

## Russian and Japanese approaches to the Korean Peninsula: A comparison from a societal viewpoint\*

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**For citation:** Lanko D. A. Russian and Japanese approaches to the Korean Peninsula: A comparison from a societal viewpoint. *Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. International Relations*, 2020, vol. 13, issue 2, pp. 238–250. <https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu06.2020.208>

The article compares Russian and Japanese approaches to security on and around the Korean Peninsula from the viewpoint of the English school of international studies. The English school is not a popular approach to international studies in Russia, where many scholars and decision-makers believe that international society is an instrument that helps Western nations to pursue their interests, not an alliance based on shared values. Russian scholars and decision-makers do not view their relationship with any of the main stakeholders in the debate on Korean security, including the U.S., China, Japan, and two Korean states, as a relationship based on shared values. At the same time, Russian scholars and decision-makers admit that their country has some interests in common with all stakeholders of the debate on Korean security, including Japan. In Japan, the English school is a popular approach to international studies, and the belief that Japan belongs to the same international society as the U.S. is widely spread among both scholars and decision-makers. At the same time, the intensifying conflict between Japan and South Korea makes scholars and decision-makers in the former country believe that the relationship between the two countries is not grounded in shared values, despite some common interests. The Japanese-South Korean conflict, on the Asian border of international society, necessitates revisiting the issue of limits on the enlargement of the international society.

*Keywords:* Russia, Japan, Korea, international relations, English school, international society.

Russian and Japanese approaches to the Korean Peninsula significantly differ not only from each other, but also from the approaches of other four most important participants of the debate on security on the Korean Peninsula, namely the two Korean states themselves, the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the United States and the Chinese People's Republic. The two Korean states approach security issues on and around the Korean Peninsula from the viewpoint of the relations between themselves; each of them expects their relations to develop towards unification of the Korean Peninsula [1; 2]. The U.S. and China also approach security issues on and around the Korean Peninsula from the viewpoint of the relations between themselves, namely their struggle for control of security agendas in Northeast Asia, in the Asia-Pacific Region as a whole,

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\* This work was supported by the Core University Program for Korean Studies through the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and Korean Studies Promotion Service of the Academy of Korean Studies (AKS-2016-OLU-2250002).

and globally [3; 4]. Unlike the above-mentioned two couples, neither Russia nor Japan perceives security on and around the Korean Peninsula as a source of potential conflict for their bilateral relations. Thus, Russia and Japan together could play an important stabilizing role for security on and around the Korean Peninsula, if they could walk all the way from the present situation to working out of a common approach to the Korean puzzle.

In early 20<sup>th</sup> century, Russia and Japan used to clash over the Korean Peninsula. Conflicts over Korea and Manchuria were the main reasons of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 [5; 6]. During the Korean War of 1950–1953, Soviet ruler Joseph Stalin attempted to convince leaders of the Communist Party of Japan to pursue a revolution by force [7], which led to negative consequences for security in Japan domestically. After the Korean War, the Soviet Union maintained diplomatic, political and economic relations with North Korea, while Japan maintained relations with South Korea. After the end of the Cold War, Russia established diplomatic relations with South Korea while maintaining diplomatic relations with North Korea at the same time. Japan attempted talks on normalization of relations with North Korea in early 1990s, though unsuccessfully. In the following thirty years, Japan failed to establish formal relations with North Korea, although Japanese officials have participated in talks with North Korean officials over North Korea's nuclear programme and the issue of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea during the Cold War. In early 21<sup>st</sup> century, despite Russian and Japanese approaches to North Korea are different, Russia and Japan do not any longer clash over the Korean Peninsula.

Another commonality between Russia and Japan is their position on opposite ends of the international society, with its centre in the Northern Atlantic. The concept of international society was born within the English School of international studies as a result of its attempt to bridge realism and liberalism as two dominant approaches to international studies in mid-20<sup>th</sup> century by means of “blending power with morality in international relations” [8, p. 3]. On one hand, the international society is an alliance, which is powerful. On other hand, unlike the alliances discussed in the writings of international relations scholars of realist orientation, the international society is not based on interests of the states participating in it, but on moral values shared in those states. Interests tend to change in the short run, while values remain unchanged even in the long run.

