14	12	11		7	6		0									
0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1		rs1		0	0	1		rd		0	0	1	0	0	1	1

### Description

This instruction is supported for the RV64 base architecture. It implements the Sigma1 transform of the SHA2-512 hash function. [49]. This instruction must *always* be implemented such that its execution latency does not depend on the data being operated on.

### Operation

```
function clause execute (SHA512SIG1(rs1, rd)) = {
    X(rd) = ror64(X(rs1), 19) ^ ror64(X(rs1), 61) ^ (X(rs1) >> 6);
    RETIRE_SUCCESS
}
```

### Included in

Extension	Minimum version	Lifecycle state
<a href="#">Zknh</a> (RV64)	v1.0.0	Frozen
<a href="#">Zkn</a> (RV64)	v1.0.0	Frozen
<a href="#">Zk</a> (RV64)	v1.0.0	Frozen

## 3.39. sha512sum0

### Synopsis

Implements the Sum0 transformation function as used in the SHA2-512 hash function [49] (Section 4.1.3).

### Mnemonic

sha512sum0 rd, rs1

### Encoding

31	30	29		25	24		20	19		15	14	12	11		7	6		0									
0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0		rs1		0	0	1		rd		0	0	1	0	0	1	1

### Description

This instruction is supported for the RV64 base architecture. It implements the Sum0 transform of the SHA2-512 hash function. [49]. This instruction must *always* be implemented such that its execution latency does not depend on the data being operated on.

### Operation

```
function clause execute (SHA512SUM0(rs1, rd)) = {
    X(rd) = ror64(X(rs1), 28) ^ ror64(X(rs1), 34) ^ ror64(X(rs1), 39);
    RETIRE_SUCCESS
}
```

### Included in

Extension	Minimum version	Lifecycle state
<a href="#">Zknh</a> (RV64)	v1.0.0	Frozen
<a href="#">Zkn</a> (RV64)	v1.0.0	Frozen
<a href="#">Zk</a> (RV64)	v1.0.0	Frozen

## 3.40. sha512sum1

### Synopsis

Implements the Sum1 transformation function as used in the SHA2-512 hash function [49] (Section 4.1.3).

### Mnemonic

sha512sum1 rd, rs1

### Encoding

31	30	29		25	24		20	19		15	14	12	11		7	6		0									
0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1		rs1		0	0	1		rd		0	0	1	0	0	1	1

### Description

This instruction is supported for the RV64 base architecture. It implements the Sum1 transform of the SHA2-512 hash function. [49]. This instruction must *always* be implemented such that its execution latency does not depend on the data being operated on.

### Operation

```
function clause execute (SHA512SUM1(rs1, rd)) = {
    X(rd) = ror64(X(rs1), 14) ^ ror64(X(rs1), 18) ^ ror64(X(rs1), 41);
    RETIRE_SUCCESS
}
```

### Included in

Extension	Minimum version	Lifecycle state
<a href="#">Zknh</a> (RV64)	v1.0.0	Frozen
<a href="#">Zkn</a> (RV64)	v1.0.0	Frozen
<a href="#">Zk</a> (RV64)	v1.0.0	Frozen

## 3.41. sm3p0

### Synopsis

Implements the  $P0$  transformation function as used in the SM3 hash function [4, 30].

### Mnemonic

sm3p0 rd, rs1

### Encoding

31	30	29		25	24		20	19		15	14	12	11		7	6		0									
0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0		rs1		0	0	1		rd		0	0	1	0	0	1	1

### Description

This instruction is supported for the RV32 and RV64 base architectures. It implements the  $P0$  transform of the SM3 hash function [4, 30]. This instruction must *always* be implemented such that its execution latency does not depend on the data being operated on.



#### Supporting Material

This instruction is based on work done in [56].

### Operation

```
function clause execute (SM3P0(rs1, rd)) = {
  let r1      : bits(32) = X(rs1)[31..0];
  let result : bits(32) = r1 ^ rol32(r1, 9) ^ rol32(r1, 17);
  X(rd) = EXTS(result);
  RETIRE_SUCCESS
}
```

### Included in

Extension	Minimum version	Lifecycle state
Zksh	v1.0.0	Frozen
Zks	v1.0.0	Frozen

## 3.42. sm3p1

### Synopsis

Implements the *P1* transformation function as used in the SM3 hash function [4, 30].

### Mnemonic

sm3p1 rd, rs1

### Encoding

31	30	29		25	24		20	19		15	14	12	11		7	6				0							
0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	rs1			0	0	1	rd			0	0	1	0	0	1	1

### Description

This instruction is supported for the RV32 and RV64 base architectures. It implements the *P1* transform of the SM3 hash function [4, 30]. This instruction must *always* be implemented such that its execution latency does not depend on the data being operated on.



#### Supporting Material

This instruction is based on work done in [56].

### Operation

```
function clause execute (SM3P1(rs1, rd)) = {
    let r1      : bits(32) = X(rs1)[31..0];
    let result  : bits(32) = r1 ^ rol32(r1, 15) ^ rol32(r1, 23);
    X(rd) = EXTS(result);
    RETIRE_SUCCESS
}
```

### Included in

Extension	Minimum version	Lifecycle state
<a href="#">Zksh</a>	v1.0.0	Frozen
<a href="#">Zks</a>	v1.0.0	Frozen



## 3.43. sm4ed

### Synopsis

Accelerates the block encrypt/decrypt operation of the SM4 block cipher [5, 31].

### Mnemonic

sm4ed rd, rs1, rs2, bs

### Encoding

31	30	29		25	24		20	19		15	14		12	11		7	6		0					
bs	1	1	0	0	0		rs2			rs1		0	0	0		rd		0	1	1	0	0	1	1

### Description

Implements a T-tables in hardware style approach to accelerating the SM4 round function. A byte is extracted from **rs2** based on **bs**, to which the SBox and linear layer transforms are applied, before the result is XOR'd with **rs1** and written back to **rd**. This instruction exists on RV32 and RV64 base architectures. On RV64, the 32-bit result is sign extended to XLEN bits. This instruction must *always* be implemented such that its execution latency does not depend on the data being operated on.

### Operation

```
function clause execute (SM4ED (bs,rs2,rs1,rd)) = {
  let shamt : bits(5) = bs @ 0b000; /* shamt = bs*8 */
  let sb_in : bits(8) = (X(rs2)[31..0] >> shamt)[7..0];
  let x     : bits(32) = 0x000000 @ sm4_sbox(sb_in);
  let y     : bits(32) = x ^ (x << 8) ^ (x << 2) ^
                        (x << 18) ^ ((x & 0x0000003F) << 26) ^
                        ((x & 0x000000C0) << 10);
  let z     : bits(32) = rol32(y, unsigned(shamt));
  let result: bits(32) = z ^ X(rs1)[31..0];
  X(rd)
    = EXTS(result);
  RETIRE_SUCCESS
}
```

### Included in

Extension	Minimum version	Lifecycle state
<a href="#">Zksed</a>	v1.0.0	Frozen
<a href="#">Zks</a>	v1.0.0	Frozen



## 3.45. unzip


### Synopsis

Place odd and even bits of the source word into upper/lower halves of the destination.

### Mnemonic

unzip *rd, rs*

### Encoding



### Description

This instruction places the even bits of the source register into the low half of the destination, and the odd bits of the source into the high bits of the destination. It is the inverse of the [zip](#) instruction. This instruction is available only on RV32.



This instruction is a specific encoding of a more generic instruction which was originally proposed as part of the RISC-V Bitmanip extension ([unshfli](#)). Eventually, the more generic instruction may be standardised. Until then, only the most common instances of it, such as this, are being included in specifications.

### Operation

```
foreach (i from 0 to xlen/2-1) {
  X(rd)[i      ] = X(rs1)[2*i  ]
  X(rd)[i+xlen/2] = X(rs1)[2*i+1]
}
```



#### Software Hint

This instruction is useful for implementing the SHA3 cryptographic hash function on a 32-bit architecture, as it implements the bit-interleaving operation used to speed up the 64-bit rotations directly.

### Included in

Extension	Minimum version	Lifecycle state
Zbkb ( <a href="#">Zbkb</a> ) (RV32)	v1.0.0-rc4	Frozen



## 3.47. xperm8


### Synopsis

Byte-wise lookup of indicies into a vector in registers.

### Mnemonic

xperm8 *rd, rs1, rs2*

### Encoding



### Description

The xperm8 instruction operates on bytes. The *rs1* register contains a vector of XLEN/8 8-bit elements. The *rs2* register contains a vector of XLEN/8 8-bit indexes. The result is each element in *rs2* replaced by the indexed element in *rs1*, or zero if the index into *rs2* is out of bounds.

### Operation

```

val xperm8_lookup : (bits(8), xlenbits) -> bits(8)
function xperm8_lookup (idx, lut) = {
    (lut >> (idx @ 0b000))[7..0]
}

function clause execute ( XPERM_8 (rs2,rs1,rd)) = {
    result : xlenbits = EXTZ(0b0);
    foreach(i from 0 to xlen by 8) {
        result[i+7..i] = xperm8_lookup(X(rs2)[i+7..i], X(rs1));
    };
    X(rd) = result;
    RETIRE_SUCCESS
}

```

### Included in

Extension	Minimum version	Lifecycle state
Zbkx ( <a href="#">Zbkx</a> )	v1.0.0-rc4	Frozen

## 3.48. xperm4


### Synopsis

Nibble-wise lookup of indicies into a vector.

### Mnemonic

xperm4 *rd*, *rs1*, *rs2*

### Encoding



### Description

The `xperm4` instruction operates on nibbles. The `rs1` register contains a vector of XLEN/4 4-bit elements. The `rs2` register contains a vector of XLEN/4 4-bit indexes. The result is each element in `rs2` replaced by the indexed element in `rs1`, or zero if the index into `rs2` is out of bounds.

### Operation

```
val xperm4_lookup : (bits(4), xlenbits) -> bits(4)
function xperm4_lookup (idx, lut) = {
  (lut >> (idx @ 0b00))[3..0]
}

function clause execute ( XPERM_4 (rs2,rs1,rd)) = {
  result : xlenbits = EXTZ(0b0);
  foreach(i from 0 to xlen by 4) {
    result[i+3..i] = xperm4_lookup(X(rs2)[i+3..i], X(rs1));
  };
  X(rd) = result;
  RETIRE_SUCCESS
}
```

### Included in

Extension	Minimum version	Lifecycle state
Zbkx ( <a href="#">Zbkx</a> )	v1.0.0-rc4	Frozen

## 3.49. zip


### Synopsis

Place upper/lower halves of the source register into odd/even bits of the destination respectively.

### Mnemonic

zip *rd, rs*

### Encoding



### Description

This instruction places bits in the low half of the source register into the even bit positions of the destination, and bits in the high half of the source register into the odd bit positions of the destination. It is the inverse of the [unzip](#) instruction. This instruction is available only on RV32.



This instruction is a specific encoding of a more generic instruction which was originally proposed as part of the RISC-V Bitmanip extension ([shfli](#)). Eventually, the more generic instruction may be standardised. Until then, only the most common instances of it, such as this, are being included in specifications.

### Operation

```
foreach (i from 0 to xlen/2-1) {
  X(rd)[2*i] = X(rs1)[i]
  X(rd)[2*i+1] = X(rs1)[i+xlen/2]
}
```



#### Software Hint

This instruction is useful for implementing the SHA3 cryptographic hash function on a 32-bit architecture, as it implements the bit-interleaving operation used to speed up the 64-bit rotations directly.

### Included in

Extension	Minimum version	Lifecycle state
Zbkb ( <a href="#">Zbkb</a> ) (RV32)	v1.0.0-rc4	Frozen

## Chapter 4. Entropy Source

The `seed` CSR provides an interface to a NIST SP 800-90B [61] or BSI AIS-31 [36] compliant physical Entropy Source (ES).

An entropy source, by itself, is not a cryptographically secure Random Bit Generator (RBG), but can be used to build standard (and nonstandard) RBGs of many types with the help of symmetric cryptography. Expected usage is to condition (typically with SHA-2/3) the output from an entropy source and use it to seed a cryptographically secure Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) such as AES-based `CTR_DRBG` [14]. The combination of an Entropy Source, Conditioning, and a DRBG can be used to create random bits securely [15]. See [Appendix B](#) for a non-normative description of a certification and self-certification procedures, design rationale, and more detailed suggestions on how the entropy source output can be used.

