

Unclonable Secret Sharing

Prabhanjan Ananth* Vipul Goyal† Jiahui Liu‡ Qipeng Liu§

Abstract

Unclonable cryptography utilizes the principles of quantum mechanics to address cryptographic tasks that are impossible classically. We introduce a novel unclonable primitive in the context of secret sharing, called unclonable secret sharing (USS). In a USS scheme, there are n shareholders, each holding a share of a classical secret represented as a quantum state. They can recover the secret once all parties (or at least t parties) come together with their shares. Importantly, it should be infeasible to copy their own shares and send the copies to two non-communicating parties, enabling both of them to recover the secret.

Our work initiates a formal investigation into the realm of unclonable secret sharing, shedding light on its implications, constructions, and inherent limitations.

- **Connections:** We explore the connections between USS and other quantum cryptographic primitives such as unclonable encryption and position verification, showing the difficulties to achieve USS in different scenarios.
- **Limited Entanglement:** In the case where the adversarial shareholders do not share any entanglement or limited entanglement, we demonstrate information-theoretic constructions for USS.
- **Large Entanglement:** If we allow the adversarial shareholders to have unbounded entanglement resources (and unbounded computation), we prove that unclonable secret sharing is impossible. On the other hand, in the quantum random oracle model where the adversary can only make a bounded polynomial number of queries, we show a construction secure even with unbounded entanglement.

Furthermore, even when these adversaries possess only a polynomial amount of entanglement resources, we establish that any unclonable secret sharing scheme with a reconstruction function implementable using Cliffords and logarithmically many T-gates is also unattainable.

*University of California, Santa Barbara. prabhanjan@cs.ucsb.edu.

†NTT Research, Carnegie Mellon University. vipul@cmu.edu.

‡Massachusetts Institute of Technology. jiahui@csail.mit.edu.

§University of California, San Diego. qipengliu0@gmail.com.

Contents

| | | |
|----------|--|-----------|
| 1 | Introduction | 3 |
| 1.1 | Our Results | 5 |
| 2 | Technical Overview | 8 |
| 2.1 | USS_1 implies UE, UE implies USS_2 | 8 |
| 2.2 | Construction of $USS_{\omega(\log \lambda)}$ | 9 |
| 2.3 | Impossibility of USS_1 | 11 |
| 2.4 | Barriers of USS_1 (implication of PV) | 12 |
| 3 | Preliminaries | 13 |
| 3.1 | Notations | 13 |
| 3.2 | Unclonable Encryption | 13 |
| 3.3 | Quantum Gate Sets | 14 |
| 3.4 | Quantum Query Algorithms | 15 |
| 3.5 | Port-based Teleportation | 15 |
| 4 | Definitions and Notations | 16 |
| 4.1 | Unclonable Secret Sharing | 16 |
| 4.2 | Indistinguishability-Based Security | 16 |
| 4.3 | Entanglement Graph | 17 |
| 5 | Adversaries with Disconnected Entanglement Graphs | 18 |
| 5.1 | $USS_{\omega(\log \lambda)}$: an Information-Theoretic Approach | 18 |
| 5.2 | USS_d , for $d \geq 2$: from Unclonable Encryption | 20 |
| 6 | Adversaries with Full Entanglement | 22 |
| 6.1 | Security | 23 |
| 7 | Impossibilities and Barriers | 24 |
| 7.1 | Impossibility in the Information-Theoretic Setting | 25 |
| 7.2 | Impossibility with Low T-gates for Efficient Adversaries | 26 |
| 7.3 | USS Implies Unclonable Encryption | 28 |
| 7.4 | Search-based USS Implies Position Verification | 30 |
| | References | 33 |
| A | Additional Preliminaries | 35 |
| A.1 | Gate Teleportation Protocol | 35 |
| A.2 | Search-Based Security and Collusion-Resistant Security | 36 |

1 Introduction

Alice is looking for storage for her sensitive data. She decides to hire multiple independent cloud providers and secret shares her data across them. Later on, Alice retrieves these shares and reconstructs the data. Everything went as planned. However: what if the cloud providers keep a copy and sell shares of her data to her competitor, Bob? How can Alice make sure that once she retrieves her data, no one else can?

This is clearly impossible in the classical setting. The cloud providers can always keep a copy of the share locally and later, if Bob comes along, sell that copy to Bob. Nonetheless, this problem has been recently studied in the classical setting by a recent work of Goyal, Song, and Srinivasan [GSS21] who introduced the notion of traceable secret sharing (TSS). In TSS, if (a subset of) the cloud providers sell their shares to Bob, they cannot avoid leaving a cryptographic proof of fraud with Bob. Moreover, this cryptographic proof could not have been generated by Alice. Hence, (assuming Bob cooperates with Alice), Alice can sue the cloud providers in court and recover damages. Thus, TSS only acts as a deterrent and indeed, cannot stop the cloud providers from copying the secret.

However, in the quantum setting, the existence of no cloning theorem offers the tantalizing possibility that perhaps one may be able to build an “unclonable secret sharing” (USS) scheme. Very informally, the most basic version of a USS can be described as follows:

- Alice (the dealer) has a classical secret $m \in \{0, 1\}^*$. She hires n cloud providers $\mathcal{P}_1, \dots, \mathcal{P}_n$.
- Alice computes shares (ρ_1, \dots, ρ_n) , which is an n -partite state, from m and sends the share ρ_i to the party \mathcal{P}_i (note that Alice does not need to store any information like a cryptography key on her own).
- Given (ρ_1, \dots, ρ_n) , it is easy to recover m . But given any strict subset of the shares, no information about m can be deduced (i.e., it is an n -out-of- n secret sharing scheme).
- The most important is the unclonability. For every $i \in [n]$, the party \mathcal{P}_i computes a bipartite state $\sigma_{\mathbf{X}_i \mathbf{Y}_i}$. It sends the register \mathbf{X}_i to Bob and \mathbf{Y}_i to Charlie. Assuming that the message m was randomly chosen to be either m_0 or m_1 (where (m_0, m_1) is chosen adversarially), the probability that both Bob and Charlie can guess the correct message must be upper bounded by a quantity negligibly close to $\frac{1}{2}$.

In other words, the parties $\mathcal{P}_1, \dots, \mathcal{P}_n$ must be unable to locally clone their shares such that both sets of shares allow for reconstruction. Indeed, as we mentioned, this is the most basic version of USS. Even this basic setting has a practical significance: the servers which store Alice’s shares may not intentionally communicate her shares with each other, because they belong to companies with conflict of interest; but a malicious Bob may still buy a copy of Alice’s share from each of them.

One can consider more general settings where, e.g., we are interested in threshold (i.e., t -out-of- n) USS or, where a subset of the n parties might collude in attempting to clone their shares. One can also consider the setting where the parties $\mathcal{P}_1, \dots, \mathcal{P}_n$ share some entanglement (allowing them to use quantum teleportation).

Unclonable cryptography leverages the power of quantum information and empowers one to achieve primitives which are clearly impossible in classical cryptography. While a lot of efforts have been made towards various unclonable cryptographic primitives including but not limited to

quantum money [BB20, AC12, Zha17, Shm22, LMZ23], copy-protection [Aar09, CLLZ21, AL20], tokenized signatures [BS16, CLLZ21, Shm22] and unclonable encryption (UE) [Got02, BL20, AK21, AKL⁺22, AKL23], the question of unclonable secret sharing had not been studied prior to our work. Secret sharing is one of the most fundamental primitives in cryptography and as such, we believe that studying unclonable secret sharing is an important step towards laying the foundation of unclonable cryptography. Our contribution lies in initiating a systematic study of USS.

Connection to Unclonable Encryption. The classical counterparts of unclonable encryption and (2-out-of-2) unclonable secret sharing are very similar. For instance, both one-time pad encryption and 2-out-of-2 secret sharing rely on the same ideas in the classical setting. One may wonder if UE and USS share similar a relation. UE resembles standard encryption with one additional property: now ciphertext is unclonable, meaning no one can duplicate a ciphertext into two parts such that both parts can be used separately to recover the original plaintext. At first glance, it might seem like UE directly implies a 2-out-of-2 USS. To secret share m , the dealer (Alice) would generate a secret key sk , and compute ciphertext ρ_{ct} , which encrypts the classical message m . One of the shares will be ρ_{ct} while the other will be sk . Since ρ_{ct} is unclonable, this may prevent two successful reconstructions of the original message.

However, the above intuition does not work if the two parties in (2-out-of-2) USS share entanglement. In UE, the ciphertext ρ_{ct} is a split into two components and sent to Alice and Bob. Later on, the secret key sk is sent (without any modification) to both Alice and Bob. However, in USS, the secret key sk corresponds to the second share and might also be split into two register such that one is sent to Alice and the other to Bob. This split could be done using a quantum register which is entangled with the quantum register used to split the cipher text ρ_{ct} . It is unclear if such an attack can be reduced to the UE setting, where there is no analog of such an entangled register. In fact, we show the opposite. We show that in some settings, USS implies UE, thus showing that USS could be a stronger primitive.

Connection to Instantaneous Non-Local Computation. It turns out that the positive results on instantaneous non-local computation imply negative results on USS in specific settings. The problem of instantaneous non-local computation [Vai03, BK11, Spe15, IH08, GC19] is the following: Dave and Eve would like to compute a unitary U on a state $\rho_{\mathbf{X}\mathbf{Y}}$, where Dave has the register \mathbf{X} and Eve has the register \mathbf{Y} . They need to do so by just exchanging one message simultaneously with each other. Non-local computation has connections to the theory of quantum gravity, as demonstrated in some recent works [May19, May22]. Suppose there is a unitary U for which non-local computation is possible then this rules out a certain class of unclonable secret sharing schemes. Specifically, it disallows certain reconstruction procedures that are functionally equivalent to U . In more detail, consider a USS scheme that is defined as follows: on input a message m , it produces shares on two registers \mathbf{X} and \mathbf{Y} . The reconstruction procedure¹ takes as input the shares and outputs m in both registers \mathbf{X} and \mathbf{Y} . Any non-local computation protocol for such a reconstruction procedure would violate the security of the USS scheme. Investigating both positive and negative results of USS schemes could shed more light on the feasibility of non-local computation. In this work, we adapt and generalize techniques used in the literature on non-local computation to obtain impossibility

¹In general, a reconstruction procedure need not output a copy of the secret twice but using CNOT gates, we can easily transform any reconstruction procedure into one that outputs two copies of the secret.

results for USS.

USS also has connections to position verification, a well-studied notion in quantum cryptography that has connections to problems in fundamental physics. We discuss this in the next section.

1.1 Our Results

In this work, our primary emphasis will be on n -out-of- n unclonable secret sharing schemes as even though they are the simplest, they give rise to numerous intriguing questions. Our results are twofold, as below.

1.1.1 Results on Information-Theoretic USS




Figure 1: Relations between USS and UE in the information-theoretic regime.

We first examine the connections between USS and UE and constructions of UE in the information-theoretic regime. The first part of our results can be summarized by [Figure 1](#). In the figure, USS_1 stands for information-theoretic USS, secure against adversarial parties sharing *unbounded* amount of entanglement; we will explain why we call it USS_1 later on. We first show that, even if we restrict adversaries in USS_1 to have a polynomial amount of entanglement, it implies UE.

Theorem 1.1 (direction (a) in [Figure 1](#), [Section 7.3](#)). *Information-theoretic USS that is secure against adversarial parties \mathcal{P} sharing polynomial amount of entanglement implies UE.*

This leads us to ponder whether USS_1 and UE share equivalence, like their classical counterparts do. Perhaps surprisingly, we show that this connection is unlike to hold. We prove that USS_1 does not exist in the information-theoretic setting. Since there is no obvious evidence to refute UE in the IT setting and many candidates were proposed toward information-theoretic UE, our impossibility stands in sharp contrast to UE.

Theorem 1.2 (direction (b) in [Figure 1](#), [Section 7.1](#)). *Information-theoretic USS that is secure against adversarial parties \mathcal{P} sharing unbounded amount of entanglement with each other, does not exist.*

Facing the above impossibility, it seems like USS in the IT regime comes to a dead end. To overcome the infeasibility result, we investigate USS against adversarial parties with specific entanglement configurations. We consider the case where every pair of \mathcal{P}_i and \mathcal{P}_j either shares unbounded entanglement or shares no entanglement. In this case, we can define an entanglement graph, of which an edge (i, j) corresponds to entanglement between \mathcal{P}_i and \mathcal{P}_j . Then, we propose the natural generalization and define USS_d for any $d > 1$:

USS_d : Information-theoretic USS, secure against adversarial parties sharing entanglement whose entanglement graph has at least d connected components.

The above definition captures the case that there are d groups of parties; there is unlimited entanglement between parties in the same group and no entanglement between parties in different groups. This notation is not only for overcoming the barrier, but also has practical interest: parties from different groups are geographically separated or have conflict of interest, maintaining entanglement between them is either too expensive or impossible. Note that the characterization of entanglement is only for adversarial parties, whereas honest execution of the scheme does not need any pre-shared entanglement. We also like to note that aforementioned USS_1 is also captured by the above definition when $d = 1$.

It is easy to see that the existence of USS_d implies USS_{d+1} for any $d \geq 1$, as having less entanglement makes attacking more difficult. However, since USS_1 is impossible, can we construct USS_d for some d ? We complete the picture of USS and UE by presenting the following two theorems.

Theorem 1.3 (direction (c) in [Figure 1, Section 5.2](#)). *UE implies USS_2 in the information-theoretic setting. As a corollary, it implies USS_d for any $d > 1$ in the IT setting.*

Theorem 1.4 (construction (d) in [Figure 1, Section 5.1](#)). *USS_d exists for every $d = \omega(\log \lambda)$ in the information-theoretic setting, where λ is the security parameter.*

Along with [Theorem 1.4](#), we proved a special XOR lemma of the well-known monogamy-of-entanglement property for BB84 states [[BB20](#), [TFKW13](#)], when the splitting adversary is limited to tensor strategies. More precisely, we only consider cloning strategies that apply channels on each individual qubit, but never jointly on two or more qubits. Given a BB84 state, let $p(n)$ be the probability of the optimal tensor cloning strategy, that later two non-communicating parties recover the parity simultaneously. $p(1) = 1/2 + 1/2\sqrt{2}$ was proved in [[TFKW13](#)]. In this work, we show that $p(n) = 1/2 + \exp(-\Omega(n))$, which demonstrates a XOR hardness amplification for tensor strategies. We believe the proof of the theorem will be of independent interest, as a more general version of the theorem (that applies to any cloning strategies) will imply UE in the IT setting, resolving an open question on unclonable encryption since [[BL20](#)].

These two theorems establish a clear distinction between USS_1 and USS_d for all d greater than 1. Furthermore, the latter theorem illustrates that as the value of d becomes sufficiently large, it becomes feasible to achieve USS_d within the IT setting. Consequently, it implies that, at the very least, certain objectives outlined in [Figure 1](#) can be constructed.

Lastly, as the final arrow in [Figure 1](#), does USS_2 or $\text{USS}_{\omega(\log \lambda)}$ implies UE?