That explains durability of the Anglo-American alliance, the core of the international society. In late 19<sup>th</sup> century, when U.S. President McKinley was choosing America's strategic ally in Europe, he chose Britain, because he did not perceive German Emperor Wilhelm II an “enlightened ruler” [9], Enlightenment being considered an important value by the 25<sup>th</sup> U.S. President. One cannot help mentioning here that besides coincidence of values, coincidence of interests of the U.S. and Britain made the Anglo-American alliance possible. At the same time, lasting coincidence of values made the Anglo-American alliance durable. To generalize, the international society is a durable alliance, and its durability makes it even more powerful.

For proponents of the English School, the international society is key to understanding of international relations. At the same time, there is no consent among proponents of the English School about the values forming the basis of the international society. Pluralist concept of the international society is sometimes also referred to as “minimalist” concept of it, because it considers the international society a group of states, which have agreed on “certain minimalist rules, understandings and institutions designed to limit the inevitable conflict that was to be expected within such a fragmented political system”

[10, p. 7]. Proponents of that approach sometimes refer to the international society as to “Westphalian international society” with its minimalist but important rules, such as diplomatic privileges, that most nations of the world are committed to. Some scholars have already started talking of “emerging post-Westphalian international society” (cf. [11]), in which sovereignty may remain an important value, but it will be understood differently in the international society, not as the only possible alternative to anarchy. Pluralist concept of the international society allows suggesting that a majority of contemporary nations belong to it.

To the contrary, solidarist, or “maximalist” concept places interests of the international society as a whole above interests of individual states, of which it is made up. Proponents of that approach suggest that human rights and democracy are among the values, sharing of which opens the door into the international society for a particular nation. Maximising the scope of values that a nation “aspiring for membership in international society” [12] should commit to comes at a cost: only a minority of contemporary nations belong to the society according to solidarist concept of it. Solidarist concept expects the international society to expand into the world society, which will consist of a majority of nations sharing a maximum set of values. Today, however, proponents of that approach sometimes limit it to “European international society”, of which NATO [13] and the Council of Europe [14] are core institutions. Neither of those institutions is “liberal” in the sense that they are open to all nations willing to participate, but a nation can join either or both of them after having met certain criteria, which includes committing to a set of values in the core of the institutions.

Absence of consent about the core values of the international society combined with difficulties that some nations experience when aspiring to be recognized as members by its other members provides with the ground for some scholars to suggest that the core value of the international society is supremacy of its members, a minority of nations, over non-members, a majority of nations. Vucetic [15] goes as far as to declare that supremacism was in the core of the Anglo-American alliance at the stage of its formation. Neumann [16] agrees that the idea of European superiority played an important role in shaping the core of the international society in the 19th century, and that the idea has not completely disappeared by late 20<sup>th</sup> century, though it took on a more refined form. Finally, Callaghan [17] ties the English school not only to national identity and common rules necessary for peaceful coexistence of nations, but also to the rules of a European Empire. From that angle, the international society appears to be an alliance of nations committed to solidarist values, such as democracy and human rights, which, in their eyes, justifies violations of pluralist values by its members, for example, violations of sovereignty of non-members and of diplomatic privileges of their representatives.

Despite both Russia and Japan are equally far from the Northern Atlantic, their roles vis-à-vis the international society are different. It is more typical to perceive Russia as a non-member, despite some scholars from both Russia and countries of the international society have expressed regrets about it. For example, Kharkevich [18] regrets that Russia was a part of the international society in 1990s, but that it was “expelled” from it in early 21<sup>st</sup> century. Such viewpoint is popular among Russian international relations scholars of liberal internationalist orientation. Many Western scholars, however, refuse to recognize that Russia was a part of the international society for even a short period between the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 2014 Ukraine crisis, when “the failure of post-

Soviet Russia to integrate into the West became evident” [19]. Rather, they attempt to find out the factors that prevented Russia from entering the international society. For example, Neumann [20] explains Russia’s inability to enter the international society with its society’s memories about their country’s experience within the suzerain system of the Golden Horde, which prevent Russians from perceiving the international society as something different from another suzerain system.