### 4.1. The `seed` CSR


`seed` is an unprivileged CSR located at address `0x015`. The 32-bit contents of `seed` are as follows:

Bits	Name	Description
31:30	<code>OPST</code>	Status: <code>BIST</code> (00), <code>WAIT</code> (01), <code>ES16</code> (10), <code>DEAD</code> (11).
29:24	<i>reserved</i>	For future use by the RISC-V specification.
23:16	<i>custom</i>	Designated for custom and experimental use.
15: 0	<code>entropy</code>	16 bits of randomness, only when <code>OPST=ES16</code> .

The `seed` CSR must be accessed with a read-write instruction. A read-only instruction such as `CSRRS/CSRRC` with `rs1=x0` or `CSRRSI/CSRRCI` with `uimm=0` will raise an illegal instruction exception. The write value (in `rs1` or `uimm`) must be ignored by implementations. The purpose of the write is to signal polling and flushing.

The instruction `csrrw rd, seed, x0` can be used for fetching seed status and entropy values. It is available on both RV32 and RV64 base architectures and will zero-extend the 32-bit word to XLEN bits.

#### Encoding



The `seed` CSR is also access controlled by execution mode, and attempted read or write access will raise an illegal instruction exception outside M mode unless access is explicitly granted. See [Section 4.3](#) for more details.

The status bits `seed[31:30] = OPST` may be `ES16` (10), indicating successful polling, or one of three entropy polling failure statuses `BIST` (00), `WAIT` (01), or `DEAD` (11), discussed below.

Each returned `seed[15:0] = entropy` value represents unique randomness when `OPST=ES16` (`seed[31:30] = 10`), even if its numerical value is the same as that of a previously polled `entropy` value. The implementation requirements of `entropy` bits are defined in [Section 4.2](#). When `OPST` is not `ES16`, `entropy` must be set to 0. An implementation may safely set reserved and custom bits to zeros.

For security reasons, the interface guarantees that secret `entropy` words are not made available multiple times. Hence polling (reading) must also have the side effect of clearing (wipe-on-read) the `entropy` contents and changing the state to `WAIT` (unless there is `entropy` immediately available for `ES16`). Other states (`BIST`, `WAIT`, and `DEAD`) may be unaffected by polling.



The Status Bits returned in `seed[31:30]=OPST`:

- **00** - **BIST** indicates that Built-In Self-Test "on-demand" (BIST) testing is being performed. If **OPST** returns temporarily to **BIST** from any other state, this signals a non-fatal self-test alarm, which is non-actionable, apart from being logged. Such a **BIST** alarm must be latched until polled at least once to enable software to record its occurrence.
- **01** - **WAIT** means that a sufficient amount of entropy is not yet available. This is not an error condition and may (in fact) be more frequent than **ES16** since physical entropy sources often have low bandwidth.
- **10** - **ES16** indicates success; the low bits `seed[15:0]` will have 16 bits of randomness (**entropy**), which is guaranteed to meet certain minimum entropy requirements, regardless of implementation.
- **11** - **DEAD** is an unrecoverable self-test error. This may indicate a hardware fault, a security issue, or (extremely rarely) a type-1 statistical false positive in the continuous testing procedures. In case of a fatal failure, an immediate lockdown may also be an appropriate response in dedicated security devices.

**Example.** `0x8000ABCD` is a valid **ES16** status output, with `0xABCD` being the **entropy** value. `0xFFFFFFFF` is an invalid output (**DEAD**) with no **entropy** value.




Figure 1. Entropy Source state transition diagram.

Normally the operational state alternates between WAIT (no data) and ES16, which means that 16 bits of randomness (**entropy**) have been polled. BIST (Built-in Self-Test) only occurs after reset or to signal a non-fatal self-test alarm (if reached after WAIT or ES16). DEAD is an unrecoverable error state.

## 4.2. Entropy Source Requirements

The output **entropy** (`seed[15:0]` in ES16 state) is not necessarily fully conditioned randomness due to hardware and energy limitations of smaller, low-powered implementations. However, minimum requirements are defined. The main requirement is that 2-to-1 cryptographic post-processing in 256-bit input blocks will yield 128-bit "full entropy" output blocks. Entropy source users may make this conservative assumption but are not prohibited from using more than twice the number of seed bits relative to the desired resulting entropy.

An implementation of the entropy source should meet at least one of the following requirements sets in order to be considered a secure and safe design:

- [Section 4.2.1](#): A physical entropy source meeting NIST SP 800-90B [61] criteria with evaluated min-entropy

of 192 bits for each 256 output bits (min-entropy rate 0.75).

- [Section 4.2.2](#): A physical entropy source meeting the AIS-31 PTG.2 [36] criteria, implying average Shannon entropy rate 0.997. The source must also meet the NIST 800-90B min-entropy rate  $192/256 = 0.75$ .
- [Section 4.2.3](#): A virtual entropy source is a DRBG seeded from a physical entropy source. It must have at least a 256-bit (Post-Quantum Category 5) internal security level.

All implementations must signal initialization, test mode, and health alarms as required by respective standards. This may require the implementer to add non-standard (custom) test interfaces in a secure and safe manner, an example of which is described in [Section B.6](#)

### 4.2.1. NIST SP 800-90B / FIPS 140-3 Requirements

All NIST SP 800-90B [61] required components and health test mechanisms must be implemented.

The entropy requirement is satisfied if 128 bits of *full entropy* can be obtained from each 256-bit (16\*16 -bit) successful, but possibly non-consecutive *entropy* (ES16) output sequence using a vetted conditioning algorithm such as a cryptographic hash (See Section 3.1.5.1.1, SP 800-90B [61]). In practice, a min-entropy rate of 0.75 or larger is required for this.

Note that 128 bits of estimated input min-entropy does not yield 128 bits of conditioned, full entropy in SP 800-90B/C evaluation. Instead, the implication is that every 256-bit sequence should have min-entropy of at least  $128+64 = 192$  bits, as discussed in SP 800-90C [15]; the likelihood of successfully "guessing" an individual 256-bit output sequence should not be higher than  $2^{-192}$  even with (almost) unconstrained amount of entropy source data and computational power.

Rather than attempting to define all the mathematical and architectural properties that the entropy source must satisfy, we define that the physical entropy source be strong and robust enough to pass the equivalent of NIST SP 800-90 evaluation and certification for full entropy when conditioned cryptographically in ratio 2:1 with 128-bit output blocks.

Even though the requirement is defined in terms of 128-bit full entropy blocks, we recommend 256-bit security. This can be accomplished by using at least 512 *entropy* bits to initialize a DRBG that has 256-bit security.

### 4.2.2. BSI AIS-31 PTG.2 / Common Criteria Requirements

For alternative Common Criteria certification (or self-certification), AIS 31 PTG.2 class [36] (Sect. 4.3.) required hardware components and mechanisms must be implemented. In addition to AIS-31 PTG.2 randomness requirements (Shannon entropy rate of 0.997 as evaluated in that standard), the overall min-entropy requirement of remains, as discussed in [Section 4.2.1](#). Note that 800-90B min-entropy can be significantly lower than AIS-31 Shannon entropy. These two metrics should not be equated or confused with each other.

### 4.2.3. Virtual Sources: Security Requirement



A virtual source is not an ISA compliance requirement. It is defined for the benefit of the RISC-V security ecosystem so that virtual systems may have a consistent level of security.

A virtual source is not a physical entropy source but provides additional protection against covert channels, depletion attacks, and host identification in operating environments that can not be entirely trusted with direct access to a hardware resource. Despite limited trust, implementors should try to guarantee that even such environments have sufficient entropy available for secure cryptographic operations.

A virtual source traps access to the *seed* CSR, emulates it, or otherwise implements it, possibly without direct access to a physical entropy source. The output can be cryptographically secure pseudorandomness instead of

real entropy, but must have at least 256-bit security, as defined below. A virtual source is intended especially for guest operating systems, sandboxes, emulators, and similar use cases.

As a technical definition, a random-distinguishing attack against the output should require computational resources comparable or greater than those required for exhaustive key search on a secure block cipher with a 256-bit key (e.g., AES 256). This applies to both classical and quantum computing models, but only classical information flows. The virtual source security requirement maps to Post-Quantum Security Category 5 [51].

Any implementation of the `seed` CSR that limits the security strength shall not reduce it to less than 256 bits. If the security level is under 256 bits, then the interface must not be available.

A virtual entropy source does not need to implement `WAIT` or `BIST` states. It should fail (`DEAD`) if the host DRBG or entropy source fails and there is insufficient seeding material for the host DRBG.

### 4.3. Access Control to `seed`

The `seed` CSR is by default only available in M mode, but can be made available to other modes via the `mseccfg.sseed` and `mseccfg.useed` access control bits. `sseed` is bit 9 of and `useed` is bit 8 of the `mseccfg` CSR. Without the corresponding access control bit set to 1, any attempted access to `seed` from U, S, or HS modes will raise an illegal instruction exception.

VS and VU modes are present in systems with Hypervisor (H) extension implemented. If desired, a hypervisor can emulate accesses to the seed CSR from a virtual machine. Attempted access to `seed` from virtual modes VS and VU always raises an exception; a read-only instruction causes an illegal instruction exception, while a read-write instruction (that can potentially be emulated) causes a virtual instruction exception only if `mseccfg.sseed=1`. Note that `mseccfg.useed` has no effect on the exception type for either VS or VU modes.

Table 1. Entropy Source Access Control.

Mode	<code>sseed</code>	<code>useed</code>	Description
M	*	*	The <code>seed</code> CSR is always available in machine mode as normal (with a CSR read-write instruction.) Attempted read without a write raises an illegal instruction exception regardless of mode and access control bits.
U	*	0	Any <code>seed</code> CSR access raises an illegal instruction exception.
U	*	1	The <code>seed</code> CSR is accessible as normal. No exception is raised for read-write.
S/HS	0	*	Any <code>seed</code> CSR access raises an illegal instruction exception.
S/HS	1	*	The <code>seed</code> CSR is accessible as normal. No exception is raised for read-write.
VS/VU	0	*	Any <code>seed</code> CSR access raises an illegal instruction exception.
VS/VU	1	*	A read-write <code>seed</code> access raises a virtual instruction exception, while other access conditions raise an illegal instruction exception.

Systems should implement carefully considered access control policies from lower privilege modes to physical entropy sources. The system can trap attempted access to `seed` and feed a less privileged client *virtual entropy source* data (Section 4.2.3) instead of invoking an SP 800-90B (Section 4.2.1) or PTG.2 (Section 4.2.2) *physical entropy source*. Emulated `seed` data generation is made with an appropriately seeded, secure software DRBG. See Section B.3.5 for security considerations related to direct access to entropy sources.

Implementations may implement `mseccfg` such that `[s,u]seed` is a read-only constant value 0. Software may discover if access to the `seed` CSR can be enabled in U and S mode by writing a 1 to `[s,u]seed` and reading back the result.

If S or U mode is not implemented, then the corresponding `[s,u]seed` bits of `mseccfg` must be hardwired to zero. The `[s,u]seed` bits must have a defined reset value. The system must not allow them to be in an undefined state after a reset. `mseccfg` exists if `Zkr` is implemented, or if it is required by other processor features. If `Zkr` is *not* implemented, the `[s,u]seed` bits must be hardwired to zero.

# Chapter 5. Data Independent Execution Latency

## Subset: Zkt

The Zkt extension attests that the machine has data-independent execution time for a safe subset of instructions. This property is commonly called "*constant-time*" although should not be taken with that literal meaning.

All currently proposed cryptographic instructions (scalar K extension) are on this list, together with a set of relevant supporting instructions from I, M, C, and B extensions.



*Note to software developers*

Failure to prevent leakage of sensitive parameters via the direct timing channel is considered a serious security vulnerability and will typically result in a CERT CVE security advisory.

### 5.1. Scope and Goal

An "ISA contract" is made between a programmer and the RISC-V implementation that Zkt instructions do not leak information about processed secret data (plaintext, keying information, or other "sensitive security parameters" — FIPS 140-3 term) through differences in execution latency. Zkt does *not* define a set of instructions available in the core; it just restricts the behaviour of certain instructions if those are implemented.

