

# **Root DNSSEC KSK Ceremony 51**

Thursday 30 November 2023

Root Zone KSK Operator Key Management Facility  
18155 Technology Drive, Culpeper, VA 22701, USA

This ceremony is executed in accordance with the DNSSEC Practice Statement for the Root Zone KSK Operator 6th Edition (2020-11-04)

## Abbreviations

**AUD** = Third Party Auditor  
**EW** = External Witness  
**IW** = Internal Witness  
**OP** = Operator  
**RKOS** = RZ KSK Operations Security  
**SKR** = Signed Key Response  
**SSC** = Safe Security Controller  
**TEB** = Tamper Evident Bag (AMPAC: #GCS1013, #GCS0912, #GCS1216 or MMF Industries: #2362010N20, #2362011N20)

**CA** = Ceremony Administrator  
**FD** = Flash Drive  
**KMF** = Key Management Facility  
**PTI** = Public Technical Identifiers  
**RZM** = Root Zone Maintainer  
**SMK** = Storage Master Key  
**SW** = Staff Witness

**CO** = Crypto Officer  
**HSM** = Hardware Security Module  
**KSR** = Key Signing Request  
**RKSH** = Recovery Key Share Holder  
**SA** = System Administrator  
**SO** = Security Officer  
**TCR** = Trusted Community Representative

## Participants

Key Ceremony roles are described on <https://www.iana.org/help/key-ceremony-roles>

**Instructions:** At the end of the ceremony, participants sign IW's script. IW records time of completion.

Title / Roles	Printed Name	Signature	Date	Time
CA	David Huberman / ICANN			
IW	Andy Newton / ICANN			
SSC1	Rob Hoggarth / ICANN			
SSC2	Hope Shafer / ICANN			
CO1	Frederico Neves			
CO2	Pia Gruvö			
CO4	Robert Seastrom			
CO5	Nomsa Mwayenga			
CO6	Hugo Salgado			
RZM	Trevor Davis / Verisign			
AUD	Melanie Chen / RSM			
AUD	Grant Noah An / RSM			
SA	Darren Kara / ICANN		2023 Nov 30	22:32
RKOS / CA Backup	Andres Pavez / PTI			
RKOS / IW Backup	Aaron Foley / PTI			
SW	Butch Pfremmer / ICANN			
SW	Ariel Liang / ICANN			
SW	James Mitchell / PTI			
EW	Nick Kotakis			
EW	Lodrina Cherne			

**By signing this script, you are declaring that this document is a true and accurate record of the Root DNSSEC KSK ceremony to the best of your knowledge, and you agree that your personal data will be processed in accordance with the ICANN Privacy Policy available at <https://www.icann.org/privacy/policy>**

## Instructions for a Root DNSSEC KSK Ceremony

The Root DNSSEC Key Signing Key (KSK) Ceremony is a scripted meeting where individuals with specific roles generate or access the private key component of the root zone DNSSEC KSK. The process is audited by a third party firm for compliance with SOC 3 framework. The script and recordings are published online for the wider Internet community to review.

### Ceremony Guidelines:

- The CA leads the ceremony
- Only a CA, IW, or SA can enter and escort other participants into Tier 4 (Key Ceremony Room)
- Dual Occupancy is enforced. IW with CA or SA must remain inside Tier 4 (Key Ceremony Room) if participants are present in the room
- During a ceremony a CA, IW, or SA may escort participants out of Tier 4 (Key Ceremony Room) at the CA's discretion if Tier 5 (Safe Room) is not occupied
- All participants are required to sign in and out of Tier 4 (Key Ceremony Room) using the visitor log located in Tier 3
- The SA starts filming before the majority of participants enter Tier 4 (Key Ceremony Room)
- Ceremony participants follow the script step by step in order to attest to the ceremony's proper performance
- The CA reads each step aloud prior to its performance
- Upon the successful completion of a step, the IW will announce and record its time of completion, and initials that step in their script
- A ceremony participant who has cause for concern or detects an issue is encouraged to interrupt the ceremony for discussion. The issue is brought to resolution before the ceremony resumes
- Questions and suggestions for improvement are welcome and can be discussed at any time or after the ceremony during the ceremony debrief

Unplanned events (**exceptions**) during the ceremony are evaluated, documented, and acted upon. It is the CA's sole responsibility to decide on proper actions after consulting with the IW. In either case, an exception is regarded as an incident, and incident handling procedures are enacted.

### Key Management Facility Tiers:

- Tiers 1-3: Consist of the facility areas between the outside environment and the Key Ceremony Room
- Tier 4: Consists of the Key Ceremony Room and is subject to Dual Occupancy
- Tier 5: Consists of the Safe Room (a cage only accessible from the Key Ceremony Room) and is subject to Dual Occupancy
- Tier 6: Consists of Safe #1 (Equipment Safe) and Safe #2 (Credentials Safe)
- Tier 7: Consists of the HSM stored in Safe #1 (Equipment Safe) and the safe deposit boxes installed in Safe #2 (Credentials Safe)

Some steps during the ceremony may require the participants to recite and/or confirm identifiers comprised of numbers and letters. When spelling identifiers, the phonetic alphabet shown below should be used:

Character	Code Word	Pronunciation
<b>A</b>	Alfa	AL-FAH
<b>B</b>	Bravo	BRAH-VOH
<b>C</b>	Charlie	CHAR-LEE
<b>D</b>	Delta	DELL-TAH
<b>E</b>	Echo	ECK-OH
<b>F</b>	Foxtrot	FOKS-TROT
<b>G</b>	Golf	GOLF
<b>H</b>	Hotel	HOH-TEL
<b>I</b>	India	IN-DEE-AH
<b>J</b>	Juliet	JEW-LEE-ETT
<b>K</b>	Kilo	KEY-LOH
<b>L</b>	Lima	LEE-MAH
<b>M</b>	Mike	MIKE
<b>N</b>	November	NO-VEM-BER
<b>O</b>	Oscar	OSS-CAH
<b>P</b>	Papa	PAH-PAH
<b>Q</b>	Quebec	KEH-BECK
<b>R</b>	Romeo	ROW-ME-OH
<b>S</b>	Sierra	SEE-AIR-RAH
<b>T</b>	Tango	TANG-GO
<b>U</b>	Uniform	YOU-NEE-FORM
<b>V</b>	Victor	VIK-TAH
<b>W</b>	Whiskey	WISS-KEY
<b>X</b>	Xray	ECKS-RAY
<b>Y</b>	Yankee	YANG-KEY
<b>Z</b>	Zulu	ZOO-LOO
<b>1</b>	One	WUN
<b>2</b>	Two	TOO
<b>3</b>	Three	TREE
<b>4</b>	Four	FOW-ER
<b>5</b>	Five	FIFE
<b>6</b>	Six	SIX
<b>7</b>	Seven	SEV-EN
<b>8</b>	Eight	AIT
<b>9</b>	Nine	NIN-ER
<b>0</b>	Zero	ZEE-RO

## Act 1: Initiate Ceremony and Retrieve Materials

The CA initiates the ceremony by performing the steps below:

- Verify that the audit cameras are recording and the online video streaming is enabled
- Confirm that all of the ceremony attendees have signed in using the visitor log in Tier 3
- Review emergency evacuation procedures
- Explain the use of personal devices and the purpose of this ceremony
- Verify the time and date so that all entries into the script follow a common time source

The CA and IW will then escort the SSCs and COs into Tier 5 (Safe Room) to retrieve the following materials:

- Safe #1: HSM, laptop, OS media, etc
- Safe #2: The COs' cards required to operate the HSM

### Sign into Tier 4 (Key Ceremony Room)

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
1	CA confirms with SA that all audit cameras are recording and online video streaming is enabled.	M	18:00
2	CA confirms that all participants are signed into Tier 4 (Key Ceremony Room), then performs a roll call using the list of participants on page 2.	M	18:01
3	CA asks that any first time ceremony participants in the room introduce themselves.	M	18:03

### Emergency Evacuation Procedures and Electronics Policy

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
4	CA reviews emergency evacuation procedures with onsite participants.	M	18:03
5	CA explains the use of personal electronic devices during the ceremony.	M	18:04
6	CA summarizes the purpose of the ceremony.	M	18:06


