

How Will QUIC Change Internet **Communication?**

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QUIC: a fast, secure, evolvable transport protocol for the Internet

- Fast better user experience than TCP/TLS for HTTP/2 and other content
- Secure always-encrypted end-to-end security, resist pervasive monitoring
- Evolvable prevent network from ossifying, deploy new QUIC versions quickly
- Transport support all TCP content & more (realtime media, etc.) provide better abstractions, avoid known TCP issues






- The web will move to QUIC first, and then everything else will
- If you do anything with HTTP, TCP or just networks, **QUIC should be on your radar now**

• Affects the network and third parties, too

Always-encrypted, mostly obfuscated: need to control an endpoint to get a useful trace




QUIC - Redefining Internet Transport. J. Iyengar. IETF-93 QUIC BoF presentation, 2015.



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Build a carrier-grade network G


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google.com


Google CDN

QUIC - Redefining Internet Transport. J. Iyengar. IETF-93 QUIC BoF presentation, 2015.





QUIC - Redefining Internet Transport. J. Iyengar. IETF-93 QUIC BoF presentation, 2015.







Internet transport



The Internet hourglass


Classical version

- Inspired by OSI "seven-layer" model
 - Minus presentation (6) and session (5)
- "IP on everything"
 - All link tech looks the same (approx.)
- Transport layer provides communication abstractions to apps
 - Unicast/multicast
 - Multiplexing

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
- Streams/messages
- Reliability (full/partial)
- Flow/congestion control





Boardwatch Magazine, Aug. 1994.






Steve Deering. Watching the Waist of the Protocol Hourglass. Keynote, IEEE ICNP 1998, Austin, TX, USA. http://www.ieeeicnp.org/1998/Keynote.ppt



The Internet hourglass

2015 version (ca.)

- The waist has split: IPv4 and IPv6
- TCP is drowning out UDP
- HTTP and TLS are de facto part of transport
- Consequence: web apps on IPv4/6



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What happened?

- Transport slow to evolve (esp. TCP)
 - Fundamentally difficult problem
- Network made assumptions about what (TCP) traffic looked like & how it behaved
- Tried to "help" and "manage"
 - TCP "accelerators" & firewalls, DPI, NAT, etc.

The web happened

- Almost all content on HTTP(S)
- Easier/cheaper to develop for & deploy on
- Amplified by mobile & cloud
- Baked-in client/server assumption

Slow transport evolution


Middlebox boom

Rise of the web

Internet ossification



Example ossifications



vs. network can (should!) touch bits across a packet





TCP challenges



TCP is not aging well

We're hitting hard limits (e.g., TCP option space)

- 40B total (15 * 4B 20) -
- Used: SACK-OK (2), timestamp (10), window Scale (3), MSS (4)
- Multipath needs 12, Fast-Open 6-18...

Incredibly difficult to evolve, c.f. Multipath TCP


- New TCP must look like old TCP, otherwise it gets dropped
- TCP is already very complicated

Slow upgrade cycles for new TCP stacks (kernel update required)

- Better with more frequent update cycles on consumer OS
- Still high-risk and invasive (reboot)

TCP headers not encrypted or even authenticated – middleboxes can still meddle

TCP-MD5 and TCP-AO in practice only used for (some) BGP sessions




By Ere at Norwegian Wikipedia (Own work) [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons

ddleboxes can still meddle



Middleboxes meddle

Example: TCP accelerators



Sameer Ladiwala, Ramaswamy Ramaswamy, and Tilman Wolf. Transparent TCP acceleration. Computer Communications, Volume 32, Issue 4, 2009, pages 691-702.



Middleboxes meddle


Example: Nation states attacking end users or services



- Observe server-to-client TCP SYN/ACK
- Shoot! (HTTP Payload)
- Hope to beat server-to-client HTTP Response

The Challenge:

- Can only win the race on some links/targets
- For many links/targets: too slow to win the race!



QFIRE Pilot Lead. NSA/Technology Directorate. QFIRE pilot report. 2011.

B. Marczak, N. Weaver, J. Dalek, R. Ensafi, D. Fifield, S. McKune, A. Rey, J. Scott-Railton, R. Deibert, and V. Paxson. An Analysis of China's "Great Cannon". 5th USENIX FOCI Workshop, 2015.