Currently, the scope of this document is within scalar RV32/RV64 processors. Vector cryptography instructions (and appropriate vector support instructions) will be added later, as will other security-related functions that wish to assert leakage-free execution latency properties.

Loads, stores, conditional branches are excluded, along with a set of instructions that are rarely necessary to process secret data. Also excluded are instructions for which workarounds exist in standard cryptographic middleware due to the limitations of other ISA processors.

The stated goal is that OpenSSL, BoringSSL (Android), the Linux Kernel, and similar trusted software will not have directly observable timing side channels when compiled and running on a Zkt-enabled RISC-V target. The Zkt extension explicitly states many of the common latency assumptions made by cryptography developers.

Vendors do not have to implement all of the list's instructions to be Zkt compliant; however, if they claim to have Zkt and implement any of the listed instructions, it must have data-independent latency.

For example, many simple RV32I and RV64I cores (without Multiply, Compressed, Bitmanip, or Cryptographic extensions) are technically compliant with Zkt. A constant-time AES can be implemented on them using "bit-slice" techniques, but it will be excruciatingly slow when compared to implementation with AES instructions. There are no guarantees that even a bit-sliced cipher implementation (largely based on boolean logic instructions) is secure on a core without Zkt attestation.

Out-of-order implementations adhering to Zkt are still free to fuse, crack, change or even ignore sequences of instructions, so long as the optimisations are applied deterministically, and not based on operand data. The guiding principle should be that no information about the data being operated on should be leaked based on the execution latency.



It is left to future extensions or other techniques to tackle the problem of data-independent execution in implementations which advanced out-of-order capabilities which use value prediction, or which are otherwise data-dependent.



#### Note to software developers

Programming techniques can only mitigate leakage directly caused by arithmetic, caches, and branches. Other ISAs have had micro-architectural issues such as Spectre, Meltdown, Speculative Store Bypass, Rogue System Register Read, Lazy FP State Restore, Bounds Check Bypass Store, TLBleed, and LITF/Foreshadow, etc. See e.g. [NSA Hardware and Firmware Security Guidance](#)

It is not within the remit of this proposal to mitigate these *micro-architectural* leakages.

## 5.2. Background

- Timing attacks are much more powerful than was realised before the 2010s, which has led to a significant mitigation effort in current cryptographic code-bases.
- Cryptography developers use static and dynamic security testing tools to trace the handling of secret information and detect occasions where it influences a branch or is used for a table lookup.
- Architectural testing for Zkt can be pragmatic and semi-formal; *security by design* against basic timing attacks can usually be achieved via conscious implementation (of relevant iterative multi-cycle instructions or instructions composed of micro-ops) in way that avoids data-dependent latency.
- Laboratory testing may utilize statistical timing attack leakage analysis techniques such as those described in ISO/IEC 17825 [29].
- Binary executables should not contain secrets in the instruction encodings (Kerckhoffs's principle), so instruction timing may leak information about immediates, ordering of input registers, etc. There may be an exception to this in systems where a binary loader modifies the executable for purposes of relocation — and it is desirable to keep the execution location (PC) secret. This is why instructions such as LUI, AUIPC, and ADDI are on the list.
- The rules used by audit tools are relatively simple to understand. Very briefly; we call the plaintext, secret keys, expanded keys, nonces, and other such variables "secrets". A secret variable (arithmetically) modifying any other variable/register turns that into a secret too. If a secret ends up in address calculation affecting a load or store, that is a violation. If a secret affects a branch's condition, that is also a violation. A secret variable location or register becomes a non-secret via specific zeroization/sanitisation or by being declared ciphertext (or otherwise no-longer-secret information). In essence, secrets can only "touch" instructions on the Zkt list while they are secrets.

## 5.3. Specific Instruction Rationale

- HINT instruction forms (typically encodings with `rd=x0`) are excluded from the data-independent time requirement.
- Floating point (F, D, Q, L extensions) are currently excluded from the constant-time requirement as they have very few applications in standardised cryptography. We may consider adding floating point add, sub, multiply as a constant time requirement for some floating point extension in case a specific algorithm (such as the PQC Signature algorithm Falcon) becomes critical.
- Cryptographers typically assume division to be variable-time (while multiplication is constant time) and implement their Montgomery reduction routines with that assumption.
- Zicsr, Zifencei are excluded.
- Some instructions are on the list simply because we see no harm in including them in testing scope.

## 5.4. Programming Information

For background information on secure programming "models", see:

- Thomas Pornin: "*Why Constant-Time Crypto?*" (A great introduction to timing assumptions.) [www.bearssl.org/constanttime.html](http://www.bearssl.org/constanttime.html)
- Jean-Philippe Aumasson: "*Guidelines for low-level cryptography software.*" (A list of recommendations.) [github.com/veorq/cryptocoding](https://github.com/veorq/cryptocoding)
- Peter Schwabe: "*Timing Attacks and Countermeasures.*" (Lecture slides — nice references.) [summerschool-croatia.cs.ru.nl/2016/slides/PeterSchwabe.pdf](http://summerschool-croatia.cs.ru.nl/2016/slides/PeterSchwabe.pdf)
- Adam Langley: "*ctgrind.*" (This is from 2010 but is still relevant.) [www.imperialviolet.org/2010/04/01/ctgrind.html](http://www.imperialviolet.org/2010/04/01/ctgrind.html)
- Kris Kwiatkowski: "*Constant-time code verification with Memory Sanitizer.*" [www.amongbytes.com/post/20210709-testing-constant-time/](http://www.amongbytes.com/post/20210709-testing-constant-time/)
- For early examples of timing attack vulnerabilities, see [www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/997481](http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/997481) and related academic papers.

## 5.5. Zkt listings

The following instructions are included in the **Zkt** subset. They are listed here grouped by their original parent extension.



### Note to implementers

You do not need to implement all of these instructions to implement **Zkt**. Rather, every one of these instructions that the core does implement must adhere to the requirements of **Zkt**.

### 5.5.1. RVI (Base Instruction Set)

Only basic arithmetic and **s1t\*** (for carry computations) are included. The data-independent timing requirement does not apply to HINT instruction encoding forms of these instructions.

RV32	RV64	Mnemonic	Instruction
✓	✓	<code>lui rd, imm</code>	<a href="#">[insns-lui]</a>
✓	✓	<code>auipc rd, imm</code>	<a href="#">[insns-auipc]</a>
✓	✓	<code>addi rd, rs1, imm</code>	<a href="#">[insns-addi]</a>
✓	✓	<code>slti rd, rs1, imm</code>	<a href="#">[insns-slti]</a>
✓	✓	<code>sltiu rd, rs1, imm</code>	<a href="#">[insns-sltiu]</a>
✓	✓	<code>xori rd, rs1, imm</code>	<a href="#">[insns-xori]</a>
✓	✓	<code>ori rd, rs1, imm</code>	<a href="#">[insns-ori]</a>
✓	✓	<code>andi rd, rs1, imm</code>	<a href="#">[insns-andi]</a>
✓	✓	<code>slli rd, rs1, imm</code>	<a href="#">[insns-slli]</a>
✓	✓	<code>srli rd, rs1, imm</code>	<a href="#">[insns-srli]</a>
✓	✓	<code>srai rd, rs1, imm</code>	<a href="#">[insns-srai]</a>

RV32	RV64	Mnemonic	Instruction
✓	✓	<i>add rd, rs1, rs2</i>	[insns-add]
✓	✓	<i>sub rd, rs1, rs2</i>	[insns-sub]
✓	✓	<i>sll rd, rs1, rs2</i>	[insns-sll]
✓	✓	<i>slt rd, rs1, rs2</i>	[insns-slt]
✓	✓	<i>sltu rd, rs1, rs2</i>	[insns-sltu]
✓	✓	<i>xor rd, rs1, rs2</i>	[insns-xor]
✓	✓	<i>srl rd, rs1, rs2</i>	[insns-srl]
✓	✓	<i>sra rd, rs1, rs2</i>	[insns-sra]
✓	✓	<i>or rd, rs1, rs2</i>	[insns-or]
✓	✓	<i>and rd, rs1, rs2</i>	[insns-and]
	✓	<i>addiw rd, rs1, imm</i>	[insns-addiw]
	✓	<i>slliw rd, rs1, imm</i>	[insns-slliw]
	✓	<i>srliw rd, rs1, imm</i>	[insns-srliw]
	✓	<i>sraiw rd, rs1, imm</i>	[insns-sraiw]
	✓	<i>addw rd, rs1, rs2</i>	[insns-addw]
	✓	<i>subw rd, rs1, rs2</i>	[insns-subw]
	✓	<i>sllw rd, rs1, rs2</i>	[insns-sllw]
	✓	<i>srlw rd, rs1, rs2</i>	[insns-srlw]
	✓	<i>sraw rd, rs1, rs2</i>	[insns-sraw]

### 5.5.2. RVM (Multiply)

Multiplication is included; division and remaindering excluded.

RV32	RV64	Mnemonic	Instruction
✓	✓	<i>mul rd, rs1, rs2</i>	[insns-mul]
✓	✓	<i>mulh rd, rs1, rs2</i>	[insns-mulh]
✓	✓	<i>mulhsu rd, rs1, rs2</i>	[insns-mulhsu]
✓	✓	<i>mulhu rd, rs1, rs2</i>	[insns-mulhu]
	✓	<i>mulw rd, rs1, rs2</i>	[insns-mulw]

### 5.5.3. RVC (Compressed)

Same criteria as in RVI. Organised by quadrants.



RV32	RV64	Mnemonic	Instruction
✓	✓	c.nop	[insns-c_nop]
✓	✓	c.addi	[insns-c_addi]
✓	✓	c.addiw	[insns-c_addiw]
✓	✓	c.lui	[insns-c_lui]
✓	✓	c.srli	[insns-c_srli]
✓	✓	c.srai	[insns-c_srai]
✓	✓	c.andi	[insns-c_andi]
✓	✓	c.sub	[insns-c_sub]
✓	✓	c.xor	[insns-c_xor]
✓	✓	c.or	[insns-c_or]
✓	✓	c.and	[insns-c_and]
✓	✓	c.subw	[insns-c_subw]
✓	✓	c.addw	[insns-c_addw]
✓	✓	c.slli	[insns-c_slli]
✓	✓	c.mv	[insns-c_mv]
✓	✓	c.add	[insns-c_add]

#### 5.5.4. RVK (Scalar Cryptography)

All K-specific instructions are included. Additionally, `seed` CSR latency should be independent of `ES16` state output `entropy` bits, as that is a sensitive security parameter. See [Section B.3.5](#).

RV32	RV64	Mnemonic	Instruction
✓		aes32dsi	AES final round decrypt (RV32)
✓		aes32dsmi	AES middle round decrypt (RV32)
✓		aes32esi	AES final round encrypt (RV32)
✓		aes32esmi	AES middle round encrypt (RV32)
	✓	aes64ds	AES decrypt final round (RV64)
	✓	aes64dsm	AES decrypt middle round (RV64)
	✓	aes64es	AES encrypt final round instruction (RV64)
	✓	aes64esm	AES encrypt middle round instruction (RV64)
	✓	aes64im	AES Decrypt KeySchedule MixColumns (RV64)
	✓	aes64ks1i	AES Key Schedule Instruction 1 (RV64)
	✓	aes64ks2	AES Key Schedule Instruction 2 (RV64)
✓	✓	sha256sig0	SHA2-256 Sigma0 instruction

RV32	RV64	Mnemonic	Instruction
✓	✓	sha256sig1	SHA2-256 Sigma1 instruction
✓	✓	sha256sum0	SHA2-256 Sum0 instruction
✓	✓	sha256sum1	SHA2-256 Sum1 instruction
✓		sha512sig0h	SHA2-512 Sigma0 high (RV32)
✓		sha512sig0l	SHA2-512 Sigma0 low (RV32)
✓		sha512sig1h	SHA2-512 Sigma1 high (RV32)
✓		sha512sig1l	SHA2-512 Sigma1 low (RV32)
✓		sha512sum0r	SHA2-512 Sum0 (RV32)
✓		sha512sum1r	SHA2-512 Sum1 (RV32)
	✓	sha512sig0	SHA2-512 Sigma0 instruction (RV64)
	✓	sha512sig1	SHA2-512 Sigma1 instruction (RV64)
	✓	sha512sum0	SHA2-512 Sum0 instruction (RV64)
	✓	sha512sum1	SHA2-512 Sum1 instruction (RV64)
✓	✓	sm3p0	SM3 P0 transform
✓	✓	sm3p1	SM3 P1 transform
✓	✓	sm4ed	SM4 Encrypt/Decrypt Instruction
✓	✓	sm4ks	SM4 Key Schedule Instruction

### 5.5.5. RVB (Bitmanip)

The [Zbkb](#), [Zbkx](#) and [Zbkx](#) extensions are included in their entirety.



