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Constrained Voucher Artifacts for Bootstrapping Protocols
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Abstract

This document defines a protocol to securely assign a Pledge to an owner and to enroll it into the owner's network. The protocol uses an artifact that is signed by the Pledge's manufacturer. This artifact is known as a "voucher".

This document builds upon the work in [RFC8366] and [BRSKI], but defines an encoding of the voucher in CBOR rather than JSON, and enables the Pledge to perform its transactions using CoAP rather than HTTPS.

The use of Raw Public Keys instead of X.509 certificates for security operations is also explained.

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1. Introduction

Secure enrollment of new nodes into constrained networks with constrained nodes presents unique challenges. There are network bandwidth and code size issues to contend with. A solution for autonomous enrollment such as [[I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra](#)] may be too large in terms of code size or bandwidth required.

Therefore, this document defines a constrained version of the voucher artifact [[RFC8366](#)], along with a constrained version of BRSKI [[I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra](#)] that makes use of the constrained CoAP-based version of EST, EST-coaps [[I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est](#)] rather than EST over HTTPS [[RFC7030](#)].

While the [[RFC8366](#)] voucher is by default serialized to JSON with a signature in CMS, this document defines a new voucher serialization to CBOR ([[RFC7049](#)]) with a signature in COSE [[I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-struct](#)]. This COSE-signed CBOR-encoded voucher can be transported using secured CoAP or HTTP. The CoAP connection (between Pledge and Registrar) is to be protected by either OSCORE+EDHOC, or DTLS (CoAPS). The HTTP connection (between Registrar and MASA) is to be protected using TLS (HTTPS).

This document has a similar structure to [[RFC8366](#)] but adds sections concerning:

1. Voucher-request artifact specification based on Section 3 of [[I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra](#)],
2. Voucher(-request) transport over CoAP based on Section 3 of [[I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra](#)] and on [[I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est](#)].

The CBOR definitions for the constrained voucher format are defined using the mechanism described in [[I-D.ietf-core-yang-cbor](#)] using the SID mechanism explained in [[I-D.ietf-core-sid](#)]. As the tooling to convert YANG documents into a list of SID keys is still in its infancy, the table of SID values presented here should be considered normative rather than the output of the pyang tool.

There is additional work when the voucher is integrated into the key-exchange, described in [[I-D.selander-ace-ake-authz](#)]. This work is not in scope for this document.

2. Terminology

The following terms are defined in [[RFC8366](#)], and are used identically as in that document: artifact, domain, imprint, Join Registrar/Coordinator (JRC), Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority (MASA), Pledge, Registrar, Trust of First Use (TOFU), and Voucher.

The following terms from [[I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra](#)] are used identically as in that document: Domain CA, enrollment, IDevID, Join Proxy, LDevID, manufacturer, nonced, nonceless, PKIX.

3. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in

[BCP 14](#) [[RFC2119](#)] [[RFC8174](#)] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

4. Survey of Voucher Types

[RFC8366] provides for vouchers that assert proximity, that authenticate the Registrar and that can offer varying levels of anti-replay protection.

This document does not make any extensions to the semantic meanings of vouchers, only the encoding has been changed to optimize for constrained devices and networks.

Time-based vouchers are supported in this definition, but given that constrained devices are extremely unlikely to have accurate time, their use is very unlikely. Most Pledges using these constrained vouchers will be online during enrollment and will use live nonces to provide anti-replay protection.

[RFC8366] defined only the voucher artifact, and not the Voucher Request artifact, which was defined in [[I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra](#)]. This document defines both a constrained voucher and a constrained voucher-request. They are presented in the order "voucher-request", followed by a "voucher" response as this is the order that they occur in the protocol.

The constrained voucher request MUST be signed by the Pledge. It can sign using its IDevID X.509 certificate, or if an IDevID is not available its manufacturer-installed raw public key (RPK). The constrained voucher MUST be signed by the MASA.

For the constrained voucher request this document defines two distinct methods for the Pledge to identify the Registrar: using either the Registrar's X.509 certificate, or using a raw public key (RPK) of the Registrar. For the constrained voucher also these two methods are supported to indicate (pin) a trusted domain identity: using either a pinned domain X.509 certificate, or a pinned raw public key (RPK).

When the Pledge is known by MASA to support RPK but not X.509 certificates, the voucher produced by the MASA pins the raw public key of the Registrar in the "pinned-domain-subject-public-key-info" field of a voucher. This is described in more detail in the YANG definition for the constrained voucher and in section [Section 8](#).

When the Pledge is known by MASA to support PKIX format certificates, the "pinned-domain-cert" field present in a voucher typically pins a domain certificate. That can be either the End-Entity certificate of

the Registrar, or the certificate of a domain CA of the Registrar's domain. However, if the Pledge is known to also support RPK pinning and the MASA intends to pin the Registrar's identity (not a CA), then MASA MAY pin the RPK of the Registrar instead of the Registrar's End-Entity certificate in order to save space in the voucher.

5. Discovery and URI

This section describes the BRSKI extensions to EST-coaps [[I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est](#)] to transport the voucher between Registrar, join proxy and Pledge over CoAP. The extensions are targeted to low-resource networks with small packets. Saving header space is important and the EST-coaps URI is shorter than the EST URI.

The presence and location of (path to) the management data are discovered by sending a GET request to `"/.well-known/core"` including a resource type (RT) parameter with the value `"ace.est"` [[RFC6690](#)]. Upon success, the return payload will contain the root resource of the EST resources. It is up to the implementation to choose its root resource; throughout this document the example root resource `/est` is used.

The EST-coaps server URIs differ from the EST URI by replacing the scheme `https` by `coaps` and by specifying shorter resource path names:

```
coaps://www.example.com/est/short-name
```

Figure 5 in [section 3.2.2 of \[RFC7030\]](#) enumerates the operations and corresponding paths which are supported by EST. Table 1 provides the mapping from the BRSKI extension URI path to the EST-coaps URI path.

+-----+-----+	
BRSKI	EST-coaps
+-----+-----+	
/requestvoucher	/rv
/voucher_status	/vs
/enrollstatus	/es
+-----+-----+	

Table 1: BRSKI path to EST-coaps path

`/requestvoucher`, `/voucher_status` and `/enrollstatus` occur between the Pledge and Registrar (the BRSKI-EST protocol) and also between Registrar and MASA, but, as described in [Section 7](#), this document addresses only the BRSKI-EST portion of the protocol.

When discovering the root path for the EST resources, the server MAY return the full resource paths and the used content types. This is useful when multiple content types are specified for EST-coaps server. For example, the following more complete response is possible.

6. BRSKI-EST Protocol

The constrained BRSKI-EST protocol described in this section is between the Pledge and the Registrar only. (probably via a join proxy, such as described in [[I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-join-proxy](#)]) It extends both the BRSKI and EST-coaps protocols.

6.1. Discovery, URIs and Content Formats

The constrained BRSKI-EST protocol described in this section is between the Pledge and the Registrar only. (probably via a join proxy, such as described in [[I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-join-proxy](#)]) It extends both the BRSKI and EST-coaps protocols.

6.2. Discovery, URIs and Content Formats

TBD: content overlaps with [Section 5](#), to be fixed - issue #79

The Pledge MAY perform a discovery operation on the `"/.well-known/core?rt=brski"` resource of the Registrar if it wishes to discover possibly shorter URLs for the functions, or if it has the possibility to use a variety of onboarding protocols or certificate enrollment protocols and it wants to discover which of these protocols are available.

For example, if the Registrar supports a short BRSKI URL (`/b`) and supports the voucher format `"application/voucher-cose+cbor"` (TBD3), and status reporting in both CBOR and JSON formats:

```
REQ: GET /.well-known/core?rt=brski*
```

```
RES: 2.05 Content
```

```
Content-Format: 40
```

```
Payload:
```

```
</b>;rt=brski,
```

```
</b/rv>;rt=brski.rv;ct=TBD3,
```

```
</b/vs>;rt=brski.vs;ct="50 60",
```

```
</b/es>;rt=brski.es;ct="50 60"
```

The Registrar is under no obligation to provide shorter URLs, and MAY respond to this query with only the `"/.well-known/brski"` end points defined in [[I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra](#)] [section 5](#).

Registrars that have implemented shorter URLs MUST also respond in equivalent ways to the `"/.well-known/brski"` URLs, and MUST NOT distinguish between them. In particular, a Pledge MAY use the longer and shorter URLs in combination.

The return of multiple content-types in the `"ct"` attribute allows the Pledge to choose the most appropriate one. Note that Content-Format TBD3 is defined in this document.

The Content-Format (`"application/json"`) 50 MAY be supported and 60 MUST be supported by the Registrar for the `/vs` and `/es` resources. Content-Format TBD3 MUST be supported by the Registrar for the `/rv` resource. If the `"ct"` attribute is not indicated for this resource, this implies that at least TBD3 is supported.

The Pledge and MASA need to support one or more formats (at least TBD3) for the voucher and for the voucher request. The MASA needs to support all formats that the Pledge, produced by that manufacturer, supports.