Pervasive monitoring is an attack RFC 7528

- IETF (& wider) community consensus that pervasive monitoring is an attack
- Agreement to mitigate pervasive monitoring
- What does "mitigate" mean?
- To many, "encrypt as much as possible"



Laura Poitras / Praxis Films. CC BY 3.0








QUIC Selected aspects

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QUIC is not *that* new, actually

- Originates with Google, deployed between Google services and Chrome since 2014
- Mid 2017, QUIC made up 35% of Google egress traffic (~7% of total Internet traffic)
- Early 2021, **DE-CIX reported 20% QUIC** on some links
- Early 2022, https://radar.cloudflare.com reports ~25% QUIC




A. Langley, A. Riddoch, A. Wilk, A. Vicente, C. Krasic, D. Zhang, F. Yang, F. Kouranov, I. Swett, J. Iyengar, J. Bailey, J. Dorfman, J. Roskind, J. Kulik, P. Westin, R. Tenneti, R. Shade, R. Hamilton, V. Vasiliev, W. Chang, and Z. Shi. 2017. The QUIC Transport Protocol: Design and Internet-Scale Deployment., ACM SIGCOMM, 2017.



QUIC in the stack

- Integrated transport stack on top of UDP
- Replaces TCP and some part of HTTP; reuses TLS-1.3
- Initial target application: HTTP/2
- Prediction: many others will follow




J. Iyengar. QUIC Tutorial A New Internet Transport/ IETF-98 Tutorial, 2017.





Why UDP?

- TCP hard to evolve
- Other protocols blocked by middleboxes (SCTP, etc.)
- UDP is all we have left
- Not without problems!
 - Many middleboxes ossified on "UDP is for DNS"
 - Enforce short binding timeouts, etc.
 - Short-term issue with hardware NIC offloading
- Also, benefits
 - Can deploy in userspace (no kernel update needed)
 - Can offer alternative transport types (partial reliability, etc.)



UDP

Image from http://itpro.nikkeibp.co.jp



Why congestion control?

- Functional CC is absolute requirement for operation over real networks
 - UDP has no CC
- First approach: take what works for TCP, apply to QUIC
- Consequence: need
 - Segment/packet numbers
 - Acknowledgments (ACKs)
 - Round-trip time (RTT) estimators
 - etc.
- Not an area of large innovation at present
 - This will change




Image from People's Daily, http://people.cn/



Why transport-layer security (TLS)?


End-to-end security is critical


- To protect users
- To prevent network ossification
- TLS is very widely used
 - Can leverage all community R&D
 - Can leverage the PKI
- Don't want custom security too much to get wrong
 - Even TLS keeps having issues
 - But TLS 1.3 removes a lot of cruft
- And benefit from new TLS features
 - E.g., 0-RTT handshakes (inspired by gQUIC-crypto)



Why HTTP?

- Because that's where the impact is
 - Web industry incredibly interested in improved UE and security
- Rapid update cycles for browsers, servers, CDNs, etc.
 - Can deploy and update QUIC quickly
- Many other app protocols will follow







Minimal network-visible header

With QUIC, the network sees:

- (partially obfuscated) Packet type
- QUIC version (only in long packet header)
- Destination CID
- (obfuscated) Packet number
- With TCP, also
 - ACK numbers, ECN information
 - Timestamps
 - Windows & scale factors
- Also, entire QUIC header is authenticated, i.e., not modifiable





3 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 Version (32) Destination Connection ID (0..160) Source Connection ID (0..160)

3 90123456789012345678901 Destination Connection ID (0..160)Packet Number (8/16/24/32) Protected Payload (*)



Version negotiation


(Currently under re-design)

- 32-bit version field
 - IP: 8 bits, TCP: 0 bits
- Allows rapid deployment of new versions
 - Plus, vendor-proprietary versions
- Very few protocol invariants
 - Location and lengths of version and CIDs in LH
 - Location and lengths of CID in SH (if present)
 - Version negotiation server response
 - Etc. (details under discussion)
- Everything else is version-dependent
 - But must grease unused codepoints!

| | - D - D - M - Q | 3000003 iraft-18 iraft-29 IVFST-2 juant-22 iinQuic-0 QUIC-49 | → 4E3 → Draf → Pico → Qua → dum → gQU | ft-19 ft-30 quic-0 nt-23 nmy | - 5430 Draf Draf Pico Qua gQU gQU | t-20 t-31 quic-1 nt-24 IC-35 |
|-------|--------------------------|--|--|--|---|--|
| | 0 | MVFST_0 | Draft- 2018 | - 14 1. Jan 2 | Draft-09 | Draf 1. Apr |
| | 250k | | | | | |
| | 500k | | | | | |
| # IPs | 750k | | | | | |
| Ps | 1 000k | | | | | |
| | 1 250k | | | | | |
| | 1 500k | | | | | |
| | 1 750k | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |



Netray.io iQUIC Measurements: https://quic.netray.io/



Source: RWTH QUIC Measurements: https://quic.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/



1-RTT vs. 0-RTT handshakes

QUIC client can send 0-RTT data in first packets

- Using new TLS 1.3 feature
- Except for very first contact between client and server
 - Requires 1-RTT handshake (same latency as TCP w/o TLS)

Huge latency win in many cases (faster than TCP)

- HTTPS: 7 messages
- QUIC 1-RTT or TCP: 5 messages
- QUIC 0-RTT: 2 messages
- Also helps with
 - Tolerating NAT re-bindings
 - Connection migration to different physical interface
- But only for idempotent data



Everything else is frames

- Inside the crypto payload, **QUIC carries a sequence of frames**
 - Encrypted = can change between versions
- Frames can come in any order
- Frames carry control data and payload data
- Payload data is carried in STREAM frames
 - Most other frames carry control data
- Packet acknowledgment blocks in ACK frames



- CONNECTION CLOSE HANDSHAKE DONE
- PATH RESPONSE
- PATH CHALLENGE
- RETIRE CONNECTION ID
- NEW CONNECTION ID
- STREAM DATA BLOCKED STREAMS BLOCKED
- DATA BLOCKED
- MAX STREAMS
- MAX STREAM DATA
- MAX DATA
- STREAM
- NEW TOKEN
- STOP SENDING CRYPTO
- ACK **RESET STREAM**
- PING
- PADDING

Stream multiplexing

A QUIC connection multiplexes potentially many streams

- Congestion control happens at the connection level
- Connections are also flow controlled

Streams

- Carry units of application data
- Can be uni- or bidirectional
- Can be opened by client or server
- Are flow controlled
- Currently, always reliably transmitted (partial reliability coming soon)
- Number of open streams is negotiated over time (as are stream windows)
- Stream prioritization is up to application







Current status & discussions



QUIC and the IETF

QUIC is being standardized in the IETF

- QUIC is very different from Google QUIC
- RFCs published May 2021
- 20+ known implementation efforts:





QUIC is an IETF Working Group that is chartered to deliver the next transport protocol for the Internet.

See our contribution guidelines if you want to work with us.

Upcoming Meetings

We have scheduled an interim meeting in Zurich, on 5-6 February 2020. After that, will be meeting at IETF 107 in Vancouver.