Remark 1.5 (direction (e) in [Figure 1](#)). *We do not have an answer yet. Nonetheless, we assert that either USS_d does not imply UE, or establishing this implication is as challenging as constructing UE. The latter assertion arises from our existing knowledge of $\text{USS}_{\omega(\log \lambda)}$ — demonstrating such an implication should, in turn, furnish us with a means to construct UE within the IT framework.*

1.1.2 Results on Computational USS

In this computational regime, adversarial parties are computationally bounded; this in turn implies that the amount of pre-shared entanglement is also computationally bounded. Unlike the comprehensive picture presented in [Figure 1](#), our understanding here is more intricate. Specifically, as




Figure 2: Relations between USS and UE in the computational regime.

demonstrated in [Figure 2](#), the feasibility or infeasibility hinges on factors such as the computational complexity of USS schemes and the actual quantity of shared entanglement among malicious parties.

Similar to the IT setting, the implication of USS_1 and UE still works (direction (a) in [Figure 2](#)). What is new here is that we present one impossibility result and one infeasibility result on USS_1 .

Theorem 1.6 (Informal, impossibility (f) in [Figure 2](#), [Section 7.2](#)). *USS whose reconstruction function has only d T gates, can be attacked with adversarial parties sharing $O(2^d)$ qubits of pre-shared entanglement.*

Therefore, when the reconstruction has low T complexity, say $d = \log \lambda$, then such USS does not exist even in the computational regime. Next, we present a construction, in sharp contrast to the impossibility above. Quantum random oracle [[BDF⁺11](#)], models the perfect (and unrealizable) cryptographic hash function. As it should behave as a truly random function, it can not have a small number of T gates.

Theorem 1.7 (construction (g) in [Figure 2](#), [Section 6](#)). *USS that is secure against query-efficient adversarial parties sharing an arbitrary amount of pre-shared entanglement², exists in the quantum random oracle model (QROM).*

As quantum random oracle is not realizable in general, we wonder whether USS_1 can be constructed in the plain model. To the end, we show that USS_1 implies a cryptographic primitive called 1-dimensional position verification that is secure against parties sharing any polynomial amount of entanglement. Position verification represents an actively explored research area. Despite all the ongoing efforts, the development of a construction for position verification within the standard model remains elusive. This underscores the formidable challenge of devising USS_1 , when relying on computational assumptions.

Theorem 1.8 (direction (h) in [Figure 2](#), [Section 7.4](#)). *USS that is secure against adversarial parties having pre-shared entanglement, implies 1-dimensional position verification that is secure against parties sharing the same amount of pre-shared entanglement.*

²The adversary is polynomially bounded in queries but not in the pre-shared entanglement.

2 Technical Overview

In this section, unless otherwise specified, we focus on 2-out-of-2 USS, with **Share** and **Reconstruct**. **Share** takes as input a message m and outputs two shares ρ_0, ρ_1 ; whereas **Reconstruct** takes two quantum shares and outputs a string. We assume ρ_0, ρ_1 are unentangled. When we consider impossibility results, all arguments mentioned in this overview carry in the same way to the general cases; for constructions, we only require unentangled shares.

2.1 USS_1 implies UE, UE implies USS_2

We first examine two directions (directions (a) and (c) in [Figures 1 and 2](#)); that is, how USS_1 implies UE and how UE implies USS_2 . These two directions work in both IT and computational setting. We briefly recall the definition of UE: it is a secret key encryption scheme with the additional property: there is no way to split a quantum ciphertext into two parts, both combining with the classical secret key can recover the original plaintext (with probability at least $1/2$ plus negligible).

USS_1 implies UE, [Section 7.3](#). Given a 2-out-of-2 USS, we now design a UE:

$\text{UE.Enc}(k, m)$ takes as input a secret key k and a message,

1. it first produces two shares $(\rho_1, \rho_2) \leftarrow \text{USS.Share}(m)$,
2. it parses $k = (a, b)$ and let the unclonable ciphertext be $\text{ct} = (\rho_1, X^a Z^b \rho_2 Z^b X^a)$. In other words, it sends out ρ_1 in clear, while having ρ_2 one-time padded by the key k .

Decryption is straightforward, by unpadding $X^a Z^b \rho_2 Z^b X^a$ and applying **Reconstruct** to (ρ_1, ρ_2) . Correctness and semantic security follows easily. Its unclonability can be based on the unclonability of USS_1 ; indeed, the scheme corresponds to a special strategy of malicious \mathcal{P}_1 and \mathcal{P}_2 . Suppose there exists an adversary $(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C})$ that violates the above scheme, there exists $(\mathcal{P}_1, \mathcal{P}_2, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C})$ that violates the security of USS_1 .

\mathcal{P}_1 and \mathcal{P}_2 share EPR pairs. \mathcal{P}_2 uses the EPR pairs to teleport ρ_2 to \mathcal{P}_1 , with \mathcal{P}_2 having random (a, b) and \mathcal{P}_1 obtaining $(\rho_1, X^a Z^b \rho_2 Z^b X^a)$. As \mathcal{P}_2 only has classical information, it sends (a, b) to both \mathcal{B} and \mathcal{C} , while \mathcal{P}_1 applies \mathcal{A} on $(\rho_1, X^a Z^b \rho_2 Z^b X^a)$ and shares the bipartite state with both \mathcal{B} and \mathcal{C} .

It is not hard to see that the above attacking strategy for USS_1 exactly corresponds to an attack in the UE we proposed above: \mathcal{P}_1 tries to split a ciphertext while \mathcal{P}_2 simply forwards the secret key $k = (a, b)$. Therefore, we can base the unclonability of the UE on that of USS_1 , which completes the first direction.

UE implies USS_2 , [Section 5.2](#). Recall that 2-out-of-2 USS_2 describes adversarial parties who do not share any entanglement. We can simply set up our USS_2 scheme as follows, using UE:

$\text{Share}(m)$ takes as input a message m , it samples a key k for UE, and let $|\text{ct}\rangle$ be the unclonable ciphertext of m under k ; the procedure **Share** outputs the first share as $\rho_1 = k$, and the second share as $\rho_2 = |\text{ct}\rangle$.

As there is no entanglement between \mathcal{P}_1 and \mathcal{P}_2 , \mathcal{P}_1 with $\rho_1 = k$ forwards the classical information to both Alice and Bob. In the meantime, \mathcal{P}_2 employs her cloning strategy, which remains entirely independent of the key k . Consequently, the unclonability of our USS_2 aligns with that of UE.

When we generalize the conclusion to n -out-of- n USS_2 , we first secret share the targeted message m into n shares. For any two adjacent parties $\mathcal{P}_i, \mathcal{P}_{i+1}$ and the i -th share, the first part receives the key and the second one gets the unclonable ciphertext. As long as all the malicious parties form at least two connected components (as defined in USS_2), there must be two adjacent parties who do not have entanglement. Thus, we can incur the same logic to prove its unclonability, basing on the unclonability of UE.

2.2 Construction of $\text{USS}_{\omega(\log \lambda)}$

For simplicity, we focus on an n -out-of- n USS, where $n = \omega(\log \lambda)$ and no entanglement is shared between any malicious parties, which is a special case of a general n -out-of- n $\text{USS}_{\omega(\log \lambda)}$, for a larger $n \gg \omega(\log \lambda)$. Our construction is based on the BB84 states. Our scheme first classically secret-shares m into $(n - 1)$ shares and encodes each classical share into a single-qubit BB84 state. One party will receive the basis information θ which contains $(n - 1)$ basis; every other party will receive a BB84 state for the i -th classical share.

Share(m): it takes as input a secret $m \in \{0, 1\}$,

- it samples m_1, \dots, m_{n-1} conditioned on their parity equals to m ;
- it samples $\theta \in \{0, 1\}^{n-1}$;
- let the first $(n - 1)$ shares be $\rho_i = H^{\theta_i} |m_i\rangle \langle m_i| H^{\theta_i}$ and the last share $\rho_n = |\theta\rangle \langle \theta|$.

Reconstruction of shares is straightforward. After receiving all shares, one uses the basis information θ to recover all the classical shares m_i ; m then is clearly determined by these m_i .

To reason about the unclonability of our protocol, we first recall a theorem on BB84 states, initially proposed by Tomamichel, Fehr, Kaniewski and Wehner [TFKW13] and later adapted in constructing unclonable encryption by Broadbent and Lord [BL20]. We start by considering a cloning game of single-qubit BB84 states.

1. \mathcal{A} receives $H^\theta |x\rangle \langle x| H^\theta$ for uniformly random $x, \theta \in \{0, 1\}$, it applies a channel and produces $\sigma_{\mathbf{BC}}$. Bob and Charlie receive their registers accordingly.
2. Bob \mathcal{B} and Charlie \mathcal{C} apply their POVMs and try to recover x ; they win if and only if both guess x correctly.

Lemma 2.1 (Corollary 2 when $n = 1$, [BL20]). *No (unbounded) quantum $(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C})$ wins the above game with probability more than 0.855.*

Tomamichel, Fehr, Kaniewski and Wehner [TFKW13] and Broadbent and Lord [BL20] studied parallel repetitions of the above cloning game³. In the parallel repetition, n random and independent BB84 states are generated, which encode an n -bit string x . The goal of cloning algorithms is to guess the n -bit string x simultaneously. They showed that the cloning game follows parallel repetition,

³Indeed, [TFKW13] proved a stronger statement on a different game, which ultimately implied the parallel repetition theorem, shown by [BL20].

meaning that the optimal winning probability in an n -fold parallel repetition game is at most $(0.855)^n$.

Our proposed scheme also prepares these BB84 states in parallel, but hides the secret m as the XOR of the longer secret. Indeed, the XOR repetition of the BB84 cloning game has been a folklore and was considered as a candidate for UE. More specifically, it is conjectured that the following game can not be won by any algorithm with probability more than $1/2 + \exp(-\Omega(n))$:

XOR repetition of BB84 cloning games.

1. \mathcal{A} receives $H^\theta|x\rangle\langle x|H^\theta$ for uniformly random $x, \theta \in \{0, 1\}^n$, it applies a channel and produces $\sigma_{\mathbf{BC}}$. Bob and Charlie receive their register accordingly.
2. Bob \mathcal{B} and Charlie \mathcal{C} apply their POVMs and try to recover $\text{parity}(x)$; they win if and only if both guess correctly.

Although there is no evidence to disprove the bound for the XOR repetition so far, the validity of the bound still remains unknown. In this work, we prove this bound, when \mathcal{A} is restricted to a collection of strategies. It applies \mathcal{C}_i on the i -th qubit of the BB84 state and get $\sigma_{\mathbf{BC}}^{(i)}$; the final state $\sigma_{\mathbf{BC}} = \bigotimes_i \sigma_{\mathbf{BC}}^{(i)}$. Note that the lemma does not put any constraint on the behaviors of \mathcal{B} or \mathcal{C} .

Lemma 2.2 (An XOR lemma for BB84 cloning games, [Section 5.1](#)). *When \mathcal{A} only applies a tensor cloning strategy to prepare $\sigma_{\mathbf{BC}}$, the optimal success probability in the XOR repetition of BB84 games is $1/2 + \exp(-\Omega(n))$.*

Equipped with it, it is straightforward to show the unclonability of our protocol.

A proof for the XOR repetition. Finally, we give a brief recap on the proof for [Lemma 2.2](#).

For any \mathcal{A} 's tensor strategy with channels \mathcal{C}_i applied on the i -th qubit of a BB84 state, we recall the notation $\sigma_{\mathbf{BC}}^{(i)}$. This is the state produced from the i -th qubit of the BB84 state, when θ_i, x_i was sampled uniformly at random. Let $\sigma_{\mathbf{B}}^{(i,0)}$ be the density matrix, describing the register that will be given to Bob, when $x_i = 0$. We can similarly define $\sigma_{\mathbf{B}}^{(i,1)}$, $\sigma_{\mathbf{C}}^{(i,0)}$ and $\sigma_{\mathbf{C}}^{(i,1)}$. [Lemma 2.1](#) tells us that, there exists a constant $c > 0$, either

$$\text{TD}(\sigma_{\mathbf{B}}^{(i,0)}, \sigma_{\mathbf{B}}^{(i,1)}) < c \quad \text{or} \quad \text{TD}(\sigma_{\mathbf{C}}^{(i,0)}, \sigma_{\mathbf{C}}^{(i,1)}) < c.$$

This indicates that for every i , either Bob or Charlie can not perfectly tell the value of x_i , regardless of the channel \mathcal{C}_i . Furthermore, as the BB84 state has n qubits, w.l.o.g. we can assume that the above holds for Bob, for at least $n/2$ positions.

In the XOR repetition, Bob eventually will receive $\sigma_{\mathbf{B}}^{(i, m_i)}$. We show that Bob can not tell whether the parity of all m_i is odd or even. More precisely, we will show:

$$\text{TD} \left(\sum_{\substack{m_1, \dots, m_{n-1}: \\ \oplus_i m_i = 0}} \frac{1}{2^{n-2}} \left(\bigotimes_i \sigma_{\mathbf{B}}^{(i, m_i)} \right), \sum_{\substack{m_1, \dots, m_{n-1}: \\ \oplus_i m_i = 1}} \frac{1}{2^{n-2}} \left(\bigotimes_i \sigma_{\mathbf{B}}^{(i, m_i)} \right) \right) \leq c^{n/2}.$$

We connect the trace distance directly to the trace distance of *each pair of states* $\text{TD}(\sigma_{\mathbf{B}}^{(i,0)}, \sigma_{\mathbf{B}}^{(i,1)})$ and demonstrate *an equality* (see [Section 5.1](#)):

$$\text{TD} \left(\sum_{\substack{m_1, \dots, m_{n-1}: \\ \oplus_i m_i = 0}} \frac{1}{2^{n-2}} \left(\bigotimes_i \sigma_{\mathbf{B}}^{(i, m_i)} \right), \sum_{\substack{m_1, \dots, m_{n-1}: \\ \oplus_i m_i = 1}} \frac{1}{2^{n-2}} \left(\bigotimes_i \sigma_{\mathbf{B}}^{(i, m_i)} \right) \right) = \prod_i \text{TD} \left(\sigma_{\mathbf{B}}^{(i,0)}, \sigma_{\mathbf{B}}^{(i,1)} \right).$$

Since every trace distance is bounded by 1 and there are at least $n/2$ terms in the product smaller than c , we conclude the result.

2.3 Impossibility of USS_1

Since USS_1 implies UE, it is natural to consider building UE from USS_1 . Constructing UE in the basic model remained unresolved since [\[BL20\]](#). Perhaps the connections in the last section provide a new avenue for constructing UE. In this section, we present two impossibility results (referred to as (b) in [Figure 1](#) and (f) in [Figure 2](#)) that highlight challenges associated with USS_1 .

Information-theoretic USS_1 does not exist, [Section 7.1](#). We begin by examining the case of 2-out-of-2 USS_1 with unentangled shares, and our impossibility result extends to the general case. Let us consider two malicious parties, \mathcal{P}_1 and \mathcal{P}_2 , who share an unlimited amount of entanglement. \mathcal{P}_2 receives the initial share, ρ_2 , and teleports it to \mathcal{P}_1 . This action leaves \mathcal{P}_2 with a random one-time pad key, denoted as (a, b) while \mathcal{P}_1 now possesses $(\rho_1, X^a Z^b \rho_2 Z^b X^a)$. Now, \mathcal{P}_1 aims to jointly apply the reconstruction procedure to (ρ_1, ρ_2) , but there's a problem: \mathcal{P}_1 lacks all the necessary information, especially the one-time padded key. To address this challenge, we recall the concept of port-based teleportation [\[IH08, BK11\]](#) to help \mathcal{P}_1 .