6.3. Extensions to BRSKI

A Pledge that only supports the EST-coaps enrollment method SHOULD NOT use discovery for BRSKI resources, since it is more efficient to just try the supported enrollment method via the well-known BRSKI/EST-coaps resources, and it avoids the Pledge having to do complex CoRE Link Format parsing. A Registrar SHOULD host any discoverable BRSKI resources on the same (UDP) server port that the Pledge's DTLS connection is using. This avoids the Pledge having to reconnect using DTLS, in order to access these resources.

6.4. Extensions to EST-coaps

A Pledge that only supports the EST-coaps enrollment method SHOULD NOT use discovery for EST-coaps resources, for similar reasons as stated in the previous section. A Registrar SHOULD host any discoverable EST-coaps resources on the same (UDP) server port that the Pledge's DTLS connection is using. This avoids the Pledge having to reconnect using DTLS, in order to access these resources.

6.4.1. Pledge Extensions

A constrained Pledge SHOULD NOT perform the optional `"CSR attributes request"` (`/att`) to minimize network traffic and reduce code size (i.e. by not implementing the complex CSR attributes parsing code).

When creating the CSR, the Pledge selects itself which attributes to include. One or more Subject Distinguished Name fields MUST be

included. If the Pledge has no specific information on what attributes/fields are desired in the CSR, it MUST use the Subject Distinguished Name fields from its IDevID unmodified. The Pledge may receive such information via the voucher (encoded in a vendor-specific way) or some other, out-of-band means.

A constrained Pledge MAY use the following optimized EST-coaps procedure to minimize both network traffic and code size:

1. if the BRSKI-received voucher, validating the current EST server, contains a pinned domain CA certificate, the Pledge provisionally considers this single certificate as the sole EST trust anchor, in other words, the single result of "CA certificates request" (/crt) to the EST server.
2. Using this trust anchor it proceeds with EST simple enrollment (/sen) to obtain its provisionally trusted LDevID.
3. Then, the Pledge attempts to validate that the trust anchor CA is the signer of the LDevID. If this is the case, the Pledge finally accepts the pinned domain CA certificate as the legitimate trust anchor CA for its domain and it also accepts its LDevID.
4. If this is not the case, the Pledge MUST perform an actual "CA certificates request" (/crt) to the EST server to obtain the EST CA trust anchors since these obviously differ from the (temporary) pinned domain CA.
5. When doing this request, the Pledge MAY use a CoAP Accept Option with value TBD287 ("application/pkix-cert") to limit the number of returned EST CA trust anchors to only one. Such limiting to only one has the advantages that storage requirements for CA certificates are reduced, network traffic can be reduced, and code size can be reduced (by not having to parse the alternative format 281 "application/pkcs7-mime;smime-type=certs-only" and not having to support CoAP block-wise transfer).
6. If the Pledge cannot obtain the single CA certificate or the finally validated CA certificate cannot be chained to the LDevID, then the Pledge MUST abort the enrollment process and report the error using the enrollment status telemetry (/es).

The Content-Format ("application/json") 50 MAY be supported and 60 MUST be supported by the Registrar for the /vs and /es resources. Content-Format TBD3 MUST be supported by the Registrar for the /rv resource. If the "ct" attribute is not indicated for this resource, this implies that at least TBD3 is supported.

When a Registrar receives a "CA certificates request" (/crt) request with a CoAP Accept Option with value TBD287 it SHOULD return only the single CA certificate that is the envisioned or actual authority for the current, authenticated Pledge making the request. The only exception case is when the Registrar is configured to not support a request for a single CA certificate for operational or security reasons, e.g. because every device enrolled into the domain needs to use at least multiple CAs. In such exception case the Registrar returns the CoAP response 4.06 Not Acceptable to indicate that only the default Content-Format of 281 "application/pkcs7-mime;smime-type=certs-only" is available.

6.4.2. Registrar Extensions

When a Registrar receives a "CA certificates request" (/crt) request with a CoAP Accept Option with value TBD287 it SHOULD return only the single CA certificate that is the envisioned or actual authority for the current, authenticated Pledge making the request. The only exception case is when the Registrar is configured to not support a request for a single CA certificate for operational or security reasons, e.g. because every device enrolled into the domain needs to use at least multiple CAs. In such exception case the Registrar returns the CoAP response 4.06 Not Acceptable to indicate that only the default Content-Format of 281 "application/pkcs7-mime;smime-type=certs-only" is available.

7. BRSKI-MASA Protocol

[I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] [section 5.4](#) describes a connection between the Registrar and the MASA as being a normal TLS connection using HTTPS. This document does not change that. The use of CoAP for the BRSKI-MASA connection is NOT supported.

Some consideration was made to specify CoAP support for consistency but:

- o the Registrar is not expected to be so constrained that it cannot support HTTPS client connections.
- o the technology and experience to build Internet-scale HTTPS responders (which the MASA is) is common, while the experience doing the same for CoAP is much less common.
- o in many Enterprise networks, outgoing UDP connections are often treated as suspicious, and there seems to be no advantage to using CoAP in that environment.

- o a Registrar is likely to provide onboarding services to both constrained and non-constrained devices. Such a Registrar would need to speak HTTPS anyway.
- o similarly, a manufacturer is likely to offer both constrained and non-constrained devices, so there may in practice be no situation in which the MASA could be CoAP-only. Additionally, as the MASA is intended to be a function that can easily be outsourced to a third-party service provider, reducing the complexity would also seem to reduce the cost of that function.

8. Pinning in Voucher Artifacts

The voucher is a statement from the MASA to the Pledge indicating who the Pledge's owner is. This section deals with the question of how that owner's identity is determined and how it is encoded within the voucher.

8.1. Registrar Identity Selection and Encoding

Section 5.5 of [[I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra](#)] describes BRSKI policies for selection of the owner identity. It indicates some of the flexibility that is possible for the Registrar. The recommendation made there is for the Registrar to include only certificates in the (CMS) signing structure which participate in the certificate chain that is to be pinned.

The MASA is expected to evaluate the certificates included by the Registrar in its voucher request, forming them into a chain with the Registrar's (signing) identity on one end. Then, it pins a certificate selected from the chain. For instance, for a domain with a two-level certification authority, where the voucher-request has been signed by "Registrar" its signing structure includes two additional CA certificates:




Figure 1: Two Level PKI

When the Registrar is using a COSE-signed constrained format voucher request towards MASA, instead of a regular CMS-signed voucher request, the COSE_Sign1 object contains a protected and an unprotected header, and according to [\[I-D.ietf-cose-x509\]](#), would carry all the certificates of the chain in an "x5bag" attribute placed in the unprotected header.

8.2. MASA Pinning Policy

The MASA, having assembled and verified the chain in the signing structure, will now need to select a certificate to pin in the voucher in case there are multiple available. (For the case that only the Registrar's End-Entity certificate is included, only this certificate can be selected and this section does not apply.) The BRSKI policy for pinning by the MASA as described in Section 5.5.2 of [\[I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra\]](#) leaves much flexibility to the manufacturer. The present document adds the following rules to the MASA pinning policy, in order to reduce on average the duration of BRSKI/EST on constrained, low-bandwidth networks:

1. for a voucher containing a nonce, it SHOULD select the most specific (lowest-level) CA certificate in the chain.
2. for a nonceless voucher, it SHOULD select the least-specific (highest-level) CA certificate in the chain that is allowed under the MASA's policy for this specific customer (domain).

The rationale for 1. is that in case of a voucher with nonce, the voucher is valid only in scope of the present DTLS connection between Pledge and Registrar anyway, so it would have no benefit to pin a higher-level CA. By pinning the most specific CA the constrained Pledge can validate its DTLS connection using less crypto operations.

The rationale for pinning a CA instead of the Registrar's End-Entity certificate directly is the following benefit on constrained networks: the pinned certificate in the voucher can in common cases be re-used as a Domain CA trust anchor during the EST enrollment and during the operational phase that follows after EST enrollment, as explained elsewhere in this document. Doing so avoids an additional transmission of this trust anchor over the network during the EST enrollment, saving potentially 100s of bytes and a CoAP transaction.

The rationale for 2. follows from the flexible BRSKI trust model for, and purpose of, nonceless vouchers (Sections [5.5.*](#) and 7.4.1 of [\[I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra\]](#)).

Using the previous example of a domain with a two-level certification authority, the most specific CA ("Sub-CA") is the identity that is pinned by MASA in a nonced voucher. A Registrar that wished to have only the Registrar's End-Entity certificate pinned would omit the "priv-CA" and "Sub-CA" certificates from the voucher-request.

In case of a nonceless voucher, the MASA would depending on trust level pin only "Registrar" certificate (low trust in customer), or the "Sub-CA" certificate (in case of medium trust, implying that any Registrar of that sub-domain is acceptable), or even the "priv-CA" certificate (in case of high trust in the customer, and possibly a pre-agreed need of the customer to obtain flexible long-lived vouchers).

[8.3.](#) Pinning of Raw Public Keys

Specifically for constrained use cases, the pinning of the raw public key (RPK) of the Registrar is also supported in the constrained voucher, instead of an X.509 certificate. If an RPK is pinned it MUST be the RPK of the Registrar.




Figure 2: Raw Public Key pinning

When the Pledge is known by MASA to support RPK but not X.509 certificates, the voucher produced by the MASA pins the RPK of the Registrar in the "pinned-domain-subject-public-key-info" field of a voucher. This is described in more detail in the YANG definition for the constrained voucher. A Pledge that does not support X.509 certificates cannot use EST to enroll; it has to use another method for certificate-less enrollment and the Registrar has to support this method also. It is possible that the Pledge will not enroll, but instead only a network join operation will occur, such as described in [\[I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security\]](#). How the Pledge discovers this method and details of the enrollment method are out of scope of this document.