It is typical to perceive Japan as a member of the international society, despite some scholars, primarily American scholars of neoconservative orientation, have recently questioned the strength of the bond tying Japan to America and thus to the international society as a whole. For example, Calder [21, p. 117] points at mid-2000s as the time, when “the network dimension of the U.S. — Japan alliance has fallen into a quiet crisis”, the reasons of which were the decline of the share of Japanese-Americans among Asian-American population, limited travel and foreign study, eroding cultural ties between the elites of Japan and the U.S., as well as the rise of China, which provided with a third-country alternative to both Japan and the U.S. One cannot help admitting that China has indeed become a game-changer in U.S. — Japanese relations, but its role should not be overestimated. Despite Chinese-Americans have outnumbered Japanese-Americans among Asian-American population in the U.S., in absolute numbers, Japanese-American population in the U.S. was growing in early 21<sup>st</sup> century. Americans continued travelling to Japan, and Japanese continued travelling to the U.S. in large numbers, including for education. Erosion of cultural ties between the U.S. and Japan did not take place in early 21<sup>st</sup> century.

### **Russian Approach to the Korean Peninsula from the Societal Viewpoint**

The English school is not a popular approach among Russian scholars of international relations. Zaslavskaya and Averre [22], despite both sympathize the English school, do not find studies of the relationship between Russia and the rest of Europe from the societal viewpoint among recent Russian literature on the subject. At the same time, multiple scholars outside of Russia have attempted studies of Russian relations with Asian countries, primarily those of Central Asia and East Asia, from the viewpoint of the English school. In particular, some of them tend to explain the differences between Russian policies in Asia and similar, at the first glance, policies of Western powers towards the same region pursued at the same time by the fact that Russia is not, in their view, a part of the international society. For example, Costa Buranelli [23] applies the English School’s approach to comparison of Russia’s expansion into Central Asia in 19<sup>th</sup> century with Western powers’ “civilizational” missions in their colonies pursued at the same time in order to come to the conclusion that the outcomes of Russia’s expansion were weaker due to its status of “less civilized civilizer” within the European concert of nations. Pourchot and Stivachtis [24] claim that during the Cold War, the Soviet Union attempted to divide the international society into two sub-global international societies with the Soviet Union and its allies forming one of them.

Soviet propaganda used the term “all progressive humankind” when referring to ethical superiority of the Soviet bloc’s “international society”. In Cold War times, the “international society” and “all progressive humankind” were the concepts identifying reference groups that the U.S. and its allies and the Soviet Union and its allies respectively referred to in their rhetorical exchange. The “international society” condemned viola-

tions of human rights in the Soviet Union and its allies while keeping a blind eye at similar violations in the U.S. and its allies. The “progressive humankind”, in turn, condemned prosecutions of activists in the U.S. and its allies while not noticing prosecutions of activists in the Soviet Union and its allies. That created the situation of hypocrisy, or “double standards”, in Soviet terminology, typical for the Cold War. After the end of the Cold War, the concept of progressive humankind disappeared from international rhetoric, while the concept of the international society received a new meaning in early 21<sup>st</sup> century. However, even today findings of the English school are sometimes used for explanations of, for example, the differences in the approaches to Eurasian integration between Russia and Kazakhstan, of which the former pursues a Gemeinschaft-type of an international society, while the latter pursues a Gesellschaft-type of a society as the desired outcome of Eurasian integration [25].

Russian approach to East Asian affairs in general and to the Korean Peninsula in particular is significantly influenced by the difficulties that Russians experience when attempting to recognize the existence of shared values between themselves and major participants of the debate on security on the Korean Peninsula. One may say that Russian approach to the Korean Peninsula is influenced, on one hand, by its own Orientalist [26] discourse, which prevents many Russians from recognizing that they might share common values with Japanese, Koreans (both North and South Koreans) or Chinese. On other hand, it is influenced by Russian reaction to Western Orientalist discourse, which often treats Russia as Oriental, and which thus prevents many Russians from recognizing that they might share common values with people of the West, first of all and most importantly in relation to the Korean Peninsula, with Americans. Russia is not a unique community frustrated about being an object of Western Orientalist discourse and simultaneously a subject of its own Orientalist discourse. Likewise Russia, Turkey, another European “other”, according to Neumann [27], is, on one hand, frustrated about the fact that “in Eurocentric historical narratives, the Ottomans are represented as an abnormal entity or as the very opposite of Europeanness” [28], but, on other hand, it has “created its own Orient” [29].