Port-based teleportation allows one party to teleport a d -qubit quantum state to another party, while leaving the state in plain. This is certainly impossible without paying any cost, as it contradicts with special relativity. Two parties need to pre-share about $O(d2^d)$ EPR pairs, divided into $O(2^d)$ blocks of d qubits. After the port-based teleportation, the teleported state will be randomly dropped into one of the blocks of \mathcal{P}_2 , while only \mathcal{P}_1 has the classical information about which block consists of the original state.

Equipped with port-based teleportation, \mathcal{P}_1 teleports $(\rho_1, X^a Z^b \rho_2 Z^b X^a)$ to \mathcal{P}_2 ; it has the classical information ind specifying the location of the teleported state. \mathcal{P}_2 then runs $\text{Reconstruct} \circ (I \otimes Z^b X^a)$ on every possible block among the pre-shared entanglement, yielding $O(2^d)$ different values; even though most of the execution is useless, the ind -th block will store the correct (classical) answer. Finally, both \mathcal{P}_1 and \mathcal{P}_2 sends all their classical information to Alice and Bob; each of them can independently determine the message. This clearly violates the unclonability of USS_1 . Thus, for any 2-out-of-2 USS_1 whose shares are of length d , there is an attacking strategy that takes time and entanglement of order $\tilde{O}(d2^d)$ and completely breaks its unclonability.

We refer readers to [Section 7.1](#) for the proof of a general theorem statement.

Impossibility of computationally secure USS_1 , with low-T Reconstruct , [Section 7.2](#). We now focus on the case when the reconstruction circuit can be implemented by Clifford gates and logarithmically many T gates. We would like to mention that a similar result has already been shown in [\[Spe15\]](#) in the context of instantaneous non-local computation; we rediscovered the following

simple attack for unclonable secret sharing. We also extend the attack to an n -party setting whereas [Spe15] considers only 2 parties.

Denote C to be the reconstruction circuit. That is, on input two shares of the form ρ_1, ρ_2 , the output is the first bit of $C(\rho_1 \otimes \rho_2)C^\dagger = |m\rangle \langle m| \otimes \tau$.

We let \mathcal{P}_2 teleport ρ_2 to \mathcal{P}_1 and they try to compute Reconstruct in a non-local manner. In the previous attack, this is done by leveraging an exponential amount of entanglement. To avoid this and make the attack efficient, we hope that \mathcal{P}_1 can homomorphically compute on the one-time padded data $(\rho_1, X^a Z^b \rho_2 Z^b X^a)$, without decrypting it.

Suppose C is a Clifford circuit. We use the fact that the Clifford group is a normalizer for the Pauli group (specifically, the $X^a Z^b$ operator). Let us assume each ρ_1, ρ_2 is of ℓ qubits. In other words, for any $a, b \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$ and Clifford circuit C , there exists a polynomial-time computable $a', b' \in \{0, 1\}^{2\ell}$ depending only on a, b and C , such that

$$C(\rho_1 \otimes X^a Z^b \rho_2 Z^b X^a)C^\dagger = X^{a'} Z^{b'} C(\rho_1 \otimes \rho_2)C^\dagger Z^{b'} X^{a'}.$$

Here a', b' act as a bigger quantum one-time pad operated on $C(\rho_1 \otimes \rho_2)C^\dagger = |m\rangle \langle m| \otimes \tau$.

Now \mathcal{P}_1 measures the first qubit in the computational basis, yielding $m \oplus a'_1$; whereas \mathcal{P}_2 compute a', b' (and most importantly, a'_1) from its classical information a, b . They send their knowledge to both Alice and Bob, who later simultaneously recover m .

Next, let us consider the more general case where C consists of Clifford gates and t number of T gates. The homomorphic evaluation of Clifford gates are as before. However, the homomorphic evaluation of T gates are handled differently.

Let us consider one single T gate that applies to the first qubit. We consider two identities, for any $x, z \in \{0, 1\}$ and any single-qubit state $|\psi\rangle$

$$\begin{aligned} (i) \quad & T(X^x Z^z) |\psi\rangle = (X^x Z^{x \oplus z} P^x) T |\psi\rangle, \\ (ii) \quad & P(X^x Z^z) |\psi\rangle = (X^x Z^{x \oplus z}) P |\psi\rangle \end{aligned}$$

Suppose, the current state is of the form $X^x Z^z |\psi\rangle$ and we apply $P^x T$ to the state. We would like to show that the resulting state is $X^{a'} Z^{b'} T |\psi\rangle$ for some $a' \in \{0, 1\}, b' \in \{0, 1\}$. We use the above identities:

$$(P^x T)(X^x Z^z) |\psi\rangle \stackrel{\text{From (i)}}{=} P^x (X^x Z^{x \oplus z} P^x) T |\psi\rangle \stackrel{\text{From (ii)}}{=} X^x Z^{x \oplus z} P^{x \oplus x} T |\psi\rangle.$$

Note that $P^2 = P^0 = I$. Thus, if we can learn x ahead, we can successfully homomorphically compute T on the encrypted data. However, in our case, x corresponds to any bit in the one-time pad key a of any stage. \mathcal{P}_1 has no way to learn x . This is where the limitation of low-T gate comes from. Instead of knowing x ahead, each time when a T homomorphic evaluation is needed, one simply guesses x' ; as long as $x = x'$ (which happens with probability $1/2$), we succeed. Thus, \mathcal{P}_1 only guesses all x 's (for each T gate) correctly with probability 2^{-t} . If t is logarithmic, our attack violates the security with inverse polynomial probability; therefore, it rules out computationally secure USS_1 with a low-T Reconstruct procedure.

2.4 Barriers of USS_1 (implication of PV)

To further demonstrate the challenge of building USS against entangled adversaries, we show that 2-party USS_1 implies a primitive called position verification. Position verification (PV) has remained a vexing problem since its inception [CGMO09].

We briefly introduce the notion of position verification for the 1-dimensional setting: two verifiers on a line will send messages to a prover who claims to be located at a position between the two verifiers. By computing a function of the verifiers' messages and returning the answers to the verifiers in time, the prover ensures them of its location. However, two malicious provers may collude to impersonate such an honest verifier by standing at the two sides of the claimed position.

We demonstrate that 2-party USS_1 , even with the weaker search-based security, will imply PV: the two verifiers in the position verification protocol will generate secret shares (ρ_0, ρ_1) of a random string s ; then they will each send the messages ρ_0 and ρ_1 respectively to the prover; the prover needs to reconstruct s and send s to both verifiers in time. Any attack against PV can be viewed as a two-stage strategy—one can perfectly turn the first-stage strategy in PV into the shareholders' strategy in USS and the second-stage strategy in PV into the recoverers' strategy in USS .

Despite many efforts, progress on PV in the computational setting against entangled adversaries has unfortunately been slow. We do not even know of any secure computational PV against adversaries with unbounded polynomial amount of entanglement in the plain model, nor any impossibility result. Moreover, some recent advancement in quantum gravity has unveiled some connections between the security of position verification and problems in quantum gravity [May19, May22].

Any progress of USS_1 in the plain model will contribute towards resolving this long-standing open problem and unveil more implications.

3 Preliminaries

3.1 Notations

We assume that the reader is familiar with the basic background from [NC10]. The Hilbert spaces we are interested in are \mathbb{C}^d , for $d \in \mathbb{N}$. We denote the quantum registers with capital bold letters \mathbf{R} , \mathbf{W} , \mathbf{X} , We abuse the notation and use registers in place of the Hilbert spaces they represent. The set of all linear mappings from \mathbf{R} to \mathbf{W} is denoted by $L(\mathbf{R}, \mathbf{W})$, and $L(\mathbf{R})$ denotes $L(\mathbf{R}, \mathbf{R})$. We denote unitaries with capital letters C , E , ... and the set of unitaries on register \mathbf{R} with $U(\mathbf{R})$. We denote the identity operator on \mathbf{R} with $\mathbb{I}_{\mathbf{R}}$; if the register \mathbf{R} is clear from the context, we drop the subscript \mathbf{R} from the notation $\mathbb{I}_{\mathbf{R}}$. We denote the set of all positive semi-definite linear mappings in $L(\mathbf{R}, \mathbf{R})$ with trace 1 (i.e., set of all valid quantum states) by $D(\mathbf{R})$. For a register \mathbf{R} in a multi-qubit system, we denote $\bar{\mathbf{R}}$ to be a register consisting of all the qubits in the system not contained in \mathbf{R} . We denote $\text{Tr}_{\mathbf{R}}(\rho)$ to be the state obtained by tracing out all the registers of ρ except \mathbf{R} . A quantum channel Φ refers to a completely positive and trace-preserving (CPTP) map from a Hilbert space \mathcal{H}_1 to a possibly different Hilbert space \mathcal{H}_2 .

3.2 Unclonable Encryption

Unclonable encryption was originally defined in [BL20] and they considered two security notions, namely search and indistinguishability security, with the latter being stronger than the former. We consider below a mild strengthening of the indistinguishability security due to [AK21].

Definition 3.1. *An unclonable encryption scheme UE is a triple of efficient quantum algorithms $(\text{UE.KeyGen}, \text{UE.Enc}, \text{UE.Dec})$ with the following procedures:*

- $\text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$: On input a security parameter 1^λ , returns a classical key sk ⁴.
- $\text{Enc}(\text{sk}, m)$: It takes the key sk and the message m for $m \in \{0, 1\}^{\text{poly}(\lambda)}$ as input and outputs a quantum ciphertext ρ_{ct} .
- $\text{Dec}(\text{sk}, \rho_{ct})$: It takes the key sk and the quantum ciphertext ρ_{ct} , it outputs a quantum state τ .

Correctness. The following must hold for the encryption scheme. For every $\text{sk} \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$ and every message m , we must have $\text{Tr}[|m\rangle\langle m| \text{Dec}(\text{sk}, \text{Enc}(\text{sk}, |m\rangle\langle m|))] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

Unclonability. In the rest of the work, we focus on unclonable IND-CPA security. The regular IND-CPA security follows directly from its unclonable IND-CPA security. To define unclonable security, we introduce the following security game.

Definition 3.2 (Unclonable IND-CPA game). *Let $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}^+$. Consider the following game against the adversary $(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C})$.*

- The adversary \mathcal{A} generates $m_0, m_1 \in \{0, 1\}^{n(\lambda)}$ and sends (m_0, m_1) to the challenger.
- The challenger randomly chooses a bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and returns $\text{Enc}(\text{sk}, m_b)$ to \mathcal{A} . \mathcal{A} produces a quantum state $\rho_{\mathbf{BC}}$ on registers \mathbf{B} and \mathbf{C} , and sends the corresponding registers to \mathcal{B} and \mathcal{C} .
- \mathcal{B} and \mathcal{C} receive the key sk , and output bits $b_{\mathcal{B}}$ and $b_{\mathcal{C}}$ respectively.

The adversary wins if $b_{\mathcal{B}} = b_{\mathcal{C}} = b$.

We denote the success probability of the above game by $\text{adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C}}(\lambda)$. We say that the scheme is information-theoretically (resp., computationally) secure if for all (resp., quantum polynomial-time) adversaries $(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C})$,

$$\text{adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C}}(\lambda) \leq 1/2 + \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

3.3 Quantum Gate Sets

We will work with the following quantum gate sets.

Pauli Group. The single-qubit Pauli group \mathcal{P} consists of the group generated by the following Pauli matrices:

$$I = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \quad X = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \quad Y = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & i \\ -i & 0 \end{pmatrix} \quad Z = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & -1 \end{pmatrix}$$

The n -qubit Pauli group \mathcal{P}_n is the n -fold tensor product of \mathcal{P} .

Clifford Group. The n -qubit Clifford group is defined to be the set of unitaries C such that

$$C\mathcal{P}_nC^\dagger = \mathcal{P}_n.$$

Elements of the Clifford group are generated by CNOT (a two-qubit gate that maps $|a, b\rangle$ to $|a, b \oplus a\rangle$), Hadamard $\left(H = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 1 & -1 \end{pmatrix}\right)$, and Phase $\left(P = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & i \end{pmatrix}\right)$ gates.

⁴In our construction, we require sk being a uniform random string. Such a UE scheme can be constructed in QROM [AKL⁺22, AKL23]

Universal Gate Set. A set of gates is said to be universal if for any integer $n \geq 1$, any n -qubit unitary operator can be approximated to arbitrary accuracy by a quantum circuit using only gates from that set. It is a well-known fact that Clifford gates are not universal, but adding any non-Clifford gate, such as $T \left(T = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & \sqrt{i} \end{pmatrix} \right)$, gives a universal set of gates. Throughout the paper, we will use the universal gate set $\{H, T, \text{CNOT}\}$.

3.4 Quantum Query Algorithms

We consider the quantum query model in this work, which gives quantum circuits access to some oracles.

Definition 3.3 (Classical Oracle). *A classical oracle \mathcal{O} is a unitary transformation of the form $U_f |x, y, z\rangle \rightarrow |x, y + f(x), z\rangle$ for classical function $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m$. Note that a classical oracle can be queried in quantum superposition.*

In the rest of the paper, unless specified otherwise, we refer to the word “oracle” as “classical oracle”. A quantum oracle algorithm with oracle access to \mathcal{O} is a sequence of local unitaries U_i and oracle queries U_f . Thus, the query complexity of a quantum oracle algorithm is defined as the number of oracle calls to \mathcal{O} .

In the analysis of the security of the USS scheme in QROM (Theorem 6.1), we will use the following theorem from [BBBV97] to bound the change in adversary’s state when we change the oracle’s input-output behavior at places where the adversary hardly ever queries on.

Theorem 3.4 ([BBBV97]). *Let $|\phi_i\rangle$ be the superposition of oracle quantum algorithms \mathcal{M} with oracle \mathcal{O} on input x at time i . Define $W_y(|\phi_i\rangle)$ to be the sum of squared magnitudes in $|\phi_i\rangle$ of configurations of \mathcal{M} which are querying the oracle on string y . For $\epsilon > 0$, let $F \subseteq [0, T - 1] \times \Sigma^*$ be the set of time-string pairs such that $\sum_{(i,y) \in F} W_y(|\phi_i\rangle) \leq \epsilon^2/T$.*

Now suppose the answer to each query $(i, y) \in F$ is modified to some arbitrary fixed $a_{i,y}$ (these answers need not be consistent with an oracle). Let $|\phi'_i\rangle$ be the superposition of \mathcal{M} on input x at time i with oracle \mathcal{O} modified as stated above. Then $\| |\phi_T\rangle - |\phi'_T\rangle \|_{\text{tr}} \leq \epsilon$.

3.5 Port-based Teleportation

In this section, we review a type of teleportation introduced by Ishizaka and Hiroshima [IH08]. To distinguish their teleportation protocol from the traditional one, we borrow from their terminology and call this port-based teleportation.

The port-based teleportation protocol is described as follows: Alice wants to teleport a qudit state $|\psi_{\mathbf{A}}\rangle$ from her system $\mathbf{A} \cong \mathbb{C}^d$ to Bob’s system $\mathbf{B} \cong \mathbb{C}^d$. We assume that Alice and Bob share $N = O(2^d)$ copies of the maximally entangled state $|\Phi\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{d}} \sum_i |i\rangle |i\rangle$ respectively in registers $\mathbf{A}'_1, \mathbf{B}'_1; \mathbf{A}'_2, \mathbf{B}'_2; \dots; \mathbf{A}'_N, \mathbf{B}'_N$. We fix an orthonormal standard basis in each of these spaces.