### Verify the Time and Date

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
7	IW enters UTC date (YYYY-MM-DD) and time (HH:MM) using a reasonably accurate clock visible to all in Tier 4 (Key Ceremony Room): Date and time: <u>2023-11-30 18:06</u>  Note: All entries into this script or any logs should follow this common source of time.	M	18:06

**Open Safe #2 (Tier 6, Credentials Safe)**

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
8	CA transports the guard key and flashlight, and with IW escorts SSC2 and the COs into Tier 5 (Safe Room.)	M	18:10
9	SSC2 opens Safe #2 while shielding the combination from the camera. <b>Note: SSC begins by rapidly spinning the dial counter-clockwise 15-20 revolutions in order to charge it before stopping at the first number in the combination.</b>	M	18:12
10	Perform the following steps to complete the safe log: a) SSC2 removes the existing safe log, then shows the most recent page to the audit camera. b) IW provides the pre-printed safe log to SSC2. c) SSC2 writes the date and time, then signs the safe log where <b>"Open Safe"</b> is indicated. d) IW verifies the entry then initials it.	M	18:13

## COs Access the Credentials in Safe Deposit Boxes (Tier 7)

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
11	<p>COs perform the following steps sequentially to access the listed TEBs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) After the CA operates the guard key in the bottom lock, CO reads aloud their safe deposit box number then uses their tenant key to operate the top lock.</li> <li>b) CO opens their safe deposit box, verifies its integrity, then removes the TEBs.</li> <li>c) CO reads aloud the TEB numbers, then verifies integrity of TEBs while showing them to the audit camera above.</li> <li>d) CO performs the actions specified below, then locks their safe deposit box.</li> </ul> <p><b>Note 1:</b> The CO's key will remain inserted in their assigned safe deposit box lock when specified below.</p> <p><b>Note 2:</b> The COs will retrieve their new safe deposit box keys when specified below.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>e) CO writes the date and time, then signs the safe log.</li> <li>f) IW verifies the completed safe log entries, then initials them.</li> </ul> <p><b>CO1: Frederico Neves</b>  <b>Box # 1239</b>  <b>Set # 1 TEB # BB02639501</b> (Retain)                      Last Verified: KSK Ceremony 47 2022-11-03  <b>Set # 2 TEB # BB02638534</b> (Check and Return)                      Last Verified: KSK Ceremony 49 2023-04-27</p> <p><b>CO2: Pia Gruvö</b>  <b>Box # 1264</b>  <b>Set # 1 TEB # BB02639500</b> (Retain)                      Last Verified: KSK Ceremony 47 2022-11-03  <b>Set # 2 TEB # BB02639498</b> (Check and Return)                      Last Verified: KSK Ceremony 45 2022-05-12</p> <p><b>CO4: Robert Seastrom</b>  <b>Box # 1260</b> (Key shall remain in lock)  <b>New Box # 1243</b> (Retrieve keys from lock)  <b>OP TEB # BB91951237</b> (Retain)  <b>SO TEB # BB02639553</b> (Retain)  <b>Set # 1 TEB # BB02639552</b> (Retain)                      Last Verified: KSK Ceremony 45 2022-05-12  <b>Set # 2 TEB # BB02639551</b> (Transfer to newly assigned safe deposit box)                      Last Verified: KSK Ceremony 45 2022-05-12</p> <p><b>CO5: Nomsa Mwayenga</b>  <b>Box # 1262</b>  <b>Set # 1 TEB # BB02639496</b> (Retain)                      Last Verified: KSK Ceremony 47 2022-11-03  <b>Set # 2 TEB # BB02639548</b> (Retain)                      Last Verified: KSK Ceremony 45 2022-05-12</p> <p><b>CO6: Hugo Salgado</b>  <b>Box # 1242</b>  <b>Set # 1 TEB # BB02638531</b> (Retain)                      Last Verified: KSK Ceremony 49 2023-04-27  <b>Set # 2 TEB # BB02638530</b> (Check and Return)                      Last Verified: KSK Ceremony 49 2023-04-27</p> <p><b>Note:</b> "Last verified" indicates the last time a piece of equipment was placed in a new TEB during a ceremony. It is listed here for audit tracking purposes.</p>		

### Close Safe #2 (Tier 6, Credentials Safe)

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
12	Once all safe deposit boxes are closed and locked, SSC2 writes the date and time, then signs the safe log where "Close Safe" is indicated. IW verifies the entry then initials it.	M	18:28
13	SSC2 returns the safe log to Safe #2, closes the safe door, pulls up on the handle, and ensures it's locked by spinning the dial at least two full revolutions each way, counter-clockwise then clockwise. CA and IW verify that the safe is locked and the "WAIT" light indicator is off.	M	18:29
14	CA, IW, SSC2, and COs leave Tier 5 (Safe Room) with TEBs, returning to Tier 4 (Key Ceremony Room).	M	18:30

### Open Safe #1 (Tier 6, Equipment Safe)

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
15	CA and IW transport a cart, and escort SSC1 into Tier 5 (Safe Room.)	M	18:30
16	SSC1 opens Safe #1 while shielding the combination from the camera. Note: SSC begins by rapidly spinning the dial counter-clockwise 15-20 revolutions in order to charge it before stopping at the first number in the combination.	M	18:32
17	Perform the following steps to complete the safe log: a) SSC1 removes the existing safe log, then shows the most recent page to the audit camera. b) IW provides the pre-printed safe log to SSC1. c) SSC1 writes the date and time, then signs the safe log where "Open Safe" is indicated. d) IW verifies the entry then initials it.	M	18:33



**Remove Equipment from Safe #1 (Tier 6, Equipment Safe)**

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
18	<p>CA performs the following steps to extract each piece of equipment from the safe:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) CAREFULLY remove each equipment TEB from the safe.</li> <li>b) Read aloud each TEB number, then verify its integrity while showing it to the audit camera.</li> <li>c) Place each equipment TEB on the cart as specified in the list below.</li> <li>d) Write the date and time, then signs the safe log.</li> <li>e) IW verifies the completed safe log entries, then initials it.</li> </ul> <p><b>HSM5E: TEB # BB51184606 (Place on Cart)</b> Last Verified: KSK Ceremony 49 2023-04-27</p> <p><b>HSM6E: TEB # BB51184243 (Check and Return)</b> Last Verified: KSK Ceremony 49 2023-04-27</p> <p><b>HSM7E: TEB # BB51184253 (Place on Cart)</b> Last Verified: AT Ceremony 51 2023-11-29</p> <p><b>HSM8E: TEB # BB51184254 (Place on Cart)</b> Last Verified: AT Ceremony 51 2023-11-29</p> <p><b>Laptop3: TEB # BB97448418 (Check and Return)</b> Last Verified: KSK Ceremony 49 2023-04-27</p> <p><b>Laptop4: TEB # BB81420064 (Place on Cart)</b> Last Verified: KSK Ceremony 47 2022-11-03</p> <p><b>OS media (release coen-1.0.0) + HSMFD: TEB # BB02638528 (Place on Cart)</b> Last Verified: KSK Ceremony 49 2023-04-27</p> <p><b>KSK-2017: TEB # BB46584614 (Place on Cart)</b> Last Verified: KSK Ceremony 43 2021-10-14</p> <p><b>KSK-2023: TEB # BB02638526 (Place on Cart)</b> Last Verified: KSK Ceremony 49 2023-04-27</p> <p>Note: "Last verified" indicates the last time a piece of equipment was placed in a new TEB during a ceremony. It is listed here for audit tracking purposes.</p>	M	18:40

**Close Safe #1 (Tier 6, Equipment Safe) Exit Tier 5 (Safe Room)**

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
19	SSC1 writes the date and time, then signs the safe log where "Close Safe" is indicated. IW verifies the safe log entry then initials it.	M	18:40
20	SSC1 returns the safe log to Safe #1, closes the safe door, pulls up on the handle, and ensures it's locked by spinning the dial at least two full revolutions each way, counter-clockwise then clockwise. CA and IW verify that the safe is locked and the "WAIT" light indicator is off.	M	18:41
21	CA, IW, and SSC1 leave Tier 5 (Safe Room) with the cart, returning to Tier 4 (Key Ceremony Room).	M	18:41

## Root DNSSEC Script Exception

### Exception Details

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
1	IW writes the details of the ceremony exception: Act: <u>2</u> Step(s): <u>1</u> Page(s): <u>10</u> Date and Time: <u>30 Nov 2023 18:42</u>  Note: IW describes the exception(s) and action(s) below.	<i>M</i>	18:42

Melanie Chen was escorted out of tier 3 by Andres Pavez.