The debate between Slavophiles and Westerners, which has been characterizing Russian ideological space since as long ago as 1830s, is still characteristic of it today [30]. Part of Russia’s elite perceives their country as a part of Europe, but another part perceives it as something different, most often as a Eurasian country. As a part of Europe, Russia belongs to Eastern Europe and thus becomes an object of Western European semi-Orientalist discourse justifying superiority of Western Europe over Easter Europe [31]. As a non-Europe, Russia is big enough to become object of a separate Western discourse, which again bears semi-Orientalist features [32]. Those two discourses limit the ability of many representatives of American elite to recognize that they might share some common values with Russians, while the reaction to those two discourses, about which many representatives of Russian elite are aware, limits their abilities to recognize that they might share some common values with Americans. Mutual inability to recognize their shared values “affects Russia-US interaction in the Asia Pacific and makes their cooperation on pressing security issues, such as North Korea, difficult” [33].

At the same time, Russia’s own Orientalist discourse limits the ability of its elite to recognize that they might share some common values with representatives of the elites of major Asian participants of the debate on security on the Korean Peninsula: China, both Korean states and Japan. Moreover, Russia’s own Orientalist discourse is one of the major

obstacles to success of the “turn to the East” in Russian foreign policy officially declared in mid-2010s after Russia’s relations with the West deteriorated thanks to the Ukraine crisis [34]. Despite so far Russia’s turn to the East has only brought limited fruit, some scholars have noticed the emergence of not yet common values shared by Russia and China, but of mutually acceptable rules of behaviour that both Russia and China are committed to in order to avoid a major conflict between them. According to Wishnick [35], “Sino-Russian great power management involves rule making, a distinctive approach to crisis management, and overlapping policy approaches toward countries such as Burma and the Philippines”. In a similar manner, the understanding existing in both Russia and China that Central Asia is a foreign policy priority to both countries “has encouraged Beijing and Moscow to coordinate their policies across a wide range of issue areas” [36]. However, Russia and China have not yet worked out a common approach to the Korean Peninsula.

Russia maintains relations with both Korean states; however, both the essence and the meaning of the relations between Russia and South Korea and between Russia and North Korea significantly differ from each other. In the past, Russia and two Korean states have discussed possibilities of implementation of trilateral infrastructure projects, such as building of an oil and/or natural gas pipeline and a high-voltage electric power line connecting Russia and South Korea, whose economy heavily depends on energy imports, through the territory of North Korea. However, implementation of those projects at the moment looks problematic due to international sanctions imposed against North Korea and unpredictability of the North Korean regime. Russia maintains dialogue with North Korea on security issues, including North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes, but cooperation in the field of hard security, including military cooperation, is impossible due to UN sanctions against North Korea. Cooperation in the field of soft security is not completely ruled out, but the ability “to cooperate on non-traditional security remains limited by both the absence of clear and mutually defined threats as well as differing approaches to non-traditional security issues” [37].

Russia cooperates with South Korea on a wide range of soft security issues and maintains dialogue on North Korean nuclear and missile programmes as well as on security in Northeast Asia in general. However, possibilities of cooperation in the field of hard security are limited due to South Korea’s alliance with the U.S. and U.S. troops being stationed on South Korean territory. Though Russia borders North Korea, it does not have a territorial dispute with it, but Russia has a territorial dispute with South Korea despite not bordering it. In 1990, the Soviet Union and North Korea signed a border treaty, according to which the border between them passed along the fairway of the Tumangan River, and the island of Noktundo became part of the Soviet Union. South Korea did not recognize that treaty; thus, Russia and South Korea dispute sovereignty of the island, despite that has not been a serious problem in Russian-South Korean relations practically. Possibilities of economic cooperation between Russia and North Korea are limited due to sanctions imposed against the latter. As to South Korea, it is Russia’s important economic partner and it is the second biggest economic partner of Russia’s Far East after China and ahead of Japan [38]. Russia very positively received the news that South Korea refused to introduce even formal sanctions against it in 2014, when most Western countries and Japan introduced sanctions against Russia.