1. Alice performs a certain POVM $\{E_{\mathbf{A}_i \mathbf{A}'_i}^i\}_{i=1}^N$ on her systems $\{\mathbf{A}_i, \mathbf{A}'_i\}_{i \in [N]}$. She sends the result i to Bob.
2. Bob discards everything except the subsystem \mathbf{B}'_i and calls it \mathbf{B} .
3. The guarantee of the protocol is that, this register \mathbf{B} now holds the state $|\psi_{\mathbf{A}}\rangle$.

4 Definitions and Notations

4.1 Unclonable Secret Sharing

An (t, n) -unclonable secret sharing scheme, associated with n parties $\mathcal{P}_1, \dots, \mathcal{P}_n$, consists of the following QPT algorithms:

- $\text{Share}(1^\lambda, 1^n, 1^t, m) \rightarrow \rho_{\mathbf{R}_1 \mathbf{R}_2 \dots \mathbf{R}_n}$: On input security parameter λ , n parties, a secret $m \in \{0, 1\}^*$, output registers $\mathbf{R}_1, \mathbf{R}_2, \dots, \mathbf{R}_n$.
- $\text{Reconstruct}(\rho_{\mathbf{R}'_1}, \dots, \rho_{\mathbf{R}'_t})$: On input shares $\mathbf{R}'_1, \dots, \mathbf{R}'_t$, output a secret \widehat{m} .

When it is an n -out-of- n USS scheme, we ignore the input 1^t in **Share**. In the rest of the work, we will focus on constructions with unentangled shares and impossibility results for entangled shared. For sake of clarity, we will use ρ_1, \dots, ρ_n to denote these shares. We require the following properties to hold.

Correctness. We can recover the secret with probability (almost) 1, more formally:

$$\Pr[\text{Reconstruct}(\rho_{i_1}, \dots, \rho_{i_k}) = m \mid (\rho_1, \dots, \rho_n) \leftarrow \text{Share}(1^\lambda, 1^n, m) \cap k \geq t] = 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

4.2 Indistinguishability-Based Security

In this work, we will mostly focus on the (n, n) -unclonable secret sharing case. For simplicity, we call it n -party USS.

In this section, we define indistinguishability-based security for n -party USS. The security guarantees that for any two messages m_0, m_1 , no two reconstructing parties can simultaneously distinguish between whether the secret is m_0 or m_1 , given their sets of respective cloned shares. Formally, we define the following experiment:

$\text{Expt}_{(\{\mathcal{A}_i\}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C}, \xi)}$:

1. Let ξ be a quantum state on registers $\mathbf{Aux}_1, \dots, \mathbf{Aux}_n$. For every $i \in [n]$, \mathcal{A}_i gets the register \mathbf{Aux}_i .
2. $\text{Adv} = (\{\mathcal{A}_i\}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C}, \xi)$ sends (m_0, m_1) to the challenger such that $|m_0| = |m_1|$.
3. **Share Phase:** The challenger chooses a bit $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$. It computes $\text{Share}(1^\lambda, 1^n, m_b)$ to obtain (ρ_1, \dots, ρ_n) and sends ρ_i to \mathcal{A}_i .
4. **Challenge Phase:** For every $i \in [n]$, \mathcal{A}_i computes a bipartite state $\sigma_{\mathbf{X}_i \mathbf{Y}_i}$. It sends the register \mathbf{X}_i to \mathcal{B} and \mathbf{Y}_i to \mathcal{C} .
5. \mathcal{B} on input the registers $\mathbf{X}_1, \dots, \mathbf{X}_n$, outputs a bit $b_{\mathcal{B}}$. \mathcal{C} on input the registers $\mathbf{Y}_1, \dots, \mathbf{Y}_n$, outputs a bit $b_{\mathcal{C}}$.
6. Output 1 if $b_{\mathcal{B}} = b$ and $b_{\mathcal{C}} = b$.

Definition 4.1 (Information-theoretic Unclonable Secret Sharing). *An n -party unclonable secret sharing scheme (Share, Reconstruct) satisfies 1-bit unpredictability if for any non-uniform adversary $\text{Adv} = (\{\mathcal{A}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C}, \xi)$, the following holds:*

$$\Pr \left[1 \leftarrow \text{Expt}_{(\{\mathcal{A}_i\}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C}, \xi)} \right] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

Definition 4.2 (Computational Unclonable Secret Sharing). *An n -party unclonable secret sharing scheme (Share, Reconstruct) satisfies 1-bit unpredictability if for any non-uniform quantum polynomial-time adversary $\text{Adv} = (\{\mathcal{A}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C}, \xi)$, the following holds:*

$$\Pr \left[1 \leftarrow \text{Expt}_{(\{\mathcal{A}_i\}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C}, \xi)} \right] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

Claim 1. *Existence of $(n - 1)$ -party USS unconditionally implies n -party USS.*

This is straightforward to see, by creating a dummy share.

4.3 Entanglement Graph

We will focus on the setting when there are multiple quantum adversaries with shared entanglement modeled as a graph, that we refer to as an *entanglement graph*. We formally define entanglement graphs below.

Definition 4.3 (Entanglement Graph). *Let ρ be a n -partite quantum state over the registers $\mathbf{X}_1, \dots, \mathbf{X}_n$. Let $\rho[i]$ be the mixed state over register \mathbf{X}_i (i.e., $\rho[i] = \text{Tr}_{\mathbf{X}_i}(\rho)$) and $\rho[i, j]$ be the mixed state over the registers $\mathbf{X}_i, \mathbf{X}_j$ (i.e., $\rho[i, j] = \text{Tr}_{\mathbf{X}_i, \mathbf{X}_j}(\rho)$). An entanglement graph $G = (V, E)$ associated with $(\rho, \mathbf{X}_1, \dots, \mathbf{X}_n)$ is defined as follows:*

- G is an undirected graph;
- $V = \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$;
- E contains an edge (u, v) if and only if \mathbf{X}_u and \mathbf{X}_v are entangled; or in other words, there does not exist σ_u, σ_v such that $\rho[u, v] = \sigma_u \otimes \sigma_v$.

Performing non-local operations on a state ρ , over the registers $\mathbf{X}_1, \dots, \mathbf{X}_n$, could change the entanglement graph. For instance, performing arbitrary channels on some \mathbf{X}_i , could remove some edges associated with the node i ; for example, a resetting channel that maps every state to $|0\rangle\langle 0|$. However, on the other hand, performing only unitary operations on each of $\mathbf{X}_1, \dots, \mathbf{X}_n$ is not going to change the entanglement graph.

Unless otherwise specified, we assume that the amount of entanglement shared between the different parties is either unbounded for information-theoretic protocols, or arbitrarily polynomial for computational protocols.

Definition 4.4. *Let $\mathcal{P} = (\mathcal{P}_1, \dots, \mathcal{P}_n)$ be the set of parties with ρ being the state received by all the parties. That is, ρ is an n -partite quantum state over the registers $\mathbf{X}_1, \dots, \mathbf{X}_n$ such that the party \mathcal{P}_i gets the register \mathbf{X}_i . We say that G is the entanglement graph associated with \mathcal{P} if G is the entanglement graph associated with $(\rho, \mathbf{X}_1, \dots, \mathbf{X}_n)$.*

Definition 4.5 (USS_d). We say an information-theoretic/computational unclonable secret sharing scheme is a secure USS_d scheme, if it has indistinguishability-based security against all unbounded/efficient adversaries with pre-shared entanglement, whose entanglement graph has at least d connect components.

It is not hard to see that, USS_1 is a USS satisfying the regular indistinguishability security.

5 Adversaries with Disconnected Entanglement Graphs

In this section, we give a construction of unclonable secret sharing with security against quantum adversaries with disconnected entanglement graphs.

5.1 $\text{USS}_{\omega(\log \lambda)}$: an Information-Theoretic Approach

We present an information-theoretic protocol in the setting when there are $\omega(\log \lambda)$ connected components. For simplicity, we consider the case when there are $(n+1)$ parties and the entanglement graph does not have any edges. We demonstrate a construction of USS in this setting, where the security scales with n .

1. $\text{Share}(1^\lambda, 1^{(n+1)}, m \in \{0, 1\})$:
 - (a) Sample uniformly random $r_1, \dots, r_n \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ conditioned on $\oplus_i r_i = m$.
 - (b) Sample $\theta_1, \dots, \theta_n \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$.
 - (c) For each $i \in [n]$: let the i^{th} share be $\rho_i = H^{\theta_i} |r_i\rangle\langle r_i| H^{\theta_i}$. Let the $(n+1)^{\text{th}}$ share be $\rho_{n+1} = (\theta_1, \dots, \theta_n)$.
 - (d) Output $(\rho_1, \dots, \rho_{n+1})$.
2. $\text{Reconstruct}(\rho_1, \dots, \rho_{n+1})$:
 - (a) Measure ρ_{n+1} in the computational basis to get $(\theta_1, \dots, \theta_n)$.
 - (b) For every $i \in [n]$, apply H^{θ_i} to ρ_i . Measure the resulting state in the computational basis to get r_i .
 - (c) Output $\oplus_i r_i = m$.

Security. Consider the adversary to be $\text{Adv} = (\{\mathcal{A}_i\}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C}, \xi)$, where ξ is a product state. Henceforth, we omit mentioning $\xi = \xi_1 \otimes \dots \otimes \xi_{n+1}$, where \mathcal{A}_i receives ξ_i , since we can think of ξ_i to be part of the description of \mathcal{A}_i .

For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, let $(\rho_1^{r_1}, \dots, \rho_n^{r_n}, \rho_{n+1}) \leftarrow \text{Share}(1^\lambda, 1^{(n+1)}, b)$, where $\oplus_i r_i = b$ and $\rho_i = H^{\theta_i} |r_i\rangle\langle r_i| H^{\theta_i}$ and $\rho_{n+1} = |\theta_1 \dots \theta_n\rangle\langle \theta_1 \dots \theta_n|$. Suppose upon receiving $\rho_i^{r_i}$, \mathcal{A}_i sends registers $\{\mathbf{X}_i^{r_i}\}$ and $\{\mathbf{Y}_i^{r_i}\}$ respectively to \mathcal{B} and \mathcal{C} . We denote the reduced density matrix on $\mathbf{X}_i^{r_i}$ to be $\sigma_i^{r_i}$ and on $\mathbf{Y}_i^{r_i}$ to be $\zeta_i^{r_i}$. We assume without loss of generality that ρ_{n+1} is given to both \mathcal{B} and \mathcal{C} since it is a computational basis state.

Define $\mathcal{S}_{\mathcal{B}}$ and $\mathcal{S}_{\mathcal{C}}$ as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{S}_{\mathcal{B}} &= \{i \in [n] : \text{TD}(\sigma_i^0, \sigma_i^1) \leq 0.86\} \\ \mathcal{S}_{\mathcal{C}} &= \{i \in [n] : \text{TD}(\zeta_i^0, \zeta_i^1) \leq 0.86\} \end{aligned}$$

We prove the following claims.

Claim 2. *Either $|\mathcal{S}_B| \geq \lceil \frac{n}{2} \rceil$ or $|\mathcal{S}_C| \geq \lceil \frac{n}{2} \rceil$.*

Proof. We prove by contradiction; suppose it is not the case. Then there exists an index $i \in [n]$ such that $i \notin \mathcal{S}_B$ and $i \notin \mathcal{S}_C$. That is, $\text{TD}(\sigma_i^0, \sigma_i^1) > 0.86$ and $\text{TD}(\zeta_i^0, \zeta_i^1) > 0.86$, meaning the optimal state distinguishing circuit can distinguish σ_i^0, σ_i^1 with probability at least $0.93 = (1 + 0.86)/2$. Similarly, the optimal distinguishing probability for states ζ_i^0, ζ_i^1 is at least 0.93.

Using this, we design an adversary that violates the unclonable security of single-qubit BB84 states [BL20, Corollary 2]. Let us first recall the security game for the unclonability of single-qubit BB84 states:

1. \mathcal{A} receives $H^\theta|x\rangle\langle x|H^\theta$ for uniformly random $x, \theta \in \{0, 1\}$, it applies a channel and produces σ_{BC} . Bob and Charlie receive their register accordingly.
2. Bob \mathcal{B} and Charlie \mathcal{C} apply their POVMs and try to recover x ; they win if and only if both guess x correctly.

Lemma 5.1 (Corollary 2 when $\lambda = 1$, [BL20]). *No (unbounded) quantum $(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C})$ wins the game with probability more than 0.855.*

We design an adversary $(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C})$ as follows, with winning probability $0.86 > 0.855$, a contradiction.

- \mathcal{A} receives as input an unknown BB84 state. It runs \mathcal{A}_i on the state to obtain a bipartite state, which it shares with \mathcal{B} and \mathcal{C} .
- \mathcal{B} and \mathcal{C} in the security game of BB84 state will receive θ_i from the challenger.
- \mathcal{B} runs the optimal distinguisher distinguishing σ_i^0 and σ_i^1 . Based on the output of the distinguisher, it outputs its best guess of the challenge bit. Similarly, Charlie runs the optimal distinguisher distinguishing ζ_i^0 and ζ_i^1 . It outputs its best guess of the challenge bit.

By a union bound, the probability that one of \mathcal{B} or \mathcal{C} fails is at most $0.14 = 0.07 \times 2$. Thus, they simultaneously succeed with probability at least 0.86, a contradiction. \square

Claim 3. *The following holds:*

1.

$$\text{TD} \left(\sum_{\substack{r_1, \dots, r_n: \\ \oplus_i r_i = 0}} \frac{1}{2^{n-1}} \left(\bigotimes_i \sigma_i^{r_i} \right), \sum_{\substack{r_1, \dots, r_n: \\ \oplus_i r_i = 1}} \frac{1}{2^{n-1}} \left(\bigotimes_i \sigma_i^{r_i} \right) \right) \leq 0.86^{|\mathcal{S}_B|}$$

2.

$$\text{TD} \left(\sum_{\substack{r_1, \dots, r_n: \\ \oplus_i r_i = 0}} \frac{1}{2^{n-1}} \left(\bigotimes_i \zeta_i^{r_i} \right), \sum_{\substack{r_1, \dots, r_n: \\ \oplus_i r_i = 1}} \frac{1}{2^{n-1}} \left(\bigotimes_i \zeta_i^{r_i} \right) \right) \leq 0.86^{|\mathcal{S}_C|}$$

Proof. We prove bullet 1 since bullet 2 follows symmetrically.

$$\begin{aligned}
& \text{TD} \left(\sum_{\substack{r_1, \dots, r_n: \\ \oplus_i r_i = 0}} \frac{1}{2^{n-1}} \left(\bigotimes_i \sigma_i^{r_i} \right), \sum_{\substack{r_1, \dots, r_n: \\ \oplus_i r_i = 1}} \frac{1}{2^{n-1}} \left(\bigotimes_i \sigma_i^{r_i} \right) \right) \\
&= \frac{1}{2} \left\| \sum_{\substack{r_1, \dots, r_n: \\ \oplus_i r_i = 0}} \frac{1}{2^{n-1}} \left(\bigotimes_i \sigma_i^{r_i} \right) - \sum_{\substack{r_1, \dots, r_n: \\ \oplus_i r_i = 1}} \frac{1}{2^{n-1}} \left(\bigotimes_i \sigma_i^{r_i} \right) \right\|_1 \\
&= \left\| \bigotimes_i \frac{(\sigma_i^0 - \sigma_i^1)}{2} \right\|_1 \\
&= \prod_i \left\| \frac{(\sigma_i^0 - \sigma_i^1)}{2} \right\|_1 \\
&\leq \prod_{i \in \mathcal{S}_B} \text{TD}(\sigma_i^0, \sigma_i^1) \\
&\leq 0.86^{|\mathcal{S}_B|}
\end{aligned}$$

Here $\|\cdot\|_1$ denotes the trace norm. In the above proof, we use the fact that $\|\bigotimes_i \tau_i\|_1 = \prod_i \|\tau_i\|_1$. \square

Lemma 5.2. *The above USS scheme satisfies indistinguishability security against any adversaries with no shared entanglement; i.e., it is a secure USS_n scheme (see [Definition 4.5](#)) with $n = \omega(\log \lambda)$.*

Proof. From [Claim 2](#), either $|\mathcal{S}_B| \geq \lceil \frac{n}{2} \rceil$ or $|\mathcal{S}_C| \geq \lceil \frac{n}{2} \rceil$. We will assume without loss of generality that $|\mathcal{S}_B| \geq \lceil \frac{n}{2} \rceil$. From bullet 1 of [Claim 3](#), it holds that \mathcal{B} can successfully distinguish whether it is in the experiment when the challenge bit 0 was used or when the challenge bit 1 was used, with probability at most $\frac{1+\nu(n)}{2}$, for some exponentially small function ν in n . Thus, both \mathcal{B} and \mathcal{C} can only simultaneously distinguish with probability at most $\frac{1+\nu(n)}{2}$. This completes the proof. \square

5.2 USS_d , for $d \geq 2$: from Unclonable Encryption

We present a construction of USS with security against quantum adversaries associated with *any* disconnected entanglement graph. In the construction, we use an information-theoretically secure unclonable encryption scheme, $\text{UE} = (\text{UE.KeyGen}, \text{UE.Enc}, \text{UE.Dec})$. The resulting USS scheme is consequently information-theoretically secure.