When the Pledge is known by MASA to support PKIX format certificates, the "pinned-domain-cert" field present in a voucher typically pins a domain certificate. That can be either the End-Entity certificate of the Registrar, or the certificate of a domain CA of the Registrar's domain. However, if the Pledge is known to also support RPK pinning and the MASA intends to pin the Registrar's identity (not a CA), then MASA SHOULD pin the RPK (RPK3 in figure Figure 2) of the Registrar instead of the Registrar's End-Entity certificate in order to save space in the voucher.

To Be Completed further (TBD): Note, the above paragraphs are duplicated from the section [Section 4](#) so we may have to resolve this duplication.

9. Artifacts

This section describes the abstract (tree) definition as explained in [[I-D.ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams](#)] first. This provides a high-level view of the contents of each artifact.

Then the assigned SID values are presented. These have been assigned using the rules in [[I-D.ietf-core-sid](#)], with an allocation that was made via the <http://comi.space> service.

9.1. Voucher Request artifact

9.1.1. Tree Diagram

The following diagram is largely a duplicate of the contents of [[RFC8366](#)], with the addition of proximity-registrar-subject-public-key-info, proximity-registrar-cert, and prior-signed-voucher-request.

prior-signed-voucher-request is only used between the Registrar and the MASA. proximity-registrar-subject-public-key-info replaces proximity-registrar-cert for the extremely constrained cases.


```
module: ietf-constrained-voucher-request
```

```
grouping voucher-request-constrained-grouping
```

```
  +-- voucher
```

```
    +-- created-on?
```

```
      |      yang:date-and-time
```

```
    +-- expires-on?
```

```
      |      yang:date-and-time
```

```
    +-- assertion
```

```
      |      enumeration
```

```
    +-- serial-number
```

```
      |      string
```

```
    +-- idevid-issuer?
```

```
      |      binary
```

```
    +-- pinned-domain-cert?
```

```
      |      binary
```

```
    +-- domain-cert-revocation-checks?
```

```
      |      boolean
```

```
    +-- nonce?
```

```
      |      binary
```

```
    +-- last-renewal-date?
```

```
      |      yang:date-and-time
```

```
    +-- proximity-registrar-subject-public-key-info?
```

```
      |      binary
```

```
    +-- proximity-registrar-sha256-of-subject-public-key-info?
```

```
      |      binary
```

```
    +-- proximity-registrar-cert?
```

```
      |      binary
```

```
    +-- prior-signed-voucher-request?
```

```
      binary
```

[9.1.2.](#) SID values

SID Assigned to

```
-----  
2501 data /ietf-constrained-voucher-request:voucher  
2502 data .../assertion  
2503 data .../created-on  
2504 data .../domain-cert-revocation-checks  
2505 data .../expires-on  
2506 data .../idevid-issuer  
2507 data .../last-renewal-date  
2508 data /ietf-constrained-voucher-request:voucher/nonce  
2509 data .../pinned-domain-cert  
2510 data .../prior-signed-voucher-request  
2511 data .../proximity-registrar-cert  
2512 data mity-registrar-sha256-of-subject-public-key-info  
2513 data .../proximity-registrar-subject-public-key-info  
2514 data .../serial-number
```

WARNING, obsolete definitions

9.1.3. YANG Module

In the constrained-voucher-request YANG module, the voucher is "augmented" within the "used" grouping statement such that one continuous set of SID values is generated for the constrained-voucher-request module name, all voucher attributes, and the constrained-voucher-request attribute. Two attributes of the voucher are "refined" to be optional.

```
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-constrained-voucher-request@2019-09-01.yang"  
module ietf-constrained-voucher-request {  
  yang-version 1.1;  
  
  namespace  
    "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-constrained-voucher-request";  
  prefix "constrained";  
  
  import ietf-restconf {  
    prefix rc;  
    description  
      "This import statement is only present to access  
      the yang-data extension defined in RFC 8040.";  
    reference "RFC 8040: RESTCONF Protocol";  
  }  
  
  import ietf-voucher {  
    prefix "v";  
  }  
}
```


organization

"IETF ANIMA Working Group";

contact

"WG Web: <<http://tools.ietf.org/wg/anima/>>
WG List: <<mailto:anima@ietf.org>>
Author: Michael Richardson
<<mailto:mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>>
Author: Peter van der Stok
<<mailto:consultancy@vanderstok.org>>
Author: Panos Kampanakis
<<mailto:pkampana@cisco.com>>";

description

"This module defines the format for a voucher request, which is produced by a pledge to request a voucher. The voucher-request is sent to the potential owner's Registrar, which in turn sends the voucher request to the manufacturer or delegate (MASA).

A voucher is then returned to the pledge, binding the pledge to the owner. This is a constrained version of the voucher-request present in [draft-ietf-anima-bootstrap-keyinfra.txt](#).

This version provides a very restricted subset appropriate for very constrained devices.

In particular, it assumes that nonce-ful operation is always required, that expiration dates are rather weak, as no clocks can be assumed, and that the Registrar is identified by a pinned Raw Public Key.

The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in the module text are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119](#).";

revision "2019-09-01" {

description

"Initial version";

reference

"RFC XXXX: Voucher Profile for Constrained Devices";

}

rc:yang-data voucher-request-constrained-artifact {

// YANG data template for a voucher.

uses voucher-request-constrained-grouping;

}


```
// Grouping defined for future usage
grouping voucher-request-constrained-grouping {
  description
    "Grouping to allow reuse/extensions in future work.";

  uses v:voucher-artifact-grouping {

    refine voucher/created-on {
      mandatory false;
    }

    refine voucher/pinned-domain-cert {
      mandatory false;
    }

  }

  augment "voucher" {
    description "Base the constrained voucher-request upon the
      regular one";

    leaf proximity-registrar-subject-public-key-info {
      type binary;
      description
        "The proximity-registrar-subject-public-key-info replaces
        the proximit-registrar-cert in constrained uses of
        the voucher-request.
        The proximity-registrar-subject-public-key-info is the
        Raw Public Key of the Registrar. This field is encoded
        as specified in RFC7250, section 3.
        The ECDSA algorithm MUST be supported.
        The EdDSA algorithm as specified in
        draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis-17 SHOULD be supported.
        Support for the DSA algorithm is not recommended.
        Support for the RSA algorithm is MAY, but due to
        size is discouraged.";
    }

    leaf proximity-registrar-sha256-of-subject-public-key-info {
      type binary;
      description
        "The proximity-registrar-sha256-of-subject-public-key-info
        is an alternative to
        proximity-registrar-subject-public-key-info.
        and pinned-domain-cert. In many cases the
        public key of the domain has already been transmitted
        during the key agreement protocol, and it is wasteful
        to transmit the public key another two times.
        The use of a hash of public key info, at 32-bytes for
```


sha256 is a significant savings compared to an RSA public key, but is only a minor savings compared to a 256-bit ECDSA public-key.

Algorithm agility is provided by extensions to this specifications which define new leaf for other hash types.";

}

leaf proximity-registrar-cert {

type binary;

description

"An X.509 v3 certificate structure as specified by

[RFC 5280](#),

[Section 4](#) encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.

The first certificate in the Registrar TLS server certificate_list sequence (see [[RFC5246](#)]) presented by the Registrar to the Pledge. This MUST be populated in a Pledge's voucher request if the proximity assertion is populated.";

}

leaf prior-signed-voucher-request {

type binary;

description

"If it is necessary to change a voucher, or re-sign and forward a voucher that was previously provided along a protocol path, then the previously signed voucher SHOULD be included in this field.

For example, a pledge might sign a proximity voucher, which an intermediate registrar then re-signs to make its own proximity assertion. This is a simple mechanism for a chain of trusted parties to change a voucher, while maintaining the prior signature information.

The pledge MUST ignore all prior voucher information when accepting a voucher for imprinting. Other parties MAY examine the prior signed voucher information for the purposes of policy decisions. For example this information could be useful to a MASA to determine that both pledge and registrar agree on proximity assertions. The MASA SHOULD remove all prior-signed-voucher-request information when signing a voucher for imprinting so as to minimize the final voucher size.";


```

    }
  }
}
}
<CODE ENDS>

```

9.1.4. Example voucher request artifact

Below is a CBOR serialization of an example constrained voucher request from a Pledge to a Registrar, shown in CBOR diagnostic notation. The enum value of the assertion field is calculated to be 2 by following the algorithm described in [section 9.6.4.2 of \[RFC7950\]](#). Four dots ("....") in a CBOR byte string denotes a sequence of bytes that are not shown for brevity.

```

{
  2501: {
    +2 : "2016-10-07T19:31:42Z", / SID= 2503, created-on /
    +4 : "2016-10-21T19:31:42Z", / SID= 2505, expires-on /
    +1 : 2,                      / SID= 2502, assertion /
                                / "proximity" /
    +13: "JADA123456789",        / SID= 2514, serial-number /
    +5 : h'01020D0F',           / SID= 2506, idevid-issuer /
    +10: h'cert.der',           / SID=2511, proximity-registrar-cert/
    +3 : true,                  / SID= 2504, domain-cert
                                -revocation-checks/
    +6 : "2017-10-07T19:31:42Z", / SID= 2507, last-renewal-date /
    +12: h'key_info'            / SID= 2513, proximity-registrar
                                -subject-public-key-info /
  }
}

```

```

<CODE ENDS>

```

9.2. Voucher artifact

The voucher's primary purpose is to securely assign a Pledge to an owner. The voucher informs the Pledge which entity it should consider to be its owner.