#### Note to implementers

Recall that [rev](#), [zip](#) and [unzip](#) are pseudo-instructions representing specific instances of [grevi](#), [shfli](#) and [unshfli](#) respectively.

RV32	RV64	Mnemonic	Instruction
✓	✓	clmul	Carry-less multiply (low-part)
✓	✓	clmulh	Carry-less multiply (high-part)
✓	✓	xperm4	Crossbar permutation (nibbles)
✓	✓	xperm8	Crossbar permutation (bytes)
✓	✓	ror	Rotate right (Register)
✓	✓	rol	Rotate left (Register)
✓	✓	rori	Rotate right (Immediate)
	✓	roriw	Rotate right Word (Immediate)
✓	✓	andn	AND with inverted operand

RV32	RV64	Mnemonic	Instruction
✓	✓	orn	OR with inverted operand
✓	✓	xnor	Exclusive NOR
✓	✓	pack	Pack low halves of registers
✓	✓	packh	Pack low bytes of registers
	✓	packw	Pack low 16-bits of registers (RV64)
✓	✓	brev8	Reverse bits in bytes
✓	✓	rev8	Byte-reverse register
✓		zip	Zip
✓		unzip	Unzip

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## Appendix A: Instruction Rationale

This section contains various rationale, design notes and usage recommendations for the instructions in the scalar cryptography extension. It also tries to record how the designs of instructions were derived, or where they were contributed from.

### A.1. AES Instructions

The 32-bit instructions were derived from work in [57] and contributed to the RISC-V cryptography extension. The 64-bit instructions were developed collaboratively by task group members on our mailing list.

Supporting material, including rationale and a design space exploration for all of the AES instructions in the specification can be found in the paper "[The design of scalar AES Instruction Set Extensions for RISC-V](#)" [42].

### A.2. SHA2 Instructions

These instructions were developed based on academic work at the University of Bristol as part of the XCrypto project [43], and contributed to the RISC-V cryptography extension.

The RV32 SHA2-512 instructions were based on this work, and developed in [56], before being contributed in the same way.

### A.3. SM3 and SM4 Instructions

The SM4 instructions were derived from work in [57], and are hence very similar to the RV32 AES instructions.

The SM3 instructions were inspired by the SHA2 instructions, and based on development work done in [56], before being contributed to the RISC-V cryptography extension.

### A.4. Bitmanip Instructions for Cryptography

Many of the primitive operations used in symmetric key cryptography and cryptographic hash functions are well supported by the RISC-V Bitmanip [2] extensions.



This section repeats much of the information in [Zbkb](#), [Zbkc](#) and [Zbkx](#), but includes more rationale.

We proposed that the scalar cryptographic extension *reuse* a subset of the instructions from the Bitmanip extensions [Zb\[abc\]](#) directly. Specifically, this would mean that a core implementing *either* the scalar cryptographic extensions, *or* the [Zb\[abc\]](#), *or* both, would be required to implement these instructions.

#### A.4.1. Rotations

RV32, RV64:

```
ror   rd, rs1, rs2
rol   rd, rs1, rs2
rori  rd, rs1, imm
```

RV64 only:

```
rorw  rd, rs1, rs2
rolw  rd, rs1, rs2
roriw rd, rs1, imm
```

See [3] (Section 3.1.1) for details of these instructions.

*Notes to software developers*

Standard bitwise rotation is a primitive operation in many block ciphers and hash functions; it features particularly in the ARX (Add, Rotate, Xor) class of block ciphers and stream ciphers.

- Algorithms making use of 32-bit rotations: SHA256, AES (Shift Rows), ChaCha20, SM3.
- Algorithms making use of 64-bit rotations: SHA512, SHA3.

## A.4.2. Bit & Byte Permutations

RV32:

```
brev8 rd, rs1 // grevi rd, rs1, 7 - Reverse bits in bytes
rev8 rd, rs1 // grevi rd, rs1, 24 - Reverse bytes in 32-bit word
```

RV64:

```
brev8 rd, rs1 // grevi rd, rs1, 7 - Reverse bits in bytes
rev8 rd, rs1 // grevi rd, rs1, 56 - Reverse bytes in 64-bit word
```

The scalar cryptography extension provides the following instructions for manipulating the bit and byte endianness of data. They are all parameterisations of the Generalised Reverse with Immediate (`grevi`) instruction. The scalar cryptography extension requires *only* the above instances of `grevi` be implemented, which can be invoked via their pseudo-ops.

The full specification of the `grevi` instruction is available in [3] (Section 2.2.2).

*Notes to software developers*

Reversing bytes in words is very common in cryptography when setting a standard endianness for input and output data. Bit reversal within bytes is used for implementing the GHASH component of Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) [22].

RV32:

```
zip rd, rs1 // shfli rd, rs1, 15 - Bit interleave
unzip rd, rs1 // unshfli rd, rs1, 15 - Bit de-interleave
```

The `zip` and `unzip` pseudo-ops are specific instances of the more general `shfli` and `unshfli` instructions. The scalar cryptography extension requires *only* the above instances of `[un]shfli` be implemented, which can be invoked via their pseudo-ops. Only RV32 implementations require these instructions.

The full specification of the `shfli` instruction is available in [3] (Section 2.2.3).

*Notes to software developers*

These instructions perform a bit-interleave (or de-interleave) operation, and are useful for implementing the 64-bit rotations in the SHA3 [50] algorithm on a 32-bit architecture. On RV64, the relevant operations in SHA3 can be done natively using rotation instructions, so `zip` and `unzip` are not required.

### A.4.3. Carry-less Multiply

RV32, RV64:

```
clmul rd, rs1, rs2
clmulh rd, rs1, rs2
```

See [3] (Section 2.6) for details of this instruction. See [Chapter 5](#) for additional implementation requirements for these instructions, related to data independent execution latency.



#### Notes to software developers

As is mentioned there, obvious cryptographic use-cases for carry-less multiply are for Galois Counter Mode (GCM) block cipher operations. GCM is recommended by NIST as a block cipher mode of operation [22], and is the only *required* mode for the TLS 1.3 protocol.

### A.4.4. Logic With Negate

RV32, RV64:

```
andn rd, rs1, rs2
orn rd, rs1, rs2
xnor rd, rs1, rs2
```

See [3] (Section 2.1.3) for details of these instructions. These instructions are useful inside hash functions, block ciphers and for implementing software based side-channel countermeasures like masking. The `andn` instruction is also useful for constant time word-select in systems without the ternary Bitmanip `cmov` instruction.



#### Notes to software developers

In the context of Cryptography, these instructions are useful for: SHA3/Keccak Chi step, Bit-sliced function implementations, Software based power/EM side-channel countermeasures based on masking.

### A.4.5. Packing

RV32, RV64:

```
pack rd, rs1, rs2
packh rd, rs1, rs2
```

RV64:

```
packw rd, rs1, rs2
```

See [3] (Section 2.1.4) for details of these instructions.



#### Notes to software developers

The `pack*` instructions are useful for re-arranging halfwords within words, and generally getting data into the right shape prior to applying transforms. This is particularly useful for cryptographic algorithms which pass inputs around as (potentially un-aligned) byte strings, but can operate on words made out of those byte strings. This occurs (for example) in AES when loading blocks and keys (which may not be word aligned) into registers to perform the round functions.

## A.4.6. Crossbar Permutation Instructions

RV32, RV64:

```
xperm4 rd, rs1, rs2
xperm8 rd, rs1, rs2
```

See [3] (Section 2.2.4) for a complete description of this instruction.

The `xperm4` instruction operates on nibbles. `GPR[rs1]` contains a vector of `XLEN/4` 4-bit elements. `GPR[rs2]` contains a vector of `XLEN/4` 4-bit indexes. The result is each element in `GPR[rs2]` replaced by the indexed element in `GPR[rs1]`, or zero if the index into `GPR[rs2]` is out of bounds.

The `xperm8` instruction operates on bytes. `GPR[rs1]` contains a vector of `XLEN/8` 8-bit elements. `GPR[rs2]` contains a vector of `XLEN/8` 8-bit indexes. The result is each element in `GPR[rs2]` replaced by the indexed element in `GPR[rs1]`, or zero if the index into `GPR[rs2]` is out of bounds.

### *Notes to software developers*

The instruction can be used to implement arbitrary bit permutations. For cryptography, they can accelerate bit-sliced implementations, permutation layers of block ciphers, masking based countermeasures and SBox operations.



Lightweight block ciphers using 4-bit SBoxes include: PRESENT [20], Rectangle [65], GIFT [12], Twine [60], Skinny, MANTIS [17], Midori [11].

National ciphers using 8-bit SBoxes include: Camellia [8] (Japan), Aria [37] (Korea), AES [47] (USA, Belgium), SM4 [5] (China) Kuznyechik (Russia).

All of these SBoxes can be implemented efficiently, in constant time, using the `xperm8` instruction [1]. Note that this technique is also suitable for masking based side-channel countermeasures.

[1] [svn.clairexen.net/handicraft/2020/lut4perm/demo02.cc](https://svn.clairexen.net/handicraft/2020/lut4perm/demo02.cc)

# Appendix B: Entropy Source Rationale and Recommendations

This **non-normative** appendix focuses on the rationale, security, self-certification, and implementation aspects of entropy sources. Hence we also discuss non-ISA system features that may be needed for cryptographic standards compliance and security testing.

## B.1. Checklists for Design and Self-Certification

The security of cryptographic systems is based on secret bits and keys. These bits need to be random and originate from cryptographically secure Random Bit Generators (RBGs). An Entropy Source (ES) is required to construct secure RBGs.

While entropy source implementations do not have to be certified designs, RISC-V expects that they behave in a compatible manner and do not create unnecessary security risks to users. Self-evaluation and testing following appropriate security standards is usually needed to achieve this.

- **ISA Architectural Tests.** Verify, to the extent possible, that RISC-V ISA requirements in this specification are correctly implemented. This includes the state transitions ([Chapter 4](#) and [Section B.6](#)), access control ([Section 4.3](#)), and that **seed** ES16 **entropy** words can only be read destructively. The scope of RISC-V ISA architectural tests are those behaviors that are independent of the physical entropy source details. A smoke test ES module may be helpful in design phase.
- **Technical justification for entropy.** This may take the form of a stochastic model or a heuristic argument that explains why the noise source output is from a random, rather than pseudorandom (deterministic) process, and is not easily predictable or externally observable. A complete physical model is not necessary; research literature can be cited. For example, one can show that a good ring oscillator noise derives an amount of physical entropy from local, spontaneously occurring Johnson-Nyquist thermal noise [58], and is therefore not merely "random-looking".
- **Entropy Source Design Review.** An entropy source is more than a noise source, and must have features such as health tests ([Section B.4](#)), a conditioner ([Section B.2.2](#)), and a security boundary with clearly defined interfaces. One may tabulate the SHALL statements of SP 800-90B [61], FIPS 140-3 Implementation Guidance [53], AIS-31 [36] or other standards being used. Official and non-official checklist tables are available: [github.com/usnistgov/90B-Shell-Statements](https://github.com/usnistgov/90B-Shell-Statements)
- **Experimental Tests.** The raw noise source is subjected to entropy estimation as defined in NIST 800-90B, Section 3 [61]. The interface described in [Section B.6](#) can be used to record datasets for this purpose. One also needs to show experimentally that the conditioner and health test components work appropriately to meet the ES16 output entropy requirements of [Section 4.2](#). For SP 800-90B, NIST has made a min-entropy estimation package freely available: [github.com/usnistgov/SP800-90B\\_EntropyAssessment](https://github.com/usnistgov/SP800-90B_EntropyAssessment)
- **Resilience.** Above physical engineering steps should consider the operational environment of the device, which may be unexpected or hostile (actively attempting to exploit vulnerabilities in the design).

See [Section B.5](#) for a discussion of various implementation options.