1. $\text{Share}(1^\lambda, 1^n, m)$:

- (a) Sample $r_1, \dots, r_n \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{|m|}$.
- (b) For each $i \in [n]$, let $y_i = r_i$; let $y_n = m \oplus \sum_{i=1}^n r_i$.
- (c) For each $i \in [n]$:
 - i. Compute $\text{sk}_i \leftarrow \text{UE.KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$. We denote the length of sk_i to be $\ell = \ell(\lambda)$.
 - ii. Compute $|\text{ct}_i\rangle \leftarrow \text{UE.Enc}(\text{sk}_i, y_i)$
- (d) For each $i \in [n]$: let each share $\rho_i = (\text{sk}_{i-1}, |\text{ct}_i\rangle)$; here we define $\text{sk}_0 = \text{sk}_n$.

- (e) Output (ρ_1, \dots, ρ_n)
2. Reconstruct (ρ_1, \dots, ρ_n) :
- (a) For each $i \in [n]$,
- i. Parse ρ_i as $(\text{sk}_{i-1}, |\text{ct}_i\rangle)$. We define $\text{sk}_n = \text{sk}_0$.
 - ii. Compute $y_i \leftarrow \text{UE.Dec}(\text{sk}_i, |\text{ct}_i\rangle)$
- (b) Output $m = \sum_{i=1}^n y_i$.

Theorem 5.3. *The above scheme satisfies indistinguishability-based security against adversaries with any disconnected entanglement graph. More precisely, it is a secure USS₂ scheme (see Definition 4.5).*

Proof. The correctness of the scheme follows from the correctness of UE decryption.

We now prove the security of the above scheme. Suppose we have an USS adversary $(\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_1, \dots, \mathcal{A}_n), \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C}, \xi)$ who succeeds with probability $\frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon$ in Definition 4.5, we construct an UE adversary $(\mathcal{A}', \mathcal{B}', \mathcal{C}')$ who succeeds with probability $\frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon$ in Definition 3.2.

Let \mathcal{A} receive as input an n -partite state ξ over the registers $\mathbf{Aux}_1, \dots, \mathbf{Aux}_n$ such that \mathcal{A}_i receives as input the register \mathbf{Aux}_i . Additionally, without loss of generality, we can assume that \mathcal{A} also receives as input the challenge messages (m_0, m_1) , where $|m_0| = |m_1|$. Let $G = (V, E)$ be the entanglement graph associated with $(\xi, \mathbf{Aux}_1, \dots, \mathbf{Aux}_n)$, where, $V = \{1, \dots, n\}$. Since G is disconnected, there exists $i^* \in [n]$ such that $(i^*, i^* + 1) \notin E$. Let $G_1 = (V_1, E_1)$ and $G_2 = (V_2, E_2)$ be two subgraphs of G such that $V_1 \cup V_2 = V$, $V_1 \cap V_2 = \emptyset$, $i^* \in V_1$, $i^* + 1 \in V_2$. Moreover, G_1 and G_2 are disconnected with each other. This further means that ξ can be written as $\xi_{G_1} \otimes \xi_{G_2}$, for some states ξ_{G_1}, ξ_{G_2} , such that ξ_{G_1} is over the registers $\{\mathbf{Aux}_i\}_{i \in V_1}$ and ξ_{G_2} is over the registers $\{\mathbf{Aux}_i\}_{i \in V_2}$.

We describe $(\mathcal{A}', \mathcal{B}', \mathcal{C}')$ as follows:

Description of \mathcal{A}' . Fix $i^*, (m_0, m_1)$ (as defined above). Upon receiving a quantum state $|\text{ct}^*\rangle$ \mathcal{A}' does the following:

- It prepares quantum states $\xi_{G_1}, (\xi_{G_2})^{\otimes 2^\ell}$.
- It samples $r_i \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{|m_0|}$, where $i \in [n]$, subject to the constraint that $\oplus_i r_i = m_0$.
- It submits $(r_{i^*}, r_{i^*} \oplus m_0 \oplus m_1)$ to the UE challenger and in return, it receives $|\text{ct}^*\rangle$. It sets $|\text{ct}_{i^*+1}\rangle = |\text{ct}^*\rangle$.
- For every $i \in [n]$, generate $\text{sk}_i \leftarrow \text{UE.KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$; let $\text{sk}_{n+1} = \text{sk}_1$.
- For every $i \in [n]$ and $i \neq i^*$, generate $|\text{ct}_i\rangle \leftarrow \text{UE.Enc}(\text{sk}_i, \text{sh}_i)$.
- For every $i \in [n]$ and $i \neq i^* + 1$, define $\rho_i = (\text{sk}_{i-1}, |\text{ct}_i\rangle)$.
- We need to define $\rho_{i^*+1} = (\text{sk}_{i^*}, |\text{ct}_{i^*+1}\rangle)$. However, as sk_{i^*} will only be received by \mathcal{B}' and \mathcal{C}' in the UE security game later, we will enumerate all possible values of sk_{i^*} and the corresponding computation result in the subgraph G_2 .

- For every $x \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$ (possible value of sk_{i^*}), compute $\{\mathcal{A}_i\}_{i \in V_2}$ on $\{\rho_i\}_{i \in V_2}, \xi_{G_2}$ to obtain two sets of registers $\{\mathbf{X}_i^{(x)}\}_{i \in G_2}$ and $\{\mathbf{Y}_i^{(x)}\}_{i \in G_2}$.
- Compute $\{\mathcal{A}_i\}_{i \in V_1}$ on $\{\rho_i\}_{i \in V_1}$ and ξ_{G_1} to obtain two sets of registers $\{\mathbf{X}_i\}_{i \in G_1}$ and $\{\mathbf{Y}_i\}_{i \in G_1}$.
- Send the registers $\{\mathbf{X}_i\}_{i \in G_1}$ and $\{\mathbf{X}_i^{(x)}\}_{i \in G_2, x \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda}$ to \mathcal{B}' . Send the registers $\{\mathbf{Y}_i\}_{i \in G_1}$ and $\{\mathbf{Y}_i^{(x)}\}_{i \in G_2, x \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda}$ to \mathcal{C}' .

Description of \mathcal{B}' and \mathcal{C}' . \mathcal{B}' upon receiving the secret key k (which is sk_{i^*}), computes \mathcal{B} on $\{\mathbf{X}_i\}_{i \in G_1}$ and $\{\mathbf{X}_i^{(k)}\}_{i \in G_2}$ to obtain a bit $b_{\mathcal{B}}$. \mathcal{C}' is defined similarly. We denote the output of \mathcal{C}' to be $b_{\mathcal{C}}$.

If the challenger of the UE security chooses the bit $b = 0$, then $(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C})$ in the above reduction are receiving shares of m_0 ; otherwise, they are receiving shares of m_1 . Thus, the success probability of $(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C})$ in [Definition 4.5](#) is precisely the same as the success probability of $(\mathcal{A}', \mathcal{B}', \mathcal{C}')$ in [Definition 3.2](#). \square

6 Adversaries with Full Entanglement

Theorem 6.1. (*QROM protocol*) *There exists a n -party USS protocol with indistinguishability-based security against adversaries sharing an arbitrary amount of entanglement (USS₁, see [Definition 4.5](#)) in the QROM, for any $n \geq 2$.*

Construction Assume we have an underlying unclonable encryption scheme UE for one-bit messages (see [Definition 3.2](#)), consisting of three procedures UE.KeyGen, UE.Enc, UE.Dec and a hash function $H : \{0, 1\}^{k \cdot n} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell$ modeled as a random oracle, where $\ell = \ell(\lambda)$ is the length of the UE secret key. It is easy to generalize our construction for the one-bit message to the n -bit message setting with indistinguishability based security in [Section 4.2](#).

We assume, without loss of generality, that the secret key generated from UE.KeyGen is statistically close to uniform distribution⁵. We construct a USS scheme as follows:

- $\text{Share}(1^\lambda, 1^n, m) \rightarrow (\rho_1, \dots, \rho_n)$:
 1. Sample random $y_1, \dots, y_n \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{k \cdot n}$, where $k = k(\lambda)$. Let $\text{sk} = H(y_1, \dots, y_n)$.
 2. Compute $|\text{ct}_m\rangle = \text{UE.Enc}(\text{sk}, m \in \{0, 1\})$
 3. Let $\rho_1 = (|\text{ct}_m\rangle, y_1)$; $\rho_2 = y_2$; $\rho_3 = y_3$; \dots ; $\rho_n = y_n$.
- $\text{Reconstruct}(\rho_1, \dots, \rho_n) \rightarrow \hat{m}$: parse $\rho_1 = (|\text{ct}\rangle, y_1)$; for every $i > 1$, measure ρ_i to get y_i ; compute $\text{sk} = H(y_1, y_2, \dots, y_n)$; compute $\hat{m} \leftarrow \text{UE.Dec}(\text{sk}, |\text{ct}\rangle)$.

Correctness The correctness of the above scheme follows from the correctness of the unclonable encryption scheme and of the evaluation of the random oracle H .

⁵Given any UE scheme, we can convert it into another one where the setup outputs a random string. The new encryption algorithm will take this random string and runs the old setup to recover the secret key and then runs the old encryption algorithm.

6.1 Security

We consider the following two hybrids. We use underline to denote the differences between Hybrid 0 and Hybrid 1.

Hybrid 0. the challenger operates the 1-bit unpredictability experiment according to the original construction above. Let the adversary be $(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C})$ where $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_1, \dots, \mathcal{A}_n)$.

1. The challenger samples uniform random $y_1, \dots, y_n \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{n \cdot k}$ and $\text{sk} \leftarrow H(y_1, \dots, y_n)$.
2. The challenger samples secret $m \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$; computes $|\text{ct}_m\rangle \leftarrow \text{UE.Enc}(\text{sk}, m)$. Let $\rho_1 = (|\text{ct}_m\rangle, y_1)$; $\rho_2 = y_2$; $\rho_3 = y_3$; \dots ; $\rho_n = y_n$.
3. The challenger gives the shares ρ_1, \dots, ρ_n to $\mathcal{A}_1, \dots, \mathcal{A}_n$.
4. In the challenge phase, for every $i \in [n]$, \mathcal{A}_i computes a bipartite state $\sigma_{\mathbf{X}_i \mathbf{Y}_i}$. It sends the register \mathbf{X}_i to \mathcal{B} and \mathbf{Y}_i to \mathcal{C} .
 \mathcal{B} on input the registers $\mathbf{X}_1, \dots, \mathbf{X}_n$, outputs the bit $b_{\mathcal{B}}$. \mathcal{C} on input the registers $\mathbf{Y}_1, \dots, \mathbf{Y}_n$, outputs the bit $b_{\mathcal{C}}$.
5. The challenger outputs 1 if $b_{\mathcal{B}} = m$ and $b_{\mathcal{C}} = m$.

Hybrid 1. the challenger does the following modified version of the 1-bit unpredictability experiment:

1. The challenger samples uniform random $y_1, \dots, y_n \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{n \cdot k}$ and $\text{sk} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\ell}$, where $\ell = \ell(\lambda)$ is the length of the UE secret key.
2. The challenger samples secret $m \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$; computes $|\text{ct}_m\rangle \leftarrow \text{UE.Enc}(\text{sk}, m)$. Let $\rho_1 = (|\text{ct}_m\rangle, y_1)$; $\rho_2 = y_2$; $\rho_3 = y_3$; \dots ; $\rho_n = y_n$.
3. The challenger gives the shares ρ_1, \dots, ρ_n to $\mathcal{A}_1, \dots, \mathcal{A}_n$. It reprograms the random oracle H at the input (y_1, \dots, y_n) to be sk , right before entering the challenge phase. In other words, the resulting random oracle H' has the identical behavior as H for every input except on input (y_1, y_2, \dots, y_n) , H' outputs sk .
4. In the challenge phase, for every $i \in [n]$, \mathcal{A}_i computes a bipartite state $\sigma_{\mathbf{X}_i \mathbf{Y}_i}$. It sends the register \mathbf{X}_i to \mathcal{B} and \mathbf{Y}_i to \mathcal{C} .
 \mathcal{B} on input the registers $\mathbf{X}_1, \dots, \mathbf{X}_n$, outputs the bit $b_{\mathcal{B}}$. \mathcal{C} on input the registers $\mathbf{Y}_1, \dots, \mathbf{Y}_n$, outputs the bit $b_{\mathcal{C}}$.
5. The challenger outputs 1 if $b_{\mathcal{B}} = m$ and $b_{\mathcal{C}} = m$.

Lemma 6.2. *The advantages of adversary \mathcal{A} in Hybrid 0 and Hybrid 1 are negligibly close.*

Proof. We further clarify what happens in Hybrid 1: at the beginning of the execution, the function $H : \{0, 1\}^{k \cdot n} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\ell}$ is a random function. Then it reprograms the function H to get a new function H' such that $H'(y_1, \dots, y_n) = \text{sk}$ right before the challenge phase; i.e., before any \mathcal{A}_i sends the bipartite state $\sigma_{\mathbf{X}_i, \mathbf{Y}_i}$ to Bob and Charlie.

Suppose each \mathcal{A}_i has q queries. For each \mathcal{A}_i , note that the strings $\{y_j\}_{j \neq i, j \in [n]}$ are uniformly random from $\{0, 1\}^{k(n-1)}$. Let us denote the squared amplitudes of \mathcal{A}_i^H 's query on input x as $W_i(x)$. By Markov's inequality, we have, for each \mathcal{A}_i , given a fixed y_i and for every $0 \leq \alpha \leq 1$:

$$\Pr_{\{y_j\}_{j \neq i} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{k(n-1)}} [W_i(y_1, y_2, \dots, y_n) \geq \alpha] \leq \frac{q}{\alpha \cdot 2^{k \cdot (n-1)}}$$

We can set $\alpha = \frac{1}{2^{(k \cdot (n-1))/2}}$ and have $\Pr_{\{y_j\}_{j \neq i} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{k(n-1)}} [W_i(x) \geq \frac{1}{2^{(k \cdot (n-1))/2}}] \leq \frac{q}{2^{(k \cdot (n-1))/2}}$.