9.2.1. Tree Diagram

The following diagram is largely a duplicate of the contents of [\[RFC8366\]](#), with only the addition of pinned-domain-subject-public-key-info.


```

module: ietf-constrained-voucher

grouping voucher-constrained-grouping
  +-- voucher
    +-- created-on?
      |      yang:date-and-time
    +-- expires-on?
      |      yang:date-and-time
    +-- assertion                                enumeration
    +-- serial-number                           string
    +-- idevid-issuer?                          binary
    +-- pinned-domain-cert?                    binary
    +-- domain-cert-revocation-checks?         boolean
    +-- nonce?                                 binary
    +-- last-renewal-date?
      |      yang:date-and-time
    +-- pinned-domain-subject-public-key-info?  binary
    +-- pinned-sha256-of-subject-public-key-info? binary
<CODE ENDS>

```

[9.2.2.](#) SID values

```

      SID Assigned to
-----
2451 data /ietf-constrained-voucher:voucher
2452 data /ietf-constrained-voucher:voucher/assertion
2453 data /ietf-constrained-voucher:voucher/created-on
2454 data ../domain-cert-revocation-checks
2455 data /ietf-constrained-voucher:voucher/expires-on
2456 data /ietf-constrained-voucher:voucher/idevid-issuer
2457 data ../last-renewal-date
2458 data /ietf-constrained-voucher:voucher/nonce
2459 data ../pinned-domain-cert
2460 data ../pinned-domain-subject-public-key-info
2461 data ../pinned-sha256-of-subject-public-key-info
2462 data /ietf-constrained-voucher:voucher/serial-number

WARNING, obsolete definitions
<CODE ENDS>

```

[9.2.3.](#) YANG Module

In the constrained-voucher YANG module, the voucher is "augmented" within the "used" grouping statement such that one continuous set of SID values is generated for the constrained-voucher module name, all voucher attributes, and the constrained-voucher attribute. Two attributes of the voucher are "refined" to be optional.


```
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-constrained-voucher@2019-09-01.yang"
module ietf-constrained-voucher {
  yang-version 1.1;

  namespace
    "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-constrained-voucher";
  prefix "constrained";

  import ietf-restconf {
    prefix rc;
    description
      "This import statement is only present to access
       the yang-data extension defined in RFC 8040.";
    reference "RFC 8040: RESTCONF Protocol";
  }

  import ietf-voucher {
    prefix "v";
  }

  organization
    "IETF ANIMA Working Group";

  contact
    "WG Web:   <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/anima/>
    WG List:   <mailto:anima@ietf.org>
    Author:    Michael Richardson
               <mailto:mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
    Author:    Peter van der Stok
               <mailto:consultancy@vanderstok.org>
    Author:    Panos Kampanakis
               <mailto:pkampana@cisco.com>";

  description
    "This module defines the format for a voucher, which is produced
     by a pledge's manufacturer or delegate (MASA) to securely assign
     one or more pledges to an 'owner', so that the pledges may
     establish a secure connection to the owner's network
     infrastructure.

     This version provides a very restricted subset appropriate
     for very constrained devices.
     In particular, it assumes that nonce-full operation is
     always required, that expiration dates are rather weak, as no
     clocks can be assumed, and that the Registrar is identified
     by a pinned Raw Public Key.

     The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
     'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY',
```


and 'OPTIONAL' in the module text are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119](#)."

```
revision "2019-09-01" {
  description
    "Initial version";
  reference
    "RFC XXXX: Voucher Profile for Constrained Devices";
}

rc:yang-data voucher-constrained-artifact {
  // YANG data template for a voucher.
  uses voucher-constrained-grouping;
}

// Grouping defined for future usage
grouping voucher-constrained-grouping {
  description
    "Grouping to allow reuse/extensions in future work.";

  uses v:voucher-artifact-grouping {

    refine voucher/created-on {
      mandatory false;
    }

    refine voucher/pinned-domain-cert {
      mandatory false;
    }

    augment "voucher" {
      description "Base the constrained voucher
                  upon the regular one";
      leaf pinned-domain-subject-public-key-info {
        type binary;
        description
          "The pinned-domain-subject-public-key-info replaces the
           pinned-domain-cert in constrained uses of
           the voucher. The pinned-domain-subject-public-key-info
           is the Raw Public Key of the Registrar.
           This field is encoded as specified in RFC7250,
           section 3.
           The ECDSA algorithm MUST be supported.
           The EdDSA algorithm as specified in
           draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis-17 SHOULD be supported.
           Support for the DSA algorithm is not recommended.
           Support for the RSA algorithm is a MAY.";
      }
    }
  }
}
```



```

leaf pinned-sha256-of-subject-public-key-info {
  type binary;
  description
    "The pinned-hash-subject-public-key-info is a second
    alternative to pinned-domain-cert. In many cases the
    public key of the domain has already been transmitted
    during the key agreement process, and it is wasteful
    to transmit the public key another two times.
    The use of a hash of public key info, at 32-bytes for
    sha256 is a significant savings compared to an RSA
    public key, but is only a minor savings compared to
    a 256-bit ECDSA public-key.
    Algorithm agility is provided by extensions to this
    specifications which define new leaf for other hash types";
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
<CODE ENDS>

```

9.2.4. Example voucher artifacts

Below the CBOR serialization of an example constrained voucher is shown in CBOR diagnostic notation. The enum value of the assertion field is calculated to be zero by following the algorithm described in [section 9.6.4.2 of \[RFC7950\]](#). Four dots ("...") in a CBOR byte string denotes a sequence of bytes that are not shown for brevity.

```

{
  2451: {
    +2 : "2016-10-07T19:31:42Z", / SID = 2453, created-on /
    +4 : "2016-10-21T19:31:42Z", / SID = 2455, expires-on /
    +1 : 0, / SID = 2452, assertion "verified" /
    +11: "JADA123456789", / SID = 2462, serial-number /
    +5 : h'E40393B4....68A3', / SID = 2456, idevid-issuer /
    +8 : h'30820275....C35F', / SID = 2459, pinned-domain-cert/
    +3 : true, / SID = 2454, domain-cert /
    / -revocation-checks /
    +6 : "2017-10-07T19:31:42Z" / SID = 2457, last-renewal-date /
  }
}

```

<CODE ENDS>

9.3. Signing voucher and voucher-request artifacts with COSE

The COSE-Sign1 structure is discussed in section 4.2 of [\[I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-struct\]](#). The CBOR object that carries the body, the signature, and the information about the body and signature is called the COSE_Sign1 structure. It is used when only one signature is used on the body. Support for ECDSA with sha256 (secp256k1 and prime256v1 curves) is compulsory.

The supported COSE-sign1 object structure is shown in Figure 3. Support for EdDSA is encouraged. [EDNOTE: Expand and add a reference why.]

```
COSE_Sign1(  
  [  
    h'A101382E',          # { "alg": EC256K1 }  
    {  
      "kid" : h'789' # hash256(public key)  
    },  
    h'123', #voucher-request binary content  
    h'456', #voucher-request binary public signature  
  ]  
)
```

Figure 3: cose-sign1 example

The [\[COSE-registry\]](#) specifies the integers that replace the strings and the mnemonics in Figure 3. The value of the "kid" parameter is an example value. Usually a hash of the public key is used to identify the public key. The public key and its hash are derived from the relevant certificate (Pledge, Registrar or MASA certificate).

In [Appendix B](#) a binary cose-sign1 object is shown based on the voucher-request example of [Section 9.1.4](#).

10. Design Considerations

The design considerations for the CBOR encoding of vouchers is much the same as for [\[RFC8366\]](#).

One key difference is that the names of the leaves in the YANG does not have a material effect on the size of the resulting CBOR, as the SID translation process assigns integers to the names.

Any POST request to the Registrar with resource /est/vs or /est/es returns a 2.05 response with empty payload. The client should be aware that the server may use a piggybacked CoAP response (ACK, 2.05)

but may also respond with a separate CoAP response, i.e. first an (ACK, 0.0) that is an acknowledgement of the request reception followed by a (CON, 2.05) response in a separate CoAP message.

11. Security Considerations

11.1. Clock Sensitivity

TBD.

11.2. Protect Voucher PKI in HSM

TBD.

11.3. Test Domain Certificate Validity when Signing

TBD.

12. IANA Considerations

12.1. Resource Type Registry

Additions to the sub-registry "CoAP Resource Type", within the "CoRE parameters" registry are specified below. These can be registered either in the Expert Review range (0-255) or IETF Review range (256-9999).

ace.rt.rv needs registration with IANA
ace.rt.vs needs registration with IANA
ace.rt.es needs registration with IANA
ace.rt.ra needs registration with IANA

12.2. The IETF XML Registry

This document registers two URIs in the IETF XML registry [[RFC3688](#)]. Following the format in [[RFC3688](#)], the following registration is requested:

URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-constrained-voucher
Registrant Contact: The ANIMA WG of the IETF.
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.

URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-constrained-voucher-request
Registrant Contact: The ANIMA WG of the IETF.
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.

[12.3.](#) The YANG Module Names Registry

This document registers two YANG modules in the YANG Module Names registry [[RFC6020](#)]. Following the format defined in [[RFC6020](#)], the the following registration is requested:

```

name:          ietf-constrained-voucher
namespace:     urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-constrained-voucher
prefix:        vch
reference:     RFC XXXX

name:          ietf-constrained-voucher-request
namespace:     urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-constrained
               -voucher-request
prefix:        vch
reference:     RFC XXXX

```

[12.4.](#) The RFC SID range assignment sub-registry

Entry-point	Size	Module name	RFC Number
2450	50	ietf-constrained-voucher	[ThisRFC]
2500	50	ietf-constrained-voucher -request	[ThisRFC]

Warning: These SID values are defined in [[I-D.ietf-core-sid](#)], not as an Early Allocation.

[12.5.](#) Media-Type Registry

This section registers the the 'application/voucher-cose+cbor' in the "Media Types" registry. These media types are used to indicate that the content is a CBOR voucher either signed with a COSE_Sign1 structure [[I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-struct](#)].

[12.5.1.](#) application/voucher-cose+cbor

Type name: application
 Subtype name: voucher-cose+cbor
 Required parameters: none
 Optional parameters: cose-type
 Encoding considerations: COSE_Sign1 CBOR vouchers are COSE objects
 signed with one signer.
 Security considerations: See Security Considerations, Section
 Interoperability considerations: The format is designed to be
 broadly interoperable.
 Published specification: THIS RFC.
 Applications that use this media type: ANIMA, 6tisch, and other
 zero-touch imprinting systems
 Additional information:
 Magic number(s): None
 File extension(s): .vch
 Macintosh file type code(s): none
 Person & email address to contact for further information: IETF
 ANIMA WG
 Intended usage: LIMITED
 Restrictions on usage: NONE
 Author: ANIMA WG
 Change controller: IETF
 Provisional registration? (standards tree only): NO

12.6. CoAP Content-Format Registry

Additions to the sub-registry "CoAP Content-Formats", within the "CoRE Parameters" registry are needed for two media types. These can be registered either in the Expert Review range (0-255) or IETF Review range (256-9999).

Media type	mime type	Encoding	ID	References
-----	-----	-----	----	-----
application/voucher-cose+cbor	"COSE-Sign1"	CBOR	TBD3	[This RFC]

13. Acknowledgements

We are very grateful to Jim Schaad for explaining COSE and CMS choices. Also thanks to Jim Schaad for correcting earlier version of the COSE Sign1 objects.

Michel Veillette did extensive work on pyang to extend it to support the SID allocation process, and this document was among the first users.

14. Changelog

- 10 Design considerations extended Examples made consistent
- 08 Examples for cose_sign1 are completed and improved.
- 06 New SID values assigned; regenerated examples
- 04 voucher and request-voucher MUST be signed examples for signed request are added in [appendix I](#) IANA SID registration is updated SID values in examples are aligned signed cms examples aligned with new SIDs
- 03
Examples are inverted.
- 02
Example of requestvoucher with unsigned application/cbor is added attributes of voucher "refined" to optional
CBOR serialization of vouchers improved
Discovery port numbers are specified
- 01
application/json is optional, application/cbor is compulsory
Cms and cose mediatypes are introduced

15. References

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- [RFC7030] Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed., "Enrollment over Secure Transport", [RFC 7030](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7030>>.

[Appendix A](#). EST messages to EST-coaps

This section extends the examples from [Appendix A](#) of [\[I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est\]](#). The CoAP headers are only worked out for the enrollstatus example.

[A.1](#). enrollstatus

A coaps enrollstatus message can be :

```
POST coaps://192.0.2.1:8085/est/es
```

The corresponding coap header fields are shown below.

```
Ver = 1
T = 0 (CON)
Code = 0x02 (0.02 is POST)
Options
  Option (Uri-Path)
    Option Delta = 0xb (option nr = 11)
    Option Length = 0x3
    Option Value = "est"
  Option (Uri-Path)
    Option Delta = 0x0 (option nr = 11)
    Option Length = 0x2
    Option Value = "es"
Payload = [Empty]
```

The Uri-Host and Uri-Port Options are omitted because they coincide with the transport protocol destination address and port respectively.

A 2.05 Content response with an unsigned voucher status (ct=60) will then be:

```
2.05 Content (Content-Format: application/cbor)
```

With CoAP fields and payload:


```

Ver=1
T=2 (ACK)
Code = 0x45 (2.05 Content)
Options
  Option1 (Content-Format)
  Option Delta = 0xC (option nr 12)
  Option Length = 0x2
  Option Value = 60 (application/cbor)

Payload (CBOR diagnostic) =
{
  "version": "1",
  "Status": 1, / 1 = Success, 0 = Fail /
  "Reason": "Informative human readable message",
  "reason-context": "Additional information"
}

```

The binary payload is:

```

A46776657273696F6E6131665374617475730166526561736F6E7822
496E666F726D61746976652068756D616E207265616461626C65206D
6573736167656E726561736F6E2D636F6E74657874
764164646974696F6E616C20696E666F726D6174696F6E

```

The binary payload disassembles to the above CBOR diagnostic code.

[A.2.](#) voucher_status

A coaps voucher_status message can be:

```
POST coaps://[2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/vs
```

A 2.05 Content response with a non signed CBOR voucher status (ct=60) will then be:

```

2.05 Content (Content-Format: application/cbor)
Payload =
a46776657273696f6e6131665374617475730166526561736f6e7822496e666f7
26d61746976652068756d616e207265616461626c65206d6573736167656e7265
61736f6e2d636f6e74657874764164646974696f6e616c20696e666f726d61746
96f6e<CODE ENDS>

```

The payload above is represented in hexadecimal.

```

{"version": "1", "Status": 1, "Reason": "Informative human
readable message", "reason-context": "Additional information"}<CODE ENDS>

```


[Appendix B](#). COSE examples

These examples are generated on a pie 4 and a PC running BASH. Keys and Certificates have been generated with openssl with the following shell script:

```
#!/bin/bash
#try-cert.sh
export dir=./brski/intermediate
export cadir=./brski
export cnfdir=./conf
export format=pem
export default_crl_days=30
sn=8

DevID=pledge.1.2.3.4
serialNumber="serialNumber=$DevID"
export hwType=1.3.6.1.4.1.6715.10.1
export hwSerialNum=01020304 # Some hex
export subjectAltName="otherName:1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.4;SEQ:hmodname"
echo $hwType - $hwSerialNum
echo $serialNumber
OPENSSL_BIN="openssl"

# remove all files
rm -r ./brski/*
#
# initialize file structure
# root level
cd $cadir
mkdir certs crl csr newcerts private
chmod 700 private
touch index.txt
touch serial
echo 11223344556600 >serial
echo 1000 > crlnumber
# intermediate level
mkdir intermediate
cd intermediate
mkdir certs crl csr newcerts private
chmod 700 private
touch index.txt
echo 11223344556600 >serial
echo 1000 > crlnumber
cd ../..
```



```
# file structure is cleaned start filling

echo "#####"
echo "create registrar keys and certificates "
echo "#####"

echo "create root registrar certificate using ecdsa with sha 256 key"
$OPENSSL_BIN ecparam -name prime256v1 -genkey \
  -noout -out $cadir/private/ca-regis.key

$OPENSSL_BIN req -new -x509 \
  -config $cnfdir/openssl-regis.cnf \
  -key $cadir/private/ca-regis.key \
  -out $cadir/certs/ca-regis.crt \
  -extensions v3_ca \
  -days 365 \
  -subj "/C=NL/ST=NB/L=Helmond/O=vanderstok/OU=consultancy \
/CN=registrar.stok.nl"

# Combine authority certificate and key
echo "Combine authority certificate and key"
$OPENSSL_BIN pkcs12 -passin pass:watnietweet -passout pass:watnietweet \
  -inkey $cadir/private/ca-regis.key \
  -in $cadir/certs/ca-regis.crt -export \
  -out $cadir/certs/ca-regis-comb.pfx

# converteer authority pkcs12 file to pem
echo "converteer authority pkcs12 file to pem"
$OPENSSL_BIN pkcs12 -passin pass:watnietweet -passout pass:watnietweet \
  -in $cadir/certs/ca-regis-comb.pfx \
  -out $cadir/certs/ca-regis-comb.crt -nodes

#show certificate in registrar combined certificate
$OPENSSL_BIN x509 -in $cadir/certs/ca-regis-comb.crt -text

#
# Certificate Authority for MASA
#
echo "#####"
echo "create MASA keys and certificates "
echo "#####"

echo "create root MASA certificate using ecdsa with sha 256 key"
$OPENSSL_BIN ecparam -name prime256v1 -genkey -noout \
  -out $cadir/private/ca-masa.key

$OPENSSL_BIN req -new -x509 \
```



```
-config $cnfdir/openssl-masa.cnf \  
-days 1000 -key $cadir/private/ca-masa.key \  
-out $cadir/certs/ca-masa.crt \  
-extensions v3_ca\  
-subj "/C=NL/ST=NB/L=Helmond/O=vanderstok/OU=manufacturer\  
/CN=masa.stok.nl"  
  
# Combine authority certificate and key  
echo "Combine authority certificate and key for masa"  
$OPENSSL_BIN pkcs12 -passin pass:watnietweet -passout pass:watnietweet\  
-inkey $cadir/private/ca-masa.key \  
-in $cadir/certs/ca-masa.crt -export \  
-out $cadir/certs/ca-masa-comb.pfx  
  
# converteer authority pkcs12 file to pem for masa  
echo "converteer authority pkcs12 file to pem for masa"  
$OPENSSL_BIN pkcs12 -passin pass:watnietweet -passout pass:watnietweet\  
-in $cadir/certs/ca-masa-comb.pfx \  
-out $cadir/certs/ca-masa-comb.crt -nodes  
  
#show certificate in pledge combined certificate  
$OPENSSL_BIN x509 -in $cadir/certs/ca-masa-comb.crt -text  
  
#  
# Certificate for Pledge derived from MASA certificate  
#  
echo "#####"  
echo "create pledge keys and certificates "  
echo "#####"  
  
# Pledge derived Certificate  
  
echo "create pledge derived certificate using ecdsa with sha 256 key"  
$OPENSSL_BIN ecparam -name prime256v1 -genkey -noout \  
-out $dir/private/pledge.key  
  
echo "create pledge certificate request"  
$OPENSSL_BIN req -nodes -new -sha256 \  
-key $dir/private/pledge.key -out $dir/csr/pledge.csr \  
-subj "/C=NL/ST=NB/L=Helmond/O=vanderstok/OU=manufacturing\  
/CN=uuid:$DevID/$serialNumber"  
  
# Sign pledge derived Certificate  
echo "sign pledge derived certificate "  
$OPENSSL_BIN ca -config $cnfdir/openssl-pledge.cnf \  
-extensions 8021ar_idvid\  