Japan is an important economic partner of Russia; trade turnover exceeded U.S. \$ 30 billion in early 2010s, it fell in mid-2010 due to Russia’s economic crisis, but it grew

again in late 2010s, not least thanks to ratification of double tax treaty in 2018. Japan is also an important investor for Russia, though most of Japanese investments are focused on oil and natural gas projects on Sakhalin. Political relations between Russia and Japan improved by the end of 2010s, which can be regarded another outcome of Russia's turn to the East policy. Russian scholars have assessed the improvement from the viewpoint of multiple theories of international relations, but not from the viewpoint of the English school [39]. What continues overshadowing Russian-Japanese relations, however, is the territorial dispute. Russia and Japan dispute sovereignty over four islands jointly known in Russia as Southern Kuril Islands; in Japan, they are commonly referred to as the Northern territories. Presence of U.S. troops is the most serious obstacle to solution of the border dispute between Russia and Japan: Russia fears that in case Japan obtains sovereignty over the disputed islands, U.S. troops could be stationed there, this constituting a security threat. It will be extremely difficult to resolve the territorial dispute between Russia and Japan as long as U.S. troops remain in Japan, which is expected to last also in the long run.

### **Japanese Approach to the Korean Peninsula from the Societal Viewpoint**

Few if any Japanese scholars of international relations question their country's belonging to the international society; the English school has been a popular approach to international studies in Japan at least since Hidemi Suganami, a Japanese-British scholar, introduced it to the country [40]. Today, Suganami is a prominent theorist in the field of English school in international studies [cf. 41]. Thus, one may wonder why Dunne [42, p. 128] did not mention Japan among the U.S., Canada, Australia, China, India and other countries, where there is significant interest in the work of the English school. Despite most Japanese universities and academic institutes attach greater value to publications of their faculty members and researchers in Japanese academic journals than in international academic journals published in English, multiple Japanese professors in the field of international relations have gained international prominence thanks to their works on international society. In this respect, Yuichi Hosoya (cf. [43]) cannot help being mentioned, among many others. International society is one of the most popular central themes of graduate programmes in the field of international relations offered at Japanese universities, together with global governance and global citizenship.

Academic journal "International Relations of the Asia-Pacific" published by Oxford University Press in association with Japan Association of International Relations actively publishes results of research of the role of Japan in international relations grounded in the concepts and methods that have been worked out within the English school (cf. [44]). Proponents of both solidarist and pluralist concepts of international society can be found among Japanese scholars of international relations; for example, Nakano [45] discusses the debate before siding with the pluralist concept. Japanese scholars considering their country a member of the international society can be found among proponents of both pluralist and solidarist concepts of international society. Multiple academic accounts present Japanese entry into the international society as a long way, which began in the Meiji era; many scholars point at difficulties that Japan faced on that way (cf. [46]). Some scholars consider Japanese role in international relations in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century as a case of "regional differentiation within international society" (cf. [47]). After the end of

WWII, Japan became full member of the international society in both pluralist and solidarist meanings of the concept.

The belief that Japan belongs to the international society together with the United States, and that Russia, China and North Korea do not belong to the international society seriously influences Japanese approach to the Korean Peninsula. Likewise all other stakeholders in the negotiations on security on and around the Korean Peninsula, except for North Korea itself, Japan wants North Korea to denuclearize unilaterally, fully and unconditionally. According to Casarini and Tsuruoka [48, p. 59], “the biggest reason why Tokyo regards proliferation as a major, grave or significant threat to Japan is North Korea’s nuclear missile development, which represents a clear and present danger”. However, North Korea’s nuclear and missile programme is not the only issue that Japan is concerned about on the Korean Peninsula. Another unresolved issue in the relations between Japan and North Korea is the abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korean secret services during the Cold War. In 2002, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited North Korea; five victims returned to Japan as a result of this visit, but Japan insists that many more people were abducted besides the thirteen people that North Korea recognizes.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes were the main reason, why Japan decided to consider the possibility to deploy elements of U.S. anti-missile defence system on its territory, despite fears of U.S.-Chinese strategic arms race as a consequence of the deployment. Jimbo, a Japanese scholar, expects a U.S.-Chinese, but not a U.S.-Russian strategic arms race to begin in case of the deployment, because Russia and the U.S. both value strategic disarmament, which influenced their bilateral relations, including in the form of signing of the Treaty of Moscow in 2002 [49, p. 61]. One might read the Jimbo’s article as recognition that Russia, despite not belonging to the international society from the solidarist viewpoint, belongs to it (or at least used to belong to it in 2002) from the pluralist viewpoint. Russia is committed (or at least it was committed in 2002) to minimal set of values helpful of decreasing probability of the beginning of a major armed conflict; for nuclear nations, this minimal set of values includes the value of nuclear disarmament. One might consider that another starting point for working out of a common approach to the Korean Peninsula between Japan and Russia.