It is one of the goals of the RISC-V Entropy Source specification that a standard 90B Entropy Source Module or AIS-31 RNG IP may be licensed from a third party and integrated with a RISC-V processor design. Compared to older (FIPS 140-2) RNG and DRBG modules, an entropy source module may have a relatively small area (just a few thousand NAND2 gate equivalent). CMVP is introducing an "Entropy Source Validation Scope" which potentially allows 90B validations to be re-used for different (FIPS 140-3) modules.

## B.2. Standards and Terminology

As a fundamental security function, the generation of random numbers is governed by numerous standards and technical evaluation methods, the main ones being FIPS 140-3 [52, 53] required for U.S. Federal use, and Common Criteria Methodology [21] used in high-security evaluations internationally.

Note that FIPS 140-3 is a significantly updated standard compared to its predecessor FIPS 140-2 and is only coming into use in the 2020s.

These standards set many of the technical requirements for the RISC-V entropy source design, and we use their terminology if possible.



### B.2.1. Entropy Source (ES)

Entropy sources are built by sampling and processing data from a noise source (Section B.5.1). We will only consider physical sources of true randomness in this work. Since these are directly based on natural phenomena and are subject to environmental conditions (which may be adversarial), they require features that monitor the "health" and quality of those sources.

The requirements for physical entropy sources are specified in NIST SP 800-90B [61] (Section 4.2.1) for U.S. Federal FIPS 140-3 [52] evaluations and in BSI AIS-31 [35, 36] (Section 4.2.2) for high-security Common Criteria evaluations. There is some divergence in the types of health tests and entropy metrics mandated in these standards, and RISC-V enables support for both alternatives.

## B.2.2. Conditioning: Cryptographic and Non-Cryptographic

Raw physical randomness (noise) sources are rarely statistically perfect, and some generate very large amounts of bits, which need to be "debiased" and reduced to a smaller number of bits. This process is called conditioning. A secure hash function is an example of a cryptographic conditioner. It is important to note that even though hashing may make any data look random, it does not increase its entropy content.

Non-cryptographic conditioners and extractors such as von Neumann's "debiased coin tossing" [64] are easier to implement efficiently but may reduce entropy content (in individual bits removed) more than cryptographic hashes, which mix the input entropy very efficiently. However, they do not require cryptanalytic or computational hardness assumptions and are therefore inherently more future-proof. See [Section B.5.5](#) for a more detailed discussion.

## B.2.3. Pseudorandom Number Generator (PRNG)

Pseudorandom Number Generators (PRNGs) use deterministic mathematical formulas to create abundant random numbers from a smaller amount of "seed" randomness. PRNGs are also divided into cryptographic and non-cryptographic ones.

Non-cryptographic PRNGs, such as LFSRs and the linear-congruential generators found in many programming libraries, may generate statistically satisfactory random numbers but must never be used for cryptographic keying. This is because they are not designed to resist *cryptanalysis*; it is usually possible to take some output and mathematically derive the "seed" or the internal state of the PRNG from it. This is a security problem since knowledge of the state allows the attacker to compute future or past outputs.

## B.2.4. Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG)

Cryptographic PRNGs are also known as Deterministic Random Bit Generators (DRBGs), a term used by SP 800-90A [14]. A strong cryptographic algorithm such as AES [47] or SHA-2/3 [50, 49] is used to produce random bits from a seed. The secret seed material is like a cryptographic key; determining the seed from the DRBG output is as hard as breaking AES or a strong hash function. This also illustrates that the seed/key needs to be long enough and come from a trusted Entropy Source. The DRBG should still be frequently refreshed (reseeded) for forward and backward security.

# B.3. Specific Rationale and Considerations

## B.3.1. (Section 4.1) The `seed` CSR

The interface was designed to be simple so that a vendor- and device-independent driver component (e.g., in Linux kernel, embedded firmware, or a cryptographic library) may use `seed` to generate truly random bits.

An entropy source does not require a high-bandwidth interface; a single DRBG source initialization only requires 512 bits (256 bits of entropy), and DRBG output can be shared by any number of callers. Once initiated, a DRBG requires new entropy only to mitigate the risk of state compromise.

From a security perspective, it is essential that the side effect of flushing the secret entropy bits occurs upon reading. Hence we mandate a write operation on this particular CSR.

A blocking instruction may have been easier to use, but most users should be querying a (D)RBG instead of an entropy source. Without a polling-style mechanism, the entropy source could hang for thousands of cycles under some circumstances. A `wfi` or `pause` mechanism (at least potentially) allows energy-saving sleep on MCUs and context switching on higher-end CPUs.

The reason for the particular `OPST = seed[31:0]` two-bit mechanism is to provide redundancy. The "fault" bit combinations `11` (`DEAD`) and `00` (`BIST`) are more likely for electrical reasons if feature discovery fails and the entropy source is actually not available.

The 16-bit bandwidth was a compromise motivated by the desire to provide redundancy in the return value, some protection against potential Power/EM leakage (further alleviated by the 2:1 cryptographic conditioning discussed in [Section B.5.6](#)), and the desire to have all of the bits "in the same place" on both RV32 and RV64 architectures for programming convenience.

### B.3.2. (Section 4.2.1) NIST SP 800-90B

SP 800-90C [15] states that each conditioned block of  $n$  bits is required to have  $n+64$  bits of input entropy to attain full entropy. Hence NIST SP 800-90B [61] min-entropy assessment must guarantee at least  $128 + 64 = 192$  bits input entropy per 256-bit block ( [15], Sections 4.1. and 4.3.2 ). Only then a hashing of  $16 * 16 = 256$  bits from the entropy source will produce the desired 128 bits of full entropy. This follows from the specific requirements, threat model, and distinguishability proof contained in SP 800-90C [15], Appendix A. The implied min-entropy rate is  $192/256=12/16=0.75$ . The expected Shannon entropy is much larger.

In FIPS 140-3 / SP 800-90 classification, an RBG2(P) construction is a cryptographically secure RBG with continuous access to a physical entropy source (`seed`) and output generated by a fully seeded, secure DRBG. The entropy source can also be used to build RBG3 full entropy sources [15]. The concatenation of output words corresponds to the `Get_ES_Bitstring` function.

The 128-bit output block size was selected because that is the output size of the CBC-MAC conditioner specified in Appendix F of [61] and also the smallest key size we expect to see in applications.

If NIST SP 800-90B certification is chosen, the entropy source should implement at least the health tests defined in Section 4.4 of [61]: the repetition count test and adaptive proportion test, or show that the same flaws will be detected by vendor-defined tests.

### B.3.3. (Section 4.2.2) BSI AIS-31

PTG.2 is one of the security and functionality classes defined in BSI AIS 20/31 [36]. The PTG.2 source requirements work as a building block for other types of BSI generators (e.g., DRBGs, or PTG.3 TRNG with appropriate software post-processing).

For validation purposes, the PTG.2 requirements may be mapped to security controls T1-3 ([Section B.4](#)) and the interface as follows:

- P1 [PTG.2.1] Start-up tests map to T1 and reset-triggered (on-demand) `BIST` tests.
- P2 [PTG.2.2] Continuous testing total failure maps to T2 and the `DEAD` state.
- P3 [PTG.2.3] Online tests are continuous tests of T2 – entropy output is prevented in the `BIST` state.
- P4 [PTG.2.4] Is related to the design of effective entropy source health tests, which we encourage.
- P5 [PTG.2.5] Raw random sequence may be checked via the `GetNoise` interface ([Section B.6](#)).
- P6 [PTG.2.6] Test Procedure A [36] (Sect 2.4.4.1) is a part of the evaluation process, and we suggest self-evaluation using these tests even if AIS-31 certification is not sought.
- P7 [PTG.2.7] Average Shannon entropy of "internal random bits" exceeds 0.997.

Note how P7 concerns Shannon entropy, not min-entropy as with NIST sources. Hence the min-entropy requirement needs to be also stated. PTG.2 modules built and certified to the AIS-31 standard can also meet the "full entropy" condition after 2:1 cryptographic conditioning, but not necessarily so. The technical validation process is somewhat different.



### B.3.4. (Section 4.2.3) Virtual Sources

All sources that are not direct physical sources (meeting the SP 800-90B or the AIS-31 PTG.2 requirements) need to meet the security requirements of virtual entropy sources. It is assumed that a virtual entropy source is not a limiting, shared bandwidth resource (but a software DRBG).

DRBGs can be used to feed other (virtual) DRBGs, but that does not increase the absolute amount of entropy in the system. The entropy source must be able to support current and future security standards and applications. The 256-bit requirement maps to "Category 5" of NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography (4.A.5 "Security Strength Categories" in [51]) and TOP SECRET schemes in Suite B and the newer U.S. Government CNSA Suite [54].

### B.3.5. (Section 4.3) Security Considerations for Direct Hardware Access

The ISA implementation and system design must try to ensure that the hardware-software interface minimizes avenues for adversarial information flow even if not explicitly forbidden in the specification.

For security, virtualization requires both conditioning and DRBG processing of physical entropy output. It is recommended if a single physical entropy source is shared between multiple different virtual machines or if the guest OS is untrusted. A virtual entropy source is significantly more resistant to depletion attacks and also lessens the risk from covert channels.

The direct `msecfg.[s,u]seed` option allows one to draw a security boundary around a component in relation to Sensitive Security Parameter (SSP) flows, even if that component is not in M mode. This is helpful when implementing trusted enclaves. Such modules can enforce the entire key lifecycle from birth (in the entropy source) to death (zeroization) to occur without the key being passed across the boundary to external code.

**Depletion.** Active polling may deny the entropy source to another simultaneously running consumer. This can (for example) delay the instantiation of that virtual machine if it requires entropy to initialize fully.

**Covert Channels.** Direct access to a component such as the entropy source can be used to establish communication channels across security boundaries. Active polling from one consumer makes the resource unavailable WAIT instead of ES16 to another (which is polling infrequently). Such interactions can be used to establish low-bandwidth channels.

**Hardware Fingerprinting.** An entropy source (and its noise source circuits) may have a uniquely identifiable hardware "signature." This can be harmless or even useful in some applications (as random sources may exhibit Physically Un-clonable Function (PUF) -like features) but highly undesirable in others (anonymized virtualized environments and enclaves). A DRBG masks such statistical features.

**Side Channels.** Some of the most devastating practical attacks against real-life cryptosystems have used inconsequential-looking additional information, such as padding error messages [13] or timing information [45].

We urge implementers against creating unnecessary information flows via status or custom bits or to allow any other mechanism to disable or affect the entropy source output. All information flows and interaction mechanisms must be considered from an adversarial viewpoint: the fewer the better.

As an example of side-channel analysis, we note that the entropy polling interface is typically not "constant time." One needs to analyze what kind of information is revealed via the timing oracle; one way of doing it is to model `seed` as a rejection sampler. Such a timing oracle can reveal information about the noise source type and entropy source usage, but not about the random output `entropy` bits themselves. If it does, additional countermeasures are necessary.

## B.4. Security Controls and Health Tests

The primary purpose of a cryptographic entropy source is to produce secret keying material. In almost all cases, a hardware entropy source must implement appropriate *security controls* to guarantee unpredictability, prevent leakage, detect attacks, and deny adversarial control over the entropy output or its generation mechanism. Explicit security controls are required for security testing and certification.

Many of the security controls built into the device are called "health checks." Health checks can take the form of integrity checks, start-up tests, and on-demand tests. These tests can be implemented in hardware or firmware, typically both. Several are mandated by standards such as NIST SP 800-90B [52]. The choice of appropriate health tests depends on the certification target, system architecture, threat model, entropy source type, and other factors.

Health checks are not intended for hardware diagnostics but for detecting security issues. Hence the default action in case of a failure should be aimed at damage control: Limiting further output and preventing weak crypto keys from being generated.

We discuss three specific testing requirements T1-T3. The testing requirement follows from the definition of an Entropy Source; without it, the module is simply a noise source and can't be trusted to safely generate keying material.

### B.4.1. T1: On-demand testing

A sequence of simple tests is invoked via resetting, rebooting, or powering up the hardware (not an ISA signal). The implementation will simply return **BIST** during the initial start-up self-test period; in any case, the driver must wait for them to finish before starting cryptographic operations. Upon failure, the entropy source will enter a no-output **DEAD** state.

