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Perfect is the Enemy of Good: Setting Realistic Goals for BGP Security

Published:15 November 2018Publication History
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References

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  • Published in

    cover image ACM Conferences
    HotNets '18: Proceedings of the 17th ACM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks
    November 2018
    191 pages
    ISBN:9781450361200
    DOI:10.1145/3286062

    Copyright © 2018 ACM

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    Publication History

    • Published: 15 November 2018

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