## Act 2: Equipment Setup

The CA will set up the equipment by performing the following steps:

- Boot the laptop using the OS media (the laptop has no permanent storage device)
- Set up the printer
- Synchronize the laptop date and time
- Connect the HSMFD
- Start the log sessions
- Power ON the HSM (Tier 7)

### Laptop Setup

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
1	<p>CA performs the following steps to prepare the listed equipment:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Remove all equipment TEBs from the cart and place them on the ceremony table.</li> <li>Inspect each equipment TEB for tamper evidence.</li> <li>Read aloud the TEB number and the serial number (if applicable) while IW verifies the information using the previous ceremony script where it was last used.</li> <li>Remove and discard the TEB, then place the equipment on its designated area of the ceremony table.</li> </ol> <p><b>HSM5E: TEB # BB51184606 / Serial # H1903018</b>            Last Verified: KSK Ceremony 49 2023-04-27  <b>Laptop4: TEB # BB81420064 / Service Tag # 58SVSG2</b>            Last Verified: KSK Ceremony 47 2022-11-03  <b>OS media (release coen-1.0.0) + HSMFD: TEB # BB02638528</b>            Last Verified: KSK Ceremony 49 2023-04-27</p> <p><b>Note: "Last verified" indicates the last time a piece of equipment was placed in a new TEB during a ceremony. It is listed here for audit tracking purposes.</b></p>	M	18:49
2	<p>CA performs the following steps to confirm that no hard drive and battery are in the laptop:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Open the latch on the right side of the laptop to confirm that the hard drive slot is empty.</li> <li>Open the latch on the left side of the laptop to confirm that the battery slot is empty.</li> </ol>	M	18:49
3	<p>CA ensures the <b>lock switch</b> on the left side of the listed SD card is slid down to the lock position:  <b>OS media release coen-1.0.0</b>  <b>Copy # 2</b></p>	M	18:50
4	<p>CA performs the following steps to boot the laptop:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Connect the USB printer cable into the rear USB port of the laptop.</li> <li>Connect the null modem cable into a USB port of the laptop.</li> <li>Connect the external HDMI display cable.</li> <li>Connect the power supply.</li> <li>Insert the <b>OS media release coen-1.0.0 Copy # 2</b>.</li> <li>Switch it ON.</li> </ol>	M	18:52
5	<p>CA verifies functionality of the external display and performs adjustments if necessary:            To change the font size of the terminal:            Click the <b>View</b> menu and select <b>Zoom In</b> or <b>Zoom Out</b>            To change the resolution of each screen:            Go to <b>Applications &gt; Settings &gt; Display</b></p>	M	18:52

## OS Media Checksum Verification

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
6	<p>CA uses the terminal window to executes the following steps:</p> <p>a) Verify the byte count of the SD card matches the ISO size of by running the following command:  <code>df -B1 /dev/sda</code></p> <p>b) Calculate the SHA-256 hash by executing:  <code>head -c 375431168 /dev/sda   sha2wordlist</code></p> <p>c) IW and participants confirm the result matches the PGP Wordlist of the SHA-256 hash.</p> <p>Note: CA assigns half of the participants to confirm the hash displayed on the TV screen while the other half confirm the hash from the ceremony script.</p> <p>SHA-256 hash:  405d7c76c114feb93fcc5345e13850e59d86341a08161207d8eb8c395410c13a</p> <p>PGP Words:  crackdown filament kiwi impetus snapline belowground woodlark proximate  cowbell revolver dwelling detector tempest consulting drumbeat travesty  quadrant letterhead choking Bradbury aimless bodyguard atlas amusement  stormy underfoot offload corporate eating autopsy snapline corrosion</p> <p>Note: The SHA-256 hash of the OS media release coen-1.0.0 is also published on the IANA website <a href="https://www.iana.org/dnssec/ceremonies/51">https://www.iana.org/dnssec/ceremonies/51</a></p>	M	18:55


## Printer Setup

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
7	<p>CA confirms that the printer is switched ON, then executes the command below using the terminal window to configure the printer and print a test page:  <code>configure-printer</code></p>	M	18:55

## Date Setup

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
8	<p>CA executes <code>date</code> using the terminal window to verify if the date/time reasonably matches the ceremony clock.</p> <p>If the date/time do not match, perform the following steps:</p> <p>a) Execute <code>date -s "20231130 HH:MM:00"</code> to set the time.  where <code>HH</code> is two-digit hour, <code>MM</code> is two-digit minutes and <code>00</code> is zero seconds.</p> <p>b) Execute <code>date</code> to confirm the date/time matches the clock.</p>	M	18:56

## Connect the HSMFD

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
9	CA plugs the <b>Ceremony 49 HSMFD</b> into the USB slot, then performs the steps below: a) Wait for the OS to recognize it. b) Display the HSMFD contents to all participants. c) Close the file system window.	<i>M</i>	18:57
10	CA executes the command below using the terminal window to calculate the SHA-256 hash of the HSMFD:  <code>hsmfd-hash -c</code>  CA assigns half of the participants to confirm the hash displayed on the TV screen while the other half confirm the hash with the following image from the previous ceremony script.    IW confirms that the result matches the SHA-256 hash of the HSMFD using the printed HSMFD hash from the Ceremony 49 OS Media bundle.	<i>M</i>	18:59

## Distribute Previous HSMFD

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
11	CA gives the unused <b>HSMFD 49</b> and the sheet of paper with the printed HSMFD hash to RKOS.	<i>M</i>	19:00

## Start the Terminal Session Logging

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
12	CA executes the command below using the terminal window to change the working directory to HSMFD: <code>cd /media/HSMFD</code>	<i>M</i>	19:00
13	CA executes the command below to log activities of the <b>Commands</b> terminal window: <code>script script-20231130.log</code>	<i>M</i>	19:00

## Start the HSM Output Logging

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
14	CA performs the following steps using the <b>HSM Output</b> terminal window to capture the activity logs of the HSM: a) Change the working directory to HSMFD by executing: <code>cd /media/HSMFD</code> b) Set the serial port baud rate by executing: <code>stty -F /dev/ttyUSB0 115200</code> c) Start logging the serial output by executing: <code>ttyaudit /dev/ttyUSB0</code>  Note: DO NOT unplug the null modem cable from the laptop as this will stop capturing activity logs from the HSM.	<i>M</i>	19:01

## Power ON the HSM (Tier 7)

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
15	<p>CA performs the following steps to prepare the HSM:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Verify the label on the HSM reads <b>HSM5E</b>.</li> <li>b) Plug the null modem cable into the serial port of the HSM.</li> <li>c) Connect the power to the HSM, then switch it ON.</li> </ul> <p><b>Note: Status information should appear in the HSM output logging screen.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>d) Scroll up on the logging screen while IW verifies the displayed HSM serial number on the screen reads <b>H1903018</b>.</li> <li>e) Scroll down to the end of the logging screen.</li> </ul> <p><b>HSM5E: Serial # H1903018</b></p> <p><b>Note: The date and time on the HSM is not used as a reference for logging and timestamp.</b></p>	<p><i>M</i></p>	<p>19:03</p>

## Act 3: Activate HSM (Tier 7) and Generate Signatures

Using the ksr signer application the CA takes the Key Signing Requests (KSRs) to generates the Signed Key Responses (SKRs) by performing the steps below.