Let us denote the query weight of the overall adversary $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_1, \dots, \mathcal{A}_n)$ on input (y_1, \dots, y_n) as $W(y_1, \dots, y_n)$. Since the operations performed by $\mathcal{A}_1, \dots, \mathcal{A}_n$ commute, we can apply the union bound to obtain the probability for any \mathcal{A}_i to query on y_1, \dots, y_n :

$$\Pr_{\{y_j\}_{j \neq i} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{k(n-1)}} [\exists i \in [n] : W_i(y_1, y_2, \dots, y_n) \geq \alpha] \leq \frac{n \cdot q}{2^{(k \cdot (n-1))/2}}$$

That is, with probability $(1 - \frac{n \cdot q}{2^{(k \cdot (n-1))/2}})$, for all $i \in [n]$, the query weight $W_i(y_1, \dots, y_n) \leq \alpha$. Therefore, we have with overwhelmingly large probability, their query total weight $W(y_1, \dots, y_n) = \sum_i W_i(y_1, \dots, y_n) \leq n \cdot \alpha$.

We denote the joint state of $(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C})$ at the beginning of the challenge phase in Hybrid 0 as τ_0 and the state in Hybrid 1 as τ_1 . Then we can invoke [Theorem 3.4](#), to obtain $\|\rho_{\mathcal{A},0} - \rho_{\mathcal{A},1}\|_{\text{tr}} \leq \frac{\sqrt{n \cdot q}}{2^{k(n-1)/4}} = \text{negl}(\lambda)$. We can view the final output in the challenge phase as the final outcome of a POVM on the state $\rho_{\mathcal{A},0}$ (or respectively, $\rho_{\mathcal{A},1}$). Therefore, by the fact that $\|\rho_{\mathcal{A},0} - \rho_{\mathcal{A},1}\|_{\text{tr}} = \max_E \|E(\rho_{\mathcal{A},0}) - E(\rho_{\mathcal{A},1})\|_{\text{tr}}$ where the maximum is taken over all POVMs E , we have

$$|\Pr[(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C}) \text{ wins Hybrid 0}] - \Pr[(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C}) \text{ wins Hybrid 1}]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

□

Lemma 6.3. *Assuming the IND security of the unclonable encryption in [Definition 3.2](#), the advantage of the adversary in Hybrid 1 is negligible.*

Proof. Suppose $(\mathcal{P}_1, \dots, \mathcal{P}_n, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C})$ is an adversary in the security game of the unclonable secret sharing for the above construction, we construct a QPT \mathcal{A}' for the indistinguishability unclonable encryption security defined in [Definition 3.2](#).

\mathcal{A}' samples uniform random y_1, \dots, y_n and receives the quantum ciphertext $|\text{ct}_m\rangle$ from the UE challenger. Then \mathcal{A}' prepares $\rho_1 = (|\text{ct}_m\rangle, y_1), \rho_2 = y_1, \dots, \rho_n = y_n$ and sends them to $(\mathcal{P}_1, \dots, \mathcal{P}_n)$.

\mathcal{A}' prepares the state to send to $\mathcal{B}', \mathcal{C}'$ as follows: gives (y_1, \dots, y_n) to \mathcal{B}' ; after entering the challenge phase of UE and before the challenge phase of USS, \mathcal{B}' reprograms H on input y_1, \dots, y_n to be sk , which it receives from the UE challenger; then after entering challenge phase of USS, \mathcal{B}' outputs the output of USS adversarial recoverer \mathcal{B} and \mathcal{C}' outputs the output of USS adversarial recoverer \mathcal{C} .

If \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C} both outputs the correct m , then $\mathcal{B}', \mathcal{C}'$ will win the IND UE security game. □

7 Impossibilities and Barriers

In this section, we present two impossibility results on USS. Furthermore, we present two implications of USS: namely, unclonable encryption and position verification secure against large amount of entanglement. Since no construction known for the latter two primitives, this further underscores the formidable barriers of building USS.

7.1 Impossibility in the Information-Theoretic Setting

Theorem 7.1. *Let \mathcal{P} be a set of parties. Information-theoretically secure USS for \mathcal{P} is impossible if the entanglement graph for \mathcal{P} is connected and in particular, there is an edge from P_1 to everyone else.*

Proof. The attack strategy is as follows. The n parties P_1, \dots, P_n pre-share a large amount of entanglement with one another. In the protocol, each P_i receives its share ρ_i .

- *Regular Teleportation Stage:* all parties P_i , where $i \neq 1$ teleport their shares to party P_1 via regular teleportation. Each P_i obtains a measurement outcome (a_i, b_i) .
- Now P_1 holds a state in the following format: $(\mathbb{I} \otimes X^{a_2} Z^{b_2} \otimes \dots \otimes X^{a_n} Z^{b_n}) |\Psi\rangle_{P_1 P_2 \dots P_n}$ which can be represented as mixed states $(\rho_1, X^{a_2} Z^{b_2} \rho_2 X^{a_2} Z^{b_2}, \dots, X^{a_n} Z^{b_n} \rho_n X^{a_n} Z^{b_n})$. That is, quantum one-time padded shares from all other parties and its own share in the clear.
- *Port-Based Teleportation Stage:*
 - P_1 performs port-based teleportation (see [Section 3.5](#)) for the state $(\mathbb{I} \otimes X^{a_2} Z^{b_2} \otimes \dots \otimes X^{a_n} Z^{b_n}) |\Psi\rangle_{P_1 P_2 \dots P_n}$ to P_2 . P_1 obtains a measurement outcome that stands for some index i_1 . Recall that by the guarantee of port-based teleportation, the index i_1 specifies the register of P_2 that holds the above state in the clear, *without any Pauli errors on top*.
 - P_2 will now remove the quantum one time pad information X^{a_2}, Z^{a_2} on its share in the teleported state above. Since P_2 does not have information about i_1 , it simply performs $\mathbb{I} \otimes Z^{a_2} X^{a_2} \otimes \mathbb{I} \dots \otimes \mathbb{I}$ on all exponentially many possible registers that it may receive the teleported state from P_1 .
 - Next P_2 performs port-based teleportation with P_3 for *all registers that could possibly hold the state* $(\mathbb{I} \otimes \mathbb{I} \otimes X^{a_3} Z^{b_3} \otimes \dots \otimes X^{a_n} Z^{b_n}) |\Psi\rangle_{P_1 P_2 \dots P_n}$. Thus, P_2 obtains an exponential number of indices about the registers that will receive the teleported states on P_3 's hands.
 - P_3 accordingly, applies $\mathbb{I} \otimes \mathbb{I} \otimes Z^{b_3} X^{a_3} \dots \mathbb{I}$ on all the possible registers that can hold the teleported state; performs a port-based teleportation to P_4 with all of these registers and obtains a measurement outcome that has a doubly-exponential number of indices ⁶.
 - ...
 - Finally, P_n receives the teleported states from P_{n-1} and performs $\mathbb{I} \otimes \dots \mathbb{I} \otimes Z^{b_n} X^{a_n}$ on all of them. One of these registers will hold the state $|\Psi\rangle_{P_1 \dots P_n} = (\rho_1, \dots, \rho_n)$ in the clear. Then P_n performs the reconstruction algorithm on all of these registers to obtain a large number of possible outcomes. One of them will hold the correctly reconstructed secret s .
- *Reconstruction Stage:* now P_n sends all its measurement outcomes to both Bob and Charlie. All other P_i 's send their indices information measured in the port teleportation protocol. Bob and Charlie can therefore find the correct index in P_n 's measurement outcomes that holds s , by following a path of indices.

□

⁶For $P_i, 2 \leq i < n$, the measurement outcome will have its size grow in an exponential tower of height i .

Remark 7.2. *The above strategy can be easily converted into a strategy where the underlying entanglement graph is connected (but may not be a complete graph) and every pair of connected parties share (unbounded) entanglement. The similar idea applies by performing regular teleportation and port-based teleportation via any DFS order of the graph. Thus, we have the following theorem.*

Theorem 7.3. *Let \mathcal{P} be a set of parties. Information-theoretically secure USS for \mathcal{P} is impossible if the entanglement graph for \mathcal{P} is connected.*

7.2 Impossibility with Low T-gates for Efficient Adversaries

Our impossibility result above in the information-theoretic setting requires exponential amount of entanglement between the parties. In this section, we present an attack that can be performed by efficient adversaries, albeit on USS schemes with restricted reconstruction algorithms.

Again, we point out that our result is a rediscovery of a similar algorithm in [Spe15] in the context of instantaneous non-local computation. We also extend the attack to an n -party setting whereas [Spe15] considers only 2 parties.

Theorem 7.4. *Let \mathcal{P} be a set of parties and if the entanglement graph for \mathcal{P} is connected, then there exists an attack using polynomial-time and polynomial amount of entanglement on any USS scheme where the procedure `Reconstruct` consists of only Clifford gates and $O(\log \lambda)$ number of T gates.*

Proof. We first consider the two party case for the sake of clarity, and then generalize to n -party case.

Let us assume that the number of qubits in each party \mathcal{A}_i 's secret share ρ_i to be k (up to some padding with $|00 \cdots 0\rangle$ if they have different lengths) and they are each stored in registers P_i , respectively. Without loss of generality, we view the entire system over registers P_1 and P_2 as a pure state $|\psi_{12}\rangle$ since our attack works regardless of this state being mixed or pure.

We write the honest protocol's reconstruction circuit `Reconstruct` on $2k$ -qubit inputs as a circuit consisting of Clifford gates and T gates, followed by a measurement in the computational basis in the end. The secret m to recover will be the first bit in the measurement outcome.

Recall that in the gate teleportation protocol [Appendix A.1](#), given the Pauli errors (a, b) as the sender's (Alice) measurement result, and given a Clifford circuit G the receiver (Bob) intends to apply on the teleported state $|\psi\rangle$, we can compute an update function f_G for G , so that $(a', b') \leftarrow f_G(a, b)$ and $Z^{b'} X^{a'} G(X^a Z^b) |\psi\rangle = G |\psi\rangle$. Instead of using the approach in [BK20] to compute a (relatively complicated) update function for any Clifford+T quantum circuit, we will instead use a simpler approach to compute the update function $f_{\text{Reconstruct}}$ just as for a Clifford-only circuit.

1. \mathcal{A}_1 and \mathcal{A}_2 pre-shares k -ebit of entanglement in register P'_1, P'_2 . \mathcal{A}_1 teleports its share ρ_1 to \mathcal{A}_2 and obtains the measurement outcomes $(a, b) \in \{0, 1\}^{2k}$. Now \mathcal{A}_2 should have a quantum one-time padded $X^a Z^b \rho_1 Z^b X^a$ in its register P'_2 .
2. \mathcal{A}_2 applies `Reconstruct` circuit in a gate-by-gate manner, with the following approaches:
 - (a) If the next gate to apply is a Clifford gate, then \mathcal{A}_2 simply applies it to the corresponding registers in P'_2 and/or P_2 . Recall that P'_2 consists of teleported first share and P_2 has the second share.

- (b) If the next gate is a T gate, and suppose it is the j -th T gate, according to the topological numbering on all T gates in the Reconstruct circuit: \mathcal{A}_2 first applies the T gate. Then it samples a random bit $s_j \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ and applies a P^{s_j} gate upon applying the j -th T gate. (i.e., if $s_j = 1$ then it applies a P gate upon applying the T gate, and if $s_j = 0$, it does nothing).

Every time after applying the T gate and its following P^{s_j} gate, \mathcal{A}_2 modifies the circuit description for Reconstruct: append the gate P^{s_j} after the j -th T gate; the gate P^{s_j} operates on the same qubit.

3. In the end, \mathcal{A}_2 finishes applying all the gates and obtains an modified reconstruction circuit Reconstruct'. It will obtain a classical outcome c .
4. In the challenge phase, \mathcal{A}_2 sends the modified circuit description Reconstruct' and c to the recoverers \mathcal{B} and \mathcal{C} . \mathcal{A}_1 sends the one-time pads (a, b) to \mathcal{B} and \mathcal{C} .
5. \mathcal{B} and \mathcal{C} computes the update function $f_{\text{Reconstruct}'}$ according to the updated Reconstruct' circuit and computes $f_{\text{Reconstruct}'}(a||0\cdots 0, b||0\cdots 0)$ (the quantum OTPs (a, b) are each appended with k zeros to represent the quantum OTPs on \mathcal{A}_2 's state ρ_2 before applying any gate). In the successful case, they will obtain Pauli corrections (a^*, b^*) ; in an unsuccessful case, they abort ⁷. They then each apply $Z^{b^*}X^{a^*}$ to c and output the first bit of $Z^{b^*}X^{a^*}c$ as m (in our settings, Z^{b^*} is in fact unnecessary).

Correctness We show that the above strategy allows $\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C}$ to win with a noticeable probability, when the number of T gates is $O(\log \lambda)$.

Recall that we have the following identity (in [Appendix A.1.1](#)):

$$\text{T} \left(X^a Z^b \right) |\psi\rangle = \left(X^a Z^{b \oplus a} P^a \right) \text{T} |\psi\rangle$$

Every time \mathcal{A}_2 applies a T gate on the quantum one-time padded input, if we directly "move" this T gate to the right side, we will have an unwanted P^a on the right side of the Pauli one-time pads X, Z 's. Our solution is to make a guess on the bit $a \in \{0, 1\}$ and apply an additional P^a in order to remove the unwanted phase gate P^a from the final correction.

When the guess is correct, i.e. $s_j = a$, we have the following after applying the T-gate and $P^{s_j} = P^a$ gate:

$$\begin{aligned} P^a X^a Z^{b \oplus a} P^a \text{T} |\psi\rangle &= X^a Z^{b \oplus a^2} P^{a \oplus a} \text{T} |\psi\rangle \\ &= X^a Z^{b \oplus a} \text{T} |\psi\rangle \text{ since } a^2 = a, a \oplus a = 0. \end{aligned}$$

The above equalities follow from applying the update rules in [Appendix A.1.1](#).

Now we have successfully "moved" the original T gate to the right side of Pauli pads X, Z 's, and removed the unwanted P^a gate.

⁷When computing the update function for the circuit Reconstruct', we can modify the algorithm inside the update function to do the following: if the next gate is a T gate and assume the update function after applying the previous gate gives outcome (a', b') , then first check if there's a correct $P^{a'}$ gate following the T gate; if yes, compute the update function for these two gates together as $(a', b' \oplus a') \leftarrow f_{P^{a'} \text{T}}(a', b')$; otherwise if there's not a correct $P^{a'}$ gate that follows the T gate, the update function aborts.

Let us suppose for all $j \in [\kappa]$, where κ is the number of T gates, \mathcal{A}_2 's guess for s_j is correct: that is, assuming the update function after applying the previous gate gives outcome (a', b') , then if $a' = 1$ then there is a P gate that follows the T gate; else there would not be one. Then whenever the update function $f_{\text{Reconstruct}'}$ runs into a T gate followed by a correct $P^{s_j} = P^{a'}$, we will obtain the updated Pauli errors as $(a', b' \oplus a') \leftarrow f_{P^{a'}T}(a', b')$.