**Rationale.** Interaction with hardware self-test mechanisms from the software side should be minimal; the term "on-demand" does not mean that the end-user or application program should be able to invoke them in the field (the term is a throwback to an age of discrete, non-autonomous crypto devices with human operators).

### B.4.2. T2: Continuous checks

If an error is detected in continuous tests or environmental sensors, the entropy source will enter a no-output state. We define that a non-critical alarm is signaled if the entropy source returns to **BIST** state from live (**WAIT** or **ES16**) states. Critical failures will result in **DEAD** state immediately. A hardware-based continuous testing mechanism must not make statistical information externally available, and it must be zeroized periodically or upon demand via reset, power-up, or similar signal.

**Rationale.** Physical attacks can occur while the device is running. The design should avoid guiding such active attacks by revealing detailed status information. Upon detection of an attack, the default action should be aimed at damage control — to prevent weak crypto keys from being generated.

The statistical nature of some tests makes "type-1" false positives a possibility. There may also be requirements for signaling of non-fatal alarms; AIS 31 specifies "noise alarms" that can go off with non-negligible probability even if the device is functioning correctly; these can be signaled with **BIST**. There rarely is anything that can or should be done about a non-fatal alarm condition in an operator-free, autonomous system.

The state of statistical runtime health checks (such as counters) is potentially correlated with some secret keying material, hence the zeroization requirement.

### B.4.3. T3: Fatal error states

Since the security of most cryptographic operations depends on the entropy source, a system-wide "default deny" security policy approach is appropriate for most entropy source failures. A hardware test failure should at least result in the **DEAD** state and possibly reset/halt. It's a show stopper: The entropy source (or its cryptographic client application) *must not* be allowed to run if its secure operation can't be guaranteed.

**Rationale.** These tests can complement other integrity and tamper resistance mechanisms (See Chapter 18 of [7] for examples).

Some hardware random generators are, by their physical construction, exposed to relatively non-adversarial environmental and manufacturing issues. However, even such "innocent" failure modes may indicate a *fault attack* [34] and therefore should be addressed as a system integrity failure rather than as a diagnostic issue.

Security architects will understand to use permanent or hard-to-recover "security-fuse" lockdowns only if the threshold of a test is such that the probability of false-positive is negligible over the entire device lifetime.

### B.4.4. Information Flows

Some of the most devastating practical attacks against real-life cryptosystems have used inconsequential-looking additional information, such as padding error messages [13] or timing information [45]. In cryptography, such out-of-band information sources are called "oracles."

To guarantee that no sensitive data is read twice and that different callers don't get correlated output, it is required that hardware implements *wipe-on-read* on the randomness pathway during each read (successful poll). For the same reasons, only complete and fully processed random words shall be made available via **entropy** (ES16 status of **seed**).

This also applies to the raw noise source. The raw source interface has been delegated to an optional vendor-specific test interface. Importantly the test interface and the main interface should not be operational at the same time.

The noise source state shall be protected from adversarial knowledge or influence to the greatest extent possible. The methods used for this shall be documented, including a description of the (conceptual) security boundary's role in protecting the noise source from adversarial observation or influence.

— NIST SP 800-90B, Noise Source Requirements

An entropy source is a singular resource, subject to depletion and also covert channels [23]. Observation of the entropy can be the same as the observation of the noise source output, as cryptographic conditioning is mandatory only as a post-processing step. SP 800-90B and other security standards mandate protection of noise bits from observation and also influence.

## B.5. Implementation Strategies

As a general rule, RISC-V specifies the ISA only. We provide some additional suggestions so that portable, vendor-independent middleware and kernel components can be created. The actual hardware implementation and certification are left to vendors and circuit designers; the discussion in this Section is purely informational.

When considering implementation options and trade-offs, one must look at the entire information flow.

1. **A Noise Source** generates private, unpredictable signals from stable and well-understood physical random events.

2. **Sampling** digitizes the noise signal into a raw stream of bits. This raw data also needs to be protected by the design.
3. **Continuous health tests** ensure that the noise source and its environment meet their operational parameters.
4. **Non-cryptographic conditioners** remove much of the bias and correlation in input noise.
5. **Cryptographic conditioners** produce full entropy output, completely indistinguishable from ideal random.
6. **DRBG** takes in  $\geq 256$  bits of seed entropy as keying material and uses a "one way" cryptographic process to rapidly generate bits on demand (without revealing the seed/state).

Steps 1-4 (possibly 5) are considered to be part of the Entropy Source (ES) and provided by the **seed** CSR. Adding the software-side cryptographic steps 5-6 and control logic complements it into a True Random Number Generator (TRNG).

### B.5.1. Ring Oscillators

We will give some examples of common noise sources that can be implemented in the processor itself (using standard cells).

The most common entropy source type in production use today is based on "free running" ring oscillators and their timing jitter. Here, an odd number of inverters is connected into a loop from which noise source bits are sampled in relation to a reference clock [16]. The sampled bit sequence may be expected to be relatively uncorrelated (close to IID) if the sample rate is suitably low [36]. However, further processing is usually required.

AMD [6], ARM [9], and IBM [40] are examples of ring oscillator TRNGs intended for high-security applications.

There are related metastability-based generator designs such as Transition Effect Ring Oscillator (TERO) [63]. The differential/feedback Intel construction [27] is slightly different but also falls into the same general metastable oscillator-based category.

The main benefits of ring oscillators are: (1) They can be implemented with standard cell libraries without external components—and even on FPGAs [62], (2) there is an established theory for their behavior [25, 26, 16], and (3) ample precedent exists for testing and certifying them at the highest security levels.

Ring oscillators also have well-known implementation pitfalls. Their output is sometimes highly dependent on temperature, which must be taken into account in testing and modeling. If the ring oscillator construction is parallelized, it is important that the number of stages and/or inverters in each chain is suitable to avoid entropy reduction due to harmonic "Huyghens synchronization" [10]. Such harmonics can also be inserted maliciously in a frequency injection attack, which can have devastating results [41]. Countermeasures are related to circuit design; environmental sensors, electrical filters, and usage of a differential oscillator may help.

### B.5.2. Shot Noise

A category of random sources consisting of discrete events and modeled as a Poisson process is called "shot noise." There's a long-established precedent of certifying them; the AIS 31 document [36] itself offers reference designs based on noisy diodes. Shot noise sources are often more resistant to temperature changes than ring oscillators. Some of these generators can also be fully implemented with standard cells (The Rambus / Inside Secure generic TRNG IP [55] is described as a Shot Noise generator).

### B.5.3. Other types of noise

It may be possible to certify more exotic noise sources and designs, although their stochastic model needs to be equally well understood, and their CPU interfaces must be secure. See [Section B.5.8](#) for a discussion of Quantum

entropy sources.

### B.5.4. Continuous Health Tests

Health monitoring requires some state information related to the noise source to be maintained. The tests should be designed in a way that a specific number of samples guarantees a state flush (no hung states). We suggest flush size  $W \leq 1024$  to match with the NIST SP 800-90B required tests (See Section 4.4 in [61]). The state is also fully zeroized in a system reset.

The two mandatory tests can be built with minimal circuitry. Full histograms are not required, only simple counter registers: repetition count, window count, and sample count. Repetition count is reset every time the output sample value changes; if the count reaches a certain cutoff limit, a noise alarm (BIST) or failure (DEAD) is signaled. The window counter is used to save every  $W$ 'th output (typically  $W$  in  $\{512, 1024\}$ ). The frequency of this reference sample in the following window is counted; cutoff values are defined in the standard. We see that the structure of the mandatory tests is such that, if well implemented, no information is carried beyond a limit of  $W$  samples.

Section 4.5 of [61] explicitly permits additional developer-defined tests, and several more were defined in early versions of FIPS 140-1 before being "crossed out." The choice of additional tests depends on the nature and implementation of the physical source.

Especially if a non-cryptographic conditioner is used in hardware, it is possible that the AIS 31 [36] online tests are implemented by driver software. They can also be implemented in hardware. For some security profiles, AIS 31 mandates that their tolerances are set in a way that the probability of an alarm is at least  $10^{-6}$  yearly under "normal usage." Such requirements are problematic in modern applications since their probability is too high for critical systems.

There rarely is anything that can or should be done about a non-fatal alarm condition in an operator-free, autonomous system. However, AIS 31 allows the DRBG component to keep running despite a failure in its Entropy Source, so we suggest re-entering a temporary BIST state (Section B.4) to signal a non-fatal statistical error if such (non-actionable) signaling is necessary. Drivers and applications can react to this appropriately (or simply log it), but it will not directly affect the availability of the TRNG. A permanent error condition should result in DEAD state.

### B.5.5. Non-cryptographic Conditioners

As noted in Section B.2.2, physical randomness sources generally require a post-processing step called *conditioning* to meet the desired quality requirements, which are outlined in Section 4.2.

The approach taken in this interface is to allow a combination of non-cryptographic and cryptographic filtering to take place. The first stage (hardware) merely needs to be able to distill the entropy comfortably above the necessary level.

- One may take a set of bits from a noise source and XOR them together to produce a less biased (and more independent) bit. However, such an XOR may introduce "pseudorandomness" and make the output difficult to analyze.
- The von Neumann extractor [64] looks at consecutive pairs of bits, rejects 00 and 11, and outputs 0 or 1 for 01 and 10, respectively. It will reduce the number of bits to less than 25% of the original, but the output is provably unbiased (assuming independence).
- Blum's extractor [19] can be used on sources whose behavior resembles N-state Markov chains. If its assumptions hold, it also removes dependencies, creating an independent and identically distributed (IID) source.
- Other linear and non-linear correctors such as those discussed by Dichtl and Lacharme [38].

Note that the hardware may also implement a full cryptographic conditioner in the entropy source, even though the software driver still needs a cryptographic conditioner, too ([Section 4.2](#)).

**Rationale:** The main advantage of non-cryptographic extractors is in their energy efficiency, relative simplicity, and amenability to mathematical analysis. If well designed, they can be evaluated in conjunction with a stochastic model of the noise source itself. They do not require computational hardness assumptions.

### B.5.6. Cryptographic Conditioners

For secure use, cryptographic conditioners are always required on the software side of the ISA boundary. They may also be implemented on the hardware side if necessary. In any case, the **entropy** ES16 output must always be compressed 2:1 (or more) before being used as keying material or considered "full entropy."

Examples of cryptographic conditioners include the random pool of the Linux operating system, secure hash functions (SHA-2/3, SHAKE [\[50, 49\]](#)), and the AES / CBC-MAC construction in Appendix F, SP 800-90B [\[61\]](#).

In some constructions, such as the Linux RNG and SHA-3/SHAKE [\[50\]](#) based generators, the cryptographic conditioning and output (DRBG) generation are provided by the same component.

**Rationale:** For many low-power targets constructions the type of hardware AES CBC-MAC conditioner used by Intel [\[44\]](#) and AMD [\[6\]](#) would be too complex and energy-hungry to implement solely to serve the **seed** CSR. On the other hand, simpler non-cryptographic conditioners may be too wasteful on input entropy if high-quality random output is required — (ARM TrustZone TRBG [\[9\]](#) outputs only 10Kbit/sec at 200 MHz.) Hence a resource-saving compromise is made between hardware and software generation.

### B.5.7. The Final Random: DRBGs

All random bits reaching end users and applications must come from a cryptographic DRBG. These are generally implemented by the driver component in software. The RISC-V AES and SHA instruction set extensions should be used if available since they offer additional security features such as timing attack resistance.

Currently recommended DRBGs are defined in NIST SP 800-90A (Rev 1) [\[14\]](#): **CTR\_DRBG**, **Hash\_DRBG**, and **HMAC\_DRBG**. Certification often requires known answer tests (KATs) for the symmetric components and the DRBG as a whole. These are significantly easier to implement in software than in hardware. In addition to the directly certifiable SP 800-90A DRBGs, a Linux-style random pool construction based on ChaCha20 [\[46\]](#) can be used, or an appropriate construction based on SHAKE256 [\[50\]](#).

These are just recommendations; programmers can adjust the usage of the CPU Entropy Source to meet future requirements.

### B.5.8. Quantum vs. Classical Random

The NCSC believes that classical RNGs will continue to meet our needs for government and military applications for the foreseeable future.