- The CA activates the HSM using the COs' cards
- After connectivity is confirmed the flash drive containing the KSRs is inserted into the laptop
- The ksr signer application uses the private key stored in the HSM to generate the SKRs containing the digital signatures of the ZSK slated for future use
- The CA then prints the signer log, backs up the newly generated SKRs, and deactivates the HSM

### Crypto Officer Credentials Verification

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
1	<p>The CA calls each of the COs listed below sequentially to perform the following steps:</p> <p>a) CO reads aloud the TEB number, then CA inspects it for tamper evidence while IW verifies the information using the previous ceremony script where it was last used.</p> <p>b) CO and CA open the TEB, then the CA removes the plastic case containing the cards as specified below.</p> <p><b>CO1: Frederico Neves</b>  <b>Set # 1 TEB # BB02639501</b> (Place the cards on the designated card holder)                      Last Verified: KSK Ceremony 47 2022-11-03</p> <p><b>CO2: Pia Gruvö</b>  <b>Set # 1 TEB # BB02639500</b> (Place the cards on the designated card holder)                      Last Verified: KSK Ceremony 47 2022-11-03</p> <p><b>CO4: Robert Seastrom</b>  <b>OP TEB # BB91951237</b> (Place the plastic case on the table for destruction)  <b>SO TEB # BB02639553</b> (Place the plastic case on the table for destruction)  <b>Set # 1 TEB # BB02639552</b> (Place the cards on the designated card holder)                      Last Verified: KSK Ceremony 45 2022-05-12</p> <p><b>CO5: Nomsa Mwayenga</b>  <b>Set # 1 TEB # BB02639496</b> (Place the cards on the designated card holder)                      Last Verified: KSK Ceremony 47 2022-11-03  <b>Set # 2 TEB # BB02639548</b> (Place the plastic case on the table for TEB change)                      Last Verified: KSK Ceremony 45 2022-05-12</p> <p><b>CO6: Hugo Salgado</b>  <b>Set # 1 TEB # BB02638531</b> (Place the cards on the designated card holder)                      Last Verified: KSK Ceremony 49 2023-04-27</p> <p><b>Note: "Last verified" indicates the last time a piece of equipment was placed in a new TEB during a ceremony. It is listed here for audit tracking purposes.</b></p>	M	19:15

## Enable/Activate the HSM (Tier 7)

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
2	<p>CA performs the following steps to activate the HSM:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Utilize the HSM's keyboard to scroll through the menu using &lt; &gt;</li> <li>b) Select "<b>1.Set Online</b>", press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>c) When "<b>Set Online?</b>" is displayed, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>d) When "<b>Insert Card OP #X?</b>" is displayed, insert the OP card.</li> <li>e) When "<b>PIN?</b>" is displayed, enter "<b>11223344</b>", then press <b>ENT</b>.</li> <li>f) When "<b>Remove Card?</b>" is displayed, remove the OP card.</li> <li>g) Repeat steps d) to f) for the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> OP cards.</li> </ul> <p>Confirm the "<b>READY</b>" LED on the <b>HSM</b> is <b>ON</b>. IW records which cards were used below. Each card is returned to its designated card holder after use.</p> <p>Set # 1            1<sup>st</sup> OP card <u>6</u> of 7            2<sup>nd</sup> OP card <u>5</u> of 7            3<sup>rd</sup> OP card <u>4</u> of 7</p> <p><b>Note:</b> If a card is unreadable, gently wipe its metal contacts and try again. For a summary of card roles and their purpose see Appendix A number [14].</p>	<i>M</i>	19:18

## Check the Network Connectivity Between Laptop and HSM

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
3	CA connects the HSM to the laptop using an ethernet cable in the LAN ports.	<i>M</i>	19:18
4	<p>CA performs the following steps to test the network connectivity between laptop and HSM:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Use the <b>Commands</b> terminal window</li> <li>b) Test connectivity by executing: <code>ping hsm</code></li> <li>c) Wait for responses, then exit by pressing: <code>Ctrl + C</code></li> </ul>	<i>M</i>	19:19

## Insert the KSRFD

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
5	<p>CA plugs the <b>KSRFD</b> into an available USB port, then waits for it to be recognized by the OS. CA points out any KSR file that will be signed, then closes the file system window.</p> <p><b>Note:</b> The KSRFD was transferred to the facility by the RKOS. It contains 1 KSR.</p>	<i>M</i>	19:20

## Execute the KSR Signer for KSR 2024 Q1

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
6	CA executes the command below in the terminal window to change directory: <code>cd /media/KSRFD/KSK51/</code>	<i>M</i>	19:20
7	CA executes the command below in the terminal window to sign the KSR file: <code>kskm-ksrsigner</code>	<i>M</i>	19:20



January 18, 2023



To Whom It May Concern:


This is a letter of Verification of Employment for Trevor Davis. VeriSign, Inc. ("Verisign") has employed Trevor Davis full-time/40 hours per week since September 29, 2014, currently as a Manager - Engineering in Verisign's Production Operations department.

Verisign, a global provider of domain name registry services and internet infrastructure, enables internet navigation for many of the world's most recognized domain names. Verisign enables the security, stability, and resiliency of key internet infrastructure and services, including providing root zone maintainer services, operating two of the 13 global internet root servers, and providing registration services and authoritative resolution for the [.com](#) and [.net](#) top-level domains, which support the majority of global e-commerce. To learn more about what it means to be Powered by Verisign, please visit [Verisign.com](#).

For more than 25 years, Verisign has maintained 100 percent operational accuracy and stability for .com and .net-managing and protecting the DNS infrastructure for over 163.7 million .com and .net domain names and processing more than 219 billion query transactions daily-keeping the world connected online, seamlessly and securely. Verisign is experienced in and provides support for both IPv6 and [DNSSEC](#).

Should you have further questions, please contact me at the number below.

Sincerely,

 January 18, 2023

Dave Carney  
HR Specialist - Verisign

Dave Carney | HR Specialist - Verisign | [dcarney@verisign.com](mailto:dcarney@verisign.com) | (703) 948-4143



VERISIGN™

30 November 2023

The SHA256 hash of the 2024 Q1 KSR file is:

**ksr-root-2024-q1-0.xml:**

d31f96ec28d5296641aad3bcd5fec3675f9e7675a074032be83ab9070232af5

The PGP wordlist for the hash above is:

**PGP Words:** stapler businessman prefer unicorn breadline specialist  
breakup gossamer cranky pedigree stapler pyramid tunnel forever tumor  
congregate indulge Waterloo transit graduate enlist amusement crackdown  
component skydive Jamaica rhythm millionaire guidance cannonball  
brickyard visitor

Attested on behalf of VeriSign by:

Trevor Davis  
Senior Manager  
Cryptographic Business Operations  
VeriSign, Inc.

12061 Bluemont Way,  
Reston, VA 20190  
t: 703-948-3200  
[verisign.com](https://www.verisign.com)

Loaded configuration from file ksr-signer.yaml SHA-256 0f716d1970db983479735e132e858eeea2dae3e250f0cec ca41335e94cd43350 WORDS artist hideaway goggles bottomless guidance suspicious printer confidence jaw bone hurricane eyeglass barbecue buzzard leprosy orca universe rebirth surrender tissue tomorrow drum beat upcoming spyglass revolver regain barbecue chopper ultimate drainage souvenir chisel embezzle Configuration validated

Loaded SKR from file skr-root-2023-q4-0.xml SHA-256 7d8087f4bdaf0c70f264a881eb07ec16ae15d8fb3764f05a9 ff119e6cc5aed49 WORDS klaxon intention Neptune Virginia skullcap pharmacy ammo hesitate uproot getaway y retouch inventive trouble amusement tumor bodyguard robust bifocals stormy Wichita clamshell getaway y unearth existence quota vacancy bedlamp trombonist spigot existence tunnel dinosaur

Previous SKR:

#	Inception	Expiration	ZSK Tags	KSK (CKA_LABEL)
1	2023-10-01T00:00:00	2023-10-22T00:00:00	11019,46780	20326(Klajeyz)/S
2	2023-10-11T00:00:00	2023-11-01T00:00:00	46780	20326(Klajeyz)/S
3	2023-10-21T00:00:00	2023-11-11T00:00:00	46780	20326(Klajeyz)/S
4	2023-10-31T00:00:00	2023-11-21T00:00:00	46780	20326(Klajeyz)/S
5	2023-11-10T00:00:00	2023-12-01T00:00:00	46780	20326(Klajeyz)/S
6	2023-11-20T00:00:00	2023-12-11T00:00:00	46780	20326(Klajeyz)/S
7	2023-11-30T00:00:00	2023-12-21T00:00:00	46780	20326(Klajeyz)/S
8	2023-12-10T00:00:00	2023-12-31T00:00:00	46780	20326(Klajeyz)/S
9	2023-12-20T00:00:00	2024-01-10T00:00:00	30903,46780	20326(Klajeyz)/S

Loaded KSR from file ksr-root-2024-q1-0.xml SHA-256 d31f96ec28d5296641aad3bced5fec3675f9e7675a074032b e83ab9070232af5 WORDS stapler businessman prefer unicorn breadline specialist breakup gossamer cranky pedigree stapler pyramid tunnel forever tumor congregate indulge Waterloo transit graduate enlist amusement crackdown component skydive Jamaica rhythm millionaire guidance cannonball brickyard visitor