The concept of the international society also helps understanding the ambiguity of contemporary relations between Japan and South Korea. It is not clear whether Japanese elite, the majority of which perceives their country as belonging to the international society, considers South Korea another member of the international society. On one hand, in 2014, the Diplomatic Bluebook, a strategic foreign policy document annually published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, named Japan and South Korea “the most important neighboring countries to each other, which share fundamental values such as freedom, democracy, and respect for basic human rights” [50, p. 13]. The fundamental values that the document considers being shared by Japan and South Korea are exactly the values that any member of the international society shares according to the solidarist concept of it. One might read the document as a proof that Japanese Foreign Ministry recognizes (or, at least, used to recognize in 2014) South Korea as another part of the international society, together with Japan itself. That might be part of the explanation, why Japan is more supportive of South Korean stance at negotiations concerning North Korea’s nuclear programme than it is of North Korean stance.



However, if Japanese elite ever perceived South Korea as another member of the international society, it does not influence greatly Japanese approach to problematic issues of bilateral relations with South Korea. Two major problems overshadow the relations between Japan and South Korea: a territorial dispute and a dispute over the legacy of the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century in Japanese-Korean relations. Japan and South Korea dispute sovereignty over a group of islets in the Japanese Sea, which is called the Eastern Sea in Korea; those islets are known collectively as Takeshima in Japan and as Dokdo in South Korea, on Western maps they sometimes appear as the Liancourt Rocks. Japan used to occupy the Korean Peninsula between 1910 and 1945; after WWII, Japan has repeatedly apologized for its actions during the period and has provided substantial monetary compensation to victims. However, South Korea repeatedly raised the issue and demanded more apologies and compensations. Also, South Korea condemns ceremonial visits of Japanese Prime Ministers to Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, which is a Shinto Shrine dedicated to war dead, who served the Emperor of Japan since the Meiji Restoration through WWII, including fourteen people categorized as “Class A War Criminals” by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East of 1946-1948, commonly known as the Tokyo Tribunal.

Similar problems overshadow also the relations between Japan and China. Japan and China dispute sovereignty over a group of islets in East China Sea known as Senkaku in Japan and as Diaoyu in China. China repeatedly raises the issue of Japanese actions in China between 1894 and 1945 and demands apologies and compensations. China condemns Japanese Prime Ministers' visits to Yasukuni Shrine and expresses concerns over presentation of the events of 1894-1945 in Japanese history textbooks. The reaction of Japanese society to South Korean foreign policy actions concerning those conflicts is not very different from the reaction of Japanese society to similar Chinese actions, despite one might expect that the reaction to South Korean actions could be softer, if Japanese society considered South Korea belonging to the international society, to which Japan belongs, too. For example, Igarashi [51] compared the changes in public attitudes in Japan towards China and South Korea after Chinese activists landed on Senkaku / Diaoyu and South Korean politicians landed on Takeshima/Dokdo in 2012 and found more similarities than differences between the two situations. Japanese public did not perceive the South Korean move as a lesser threat to Japan than the Chinese move.

Japanese-South Korean relations significantly deteriorated in the first years of Moon Jae-in's presidency in South Korea. Worsening of Japanese-South Korean relations in early 21<sup>st</sup> century typically takes place during the term of a left-wing president in South Korea. Usually, right-wing presidents of South Korea lean towards pro-American foreign policy, which includes friendly relations with all U.S. allies in Asia, and the most important U.S. ally in Asia is Japan. To the contrary, left-wing president of South Korea lean towards more independent (from the U.S.) foreign policy, thus allowing nationalistic anti-Japanese sentiments to prevail over loyalty to existing alliances. It was during the presidency of left-wing Roh Moo-hyun in South Korea in 2003–2008, when tensions between Japan and South Korea intensified.