— U.K. NCSC QRNG Guidance, March 2020

A Quantum Random Number Generator (QRNG) is a TRNG whose source of randomness can be unambiguously identified to be a specific quantum phenomenon such as quantum state superposition, quantum state entanglement, Heisenberg uncertainty, quantum tunneling, spontaneous emission, or radioactive decay [\[32\]](#).

Direct quantum entropy is theoretically the best possible kind of entropy. A typical TRNG based on electronic noise is also largely based on quantum phenomena and is equally unpredictable - the difference is that the relative amount of quantum and classical physics involved is difficult to quantify for a classical TRNG.

QRNGs are designed in a way that allows the amount of quantum-origin entropy to be modeled and estimated. This distinction is important in the security model used by QKD (Quantum Key Distribution) security mechanisms which can be used to protect the physical layer (such as fiber optic cables) against interception by using quantum mechanical effects directly.

This security model means that many of the available QRNG devices do not use cryptographic conditioning and may fail cryptographic statistical requirements [28]. Many implementers may consider them to be entropy sources instead.

Relatively little research has gone into QRNG implementation security, but many QRNG designs are arguably more susceptible to leakage than classical generators (such as ring oscillators) as they tend to employ external components and mixed materials. As an example, amplification of a photon detector signal may be observable in power analysis, which classical noise-based sources are designed to resist.

### B.5.9. Post-Quantum Cryptography

PQC public-key cryptography standards [51] do not require quantum-origin randomness, just sufficiently secure keying material. Recall that cryptography aims to protect the confidentiality and integrity of data itself and does not place any requirements on the physical communication channel (like QKD).

Classical good-quality TRNGs are perfectly suitable for generating the secret keys for PQC protocols that are hard for quantum computers to break but implementable on classical computers. What matters in cryptography is that the secret keys have enough true randomness (entropy) and that they are generated and stored securely.

Of course, one must avoid DRBGs that are based on problems that are easily solvable with quantum computers, such as factoring [59] in the case of the Blum-Blum-Shub generator [18]. Most symmetric algorithms are not affected as the best quantum attacks are still exponential to key size [24].

As an example, the original Intel RNG [44], whose output generation is based on AES-128, can be attacked using Grover's algorithm with approximately square-root effort [33]. While even "64-bit" quantum security is extremely difficult to break, many applications specify a higher security requirement. NIST [51] defines AES-128 to be "Category 1" equivalent post-quantum security, while AES-256 is "Category 5" (highest). We avoid this possible future issue by exposing direct access to the entropy source which can derive its security from information-theoretic assumptions only.

## B.6. Suggested GetNoise Test Interface

Compliance testing, characterization, and configuration of entropy sources require access to raw, unconditioned noise samples. This conceptual test interface is named GetNoise in Section 2.3.2 of NIST SP 800-90B [61].

Since this type of interface is both necessary for security testing and also constitutes a potential backdoor to the cryptographic key generation process, we define a safety behavior that compliant implementations can have for temporarily disabling the entropy source `seed` CSR interface during test.

In order for shared RISC-V self-certification scripts (and drivers) to accommodate the test interface in a secure fashion, we suggest that it is implemented as a custom, M-mode only CSR, denoted here as `mnoise`.

This non-normative interface is not intended to be used as a source of randomness or for other production use. We define the semantics for single bit for this interface, `mnoise` [31], which is named `NOISE_TEST`, which will affect the behavior of `seed` if implemented.

When `NOISE_TEST = 1` in `mnoise`, the `seed` CSR must not return anything via `ES16`; it should be in `BIST` state unless the source is `DEAD`. When `NOISE_TEST` is again disabled, the entropy source shall return from `BIST` via an appropriate zeroization and self-test mechanism.

The behavior of other input and output bits is largely left to the vendor (as they depend on the technical details of the physical entropy source), as is the address of the custom `mnoise` CSR. Other contents and behavior of the CSR only can be interpreted in the context of `mvendorid`, `marchid`, and `mimpid` CSR identifiers.

When not implemented (e.g., in virtual machines), `mnoise` can permanently read zero (`0x00000000`) and ignore writes. When available, but `NOISE_TEST = 0`, `mnoise` can return a nonzero constant (e.g. `0x00000001`) but no noise samples.




Figure 2. Entropy source can't be read in test mode.

In `NOISE_TEST` mode, the `WAIT` and `ES16` states are unreachable, and no entropy is output. Implementation of test interfaces that directly affect `ES16` entropy output from the `seed` CSR interface is discouraged. Such vendor test interfaces have been exploited in attacks. For example, an ECDSA [48] signature process without sufficient entropy will not only create an insecure signature but can also reveal the secret signing key, that can be used for authentication forgeries by attackers. Hence even a temporary lapse in `entropy` security may have serious security implications.



## Appendix C: Supplementary Materials

While this document contains the specifications for the RISC-V cryptography extensions, numerous supplementary materials and example codes have also been developed. All of the materials related to the RISC-V Cryptography extension live in a Github Repository, located at [github.com/riscv/riscv-crypto](https://github.com/riscv/riscv-crypto)

- [doc/](#) Contains the source code for this document.
- [doc/supp/](#) Contains supplementary information and recommendations for implementers of software and hardware.
- [benchmarks/](#) Example software implementations.
- [rtl/](#) Example Verilog implementations of each instruction.
- [sail/](#) Formal model implementations in Sail.

## Appendix D: Supporting Sail Code

This section contains the supporting Sail code referenced by the instruction descriptions throughout the specification. The [Sail Manual](#) is recommended reading in order to best understand the supporting code.

```

/* Auxiliary function for performing GF multiplicaiton */
val xt2 : bits(8) -> bits(8)
function xt2(x) = {
  (x << 1) ^ (if bit_to_bool(x[7]) then 0x1b else 0x00)
}

val xt3 : bits(8) -> bits(8)
function xt3(x) = x ^ xt2(x)

/* Multiply 8-bit field element by 4-bit value for AES MixCols step */
val gfmul : (bits(8), bits(4)) -> bits(8)
function gfmul( x, y) = {
  (if bit_to_bool(y[0]) then      x      else 0x00) ^
  (if bit_to_bool(y[1]) then xt2(      x)  else 0x00) ^
  (if bit_to_bool(y[2]) then xt2(xt2(      x)) else 0x00) ^
  (if bit_to_bool(y[3]) then xt2(xt2(xt2(x))) else 0x00)
}

/* 8-bit to 32-bit partial AES Mix Colum - forwards */
val aes_mixcolumn_byte_fwd : bits(8) -> bits(32)
function aes_mixcolumn_byte_fwd(so) = {
  gfmul(so, 0x3) @ so @ so @ gfmul(so, 0x2)
}

/* 8-bit to 32-bit partial AES Mix Colum - inverse*/
val aes_mixcolumn_byte_inv : bits(8) -> bits(32)
function aes_mixcolumn_byte_inv(so) = {
  gfmul(so, 0xb) @ gfmul(so, 0xd) @ gfmul(so, 0x9) @ gfmul(so, 0xe)
}

/* 32-bit to 32-bit AES forward MixColumn */
val aes_mixcolumn_fwd : bits(32) -> bits(32)
function aes_mixcolumn_fwd(x) = {
  let s0 : bits (8) = x[ 7.. 0];
  let s1 : bits (8) = x[15.. 8];
  let s2 : bits (8) = x[23..16];
  let s3 : bits (8) = x[31..24];
  let b0 : bits (8) = xt2(s0) ^ xt3(s1) ^      (s2) ^      (s3);
  let b1 : bits (8) =      (s0) ^ xt2(s1) ^ xt3(s2) ^      (s3);
  let b2 : bits (8) =      (s0) ^      (s1) ^ xt2(s2) ^ xt3(s3);
  let b3 : bits (8) = xt3(s0) ^      (s1) ^      (s2) ^ xt2(s3);
  b3 @ b2 @ b1 @ b0 /* Return value */
}

```

```

}

/* 32-bit to 32-bit AES inverse MixColumn */
val aes_mixcolumn_inv : bits(32) -> bits(32)
function aes_mixcolumn_inv(x) = {
  let s0 : bits (8) = x[ 7.. 0];
  let s1 : bits (8) = x[15.. 8];
  let s2 : bits (8) = x[23..16];
  let s3 : bits (8) = x[31..24];
  let b0 : bits (8) = gfmul(s0, 0xE) ^ gfmul(s1, 0xB) ^ gfmul(s2, 0xD) ^ gfmul(s3,
0x9);
  let b1 : bits (8) = gfmul(s0, 0x9) ^ gfmul(s1, 0xE) ^ gfmul(s2, 0xB) ^ gfmul(s3,
0xD);
  let b2 : bits (8) = gfmul(s0, 0xD) ^ gfmul(s1, 0x9) ^ gfmul(s2, 0xE) ^ gfmul(s3,
0xB);
  let b3 : bits (8) = gfmul(s0, 0xB) ^ gfmul(s1, 0xD) ^ gfmul(s2, 0x9) ^ gfmul(s3,
0xE);
  b3 @ b2 @ b1 @ b0 /* Return value */
}

val aes_decode_rcon : bits(4) -> bits(32)
function aes_decode_rcon(r) = {
  match r {
    0x0 => 0x00000001,
    0x1 => 0x00000002,
    0x2 => 0x00000004,
    0x3 => 0x00000008,
    0x4 => 0x00000010,
    0x5 => 0x00000020,
    0x6 => 0x00000040,
    0x7 => 0x00000080,
    0x8 => 0x000001b,
    0x9 => 0x00000036,
    0xA => 0x00000000,
    0xB => 0x00000000,
    0xC => 0x00000000,
    0xD => 0x00000000,
    0xE => 0x00000000,
    0xF => 0x00000000
  }
}

/* SM4 SBox - only one sbox for forwards and inverse */
let sm4_sbox_table : list(bits(8)) = [
0xD6, 0x90, 0xE9, 0xFE, 0xCC, 0xE1, 0x3D, 0xB7, 0x16, 0xB6, 0x14, 0xC2, 0x28,
0xFB, 0x2C, 0x05, 0x2B, 0x67, 0x9A, 0x76, 0x2A, 0xBE, 0x04, 0xC3, 0xAA, 0x44,
0x13, 0x26, 0x49, 0x86, 0x06, 0x99, 0x9C, 0x42, 0x50, 0xF4, 0x91, 0xEF, 0x98,

```

```

0x7A, 0x33, 0x54, 0x0B, 0x43, 0xED, 0xCF, 0xAC, 0x62, 0xE4, 0xB3, 0x1C, 0xA9,
0xC9, 0x08, 0xE8, 0x95, 0x80, 0xDF, 0x94, 0xFA, 0x75, 0x8F, 0x3F, 0xA6, 0x47,
0x07, 0xA7, 0xFC, 0xF3, 0x73, 0x17, 0xBA, 0x83, 0x59, 0x3C, 0x19, 0xE6, 0x85,
0x4F, 0xA8, 0x68, 0x6B, 0x81, 0xB2, 0x71, 0x64, 0xDA, 0x8B, 0xF8, 0xEB, 0x0F,
0x4B, 0x70, 0x56, 0x9D, 0x35, 0x1E, 0x24, 0x0E, 0x5E, 0x63, 0x58, 0xD1, 0xA2,
0x25, 0x22, 0x7C, 0x3B, 0x01, 0x21, 0x78, 0x87, 0xD4, 0x00, 0x46, 0x57, 0x9F,
0xD3, 0x27, 0x52, 0x4C, 0x36, 0x02, 0xE7, 0xA0, 0xC4, 0xC8, 0x9E, 0xEA, 0xBF,
0x8A, 0xD2, 0x40, 0xC7, 0x38, 0xB5, 0xA3, 0xF7, 0xF2, 0xCE, 0xF9, 0x61, 0x15,
0xA1, 0xE0, 0xAE, 0x5D, 0xA4, 0x9B, 0x34, 0x1A, 0x55, 0xAD, 0x93, 0x32, 0x30,
0xF5, 0x8C, 0xB1, 0xE3, 0x1D, 0xF6, 0xE2, 0x2E, 0x82, 0x66, 0xCA, 0x60, 0xC0,
0x29, 0x23, 0xAB, 0x0D, 0x53, 0x4E, 0x6F, 0xD5, 0xDB, 0x37, 0x45, 0xDE, 0xFD,
0x8E, 0x2F, 0x03, 0xFF, 0x6A, 0x72, 0x6D, 0x6C, 0x5B, 0x51, 0x8D, 0x1B, 0xAF,
0x92, 0xBB, 0xDD, 0xBC, 0x7F, 0x11, 0xD9, 0x5C, 0x41, 0x1F, 0x10, 0x5A, 0xD8,
0x0A, 0xC1, 0x31, 0x88, 0xA5, 0xCD, 0x7B, 0xBD, 0x2D, 0x74, 0xD0, 0x12, 0xB8,
0xE5, 0xB4, 0xB0, 0x89, 0x69, 0x97, 0x4A, 0x0C, 0x96, 0x77, 0x7E, 0x65, 0xB9,
0xF1, 0x09, 0xC5, 0x6E, 0xC6, 0x84, 0x18, 0xF0, 0x7D, 0xEC, 0x3A, 0xDC, 0x4D,
0x20, 0x79, 0xEE, 0x5F, 0x3E, 0xD7, 0xCB, 0x39, 0x48
[]