Validating KSR using request policy:

```

_dataclass_placeholder: None
acceptable_domains: ['.']
approved_algorithms: ['RSASHA256']
check_bundle_intervals: True
check_bundle_overlap: True
check_chain_keys: True
check_chain_keys_in_hsm: True
check_chain_overlap: True
check_cycle_length: True
check_keys_match_ksk_operator_policy: True
check_keys_publish_safety: True
check_keys_retire_safety: True
dns_ttl: 172800
enable_unsupported_ecdsa: False
keys_match_zsk_policy: True
max_bundle_interval: 11 days, 0:00:00
max_cycle_inception_length: 81 days, 0:00:00
min_bundle_interval: 9 days, 0:00:00
min_cycle_inception_length: 79 days, 0:00:00
num_bundles: 9
num_different_keys_in_all_bundles: 3
num_keys_per_bundle: [2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2]
rsa_approved_exponents: [65537]
rsa_approved_key_sizes: [2048]
rsa_exponent_match_zsk_policy: True
signature_algorithms_match_zsk_policy: True
signature_check_expire_horizon: True
signature_horizon_days: 180
signature_validity_match_zsk_policy: True
validate_signatures: True

```

KSR-DOMAIN: Verified domain '.'

KSR-ID: Will be checked later, when SKR is available

KSR-BUNDLE-UNIQUE: All 9 bundles have unique ids

KSR-BUNDLE-KEYS: All 3 unique keys in the bundles accepted by policy

KSR-BUNDLE-POP: All 9 bundles contain proof-of-possession

KSR-BUNDLE-COUNT: Number of bundles (9) accepted

KSR-BUNDLE-CYCLE-DURATION: The cycle length is in accordance with the KSK operator policy

KSR-POLICY-KEYS: Validated number of keys per bundle, and for all bundles

KSR-POLICY-ALG: All 1 ZSK operator signature algorithms accepted by policy

KSR-POLICY-SIG-OVERLAP: All bundles overlap in accordance with the stated ZSK operator policy

KSR-POLICY-SIG-VALIDITY: All 9 bundles have 21 days <= validity >= 21 days

KSR-POLICY-SIG-HORIZON: All signatures expire in less than 180 days

KSR-POLICY-BUNDLE-INTERVALS: All bundles intervals in accordance with the KSK operator policy

Request:

#	Inception	Expiration	ZSK Tags	KSK (CKA_LABEL)
1	2024-01-01T00:00:00	2024-01-22T00:00:00	30903,46780	
2	2024-01-11T00:00:00	2024-02-01T00:00:00	30903	
3	2024-01-21T00:00:00	2024-02-11T00:00:00	30903	
4	2024-01-31T00:00:00	2024-02-21T00:00:00	30903	
5	2024-02-10T00:00:00	2024-03-02T00:00:00	30903	

kskm-ksrsigner-20231130-192047-894.log

```

6 2024-02-20T00:00:00 2024-03-12T00:00:00 30903
7 2024-03-01T00:00:00 2024-03-22T00:00:00 30903
8 2024-03-11T00:00:00 2024-04-01T00:00:00 30903
9 2024-03-21T00:00:00 2024-04-11T00:00:00 5613,30903
Initializing PKCS#11 module aep using /opt/Keyper/PKCS11Provider/pkcs11.linux_gcc_4_1_2_glibc_2_5_x86_64.so.5.02

```

```

HSM First slot:      ICANNKSK
HSM ManufacturerID: Ultra Electronics AEP Networks
HSM Model:          Keyper 9860-2
HSM Serial:         H1903018

```

```

Checking coherence between SKR(n-1) and this KSR
KSR-CHAIN-KEYS: The last keys in SKR(n-1) matches the first keys in this KSR
KSR-CHAIN-OVERLAP: Overlap with last bundle in SKR(n-1) 9 days is in accordance with the KSR policy
KSR-CHAIN-KEYS: All 1 signatures in the last bundle of the last SKR were made with keys present in the HSM(s)

```

```

KSR-POLICY-SAFETY: PublishSafety validated
KSR-POLICY-SAFETY: RetireSafety validated

```

Generated SKR:

#	Inception	Expiration	ZSK Tags	KSK (CKA_LABEL)
1	2024-01-01T00:00:00	2024-01-22T00:00:00	30903,46780	20326(Klajeyz)/S
2	2024-01-11T00:00:00	2024-02-01T00:00:00	30903	20326(Klajeyz)/S
3	2024-01-21T00:00:00	2024-02-11T00:00:00	30903	20326(Klajeyz)/S
4	2024-01-31T00:00:00	2024-02-21T00:00:00	30903	20326(Klajeyz)/S
5	2024-02-10T00:00:00	2024-03-02T00:00:00	30903	20326(Klajeyz)/S
6	2024-02-20T00:00:00	2024-03-12T00:00:00	30903	20326(Klajeyz)/S
7	2024-03-01T00:00:00	2024-03-22T00:00:00	30903	20326(Klajeyz)/S
8	2024-03-11T00:00:00	2024-04-01T00:00:00	30903	20326(Klajeyz)/S
9	2024-03-21T00:00:00	2024-04-11T00:00:00	30903,5613	20326(Klajeyz)/S

```

Wrote SKR to file skr-root-2024-q1-0.xml SHA-256 0f2922c76d8ac758dedff603d0c2e44e13369c1938d56ef75094
25abf8f0b48f WORDS artist certify blockade retraction goggles maverick soybean everyday tactics therapist village aggregate stagnate repellent tonic distortion Aztec congregate python bottomless classic specialist goldfish voyager drumbeat molecule bombast Pegasus Vulcan upcoming scenic midsummer

```

**Verify the KSR Hash for KSR 2024 Q1**

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
8	<p>When the hash of the KSR is displayed in the terminal window, perform the following:</p> <p>a) CA asks the Root Zone Maintainer (RZM) representative to identify themselves. The IW verifies their employment documents and identification <b>off camera</b> for the purpose of authentication while maintaining privacy.</p> <p><b>Note:</b> If the RZM representative is not physically present in the room, write the representative's name and "<i>Remote Participant</i>" next to the name on the signature line.</p> <p>b) IW retains the hash and PGP word list for the KSR(s), and employment verification letter provided by the RZM representative and writes their name on the following line:</p> <p><b>Note:</b> If the RZM representative is not physically present in the room, the documents will be provided to RKOS in advance to be included in the final annotated script and audit bundle.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>Trevor Davis</u></p> <p>c) The CA asks some participants to compare the hash in the email sent by the RZM representative prior to the ceremony and some participants to compare the hash in the terminal window, then asks the RZM representative to read aloud the PGP word list SHA-256 hash of the KSR file being used.</p>	M	19:23
9	Participants confirm that the hash matches with the RZM representative's discourse, then CA asks " <b>are there any objections?</b> "	M	19:23
10	CA enters <b>Yes</b> in response to " <b>Sign KSR?</b> " to complete the KSR signing operation. The SKR is located in: <code>/media/KSRFD/KSK51/skr-root-2024-q1-0.xml</code>	M	19:24

**Print Copies of the KSR Signer Log**

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
11	<p>CA executes the commands below using the terminal window to print the KSR Signer log:</p> <p>a) <code>printlog kskm-ksrsigner-202311*.log X</code></p> <p><b>Note:</b> Replace "X" with the amount of copies needed for the participants.</p>	M	19:26
12	IW attaches a copy of the required ksr signer log to their script.	M	19:26