```



```
-days 365 -in $dir/csr/pledge.csr \  
-out $dir/certs/pledge.crt  
  
# Add pledge key and pledge certificate to pkcs12 file  
echo "Add derived pledge key and derived pledge \  
certificate to pkcs12 file"  
$OPENSSL_BIN pkcs12 -passin pass:watnietweet -passout pass:watnietweet\  
-inkey $dir/private/pledge.key \  
-in $dir/certs/pledge.crt -export \  
-out $dir/certs/pledge-comb.pfx  
  
# converteer pledge pkcs12 file to pem  
echo "converteer pledge pkcs12 file to pem"  
$OPENSSL_BIN pkcs12 -passin pass:watnietweet -passout pass:watnietweet\  
-in $dir/certs/pledge-comb.pfx \  
-out $dir/certs/pledge-comb.crt -nodes  
  
#show certificate in pledge-comb.crt  
$OPENSSL_BIN x509 -in $dir/certs/pledge-comb.crt -text  
  
#show private key in pledge-comb.crt  
$OPENSSL_BIN ecparam -name prime256v1\  
-in $dir/certs/pledge-comb.crt -text  
<CODE ENDS>
```

The xxxx-comb certificates have been generated as required by libcoap for the DTLS connection generation.

B.1. Pledge, Registrar and MASA keys

This first section documents the public and private keys used in the subsequent test vectors below. These keys come from test code and are not used in any production system, and should only be used only to validate implementations.

B.1.1. Pledge private key

Private-Key: (256 bit)

priv:

9b:4d:43:b6:a9:e1:7c:04:93:45:c3:13:d9:b5:f0:
41:a9:6a:9c:45:79:73:b8:62:f1:77:03:3a:fc:c2:
9c:9a

pub:

04:d6:b7:6f:74:88:bd:80:ae:5f:28:41:2c:72:02:
ef:5f:98:b4:81:e1:d9:10:4c:f8:1b:66:d4:3e:5c:
ea:da:73:e6:a8:38:a9:f1:35:11:85:b6:cd:e2:04:
10:be:fe:d5:0b:3b:14:69:2e:e1:b0:6a:bc:55:40:
60:eb:95:5c:54

ASN1 OID: prime256v1

NIST CURVE: P-256

<CODE ENDS>

B.1.2. Registrar private key

Private-Key: (256 bit)

priv:

81:df:bb:50:a3:45:58:06:b5:56:3b:46:de:f3:e9:
e9:00:ae:98:13:9e:2f:36:68:81:fc:d9:65:24:fb:
21:7e

pub:

04:50:7a:c8:49:1a:8c:69:c7:b5:c3:1d:03:09:ed:
35:ba:13:f5:88:4c:e6:2b:88:cf:30:18:15:4f:a0:
59:b0:20:ec:6b:eb:b9:4e:02:b8:93:40:21:89:8d:
a7:89:c7:11:ce:a7:13:39:f5:0e:34:8e:df:0d:92:
3e:d0:2d:c7:b7

ASN1 OID: prime256v1

NIST CURVE: P-256

<CODE ENDS>

B.1.3. MASA private key

Private-Key: (256 bit)

priv:

c6:bb:a5:8f:b6:d3:c4:75:28:d8:d3:d9:46:c3:31:
83:6d:00:0a:9a:38:ce:22:5c:e9:d9:ea:3b:98:32:
ec:31

pub:

04:59:80:94:66:14:94:20:30:3c:66:08:85:55:86:
db:e7:d4:d1:d7:7a:d2:a3:1a:0c:73:6b:01:0d:02:
12:15:d6:1f:f3:6e:c8:d4:84:60:43:3b:21:c5:83:
80:1e:fc:e2:37:85:77:97:94:d4:aa:34:b5:b6:c6:
ed:f3:17:5c:f1

ASN1 OID: prime256v1

NIST CURVE: P-256

<CODE ENDS>

B.2. Pledge, Registrar and MASA certificates

Below the certificates that accompany the keys. The certificate description is followed by the hexadecimal DER of the certificate

B.2.1. Pledge IDevID certificate

Certificate:

Data:

```
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 4822678189204992 (0x11223344556600)
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
Issuer: C=NL, ST=NB, L=Helmond, O=vanderstok, OU=manufacturer,
                                             CN=masa.stok.nl

Validity
  Not Before: Dec  9 10:02:36 2020 GMT
  Not After : Dec 31 23:59:59 9999 GMT
Subject: C=NL, ST=NB, L=Helmond, O=vanderstok, OU=manufacturing,
        CN=uuid:pledge.1.2.3.4/serialNumber=pledge.1.2.3.4
Subject Public Key Info:
  Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
  Public-Key: (256 bit)
  pub:
    04:d6:b7:6f:74:88:bd:80:ae:5f:28:41:2c:72:02:
    ef:5f:98:b4:81:e1:d9:10:4c:f8:1b:66:d4:3e:5c:
    ea:da:73:e6:a8:38:a9:f1:35:11:85:b6:cd:e2:04:
    10:be:fe:d5:0b:3b:14:69:2e:e1:b0:6a:bc:55:40:
    60:eb:95:5c:54
  ASN1 OID: prime256v1
  NIST CURVE: P-256
X509v3 extensions:
  X509v3 Basic Constraints:
    CA:FALSE
  X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
    keyid:
      E4:03:93:B4:C3:D3:F4:2A:80:A4:77:18:F6:96:49:03:01:17:68:A3
```

```
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
30:46:02:21:00:d2:e6:45:3b:b0:c3:00:b3:25:8d:f1:83:fe:
d9:37:c1:a2:49:65:69:7f:6b:b9:ef:2c:05:07:06:31:ac:17:
bd:02:21:00:e2:ce:9e:7b:7f:74:50:33:ad:9e:ff:12:4e:e9:
a6:f3:b8:36:65:ab:7d:80:bb:56:88:bc:03:1d:e5:1e:31:6f
```

<CODE ENDS>

This is the hexadecimal representation in (request-)voucher examples referred to as pledge-cert-hex.

30820226308201cba003020102020711223344556600300a06082a8648ce3d04
0302306f310b3009060355040613024e4c310b300906035504080c024e423110
300e06035504070c0748656c6d6f6e6431133011060355040a0c0a76616e6465
7273746f6b31153013060355040b0c0c6d616e75666163747572657231153013
06035504030c0c6d6173612e73746f6b2e6e6c3020170d323031323039313030
3233365a180f39393939313233313233353935395a308190310b300906035504
0613024e4c310b300906035504080c024e423110300e06035504070c0748656c
6d6f6e6431133011060355040a0c0a76616e64657273746f6b31163014060355
040b0c0d6d616e75666163747572696e67311c301a06035504030c1375756964
3a706c656467652e312e322e332e34311730150603550405130e706c65646765
2e312e322e332e343059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d03010703
420004d6b76f7488bd80ae5f28412c7202ef5f98b481e1d9104cf81b66d43e5c
eada73e6a838a9f1351185b6cde20410befed50b3b14692ee1b06abc554060eb
955c54a32e302c30090603551d1304023000301f0603551d23041830168014e4
0393b4c3d3f42a80a47718f6964903011768a3300a06082a8648ce3d04030203
49003046022100d2e6453bb0c300b3258df183fed937c1a24965697f6bb9ef2c
05070631ac17bd022100e2ce9e7b7f745033ad9eff124ee9a6f3b83665ab7d80
bb5688bc031de51e316f<CODE ENDS>