```

```

let aes_sbox_fwd_table : list(bits(8)) = [
0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5, 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe,
0xd7, 0xab, 0x76, 0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0, 0xad, 0xd4,
0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0, 0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7,
0xcc, 0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15, 0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3,
0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a, 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75, 0x09,
0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0, 0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3,
0x2f, 0x84, 0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b, 0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe,
0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf, 0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85,
0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8, 0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92,
0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5, 0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2, 0xcd, 0x0c,
0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17, 0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19,
0x73, 0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88, 0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14,
0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb, 0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c, 0xc2,
0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79, 0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5,
0x4e, 0xa9, 0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08, 0xba, 0x78, 0x25,
0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6, 0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a,
0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e, 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86,
0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e, 0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94, 0x9b, 0x1e,
0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf, 0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42,
0x68, 0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16
]

```

```

let aes_sbox_inv_table : list(bits(8)) = [
0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38, 0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81,
0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb, 0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87, 0x34, 0x8e,
0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb, 0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23,
0x3d, 0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e, 0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66,

```

```

0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2, 0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25, 0x72,
0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16, 0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65,
0xb6, 0x92, 0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda, 0x5e, 0x15, 0x46,
0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84, 0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a,
0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06, 0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca,
0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02, 0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b, 0x3a, 0x91,
0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6,
0x73, 0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85, 0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8,
0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e, 0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89, 0x6f,
0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b, 0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2,
0x79, 0x20, 0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4, 0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8,
0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31, 0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f,
0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d, 0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93,
0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef, 0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0, 0xc8, 0xeb,
0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61, 0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6,
0x26, 0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d
[]

```

```

/* Lookup function - takes an index and a list, and retrieves the
 * x'th element of that list.
 */

```

```

val sbbox_lookup : (bits(8), list(bits(8))) -> bits(8)
function sbbox_lookup(x, table) = {
  match (x, table) {
    (0x00, t0::tn) => t0,
    (  y, t0::tn) => sbbox_lookup(x - 0x01, tn)
  }
}

```

```

/* Easy function to perform a forward AES SBox operation on 1 byte. */

```

```

val aes_sbbox_fwd : bits(8) -> bits(8)
function aes_sbbox_fwd(x) = sbbox_lookup(x, aes_sbbox_fwd_table)

```

```

/* Easy function to perform an inverse AES SBox operation on 1 byte. */

```

```

val aes_sbbox_inv : bits(8) -> bits(8)
function aes_sbbox_inv(x) = sbbox_lookup(x, aes_sbbox_inv_table)

```

```

/* AES SubWord function used in the key expansion
 * - Applies the forward sbbox to each byte in the input word.
 */

```

```

val aes_subword_fwd : bits(32) -> bits(32)
function aes_subword_fwd(x) = {
  aes_sbbox_fwd(x[31..24]) @
  aes_sbbox_fwd(x[23..16]) @
  aes_sbbox_fwd(x[15.. 8]) @
  aes_sbbox_fwd(x[ 7.. 0])
}

```

```

/* AES Inverse SubWord function.
 * - Applies the inverse sbox to each byte in the input word.
 */
val aes_subword_inv : bits(32) -> bits(32)
function aes_subword_inv(x) = {
  aes_sbox_inv(x[31..24]) @
  aes_sbox_inv(x[23..16]) @
  aes_sbox_inv(x[15.. 8]) @
  aes_sbox_inv(x[ 7.. 0])
}

/* Easy function to perform an SM4 SBox operation on 1 byte. */
val sm4_sbox : bits(8) -> bits(8)
function sm4_sbox(x) = sbox_lookup(x, sm4_sbox_table)

val aes_get_column : (bits(128), nat) -> bits(32)
function aes_get_column(state,c) = (state >> (to_bits(7, 32 * c)))[31..0]

/* 64-bit to 64-bit function which applies the AES forward sbox to each byte
 * in a 64-bit word.
 */
val aes_apply_fwd_sbox_to_each_byte : bits(64) -> bits(64)
function aes_apply_fwd_sbox_to_each_byte(x) = {
  aes_sbox_fwd(x[63..56]) @
  aes_sbox_fwd(x[55..48]) @
  aes_sbox_fwd(x[47..40]) @
  aes_sbox_fwd(x[39..32]) @
  aes_sbox_fwd(x[31..24]) @
  aes_sbox_fwd(x[23..16]) @
  aes_sbox_fwd(x[15.. 8]) @
  aes_sbox_fwd(x[ 7.. 0])
}

/* 64-bit to 64-bit function which applies the AES inverse sbox to each byte
 * in a 64-bit word.
 */
val aes_apply_inv_sbox_to_each_byte : bits(64) -> bits(64)
function aes_apply_inv_sbox_to_each_byte(x) = {
  aes_sbox_inv(x[63..56]) @
  aes_sbox_inv(x[55..48]) @
  aes_sbox_inv(x[47..40]) @
  aes_sbox_inv(x[39..32]) @
  aes_sbox_inv(x[31..24]) @
  aes_sbox_inv(x[23..16]) @
  aes_sbox_inv(x[15.. 8]) @
  aes_sbox_inv(x[ 7.. 0])
}

```

```

}

/*
 * AES full-round transformation functions.
 */

val getbyte : (bits(64), int) -> bits(8)
function getbyte(x, i) = (x >> to_bits(6, i * 8))[7..0]

val aes_rv64_shiftrows_fwd : (bits(64), bits(64)) -> bits(64)
function aes_rv64_shiftrows_fwd(rs2, rs1) = {
  getbyte(rs1, 3) @
  getbyte(rs2, 6) @
  getbyte(rs2, 1) @
  getbyte(rs1, 4) @
  getbyte(rs2, 7) @
  getbyte(rs2, 2) @
  getbyte(rs1, 5) @
  getbyte(rs1, 0)
}

val aes_rv64_shiftrows_inv : (bits(64), bits(64)) -> bits(64)
function aes_rv64_shiftrows_inv(rs2, rs1) = {
  getbyte(rs2, 3) @
  getbyte(rs2, 6) @
  getbyte(rs1, 1) @
  getbyte(rs1, 4) @
  getbyte(rs1, 7) @
  getbyte(rs2, 2) @
  getbyte(rs2, 5) @
  getbyte(rs1, 0)
}

/* 128-bit to 128-bit implementation of the forward AES ShiftRows transform.
 * Byte 0 of state is input column 0, bits 7..0.
 * Byte 5 of state is input column 1, bits 15..8.
 */
val aes_shift_rows_fwd : bits(128) -> bits(128)
function aes_shift_rows_fwd(x) = {
  let ic3 : bits(32) = aes_get_column(x, 3);
  let ic2 : bits(32) = aes_get_column(x, 2);
  let ic1 : bits(32) = aes_get_column(x, 1);
  let ic0 : bits(32) = aes_get_column(x, 0);
  let oc0 : bits(32) = ic0[31..24] @ ic1[23..16] @ ic2[15.. 8] @ ic3[ 7.. 0];
  let oc1 : bits(32) = ic1[31..24] @ ic2[23..16] @ ic3[15.. 8] @ ic0[ 7.. 0];
  let oc2 : bits(32) = ic2[31..24] @ ic3[23..16] @ ic0[15.. 8] @ ic1[ 7.. 0];
  let oc3 : bits(32) = ic3[31..24] @ ic0[23..16] @ ic1[15.. 8] @ ic2[ 7.. 0];
}

```

```

    (oc3 @ oc2 @ oc1 @ oc0) /* Return value */
}

/* 128-bit to 128-bit implementation of the inverse AES ShiftRows transform.
 * Byte 0 of state is input column 0, bits 7..0.
 * Byte 5 of state is input column 1, bits 15..8.
 */
val aes_shift_rows_inv : bits(128) -> bits(128)
function aes_shift_rows_inv(x) = {
    let ic3 : bits(32) = aes_get_column(x, 3); /* In column 3 */
    let ic2 : bits(32) = aes_get_column(x, 2);
    let ic1 : bits(32) = aes_get_column(x, 1);
    let ic0 : bits(32) = aes_get_column(x, 0);
    let oc0 : bits(32) = ic0[31..24] @ ic3[23..16] @ ic2[15.. 8] @ ic1[ 7.. 0];
    let oc1 : bits(32) = ic1[31..24] @ ic0[23..16] @ ic3[15.. 8] @ ic2[ 7.. 0];
    let oc2 : bits(32) = ic2[31..24] @ ic1[23..16] @ ic0[15.. 8] @ ic3[ 7.. 0];
    let oc3 : bits(32) = ic3[31..24] @ ic2[23..16] @ ic1[15.. 8] @ ic0[ 7.. 0];
    (oc3 @ oc2 @ oc1 @ oc0) /* Return value */
}

/* Applies the forward sub-bytes step of AES to a 128-bit vector
 * representation of its state.
 */
val aes_subbytes_fwd : bits(128) -> bits(128)
function aes_subbytes_fwd(x) = {
    let oc0 : bits(32) = aes_subword_fwd(aes_get_column(x, 0));
    let oc1 : bits(32) = aes_subword_fwd(aes_get_column(x, 1));
    let oc2 : bits(32) = aes_subword_fwd(aes_get_column(x, 2));
    let oc3 : bits(32) = aes_subword_fwd(aes_get_column(x, 3));
    (oc3 @ oc2 @ oc1 @ oc0) /* Return value */
}

/* Applies the inverse sub-bytes step of AES to a 128-bit vector
 * representation of its state.
 */
val aes_subbytes_inv : bits(128) -> bits(128)
function aes_subbytes_inv(x) = {
    let oc0 : bits(32) = aes_subword_inv(aes_get_column(x, 0));
    let oc1 : bits(32) = aes_subword_inv(aes_get_column(x, 1));
    let oc2 : bits(32) = aes_subword_inv(aes_get_column(x, 2));
    let oc3 : bits(32) = aes_subword_inv(aes_get_column(x, 3));
    (oc3 @ oc2 @ oc1 @ oc0) /* Return value */
}

/* Applies the forward MixColumns step of AES to a 128-bit vector
 * representation of its state.
 */

```



```
val aes_mixcolumns_fwd : bits(128) -> bits(128)
function aes_mixcolumns_fwd(x) = {
  let oc0 : bits(32) = aes_mixcolumn_fwd(aes_get_column(x, 0));
  let oc1 : bits(32) = aes_mixcolumn_fwd(aes_get_column(x, 1));
  let oc2 : bits(32) = aes_mixcolumn_fwd(aes_get_column(x, 2));
  let oc3 : bits(32) = aes_mixcolumn_fwd(aes_get_column(x, 3));
  (oc3 @ oc2 @ oc1 @ oc0) /* Return value */
}

/* Applies the inverse MixColumns step of AES to a 128-bit vector
 * representation of its state.
 */
val aes_mixcolumns_inv : bits(128) -> bits(128)
function aes_mixcolumns_inv(x) = {
  let oc0 : bits(32) = aes_mixcolumn_inv(aes_get_column(x, 0));
  let oc1 : bits(32) = aes_mixcolumn_inv(aes_get_column(x, 1));
  let oc2 : bits(32) = aes_mixcolumn_inv(aes_get_column(x, 2));
  let oc3 : bits(32) = aes_mixcolumn_inv(aes_get_column(x, 3));
  (oc3 @ oc2 @ oc1 @ oc0) /* Return value */
}
```