https://quicwg.github.io/

https://quicdev.slack.com



| server \rightarrow | n201011CH | at. | ngtcp2 | بچ ا | picoquic | requie | | 6 | che | ic | not quie | AppleQUIC | duic.90 | .nr | aioquic | oquic |
|----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------|----------------------------|--------------|-----------|---------|---------------------|---------------------------|------------------|
| <i>client</i> ↓ | | duant | note | myst | | MSU | ţ | ATS | duiche | 150UIC | ngt | Pbb | duit | Quinn | aiou | , ga |
| h2o/quicly | VHDCRZSQ UL3 | HDC | | | HDCSU | | | | | | | | - | | | |
| quant | VHDCRZSQ 3 | VHDCRZSQ MBUPEL | VHDCRZSQ MBU 3 | VHDCRZQ B 3 | VHDCRZSQ MBUP 3 | VHDCRZSQ UP 3 | VHDCRZSQ UE 3 | VHDCRZSQ MB 3 | VHDCRZS 3 | VHDCRZS MUPE 3 | VHDCRZQ 3 | | - | VHDCRSQ MBUPE | VHDCRZSQ MBUP 3 | VHDCRQ 3 |
| ngtcp2 | VHDCR3 | V | VHDCRZS MBU 3dp | | VHDCRZS MBU 3 | VHDC UT 3d | VHDCRZS U 3 | VHDCRZS MB 3 | VHDCRZS 3 | VHDCRZS MBUT 3dp | | | - | | VHDCRZS MBU 3dp | VHDCR 3 |
| mvfst | | | | VHDCRZQ BLT 3dp | | | | | | | | | - | | | |
| picoQUIC | VHDCRZSQ T 3 | VHDCRZSQ MBUPT | VHDCRZSQ MBU 3 | VHDCTRZQ MLT 3 | VHDCRZSQ MBAUPLT 3 | VHDCRZSQ U 3 | VHDCRZS UT 3 | VHDCRZSQ B 3 | VHDCRZSQ 3 | VHDCRZSQ MBAUPT 3 | | VHDC | - | | | VHDCRQ B 3 |
| msquic | VHDCRQ | VHDCRZSQ MBULT | VHCRSQ MU | VHDCRZQ MBLT 3d | VHDCRZSQ MBULT 3 | VHDCRZSQ MBAUPLT 3d | VHCRS U 3 | VHDCRZSQ U 3 | VHCDRZQ | VHCRSQ MBU | V | V | - | VHDCSQ BU | VHDCRZSQ MBUL 3d | VHDCRQ B 3 |
| f5 | VHDCS T 3d | VHDCS | VHDS 3d | X | VHDCS 3 | VHDC T 3d | VHDCS T 3d | VHDCS 3d | | VS | | VHDC | - | | VHDCRZSQ MBAUPLT 3 | VHDC 3d |
| ATS | VHDCRSQ 3 | VHDCRSQ M | VHDCRSQ M 3 | | VHDCRSQ 3 | VHDCRSQ 3 | VHDCRS 3 | VHDCRSQ M 3 | VHDCRS 3 | VHDCRSQ M 3 | | | - | | VHDCRS M 3 | VHDRQ 3 |
| quiche | | | | | | | | | | | | | _ | | | |
| Isquic | VHDCRSQ 3 | | VHDCRSQ M 3dp | VHDCRQ T 3dp | VHDCRSQ PT 3 | VHDCRSQ PT 3d | VHDCRS T 3d | VHDCRSQ 3 | VHDCRS 3 | VHDCRSQ MPET 3dp [1] | | | - | | VHDCRSQ PT 3dd | VHDCRQ 3d |
| ngx_quic | | | | | | | | | | | | | - | | | |
| AppleQUIC | HDCS 3 | | | | | | HDS 3d | | | | | HD | - | | | V |
| quic-go | | | | | | | | | | | | | - | | | |
| Quinn | | VHDCRZS BU | VHDCRZ BU 3 | VHDCRZS B 3 | VHDCRZS BU 3 | VHDCRZS BU 3 | | VHDCRZS | VHDCRZS B 3 | VHDCRZS BU 3 | | | - | VHDCRZSQ BU 3 | | VHDCRS B 3 |
| aioquic | VHDCRZSQ 3 | VHDCRZSQ Bu | VHDCRZSQ MBU 3dp | VHDCRZQ BLT 3dp | VHDCRZSQ MBUPLT 3 | VHDCRZS MBUPL 3d | VHDCRZS U 3d | VHDCRZSQ MB 3 | VHDCRZS 3 | VHDCRZSQ MBUPT 3dp | | | - | | VHDCRZSQ MBUPLT 3dp | VHDCRQ 3d |
| ~gQUIC | VHDRZ 3 | V | VHDRZ 3d | - | VHDCRZ 3 | VS | VHDCRZS 3d | VHDS | VHDRS B 3 | VHDCRS 3 | | - | - | | VHDRZS B 3d | VHDCR B 3d |

Interop status

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1D0tW89vOoaScs3IY9RGC0UesWGAwE6xyLk0l4JtvTVg/edit#gid=117825384

https://interop.seemann.io/

Also, automated interop

containers and ns3 at

testing via Docker



Encryption vs. X

Network management

- Claims that network management systems rely on TCP header inspection
 - To obtain loss, RTT, etc. information
- Concern that encrypting this information will be troublesome for network operators
- Proposals for limited information exposure
 - e.g., the "spin bit", the "loss bits"
- Uncertainties
 - Can networks trust this information?
 - Incentives for opting in? Penalties??

Measurement-informed Internet evolution

- Independent passive measurability of the Internet one key factor to success
- Many protocols deficiencies were identified and fixed based on independent measurements
 - Large area of academic work
- Are we giving up something fundamental here?
- Or are we at a point where active measurements have taken over anyway?







Before I go...

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How to participate?



- QUIC WG is open to all
 - Use the mailing list
 - Discuss issues/PRs on GitHub
 - Participate in meetings
- https://quicwg.org/ will get you started
- You can talk to us first, too
- "Note Well" disclose IPR



- IETF is open to all
 - free remote attendance!
- 3x meetings/year, next:
 - Philadelphia, July 2022
 - London, November 2022
 - Asia, March 2023
- Grants for academics:
 - ACM/IRTF ANRW workshop (travel grants, only students)
 - IETF/IRTF Chair discretionary fund (need strong reason)

GitHub

- https://quicwg.org/ links to a list of implementations
- Many are open source and live on GitHub
- Contact maintainers and start issues/PRs