B.2.2. Registrar Certificate

Certificate:

Data:

Version: 3 (0x2)

Serial Number:

70:56:ea:aa:30:66:d8:82:6a:55:5b:90:88:d4:62:bf:9c:f2:8c:fd

Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256

Issuer: C=NL, ST=NB, L=Helmond, O=vanderstok, OU=consultancy,
CN=registrar.stok.nl

Validity

Not Before: Dec 9 10:02:36 2020 GMT

Not After : Dec 9 10:02:36 2021 GMT

Subject: C=NL, ST=NB, L=Helmond, O=vanderstok, OU=consultancy,
CN=registrar.stok.nl

Subject Public Key Info:

Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey

Public-Key: (256 bit)

pub:

04:50:7a:c8:49:1a:8c:69:c7:b5:c3:1d:03:09:ed:
35:ba:13:f5:88:4c:e6:2b:88:cf:30:18:15:4f:a0:
59:b0:20:ec:6b:eb:b9:4e:02:b8:93:40:21:89:8d:
a7:89:c7:11:ce:a7:13:39:f5:0e:34:8e:df:0d:92:
3e:d0:2d:c7:b7

ASN1 OID: prime256v1

NIST CURVE: P-256

X509v3 extensions:

X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:

08:C2:BF:36:88:7F:79:41:21:85:87:2F:16:A7:AC:A6:EF:B3:D2:B3

X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:

keyid:

08:C2:BF:36:88:7F:79:41:21:85:87:2F:16:A7:AC:A6:EF:B3:D2:B3

X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical

CA:TRUE

X509v3 Extended Key Usage:

CMC Registration Authority, TLS Web Server

Authentication, TLS Web Client Authentication

X509v3 Key Usage: critical

Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment,

Data Encipherment, Certificate Sign, CRL Sign

Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256

30:44:02:20:74:4c:99:00:85:13:b2:f1:bc:fd:f9:02:1a:46:
fb:17:4c:f8:83:a2:7c:a1:d9:3f:ae:ac:f3:1e:4e:dd:12:c6:
02:20:11:47:14:db:f5:1a:5e:78:f5:81:b9:42:1c:6e:47:02:
ab:53:72:70:c5:ba:fb:2d:16:c3:de:9a:a1:82:c3:5f

<CODE ENDS>

This the hexadecimal representation, in (request-)voucher examples referred to as regis-cert-hex

```
308202753082021ca00302010202147056eaaa3066d8826a555b9088d462bf9c
f28cfd300a06082a8648ce3d0403023073310b3009060355040613024e4c310b
300906035504080c024e423110300e06035504070c0748656c6d6f6e64311330
11060355040a0c0a76616e64657273746f6b31143012060355040b0c0b636f6e
73756c74616e6379311a301806035504030c117265676973747261722e73746f
6b2e6e6c301e170d3230313230393130303233365a170d323131323039313030
3233365a3073310b3009060355040613024e4c310b300906035504080c024e42
3110300e06035504070c0748656c6d6f6e6431133011060355040a0c0a76616e
64657273746f6b31143012060355040b0c0b636f6e73756c74616e6379311a30
1806035504030c117265676973747261722e73746f6b2e6e6c3059301306072a
8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d03010703420004507ac8491a8c69c7b5c31d03
09ed35ba13f5884ce62b88cf3018154fa059b020ec6bebb94e02b8934021898d
a789c711cea71339f50e348edf0d923ed02dc7b7a3818d30818a301d0603551d
0e0416041408c2bf36887f79412185872f16a7aca6efb3d2b3301f0603551d23
04183016801408c2bf36887f79412185872f16a7aca6efb3d2b3300f0603551d
130101ff040530030101ff30270603551d250420301e06082b0601050507031c
06082b0601050507030106082b06010505070302300e0603551d0f0101ff0404
030201f6300a06082a8648ce3d04030203470030440220744c99008513b2f1bc
fdf9021a46fb174cf883a27ca1d93faeacf31e4edd12c60220114714dbf51a5e
78f581b9421c6e4702ab537270c5bafb2d16c3de9aa182c35f<CODE ENDS>
```

B.2.3. MASA Certificate

Certificate:

Data:

Version: 3 (0x2)

Serial Number:

14:26:b8:1c:ce:d8:c3:e8:14:05:cb:87:67:0d:be:ef:d5:81:25:b4

Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256

Issuer: C=NL, ST=NB, L=Helmond, O=vanderstok,

OU=manufacturer, CN=masa.stok.nl

Validity

Not Before: Dec 9 10:02:36 2020 GMT

Not After : Sep 5 10:02:36 2023 GMT

Subject: C=NL, ST=NB, L=Helmond, O=vanderstok,

OU=manufacturer, CN=masa.stok.nl

Subject Public Key Info:

Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey

Public-Key: (256 bit)

pub:

04:59:80:94:66:14:94:20:30:3c:66:08:85:55:86:

db:e7:d4:d1:d7:7a:d2:a3:1a:0c:73:6b:01:0d:02:

12:15:d6:1f:f3:6e:c8:d4:84:60:43:3b:21:c5:83:

80:1e:fc:e2:37:85:77:97:94:d4:aa:34:b5:b6:c6:


```
        ed:f3:17:5c:f1
        ASN1 OID: prime256v1
        NIST CURVE: P-256
X509v3 extensions:
    X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
E4:03:93:B4:C3:D3:F4:2A:80:A4:77:18:F6:96:49:03:01:17:68:A3
    X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
        keyid:
E4:03:93:B4:C3:D3:F4:2A:80:A4:77:18:F6:96:49:03:01:17:68:A3

    X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
        CA:TRUE
    X509v3 Extended Key Usage:
        CMC Registration Authority,
        TLS Web Server Authentication,
        TLS Web Client Authentication
    X509v3 Key Usage: critical
        Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment,
        Data Encipherment, Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
30:44:02:20:2e:c5:f2:24:72:70:20:ea:6e:74:8b:13:93:67:
8a:e6:fe:fb:8d:56:7f:f5:34:18:a9:ef:a5:0f:c3:99:ca:53:
02:20:3d:dc:91:d0:e9:6a:69:20:01:fb:e4:20:40:de:7c:7d:
98:ed:d8:84:53:61:84:a7:f9:13:06:4c:a9:b2:8f:5c
```

<CODE ENDS>

This is the hexadecimal representation, in (request-)voucher examples referred to as masa-cert-hex.


```
3082026d30820214a00302010202141426b81cced8c3e81405cb87670dbeefd5
8125b4300a06082a8648ce3d040302306f310b3009060355040613024e4c310b
300906035504080c024e423110300e06035504070c0748656c6d6f6e64311330
11060355040a0c0a76616e64657273746f6b31153013060355040b0c0c6d616e
7566616374757265723115301306035504030c0c6d6173612e73746f6b2e6e6c
301e170d3230313230393130303233365a170d3233303930353130303233365a
306f310b3009060355040613024e4c310b300906035504080c024e423110300e
06035504070c0748656c6d6f6e6431133011060355040a0c0a76616e64657273
746f6b31153013060355040b0c0c6d616e756661637475726572311530130603
5504030c0c6d6173612e73746f6b2e6e6c3059301306072a8648ce3d02010608
2a8648ce3d0301070342000459809466149420303c6608855586dbe7d4d1d77a
d2a31a0c736b010d021215d61ff36ec8d48460433b21c583801efce237857797
94d4aa34b5b6c6edf3175cf1a3818d30818a301d0603551d0e04160414e40393
b4c3d3f42a80a47718f6964903011768a3301f0603551d23041830168014e403
93b4c3d3f42a80a47718f6964903011768a3300f0603551d130101ff04053003
0101ff30270603551d250420301e06082b0601050507031c06082b0601050507
030106082b06010505070302300e0603551d0f0101ff0404030201f6300a0608
2a8648ce3d040302034700304402202ec5f224727020ea6e748b1393678ae6fe
fb8d567ff53418a9efa50fc399ca5302203ddc91d0e96a692001fbe42040de7c
7d98edd884536184a7f913064ca9b28f5c<CODE ENDS>
```

B.3. COSE signed voucher request from Pledge to Registrar

In this example the voucher request has been signed by the Pledge, and has been sent to the JRC over CoAPS. The Pledge uses the proximity assertion together with an included proximity-registrar-cert field to inform MASA about its proximity to the specific Registrar.

```
POST coaps://registrar.example.com/est/rv
(Content-Format: application/voucher-cose+cbor)
signed_request_voucher
```