## Disable/Deactivate the HSM (Tier 7)

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
13	<p>CA deactivates the HSM by performing the following steps:                      Note: CA will use OP cards not previously utilized in this ceremony if available.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>CA selects the <b>HSM Output</b> terminal window.</li> <li>Utilize the HSM's keyboard to scroll through the menu using &lt; &gt;</li> <li>Select <b>"2.Set Offline"</b>, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>When <b>"Set Offline?"</b> is displayed, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>When <b>"Insert Card OP #X?"</b> is displayed, insert the OP card from the card holder.</li> <li>When <b>"PIN?"</b> is displayed, enter <b>"11223344"</b>, then press <b>ENT</b>.</li> <li>When <b>"Remove Card?"</b> is displayed, remove the OP card.</li> <li>Repeat steps e) to g) for the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> OP cards.</li> </ol> <p>Confirm the <b>"READY"</b> LED on the <b>HSM</b> is <b>OFF</b>.                      IW records which cards were used below. Each card is returned to its designated card holder after use.</p> <p>Set # 1                      1<sup>st</sup> OP card <u>2</u> of 7                      2<sup>nd</sup> OP card <u>1</u> of 7                      3<sup>rd</sup> OP card <u>6</u> of 7</p> <p>Note: If a card is unreadable, gently wipe its metal contacts and try again.                      For a summary of card roles and their purpose see Appendix A number [14].</p>	<i>M</i>	19:29

## OS Media Checksum Verification

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
14	<p>CA uses the terminal window to executes the following steps:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Verify the byte count of the SD card matches the ISO size of by running the following command:  <code>df -B1 /dev/sda</code></li> <li>Calculate the SHA-256 hash by executing:  <code>head -c 375431168 /dev/sda   sha2wordlist</code></li> <li>IW and participants confirm the result matches the PGP Wordlist of the SHA-256 hash.</li> </ol> <p>Note: CA assigns half of the participants to confirm the hash displayed on the TV screen while the other half confirm the hash from the ceremony script.</p> <p>SHA-256 hash:                      405d7c76c114feb93fcc5345e13850e59d86341a08161207d8eb8c395410c13a                      PGP Words:                      crackdown filament kiwi impetus snapline belowground woodlark proximate                      cowbell revolver dwelling detector tempest consulting drumbeat travesty                      quadrant letterhead choking Bradbury aimless bodyguard atlas amusement                      stormy underfoot offload corporate eating autopsy snapline corrosion</p> <p>Note 1: The SHA-256 hash of the OS media is being calculated a second time to ensure the contents of the SD card have not been modified during the previous steps.                      Note 2: The SHA-256 hash of the OS media release coen-1.0.0 is also published on the IANA website <a href="https://www.iana.org/dnssec/ceremonies/51">https://www.iana.org/dnssec/ceremonies/51</a></p>	<i>M</i>	19:31

## Act 4: Destroy OP and SO Cards

The Operator (OP) and Security Officer (SO) cards were originally issued in 2010 and have reached the end of their operational period. New OP and SO card sets were previously generated as replacements, and the original cards will now be destroyed.

The CA will destroy the OP and SO cards by performing the steps below:

- Clear the cards using an HSM's designated clear card function
- Slice through the cards' chips then place the cards in the shredder

### Clear and Destroy OP and SO Cards


Step	Activity	Initials	Time
1	<p>CA performs the following steps to clear Operator (OP) and Security Officer (SO) cards:</p> <p>a) CA selects the <b>HSM Output</b> terminal window.</p> <p>b) Utilize the HSM's keyboard to scroll through the menu using &lt; &gt;</p> <p>c) Select <b>"7.Role Mgmt"</b>, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</p> <p>d) When <b>"Insert Card SO #X?"</b> is displayed, insert the SO card.</p> <p>e) When <b>"PIN?"</b> is displayed, enter <b>"11223344"</b>, then press <b>ENT</b>.</p> <p>f) When <b>"Remove Card?"</b> is displayed, remove the SO card.</p> <p>g) Repeat steps d) to f) for the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> SO card.</p> <p>h) Select <b>"4.Clear RoleCard"</b>, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</p> <p>i) When <b>"Clear Card?"</b> is displayed, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</p> <p>j) When <b>"Num Cards?"</b> is displayed, enter <b>"3"</b>, then press <b>ENT</b>.</p> <p>k) When <b>"Insert Card #X?"</b> is displayed, take the required card, show the card to the audit camera and then insert the card into the HSM's card reader.</p> <p>l) When <b>"Are you sure?"</b> is displayed, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</p> <p><b>Note: The message will differ depending of the card type.</b></p> <p>m) When <b>"PIN?"</b> is displayed, enter <b>"11223344"</b>, then press <b>ENT</b>.</p> <p>n) When <b>"Remove Card?"</b> is displayed, remove the card.</p> <p>o) Repeat steps k) to n) until the specified cards have been cleared.</p> <p>p) Press <b>CLR</b> to return to the main menu <b>"Secured"</b>.</p> <p>IW records which cards were used below. Each card is returned to its designated card holder after use.</p> <p>Set # 1                      1<sup>st</sup> SO card <u>5</u> of 7                      2<sup>nd</sup> SO card <u>1</u> of 7                      3<sup>rd</sup> SO card <u>6</u> of 7</p> <p><b>Note: If a card is unreadable, gently wipe its metal contacts and try again. For a summary of card roles and their purpose see Appendix A number [14].</b></p>	M	19:32
2	<p>CA uses the shredder to destroy the cleared OP and SO cards. Use scissors to slice through the center of the chip before inserting cards into the shredder.</p>	M	19:41

## Act 5: Issue Temporary Adapter Authorization Key (AAK) Cards

When a ceremony includes the introduction of a new HSM, it is necessary to generate temporary AAK cards to allow existing CO credentials perform signing and administrative operations in the new HSM. These temporary cards will be used and subsequently destroyed before the completion of the ceremony.

Note: For a summary of card roles and their purpose see Appendix A number [14].

### Issue Temporary Adapter Authorization Key (AAK) Cards

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
1	<p>CA performs the following steps to issue temporary Adapter Authorization Key (AAK) cards:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) CA selects the <b>HSM Output</b> terminal window.</li> <li>b) Utilize the HSM's keyboard to scroll through the menu using &lt; &gt;</li> <li>c) Select <b>"7.Role Mgmt"</b>, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>d) When <b>"Insert Card SO #X?"</b> is displayed, insert the SO card.</li> <li>e) When <b>"PIN?"</b> is displayed, enter <b>"11223344"</b>, then press <b>ENT</b>.</li> <li>f) When <b>"Remove Card?"</b> is displayed, remove the SO card.</li> <li>g) Repeat steps d) to f) for the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> SO card.</li> <li>h) Select <b>"3.Backup AAK"</b>, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>i) When <b>"Backup AAK?"</b> is displayed, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>j) When <b>"Num Cards?"</b> is displayed, enter <b>"2"</b>, then press <b>ENT</b>.</li> <li>k) When <b>"Insert Card #X?"</b> is displayed, insert the required AAK card.</li> <li>l) When <b>"Remove Card?"</b> is displayed, remove the AAK card.</li> <li>m) Repeat steps k) to l) for the 2<sup>nd</sup> AAK card.</li> <li>n) When <b>"Done AAK"</b> is displayed, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>o) Press <b>CLR</b> to return to the menu <b>"Secured"</b>.</li> </ul> <p>IW records which cards were used below. Each card is returned to its designated card holder after use.</p> <p>Set # 1</p> <p>1<sup>st</sup> SO card <u>2</u> of 7</p> <p>2<sup>nd</sup> SO card <u>4</u> of 7</p> <p>3<sup>rd</sup> SO card <u>1</u> of 7</p> <p>Note: If a card is unreadable, gently wipe its metal contacts and try again. For a summary of card roles and their purpose see Appendix A number [14].</p>		<p>19:45</p>



## Place the HSM (Tier 7) into a TEB

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
2	CA switches the HSM power to OFF, then disconnects the power, serial, and ethernet connections. <b>Note: DO NOT unplug the cable connections on the laptop.</b>	<i>M</i>	19:47
3	CA places the HSM into its designated new TEB, then seals it.	<i>M</i>	19:48
4	CA performs the following steps: a) Read aloud the TEB number and HSM serial number, then show it to the audit camera above for participants to see. b) Confirm with IW that the TEB number and HSM serial number match below. c) Initial the TEB along with IW using a ballpoint pen. d) Give IW the sealing strips for post-ceremony inventory. e) Place the HSM TEB on the cart.  <b>HSM5E: TEB # BB51184250 / Serial # H1903018</b>	<i>M</i>	19:49

## Act 6: Introduce New HSM

The CA will introduce a new HSM by performing the following steps:

- Verify new HSM serial number
- Import the Adapter Authorization Key (AAK)
- Configure the HSM to a secure state
- Change and verify API settings
- Import Storage Master Key (SMK)
- Import App Key (KSK)
- Verify connectivity, activate, and initialize HSM
- Destroy temporary AAK cards