Two subsequent right-wing Presidents of the Republic of Korea, Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, attempted to improve Japanese-South Korean relations, and above-quoted account of Japanese-South Korean relations by the Japanese Foreign Ministry of 2014 might be a result of their policies. With the impeachment of Park Geun-hye and with election of Moon Jae-in, Japanese-South Korean relations worsened again. In addition to

sharpening controversies over Takeshima / Dokdo and over memories about WWII and preceding events, characteristic of Moon Jae-in's presidency was the Japanese-South Korean trade war, which began in 2019. As a result, the Diplomatic Bluebook in 2019 did not mention any shared values between Japan and South Korea; to the contrary, it described 2018 as the year, when "Japan and the Republic of Korea faced an extremely severe situation amid a series of negative moves by..." South Korea [52, p. 41]. As of 2019, Japan did not consider South Korea a member of the international society.

## Conclusions

Despite its low popularity in Russia, where many scholars and decision-makers perceive the international society as a Western concept introduced with the aim to advance the interests of self-proclaimed members of the international society among Western nations, the English school of international relations is a popular approach to international studies in Japan. Multiple Japanese scholars apply the approaches of the English school to their analysis of international relations, both on the regional level, in East Asia, and globally. In the United Kingdom, the birthplace of the English school, proponents of the English school do not turn to empirical evidence from Japan very often, but they do not neglect Japanese experience entirely either. The debate between proponents of the minimalist and maximalist concepts of the international society, which is going on in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, takes place in Japan, too. While some Japanese scholars perceive their country as belonging to the international society with the centre in Northern Atlantic thanks to the values shared by Japanese, Americans and Europeans, others approach the international society from the minimalist viewpoint and refuse to place universal values above Japanese interests.

From the societal viewpoint, Russian approach to security on and around the Korean Peninsula is influenced by presumed lack of shared values with main stakeholders of the debate on Korean security: the U.S., China, Japan and the two Korean states. Ongoing conflict with the West prevents most Russian decision-makers and scholars from seeing the values they share with Americans. Orientalist discourse prevents them from seeing the values they share with Japanese and Koreans. Even the "strategic alliance" between Russia and China, thanks to Russian Orientalist discourse, is perceived in Russia as a common-interests-based, not a shared-values-based alliance. Japanese approach to security on and around the Korean Peninsula is influenced by presumed Japan's belonging to the international society based on shared values, members of which are also the United States and (until recently) South Korea, but to which China, North Korea or Russia do not belong. In the U.S. itself, the perception of Japan as a part of the international society is also widely spread, despite some American scholars mostly of neoconservative orientation have recently expressed their concern over a "quite crisis" of the shared-values-based bond connecting Japan to the U.S., despite of insufficient evidence that could support such claims.

While the bond between Japan and the U.S. remains firm, the bond between Japan and South Korea has recently turned fragile. Recently, Japan and South Korea exchanged heated rhetoric on their territorial dispute and the legacy of the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, as well as found themselves on edge of a trade war. On one hand, the current crisis in Japanese-South Korean relations is an outcome of the policies of Moon Jae-in, the left-wing South Korean President since 2017. Past experience demonstrates that Japanese-

South Korean relations tend to worsen in times, when South Korea has a left-wing president. One may expect that the relations between the two will improve if a right-wing president comes to replace Moon Jae-in in Seoul in 2022. If the crisis in Japanese-South Korean relations continues beyond Moon Jae-in's presidency, it will have an important impact on security on and around the Korean Peninsula. Main stakeholders of the debate on Korean security, including Russia and China, will have to adapt to the changing situation. Also, it will pose a challenge to the U.S., which is the most important strategic ally to both Japan and South Korea. Last but not least, it will challenge proponents of the English school of international studies to revisit limits to enlargement of the international society.

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Received: February 10, 2020

Accepted: April 15, 2020

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