The payload signed_request_voucher is shown as hexadecimal dump (with lf added):


```

d28444a101382ea104582097113db094eeee8eae48683e7337875c0372164be89d023a5f3d
f52699c0fbfb55902d2a11909c5a60274323032302d31322d32335431323a30353a32325a
0474323032322d31322d32335431323a30353a32325a01020750684ca83e27230aff97630
cf2c1ec409a0d6e706c656467652e312e322e332e340a590279308202753082021ca00302
010202147056eaaa3066d8826a555b9088d462bf9cf28cfd300a06082a8648ce3d0403023
073310b3009060355040613024e4c310b300906035504080c024e423110300e0603550407
0c0748656c6d6f6e6431133011060355040a0c0a76616e64657273746f6b3114301206035
5040b0c0b636f6e73756c74616e6379311a301806035504030c117265676973747261722e
73746f6b2e6e6c301e170d3230313230393130303233365a170d323131323039313030323
3365a3073310b3009060355040613024e4c310b300906035504080c024e423110300e0603
5504070c0748656c6d6f6e6431133011060355040a0c0a76616e64657273746f6b3114301
2060355040b0c0b636f6e73756c74616e6379311a301806035504030c1172656769737472
61722e73746f6b2e6e6c3059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d0301070342000
4507ac8491a8c69c7b5c31d0309ed35ba13f5884ce62b88cf3018154fa059b020ec6bebb9
4e02b8934021898da789c711cea71339f50e348edf0d923ed02dc7b7a3818d30818a301d0
603551d0e0416041408c2bf36887f79412185872f16a7aca6efb3d2b3301f0603551d2304
183016801408c2bf36887f79412185872f16a7aca6efb3d2b3300f0603551d130101ff040
530030101ff30270603551d250420301e06082b0601050507031c06082b06010505070301
06082b06010505070302300e0603551d0f0101ff0404030201f6300a06082a8648ce3d040
30203470030440220744c99008513b2f1bcfdf9021a46fb174cf883a27ca1d93faeacf31e
4edd12c60220114714dbf51a5e78f581b9421c6e4702ab537270c5bafb2d16c3de9aa182c
35f58473045022063766c7bbd1b339dbc398e764af3563e93b25a69104befe9aac2b3336b
8f56e1022100cd0419559ad960ccaed4dee3f436eca40b7570b25a52eb60332bc1f299148
4e9
<CODE ENDS>

```

The representation of signed_voucher_request in CBOR diagnostic format is:

```

Diagnose(signed_request_voucher) =
18([
h'A101382E',      # {"alg": -47}
{4: h'97113DB094EEEE8EAE48683E7337875C0372164BE89D023A5F3DF52699C0FBFB5'},
h'request_voucher',
h'3045022063766C7BBD1B339DBC398E764AF3563E93B25A69104BEFE9AAC2B3336B8F56E
1022100CD0419559AD960CCAED4DEE3F436ECA40B7570B25A52EB60332BC1F2991484E9'
])

Diagnose(request_voucher) =
{2501: {2: "2020-12-23T12:05:22Z",
4: "2022-12-23T12:05:22Z",
1: 2,
7: h'684CA83E27230AFF97630CF2C1EC409A',
13: "pledge.1.2.3.4",
10: h'regis-cert-hex'}}
<CODE ENDS>

```


B.4. COSE signed voucher request from Registrar to MASA

In this example the voucher request has been signed by the JRC using the private key from [Appendix B.1.2](#). Contained within this voucher request is the voucher request from the Pledge to JRC.

```
POST coaps://masa.example.com/est/rv
(Content-Format: application/voucher-cose+cbor)
signed_masa_request_voucher
```

The payload `signed_masa_voucher_request` is shown as hexadecimal dump (with lf added):

```
d28444a101382ea1045820e8735bc4b470c3aa6a7aa9aa8ee584c09c11131b205efec5d03
13bad84c5cd05590414a11909c5a60274323032302d31322d32385431303a30333a33355a
0474323032322d31322d32385431303a30333a33355a07501551631f6e0416bd162ba53ea
00c2a050d6e706c656467652e312e322e332e3405587131322d32385431303a30333a3335
5a07501551631f6e0416bd162ba53ea00c2a050d6e706c656467652e312e322e332e34055
87131322d32385431303a300000000000000000000000000000000416bd162ba53ea00c2a050d6e
706c656467652e312e322e332e3405587131322d32385431303a09590349d28444a101382
ea104582097113db094eee8eae48683e7337875c0372164be89d023a5f3df52699c0fbfb5
5902d2a11909c5a60274323032302d31322d32385431303a30333a33355a0474323032322
d31322d32385431303a30333a33355a010207501551631f6e0416bd162ba53ea00c2a050d
6e706c656467652e312e322e332e340a590279308202753082021ca00302010202147056e
aaa3066d8826a555b9088d462bf9cf28cfd300a06082a8648ce3d0403023073310b300906
0355040613024e4c310b300906035504080c024e423110300e06035504070c0748656c6d6
f6e6431133011060355040a0c0a76616e64657273746f6b31143012060355040b0c0b636f
6e73756c74616e6379311a301806035504030c117265676973747261722e73746f6b2e6e6
c301e170d3230313230393130303233365a170d3231313230393130303233365a3073310b
3009060355040613024e4c310b300906035504080c024e423110300e06035504070c07486
56c6d6f6e6431133011060355040a0c0a76616e64657273746f6b31143012060355040b0c
0b636f6e73756c74616e6379311a301806035504030c117265676973747261722e73746f6
b2e6e6c3059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d03010703420004507ac8491a8c
69c7b5c31d0309ed35ba13f5884ce62b88cf3018154fa059b020ec6bebb94e02b89340218
98da789c711cea71339f50e348edf0d923ed02dc7b7a3818d30818a301d0603551d0e0416
041408c2bf36887f79412185872f16a7aca6efb3d2b3301f0603551d2304183016801408c
2bf36887f79412185872f16a7aca6efb3d2b3300f0603551d130101ff040530030101ff30
270603551d250420301e06082b0601050507031c06082b0601050507030106082b0601050
5070302300e0603551d0f0101ff0404030201f6300a06082a8648ce3d0403020347003044
0220744c99008513b2f1bcbfd9021a46fb174cf883a27ca1d93faeacf31e4edd12c602201
14714dbf51a5e78f581b9421c6e4702ab537270c5bafb2d16c3de9aa182c35f5847304502
2063766c7bbd1b339dbc398e764af3563e93b25a69104befe9aac2b3336b8f56e1022100c
d0419559ad960ccaed4dee3f436eca40b7570b25a52eb60332bc1f2991484e95847304502
2100e6b45558c1b806bba23f4ac626c9bdb6fd354ef4330d8dfb7c529f29cca934c802203
c1f2ccbbac89733d17ee7775bc2654c5f1cc96afba2741cc31532444aa8fed8
```

<CODE ENDS>

The representation of signed_masa_voucher_request in CBOR diagnostic format is:

```
Diagnose(signed_registrar_request-voucher)
18([
h'A101382E',      # {"alg": -47}
h'E8735BC4B470C3AA6A7AA9AA8EE584C09C11131B205EFEC5D0313BAD84C5CD0
5'},
h'registrar_request_voucher',
h'3045022100E6B45558C1B806BBA23F4AC626C9BDB6FD354EF4330D8DFB7C529
F29CCA934C802203C1F2CCBBAC89733D17EE7775BC2654C5F1CC96AFBA2741CC3
1532444AA8FED8'
])

Diagnose(registrar_request_voucher)
{2501:
  {2: "2020-12-28T10:03:35Z",
   4: "2022-12-28T10:03:35Z",
   7: h'1551631F6E0416BD162BA53EA00C2A05',
   13: "pledge.1.2.3.4",
   5: h'31322D32385431303A30333A33355A07501551631F6E0416BD162BA53EA00C2
A050D6E706C656467652E312E322E332E3405587131322D32385431303A300000
000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
22E332E3405587131322D32385431303A',
   9: h'signed_request_voucher'}}
<CODE ENDS>
```

B.5. COSE signed voucher from MASA to Pledge via Registrar

The resulting voucher is created by the MASA and returned via the JRC to the Pledge. It is signed by the MASA's private key [Appendix B.1.3](#) and can be verified by the Pledge using the MASA's public key contained within the MASA certificate.

This is the raw binary signed_voucher, encoded in hexadecimal (with lf added):

```
d28444a101382ea104582039920a34ee92d3148ab3a729f58611193270c9029f7784daf11
2614b19445d5158cfa1190993a70274323032302d31322d32335431353a30333a31325a04
74323032302d31322d32335431353a32333a31325a010007506508e06b2959d5089d7a316
9ea889a490b6e706c656467652e312e322e332e340858753073310b300906035504061302
4e4c310b300906035504080c024e423110300e06035504070c0748656c6d6f6e643113301
1060355040a0c0a76616e64657273746f6b31143012060355040b0c0b636f6e73756c7461
6e6379311a301806035504030c117265676973747261722e73746f6b2e6e6c03f45847304
5022022515d96cd12224ee5d3ac673237163bba24ad84815699285d9618f463ee73fa0221
00a6bfff9d8585c1c9256371ece94da3d26264a5dfec0a354fe7b3aef58344c512f

<CODE ENDS>
```


The representation of signed_voucher in CBOR diagnostic format is:

```
Diagnose(signed_voucher) =
18([
h'A101382E',      # {"alg": -47}
{4: h'39920A34EE92D3148AB3A729F58611193270C9029F7784DAF112614B194
45D51'},
h'voucher',
h'3045022022515D96CD12224EE5D3AC673237163BBA24AD84815699285D9618F
463EE73FA022100A6BFF9D8585C1C9256371ECE94DA3D26264A5DFEC0A354FE7B
3AEF58344C512F'
])
```

```
Diagnose(voucher) =
{2451:
  {2: "2020-12-23T15:03:12Z",
   4: "2020-12-23T15:23:12Z",
   1: 0,
   7: h'6508E06B2959D5089D7A3169EA889A49',
  11: "pledge.1.2.3.4",
   8: h'regis-cert-hex',
   3: false}}
<CODE ENDS>
```

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