### HSM7E (Tier 7) Setup

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
1	<p>CA performs the following steps to prepare the HSM:</p> <p>a) Remove the TEB from the cart and place it on the ceremony table.</p> <p>b) Inspect the TEB for tamper evidence.</p> <p>c) Read aloud the TEB number and the serial number while IW verifies the information using the previous ceremony script where it was last used.</p> <p>d) Remove and discard the TEB, then place the equipment on its designated area of the ceremony table.</p> <p><b>HSM7E: TEB # BB51184253 / Serial # H2110009</b> Last Verified: AT Ceremony 51 2023-11-29</p> <p>Note: "Last verified" indicates the last time a piece of equipment was placed in a new TEB during a ceremony. It is listed here for audit tracking purposes.</p>	M	19:51

### Power ON the HSM7E (Tier 7)

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
2	CA selects the <b>HSM Output</b> terminal window.	M	19:51
3	<p>CA performs the following steps to prepare the HSM:</p> <p>a) Verify the label on the HSM reads <b>HSM7E</b>.</p> <p>b) Plug the null modem cable into the serial port of the HSM.</p> <p>c) Connect the power to the HSM, then switch it ON. Note: Status information should appear in the HSM output logging screen.</p> <p>d) Scroll up on the logging screen while IW verifies the displayed HSM serial number on the screen reads <b>H2110009</b>.</p> <p>e) Scroll down to the end of the logging screen.</p> <p>f) After the completion of the HSM self test the display should say <b>"Important Read Manual"</b> indicating the HSM is in the initialized state.</p> <p>Note: The date and time on the HSM is not used as a reference for logging and timestamp.</p>	M	19:53

## Import the AAK

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
4	<p>CA performs the following steps to import the Adapter Authorization Key (AAK):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Utilize the HSM's keyboard to scroll through the menu using &lt; &gt;</li> <li>b) Select "<b>2.Restore AAK</b>", press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>c) When "<b>Restore AAK?</b>" is displayed, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>d) When "<b>Insert Card #X?</b>" is displayed, insert the required AAK card and press <b>ENT</b>.</li> <li>e) When "<b>Remove Card?</b>" is displayed, remove the AAK card.</li> <li>f) Repeat steps d) to e) for the 2<sup>nd</sup> AAK card.</li> <li>g) When "<b>Done AAK Imported</b>" is displayed, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> </ul> <p>Each card is returned to its designated card holder after use.</p> <p><b>Note:</b> If a card is unreadable, gently wipe its metal contacts and try again. For a summary of card roles and their purpose see Appendix A number [14].</p>		<p>19:54</p>

## Configure the HSM to Secure State

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
5	<p>CA performs the following steps, ensuring that three cards from only one of the two SO card sets are utilized to configure the HSM to secure state:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Utilize the HSM's keyboard to scroll through the menu using &lt; &gt;</li> <li>b) Select <b>"3.Secure"</b>, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>c) When <b>"Secure?"</b> is displayed, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>d) When <b>"Insert Card SO #X?"</b> is displayed, insert the SO card.</li> <li>e) When <b>"PIN?"</b> is displayed, enter <b>"11223344"</b>, then press <b>ENT</b>.</li> <li>f) When <b>"Remove Card?"</b> is displayed, remove the SO card.</li> <li>g) Repeat steps d) to f) for the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> SO cards.</li> <li>h) When <b>"SMK AES Triple DES?"</b> is displayed, press <b>CLR</b> to skip.</li> <li>i) When <b>"SMK AES"</b> is displayed, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>j) When <b>"LAN Port Number?"</b> is displayed, press <b>CLR</b> to skip.</li> <li>k) When <b>"Enable IPv4/IPv6?"</b> is displayed, press <b>CLR</b> to skip.</li> <li>l) When <b>"LAN IPv4 Address?"</b> is displayed, press <b>CLR</b> to skip.</li> <li>m) When <b>"LAN IPv4 Mask?"</b> is displayed, press <b>CLR</b> to skip.</li> <li>n) When <b>"Set IPv4 Gateway?"</b> is displayed, press <b>CLR</b> to skip.</li> <li>o) When <b>"LAN IPv6 Address?"</b> is displayed, press <b>CLR</b> to skip.</li> <li>p) When <b>"LAN IPv6 Mask?"</b> is displayed, press <b>CLR</b> to skip.</li> <li>q) When <b>"Set IPv6 Gateway?"</b> is displayed, press <b>CLR</b> to skip.</li> <li>r) When <b>"Remote Mgmt Off Enable?"</b> is displayed, press <b>CLR</b> to skip.</li> <li>s) When <b>"Remote Mgmt Off"</b> is displayed, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>t) When <b>"Change Clock?"</b> is displayed, press <b>CLR</b> to skip.</li> <li>u) When <b>"Import Config?"</b> is displayed, press <b>CLR</b> to skip.</li> <li>v) When <b>"FIPS Mode On Disable?"</b> is displayed, press <b>CLR</b> to skip.</li> <li>w) When <b>"FIPS Mode On"</b> is displayed, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>x) When <b>"Global Key Export Enabled"</b> is displayed, press <b>CLR</b> to skip.</li> </ul> <p><b>Done Rebooting Device</b> will be displayed.</p> <p>IW records which cards were used below. Each card is returned to its designated card holder after use.</p> <p>Set # 1            1<sup>st</sup> SO card <u>4</u> of 7            2<sup>nd</sup> SO card <u>5</u> of 7            3<sup>rd</sup> SO card <u>2</u> of 7</p> <p><b>Note:</b> If a card is unreadable, gently wipe its metal contacts and try again.            For a summary of card roles and their purpose see Appendix A number [14].</p>	M	19:57

## Change the API Settings

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
6	<p>CA performs the following steps to change the API settings:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Utilize the HSM's keyboard to scroll through the menu using &lt; &gt;</li> <li>b) Select <b>"5.Key Mgmt"</b>, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>c) When <b>"Insert CO Card #X?"</b> is displayed, insert the CO card.</li> <li>d) When <b>"PIN?"</b> is displayed, enter <b>"11223344"</b>, then press <b>ENT</b>.</li> <li>e) When <b>"Remove Card?"</b> is displayed, remove the CO card.</li> <li>f) Repeat steps c) to e) for the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> CO card.</li> <li>g) Select <b>"5. API Settings"</b>, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>h) Select <b>"1.Key Import"</b>, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>i) When <b>"Key Import On Disable?"</b> is displayed, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>j) Select <b>"2.Key Export"</b>, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>k) When <b>"Key Export On Disable?"</b> is displayed, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>l) Select <b>"5.Sym Key Der"</b>, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>m) When <b>"Sym Key Der On Disable?"</b> is displayed, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>n) Press <b>CLR twice</b> to return to the main menu <b>"Secured"</b>.</li> </ul> <p>IW records which cards were used below. Each card is returned to its designated card holder after use.</p> <p>Set # 1</p> <p>1<sup>st</sup> CO card <u>1</u> of 7</p> <p>2<sup>nd</sup> CO card <u>4</u> of 7</p> <p>3<sup>rd</sup> CO card <u>5</u> of 7</p> <p>Note: If a card is unreadable, gently wipe its metal contacts and try again. For a summary of card roles and their purpose see Appendix A number [14].</p>	<p><i>dm</i></p>	<p>20:00</p>

## Verify API Settings

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
7	<p>CA performs the following steps to dump the status of the HSM:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Utilize the HSM's keyboard to scroll through the menu using &lt;&gt;</li> <li>b) Select "4.HSM Info", press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>c) Select "8.Output Info", press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>d) When "Output Info?" is displayed, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>e) Press <b>CLR</b> to return to the main menu "Secured".</li> </ul> <p>CA selects the <b>HSM Output</b> terminal window and scrolls up to confirm with IW the output of the HSM configuration matches with the list below:</p> <pre> Modes: (1=Enabled 0=Disabled) Global Key Export 1 App Key Import 0 App Key Export 0 Asymmetric Key Gen 1 Symmetric Key Gen 1 Symmetric Key Derive 0 Signing 1 Signature Verify 1 MAC Generation 1 MAC Verification 1 Encrypt / Decrypt 1 Delete Asym Key 1 Delete Sym Key 1 Output Key Details 1 Output Key Summary 1 Suite B Algorithms 1 Non Suite B Algs 1 Auto Online 0 Remote Management 0 AES SMK Set Offline FIPS Mode                     </pre>	<p><i>CA</i></p>	<p>20:02</p>