If all \mathcal{A}_2 's guesses for $\{s_j\}_{j \in [\kappa]}$ are correct, then \mathcal{A}_2 's measurement outcome $c = \text{Reconstruct}' X^a Z^b |\psi_{12}\rangle$ will be equal to $X^{a^*} Z^{b^*} \text{Reconstruct} |\psi_{12}\rangle$. \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C} will obtain the $(a^*, b^*) \leftarrow f_{\text{Reconstruct}'}(a || 0^k, b || 0^k)$ so that by applying $X^{a^*} Z^{b^*}$ to c , they will both obtain the real result $\text{Reconstruct} |\psi_{12}\rangle$. by outputting the first bit they will recover the correct m .

Every time \mathcal{A}_2 makes a guess on s_j , it has probability $\frac{1}{2}$ of getting correct. When it guesses incorrectly for one $j \in [\kappa]$, then the entire approach may fail. Therefore, the above attack has success probability at least $\frac{1}{2^\kappa}$. Since the T gate number κ is logarithmic in terms of the security parameter, the attack succeeds with a noticeable probability. □

Extending to n -party case In the n -party case, every $\mathcal{A}_i, i \neq n$ can teleport its share ρ_i to the last party \mathcal{A}_n and sends their Pauli OTP information $\{(a_i, b_i)\}_{i \neq n}$ to the recoverers \mathcal{B} and \mathcal{C} .

\mathcal{A}_n performs the same operations as what \mathcal{A}_2 does in the 2-party case. In the end, it sends the outcome c and modified circuit $\text{Reconstruct}'$ to \mathcal{B} and \mathcal{C} . They should then be able to compute corrections $(a'_1, b'_1, \dots, a'_n, b'_n) \leftarrow f_{\text{Reconstruct}'}(a'_1, b'_1, \dots, 0^k, 0^k)$ and apply $Z^{b'_1, \dots, b'_n} X^{a'_1, \dots, a'_n}$ to c to recover the secret.

7.3 USS Implies Unclonable Encryption

Theorem 7.5. *Unclonable secret sharing with IND-based security against adversaries with (bounded) polynomial amount of shared entanglement and connected pre-shared entanglement graph implies secure unclonable encryption.*

We will first look at the 2-party case, which can be easily extended to the $n(> 2)$ -party case.

Proof. Assume a secure USS = (USS.Share, USS.Reconstruct) with IND-based security, we construct the following UE scheme:

1. $\text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda, 1^{|m|})$: samples a random $\text{sk} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{2\ell}$, where $\ell = \ell(\lambda)$ is the number of qubits in each share generated by $\text{USS.Share}(1^\lambda, 1^{|m|}, \cdot)$. Output sk .
2. $\text{Enc}(\text{sk}, m)$:
 - (a) compute $(\rho_1, \rho_2) \leftarrow \text{USS.Share}(1^\lambda, 1^{|m|}, m)$.
 - (b) sample random $(a, b) \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{2\ell}$. Use them to quantum one-time pad the second share ρ_2 to obtain $X^a Z^b \rho_2 Z^b X^a$.
 - (c) compute $s \leftarrow (a, b) \oplus \text{sk}$
 - (d) Output $\text{ct} = (\rho_1, X^a Z^b \rho_2 Z^b X^a, s)$.
3. $\text{Dec}(\text{ct}, \text{sk})$:
 - (a) parse $\text{ct} = (\rho_1, \rho'_2, s)$;

- (b) compute $(a, b) \leftarrow s \oplus \text{sk}$;
- (c) output $m \leftarrow \text{USS.Reconstruct}(\rho_1, X^a Z^b \rho_2' Z^b X^a)$.

Correctness The correctness easily follows from the correctness of the underlying USS scheme.

Security Suppose we have UE adversaries $(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C})$ that wins in the IND-based UE security game, we can construct adversary $(\mathcal{A}' = (\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2), \mathcal{B}', \mathcal{C}')$ for the USS IND-based security.

Before receiving the shares from the challenger, \mathcal{A}_1 and \mathcal{A}_2 agrees on a random strong $r \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{2^\ell}$. When receiving the shares, \mathcal{A}_2 teleports its share ρ_2 to \mathcal{A}_1 and obtains Pauli errors (a, b) .

\mathcal{A}_1 gives (ρ_1, r) the UE adversary \mathcal{A} . \mathcal{A}_2 computes $\text{sk}' \leftarrow (a, b) \oplus r$.

In the USS challenge phase, \mathcal{A}_2 sends sk' to both \mathcal{B}' and \mathcal{C}' . The UE adversaries \mathcal{A} has finished giving the bipartite it generated from (ρ_1, r) state $\sigma_{\mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C}}$ to \mathcal{B} and \mathcal{C} .

Then \mathcal{B}' feeds \mathcal{B} with sk' as the secret key in the UE security game (and \mathcal{C}' feeding sk' to \mathcal{C} , respectively), and outputs their output bit $b_{\mathcal{B}}, b_{\mathcal{C}}$ as the answer to USS game. Since the classical part in the unclonable ciphertext is the classical information (a, b) masked by a uniformly random sk , the reduction perfectly simulates the above scheme by first giving the UE adversary \mathcal{A} a uniformly random string r and later feeding \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C} with $r \oplus (a, b)$.

Extending to n -party case We can change the scheme to sample a longer $\text{sk} \in \{0, 1\}^{2^{(n-1)\ell}}$ and let the unclonable ciphertext be $(\rho_1, X^{a_2} Z^{b_2} \rho_2 Z^{b_2} X^{a_2}, \dots, X^{a_n} Z^{b_n} \rho_n Z^{b_n} X^{a_n}, s = (a_1, b_1, \dots, a_n, b_n) \oplus \text{sk})$.

In the reduction, when receiving the shares, $\mathcal{A}_i, i \neq 1$ teleports its share ρ_i to \mathcal{A}_1 and obtains Pauli errors (a_i, b_i) . The rest of the reduction follows easily. □

Theorem 7.6. *Unclonable secret sharing with IND-based security against adversaries with disconnected entanglement graph, where one of the parties receives as a share a quantum state and all other parties receive classical shares (in other words, computational basis states), implies secure unclonable encryption.*

Proof. In the case where only one party has a quantum share, the others classical shares, we can easily modify the above construction to have a UE scheme from USS:

1. $\text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda, 1^{|\mathcal{m}|})$: samples a random $\text{sk} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{(n-1)\ell}$, where $\ell = \ell(\lambda)$ is the number of qubits/bits in each share generated by $\text{USS.Share}(1^\lambda, 1^{|\mathcal{m}|}, \cdot)$. Output sk .
2. $\text{Enc}(\text{sk}, m)$:
 - (a) compute $(\rho_1, y_2, \dots, y_n) \leftarrow \text{USS.Share}(1^\lambda, 1^{|\mathcal{m}|}, m)$. y_1, \dots, y_n are binary strings.
 - (b) sample random $\text{sk} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{(n-1)\ell}$. Compute $s \leftarrow (y_1, \dots, y_n) \oplus \text{sk}$
 - (c) Output $\text{ct} = (\rho_1, s)$.
3. $\text{Dec}(\text{ct}, \text{sk})$:
 - (a) parse $\text{ct} = (\rho_1, s)$;
 - (b) compute $(y_1, \dots, y_n) \leftarrow s \oplus \text{sk}$;
 - (c) output $m \leftarrow \text{USS.Reconstruct}(\rho_1, y_1, \dots, y_n)$.

Security Suppose we have an UE adversary $(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C})$ that wins in the IND-based UE security game with probability $\frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon$, we construct an adversary $(\mathcal{A}' = (\mathcal{A}_1, \dots, \mathcal{A}_n), \mathcal{B}', \mathcal{C}')$ that wins in the USS IND-based security game with probability $\frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon$. Thus, if the USS scheme is secure then ε has to be negligible. We describe $\mathcal{A}_1, \dots, \mathcal{A}_n$ as follows.

Before receiving the shares from the challenger, $\mathcal{A}_1, \dots, \mathcal{A}_n$ agrees on a random string $r \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{(n-1)\ell}$.

\mathcal{A}_1 gives (ρ_1, r) to the UE adversary \mathcal{A} . \mathcal{A}_i , for $i \neq 1$, when receiving the classical share y_i from the challenger, computes $\text{sk}'_i \leftarrow y_i \oplus r_i$, where r_i is the $(i-1)$ -th block of length- ℓ string in r .

In the USS challenge phase, each \mathcal{A}_i , for $i \neq 1$, sends sk'_i to both \mathcal{B}' and \mathcal{C}' . \mathcal{A}_1 sends the bipartite state $\sigma_{\mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C}}$ to \mathcal{B}' and \mathcal{C}' , where $\sigma_{\mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C}}$ is the output of \mathcal{A} .

Then \mathcal{B}' feeds \mathcal{B} with $\text{sk}' = (\text{sk}'_2, \dots, \text{sk}'_n)$ as the secret key in the UE security game (and \mathcal{C}' feeding sk' to \mathcal{C} , respectively), and outputs their output bit $b_{\mathcal{B}}, b_{\mathcal{C}}$ as the answer to USS game. Since the classical part in the unclonable ciphertext is the classical information (y_2, \dots, y_n) masked by a uniformly random sk , the reduction perfectly simulates the above scheme by first giving the UE adversary \mathcal{A} a uniformly random string r and later feeding \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C} with $r \oplus (y_2, \dots, y_n)$. Thus, the advantage of $(\mathcal{A}', \mathcal{B}', \mathcal{C}')$ in breaking the USS security game is precisely the same as the advantage of $(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C})$ breaking the UE security game. □

7.4 Search-based USS Implies Position Verification

Quantum Position Verification We first give a definition of 1-dimensional quantum position verification.

A 1-dimensional quantum position-verification protocol in the vanilla model⁸ of verifier (V_0, V_1) and prover P consists of the following stages:

1. Setup: Verifiers V_0, V_1 exchange information over another secure (possibly quantum) channel unknown to P to prepare for the (potentially quantum) challenge (ρ_x, ρ_y) . V_0, V_1 also make sure that they are located on the two different sides of the prover P .
2. Challenge:
 - Verifiers V_0 sends ρ_x to P and V_1 sends ρ_y to P so that the two pieces of information reach P at the claimed position pos at the same time.
 - P computes $\mathcal{P}(\rho_x, \rho_y)$ for some quantum channel \mathcal{P} instantaneously and sends the (possibly quantum) answers $\rho_{\text{ans},0}$ and $\rho_{\text{ans},1}$ back to V_0, V_1 .
 - V_0, V_1 check if the answers arrive on the correct time and if $\mathcal{P}(\rho_x, \rho_y)$ is computed correctly. If both yes, accept; otherwise if one condition is violated, reject.

For any position pos (within the capability of the verifiers), we want the protocol to satisfy two properties in terms of a security parameter n :

- **Correctness:** For any honest prover P at claimed position pos , there exists a negligible function $\text{negl}(\cdot)$ such that the probability that the verifiers accept is at least $(1 - \text{negl}(\lambda))$.

⁸The vanilla model is a model where we do not consider hardware restrictions on any parties. Usually it means that we do not work with bounded storage/bounded retrieval model; all parties have synchronized clocks.

- **Soundness:** For any malicious provers (P_0, P_1, \dots, P_k) (where $k = \text{poly}(\lambda)$), none of which at the claimed position pos , there exists a negligible function $\text{negl}(\cdot)$ such that the probability that the verifiers accept is at most $\text{negl}(\lambda)$.

where the probabilities are taken over the randomness used in the protocol.

It can be observed that we can consider only two malicious provers (P_0, P_1) since adding more provers won't help increase their winning probability.

QPV with Pre-shared Entanglement In QPV, we also consider different adversarial setup such as: (1) (P_0, P_1) do not have pre-shared entanglement; (2) (P_0, P_1) can share a bounded/unbounded polynomial amount of entanglement; (3) (P_0, P_1) can share unbounded amount of entanglement. We also divide the settings into computational and information-theoretic.

Theorem 7.7. *2-party USS (computational/IT resp.) with search-based security (Definition A.1) implies 1-dimensional QPV (computational/IT, resp.), where the two adversarial provers in the QPV protocol pre-share the same amount of entanglement as the two parties in the USS protocol do.*

The following theorem demonstrates from another point of view the barrier of constructing secure protocols against entangled adversaries for USS in the IT setting. Even if we consider computational assumptions, the development in building secure QPV protocols against entangled adversaries has been slow, which indicates further evidence on how challenging USS can be in the entangled setting.

Theorem 7.8 ([BK11, BCF⁺14]). *Quantum position verification is impossible in the information theoretic setting if we allow the adversaries to pre-share entanglement.*

Proof for Theorem 7.7

Proof. Given a 2-party USS protocol with search based security, we construct a QPV protocol as follows:

1. Setup: at time t_0 , verifiers V_0, V_1 sample a random secret $s \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n$. Run $\text{USS.Share}(1^\lambda, 2, s) \rightarrow (\rho_0, \rho_1)$.
2. V_0 sends ρ_0 to the prover and V_1 sends ρ_1 to the prover so that ρ_0 and ρ_1 reach the prover at the same time. Let us denote the time that these two messages arrive at prover's location as t_1 .
3. The prover runs $\text{USS.Reconstruct}(\rho_0, \rho_1) \rightarrow s'$ (we assume that the reconstruction procedure is instantaneous compared to the travelling time of the message). It sends the recovered secret s' to both V_0 and V_1 .
4. V_0 and V_1 check if the message s' from the prover arrive on time, respectively and if the message $s' = s$. If yes, accept; else reject.

Suppose there's a pair of malicious provers (P_0, P_1) who are not at the claimed position but make the verifiers accept with non-negligible probability, then there exists some malicious shareholders (P'_0, P'_1) that break the search-based security of 2-party USS.

We first give a general description that captures all QPV attacks against the above protocol.

- P_0 will stand at a location between the left-hand-side verifier V_0 and the claimed location pos . P_1 will stand at a location between the right-hand-side verifier V_1 and the claimed location pos .
- At time $t_{0,0}$, P_0 receives the message ρ_0 from V_0 . $t_{0,0} < t_1$ because P_0 is standing closer to V_0 than pos is.
- At time $t_{0,1}$, P_1 receives ρ_1 from V_1 . For similar reason as above, $t_{0,1} < t_1$.
- Without loss of generality, P_0 applies some unitary U_0 on ρ_0 and its own auxiliary state \mathbf{Aux}_0 (possibly having preshared entanglement with P_1) to obtain two states $\rho_{0,L}, \rho_{0,R}$ as outputs.
- P_1 applies some unitary U_1 on ρ_1 and its own auxiliary state \mathbf{Aux}_1 (possibly having preshared entanglement with P_0) to obtain two states $\rho_{1,L}, \rho_{1,R}$ as outputs.
- P_0 keeps $\rho_{0,L}$ for itself and sends $\rho_{0,R}$ to P_1 ; P_1 keeps $\rho_{1,L}$ for itself and sends $\rho_{1,R}$ to P_0 .
- After P_0 receives $\rho_{1,L}$, it applies a POVM Π_0 on the joint system of $(\rho_{0,L}, \rho_{1,L})$ to get a measurement outcome s'_0 .
- After P_1 receives $\rho_{0,R}$, it applies a POVM Π_1 on the joint system of $(\rho_{0,R}, \rho_{1,R})$ to get a measurement outcome s'_1 ⁹.
- P_0 sends s'_0 to V_0 ; P_1 sends s'_1 to V_1 .

Suppose the above attack succeeds with probability ϵ ¹⁰, we construct a pair of USS adversary (P'_0, P'_1) that succeeds with probability ϵ against search based security:

- P'_0 and P'_1 share the same setup (preshared entanglement/shared randomness) as P_0, P_1 do.
- When receiving share ρ_0 , P'_0 applies the unitary U_0 on ρ_0 and its own auxiliary state \mathbf{Aux}_0 (possibly having preshared entanglement with P'_1) to obtain two states $\rho_{0,L}, \rho_{0,R}$.
- When receiving share ρ_1 , P'_1 applies the unitary U_1 on ρ_1 and its own auxiliary state \mathbf{Aux}_1 (possibly having preshared entanglement with P'_0) to obtain two states $\rho_{1,L}, \rho_{1,R}$.
- In the reconstruction stage: P'_0 sends $\rho_{0,L}$ to the recoverer \mathcal{B} and $\rho_{0,R}$ to \mathcal{C} . P'_1 sends $\rho_{1,L}$ to the recoverer \mathcal{B} and $\rho_{1,R}$ to \mathcal{C} .
- \mathcal{B} applies the POVM Π_0 on the joint system of $(\rho_{0,L}, \rho_{1,L})$ to get a measurement outcome s'_0 . \mathcal{C} applies the POVM Π_1 on the joint system of $(\rho_{0,R}, \rho_{1,R})$ to get a measurement outcome s'_1 .
- By our assumption, we have $s'_0 = s'_1 = s$ with probability ϵ .

□

⁹ U_0, U_1, Π_0, Π_1 are all instantaneous compared to message travelling time.

¹⁰It is guaranteed that using the above attack strategy, the malicious provers' messages will arrive at the verifiers on time. We omit the details here since we do not need this property for attacking USS.

References

- [Aar09] Scott Aaronson. “Quantum copy-protection and quantum money”. In: *2009 24th Annual IEEE Conference on Computational Complexity*. IEEE. 2009, pp. 229–242 (cit. on p. 4).
- [AC12] Scott Aaronson and Paul Christiano. *Quantum Money from Hidden Subspaces*. 2012. DOI: [10.48550/ARXIV.1203.4740](https://doi.org/10.48550/ARXIV.1203.4740). URL: <https://arxiv.org/abs/1203.4740> (cit. on p. 4).
- [AK21] Prabhanjan Ananth and Fatih Kaleoglu. “Unclonable Encryption, Revisited”. In: *Theory of Cryptography Conference*. Springer. 2021, pp. 299–329 (cit. on pp. 4, 13).
- [AKL⁺22] Prabhanjan Ananth, Fatih Kaleoglu, Xingjian Li, Qipeng Liu, and Mark Zhandry. “On the feasibility of unclonable encryption, and more”. In: *Annual International Cryptology Conference*. Springer. 2022, pp. 212–241 (cit. on pp. 4, 14).
- [AKL23] Prabhanjan Ananth, Fatih Kaleoglu, and Qipeng Liu. “Cloning Games: A General Framework for Unclonable Primitives”. In: *Annual International Cryptology Conference*. Springer. 2023, pp. 66–98 (cit. on pp. 4, 14).
- [AL20] Prabhanjan Ananth and Rolando L. La Placa. *Secure Software Leasing*. 2020. DOI: [10.48550/ARXIV.2005.05289](https://doi.org/10.48550/ARXIV.2005.05289). URL: <https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.05289> (cit. on p. 4).
- [BB20] Charles H Bennett and Gilles Brassard. “Quantum cryptography: Public key distribution and coin tossing”. In: *arXiv preprint arXiv:2003.06557* (2020) (cit. on pp. 4, 6).
- [BBBV97] Charles H Bennett, Ethan Bernstein, Gilles Brassard, and Umesh Vazirani. “Strengths and weaknesses of quantum computing”. In: *SIAM journal on Computing* 26.5 (1997), pp. 1510–1523 (cit. on p. 15).
- [BCF⁺14] Harry Buhrman, Nishanth Chandran, Serge Fehr, Ran Gelles, Vipul Goyal, Rafail Ostrovsky, and Christian Schaffner. “Position-based quantum cryptography: Impossibility and constructions”. In: *SIAM Journal on Computing* 43.1 (2014), pp. 150–178 (cit. on p. 31).
- [BDF⁺11] Dan Boneh, Özgür Dagdelen, Marc Fischlin, Anja Lehmann, Christian Schaffner, and Mark Zhandry. “Random oracles in a quantum world”. In: *International conference on the theory and application of cryptology and information security*. Springer. 2011, pp. 41–69 (cit. on p. 7).
- [BK11] Salman Beigi and Robert König. “Simplified instantaneous non-local quantum computation with applications to position-based cryptography”. In: *New Journal of Physics* 13.9 (2011), p. 093036 (cit. on pp. 4, 11, 31).
- [BK20] Anne Broadbent and Raza Ali Kazmi. “Indistinguishability obfuscation for quantum circuits of low T-count.” In: *IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.* 2020 (2020), p. 639 (cit. on pp. 26, 35, 36).

- [BL20] Anne Broadbent and Sébastien Lord. “Uncloneable Quantum Encryption via Oracles”. en. In: Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, 2020. DOI: [10.4230/LIPICS.TQC.2020.4](https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPICS.TQC.2020.4). URL: <https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2020/12063/> (cit. on pp. 4, 6, 9, 11, 13, 19).
- [BS16] Shalev Ben-David and Or Sattath. *Quantum Tokens for Digital Signatures*. 2016. DOI: [10.48550/ARXIV.1609.09047](https://doi.org/10.48550/ARXIV.1609.09047). URL: <https://arxiv.org/abs/1609.09047> (cit. on p. 4).
- [CGMO09] Nishanth Chandran, Vipul Goyal, Ryan Moriarty, and Rafail Ostrovsky. “Position based cryptography”. In: *Annual International Cryptology Conference*. Springer. 2009, pp. 391–407 (cit. on p. 12).
- [CLLZ21] Andrea Coladangelo, Jiahui Liu, Qipeng Liu, and Mark Zhandry. “Hidden Cosets and Applications to Unclonable Cryptography”. In: *Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2021*. Ed. by Tal Malkin and Chris Peikert. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021, pp. 556–584. ISBN: 978-3-030-84242-0 (cit. on p. 4).
- [GC19] Alvin Gonzales and Eric Chitambar. “Bounds on instantaneous nonlocal quantum computation”. In: *IEEE Transactions on Information Theory* 66.5 (2019), pp. 2951–2963 (cit. on p. 4).
- [Got02] Daniel Gottesman. “Uncloneable Encryption”. In: (2002). DOI: [10.48550/ARXIV.QUANT-PH/0210062](https://doi.org/10.48550/ARXIV.QUANT-PH/0210062). URL: <https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0210062> (cit. on p. 4).
- [GSS21] Vipul Goyal, Yifan Song, and Akshayaram Srinivasan. “Traceable secret sharing and applications”. In: *Advances in Cryptology–CRYPTO 2021: 41st Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 2021, Virtual Event, August 16–20, 2021, Proceedings, Part III 41*. Springer. 2021, pp. 718–747 (cit. on p. 3).
- [IH08] Satoshi Ishizaka and Tohya Hiroshima. “Asymptotic teleportation scheme as a universal programmable quantum processor”. In: *Physical review letters* 101.24 (2008), p. 240501 (cit. on pp. 4, 11, 15).
- [LMZ23] Jiahui Liu, Hart Montgomery, and Mark Zhandry. “Another Round of Breaking and Making Quantum Money: How to Not Build It from Lattices, and More”. In: *Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques*. Springer. 2023, pp. 611–638 (cit. on p. 4).
- [May19] Alex May. “Quantum tasks in holography”. In: *Journal of High Energy Physics* 2019.10 (2019), pp. 1–39 (cit. on pp. 4, 13).
- [May22] Alex May. “Complexity and entanglement in non-local computation and holography”. In: *Quantum* 6 (2022), p. 864 (cit. on pp. 4, 13).
- [NC10] Michael A Nielsen and Isaac L Chuang. *Quantum computation and quantum information*. Cambridge university press, 2010 (cit. on p. 13).
- [Shm22] Omri Shmueli. “Public-key Quantum money with a classical bank”. In: *Proceedings of the 54th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing*. 2022, pp. 790–803 (cit. on p. 4).
- [Spe15] Florian Speelman. “Instantaneous non-local computation of low T-depth quantum circuits”. In: *arXiv preprint arXiv:1511.02839* (2015) (cit. on pp. 4, 11, 12, 26).

- [TFKW13] Marco Tomamichel, Serge Fehr, Jędrzej Kaniewski, and Stephanie Wehner. “A monogamy-of-entanglement game with applications to device-independent quantum cryptography”. In: *New Journal of Physics* 15.10 (Oct. 2013), p. 103002. DOI: [10.1088/1367-2630/15/10/103002](https://doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/15/10/103002). URL: <https://doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/15/10/103002> (cit. on pp. 6, 9).
- [Vai03] Lev Vaidman. “Instantaneous measurement of nonlocal variables”. In: *Physical review letters* 90.1 (2003), p. 010402 (cit. on p. 4).
- [Zha17] Mark Zhandry. “Quantum Lightning Never Strikes the Same State Twice”. In: *CoRR* abs/1711.02276 (2017). arXiv: [1711.02276](https://arxiv.org/abs/1711.02276). URL: <http://arxiv.org/abs/1711.02276> (cit. on p. 4).

A Additional Preliminaries

A.1 Gate Teleportation Protocol

Suppose Alice has a quantum state $|\psi\rangle$ (without loss of generality, $|\psi\rangle$ is a one qubit state) and Alice and Bob share one half each of an EPR pair. Then Alice can send her state to Bob using the quantum teleportation protocol. This requires Alice to perform a measurement on the input as well as her half of the EPR pair (let the output of these measurements be a, b). Then Bob’s part of EPR pair gets transformed to the state $X^b Z^a |\psi\rangle$.

A simple modification to the quantum teleportation protocol allows us to achieve gate teleportation. That is, if we could apply G to Bob’s half of the EPR pair and then apply the quantum teleportation circuit, Bob gets the state $G(X^b Z^a |\psi\rangle)$. To obtain the correct outcome $G|\psi\rangle$, Bob needs to compute an update function f that helps him obtain $(a', b') \leftarrow f(a, b)$ where the inputs are the Pauli correction (a, b) ; Bob then applies $X^{a'} Z^{b'}$ on his register that hold $G(X^b Z^a |\psi\rangle)$.

A.1.1 Update function

We consider the following identities (ignoring the global phase) verbatim from [BK20]. Let $|\psi\rangle$ be a 1-qubit state and $|\phi\rangle$ be a 2-qubit state. As introduced in [BK20], we would like to obtain $G(|\psi\rangle)$ from $G(X^b Z^a |\psi\rangle)$ (output of gate teleportation). To look at how we can get $G(|\psi\rangle)$ from $G(X^b Z^a |\psi\rangle)$, we look at the case when G is a 1-qubit gate and $|\psi\rangle$ is a 1-qubit state. For this we get the following identities (ignoring the global phase):

$$\begin{aligned}
X(X^a Z^b) |\psi\rangle &= (X^a Z^b) X |\psi\rangle \\
Z(X^a Z^b) |\psi\rangle &= (X^a Z^b) Z |\psi\rangle \\
H(X^a Z^b) |\psi\rangle &= (X^b Z^a) H |\psi\rangle \\
P(X^a Z^b) |\psi\rangle &= (X^a Z^{a \oplus b}) P |\psi\rangle \\
\text{CNOT}(X^{a_1} Z^{b_1} \otimes X^{a_2} Z^{b_2}) |\phi\rangle &= (X^{a_1} Z^{b_1 \oplus b_2} \otimes X^{a_1 \oplus a_2} Z^{b_2}) \text{CNOT} |\phi\rangle \\
T(X^a Z^b) |\psi\rangle &= (X^a Z^{b \oplus a} P^a) T |\psi\rangle
\end{aligned}$$

From the above rules, we can see that for *Clifford circuits*, we can prepare a classical update function f_G according to the quantum circuit description G , apply $X^{a'}$ and $Z^{b'}$, where $(a', b') \leftarrow f_G(a, b)$, to $G(X^{b'}Z^{a'}|\psi\rangle)$ and get $G(|\psi\rangle)$.

Update function for Any Quantum Circuits Additionally, as discussed in [BK20]: suppose a state $|\psi\rangle$ is QOTP-ed using the keys $(a_1, b_1, \dots, a_n, b_n)$. Then, for any quantum circuit G (not necessarily Clifford) applied on the QOTP-ed state, there exists a correction unitary, expressed as a linear combination of Paulis, that when applied on the QOTP-ed state yields the state $G(|\psi\rangle)$. Note that computing such an update function for arbitrary quantum circuits may not be efficient, depending on the number of T gates.

A.2 Search-Based Security and Collusion-Resistant Security

Search-Based Security In this paragraph, we briefly define search-based security, a weakening of the indistinguishability definition. The security guarantees that for a random message $m \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$, no two reconstructing parties can simultaneously recover the secret m , given their set of respective cloned shares.

The security game is the same as section 4.2 except that we replace the 1-bit message b with the λ -bit message m .

Accordingly, the security definitions are:

Definition A.1 (Search-based Information-theoretic Unclonable Secret Sharing). *An n -party unclonable secret sharing scheme (Share, Reconstruct) satisfies search-based unpredictability if for any non-uniform adversary $\text{Adv} = (\{\mathcal{A}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C}, \xi)$, the following holds:*

$$\Pr \left[1 \leftarrow \text{Expt}_{(\{\mathcal{A}_i\}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C}, \xi)} \right] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

Definition A.2 (Search-based Computational Unclonable Secret Sharing). *An n -party unclonable secret sharing scheme (Share, Reconstruct) satisfies search-based unpredictability if for any non-uniform QPT adversary $\text{Adv} = (\{\mathcal{A}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C}, \xi)$, the following holds:*

$$\Pr \left[1 \leftarrow \text{Expt}_{(\{\mathcal{A}_i\}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C}, \xi)} \right] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

Collusion-Resistant USS Security t -collusion resistant USS has the same security game as in 4.2, except that we allow an adversarially and adaptively chosen partition of parties into size no larger than t to collude: that is, in the share-phase, the shareholders can be partitioned into groups of size at most t , and within each group, the shareholders can communicate and output one bipartite state $\sigma_{\mathcal{B}\mathcal{C}}$ to send \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C} before the reconstruct stage.

Claim 4. *The existence of 2-party USS unconditionally implies n -party USS with any t ($t \leq n - 1$)-collusion resistance.*

Proof. First, let $k = \binom{n}{2}$. In the collusion resistance protocol, we first run a classical information theoretic k -out-of- k secret sharing protocol on the original share x to obtain classical shares x_1, \dots, x_k . Next, for each every 2 party among all the n parties for the collusion resistance adversary, run a 2-party USS protocol on secret $x_i, i \in [k]$. Thus, no matter how the adversary partitions

the n parties into groups, with each group having size $t < n$, there will always be at least a pair two parties apart in two different groups. If the n -party collusion resistance protocol is insecure, then there exists a reduction that embeds a 2-party USS challenge in the secret sharing (by guessing correctly a separated pair of shareholders with inverse polynomial probability). The reduction can simulate the remaining $(k-1)$ runs of the two party USS protocols on its own. Suppose the collusion resistance adversary can output the correct secret in the end, then the reduction can recover the secret of the two party USS challenge as well.

□

Corollary A.3. *There exists a n -party t -collusion resistant USS protocol with indistinguishability-based security against adversaries sharing an arbitrary amount of (connected) entanglement in QROM, for any polynomial $n \geq 2$ and any $t < n$.*

The corollary easily follows from the above and [Theorem 6.1](#).