## App Key Backups

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
8	<p>CA performs the following steps to prepare the App key backups:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Remove the TEB from the cart and place it on the ceremony table.</li> <li>b) Inspect the TEB for tamper evidence.</li> <li>c) Read aloud the TEB number while IW verifies the information using the previous ceremony script where it was last used.</li> <li>d) Remove and discard the TEB, then place the App key cards and the backup HSMFD on its designated area of the ceremony table.</li> <li>e) If not already present, place corresponding labels on the APP key plastic case and ensure their respective HSMFDs remain in the plastic case.</li> </ul> <p><b>KSK-2017: TEB # BB46584614</b>                      Last Verified: KSK Ceremony 43 2021-10-14  <b>KSK-2023: TEB # BB02638526</b>                      Last Verified: KSK Ceremony 49 2023-04-27</p> <p><b>Note: "Last verified" indicates the last time a piece of equipment was placed in a new TEB during a ceremony. It is listed here for audit tracking purposes.</b></p>	<p><i>M</i></p>	<p>20:08</p>

## Import the SMK and the KSK

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
9	<p>CA performs the following steps to access the Key Management menu:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Utilize the HSM's keyboard to scroll through the menu using &lt; &gt;</li> <li>b) Select "<b>5.Key Mgmt</b>", press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>c) When "<b>Insert CO Card #X?</b>" is displayed, insert the CO card.</li> <li>d) When "<b>PIN?</b>" is displayed, enter "<b>11223344</b>", then press <b>ENT</b>.</li> <li>e) When "<b>Remove Card?</b>" is displayed, remove the CO card.</li> <li>f) Repeat steps c) to e) for the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> CO card.</li> </ul> <p>IW records which cards were used below. Each card is returned to its designated card holder after use.</p> <p>Set # 1</p> <p>1<sup>st</sup> CO card <u>2</u> of 7</p> <p>2<sup>nd</sup> CO card <u>6</u> of 7</p> <p>3<sup>rd</sup> CO card <u>1</u> of 7</p> <p><b>Note:</b> If a card is unreadable, gently wipe its metal contacts and try again. For a summary of card roles and their purpose see Appendix A number [14].</p>	<p><i>M</i></p>	<p>20:10</p>

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
10	<p>CA performs the following steps to import the SMK:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Utilize the HSM's keyboard to scroll through the menu using &lt; &gt;</li> <li>Select "<b>4.SMK</b>" from the current "<b>Key Mgmt</b>" menu, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>Select "<b>3.Restore SMK</b>", press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>When "<b>Restore SMK?</b>" is displayed, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>When "<b>Insert Card SMK #X?</b>" is displayed, insert the SMK card.</li> <li>When "<b>Remove Card?</b>" is displayed, remove the SMK card.</li> <li>Repeat steps e) to f) for the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> SMK card.</li> <li>When "<b>SMK Restored</b>" is displayed, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>Press <b>CLR</b> once to return to the menu "<b>Key Mgmt</b>".</li> </ol> <p>IW records which cards were used below. Each card is returned to its designated card holder after use.</p> <p>Set # 1</p> <p>1<sup>st</sup> SMK card <u>6</u> of 7</p> <p>2<sup>nd</sup> SMK card <u>4</u> of 7</p> <p>3<sup>rd</sup> SMK card <u>5</u> of 7</p> <p>Note: If a card is unreadable, gently wipe its metal contacts and try again. For a summary of card roles and their purpose see Appendix A number [14].</p>	M	20:12
11	<p>CA performs the following steps to import KSK:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Utilize the HSM's keyboard to scroll through the menu using &lt; &gt;</li> <li>Select "<b>3.App Keys</b>" from the current "<b>Key Mgmt</b>" menu, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>Select "<b>2.Restore</b>", press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>When "<b>Restore?</b>" is displayed, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>When "<b>Which Media?</b>" is displayed, select "<b>2. From Card</b>", press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>When "<b>Insert Card #X?</b>" is displayed, insert the required KSK card.</li> <li>When "<b>Remove Card?</b>" is displayed, remove the KSK card.</li> <li>When "<b>Restore Complete</b>" is displayed, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>Repeat steps c) to h) for any remaining App Key card listed below.</li> <li>Press <b>CLR twice</b> to return to the main menu "<b>Secured</b>".</li> </ol> <p>CA uses the card listed below. Card is returned to its designated card holder after use.</p> <p><b>KSK-2017: Klajeyz</b> App Key card # 1</p> <p><b>KSK-2023: Kmrfl3b</b> App Key card # 1</p> <p>Note: If a card is unreadable, gently wipe its metal contacts and try again. For a summary of card roles and their purpose see Appendix A number [14].</p>	M	20:14



## Enable/Activate the HSM (Tier 7)

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
12	<p>CA performs the following steps to activate the HSM:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Utilize the HSM's keyboard to scroll through the menu using &lt; &gt;</li> <li>b) Select "<b>1.Set Online</b>", press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>c) When "<b>Set Online?</b>" is displayed, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>d) When "<b>Insert Card OP #X?</b>" is displayed, insert the OP card.</li> <li>e) When "<b>PIN?</b>" is displayed, enter "<b>11223344</b>", then press <b>ENT</b>.</li> <li>f) When "<b>Remove Card?</b>" is displayed, remove the OP card.</li> <li>g) Repeat steps d) to f) for the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> OP cards.</li> </ul> <p>Confirm the "<b>READY</b>" LED on the <b>HSM</b> is <b>ON</b>. IW records which cards were used below. Each card is returned to its designated card holder after use.</p> <p>Set # 1</p> <p>1<sup>st</sup> OP card <u>1</u> of 7 2<sup>nd</sup> OP card <u>5</u> of 7 3<sup>rd</sup> OP card <u>2</u> of 7</p> <p>Note: If a card is unreadable, gently wipe its metal contacts and try again. For a summary of card roles and their purpose see Appendix A number [14].</p>	M	20:16

## Check the Network Connectivity Between Laptop and HSM

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
13	CA connects the HSM to the laptop using an ethernet cable in the LAN ports.	M	20:16
14	<p>CA performs the following steps to test the network connectivity between laptop and HSM:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Use the <b>Commands</b> terminal window</li> <li>b) Test connectivity by executing: <code>ping hsm</code></li> <li>c) Wait for responses, then exit by pressing: <code>Ctrl + C</code></li> </ul>	M	20:16

## Execute the KSR Signer for KSR 2024 Q1

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
15	CA executes the command below in the terminal window to change directory: <code>cd HSM7E/</code>	M	20:17
16	CA executes the command below in the terminal window to sign the KSR file: <code>kskm-ksrsigner</code>	M	20:17

Loaded configuration from file ksrsigner.yaml SHA-256 432a513b007acc8ae97057bccefca01f36dd334d00e7cac 0462df3abc3a69388 WORDS crucial chambermaid drunken councilman aardvark infancy spigot maverick tread mill hesitate eightball pyramid spyglass Wilmington ragtime businessman Christmas tambourine chisel disruptive aardvark truncated spellbind recipe cubic clergyman upset Pegasus snowcap paragon playhouse maritime

Configuration validated

Loaded SKR from file skr-root-2023-q4-0.xml SHA-256 7d8087f4bdaf0c70f264a881eb07ec16ael5d8fb3764f05a9 ff119e6cc5aed49 WORDS klaxon intention Neptune Virginia skullcap pharmacy ammo hesitate uproot getaway retouch inventive trouble amusement tumor bodyguard robust bifocals stormy Wichita clamshell getaway unearth existence quota vacancy bedlamp trombonist spigot existence tunnel dinosaur

Previous SKR:

#	Inception	Expiration	ZSK Tags	KSK (CKA_LABEL)
1	2023-10-01T00:00:00	2023-10-22T00:00:00	46780,11019	20326(Klajeyz)/S
2	2023-10-11T00:00:00	2023-11-01T00:00:00	46780	20326(Klajeyz)/S
3	2023-10-21T00:00:00	2023-11-11T00:00:00	46780	20326(Klajeyz)/S
4	2023-10-31T00:00:00	2023-11-21T00:00:00	46780	20326(Klajeyz)/S
5	2023-11-10T00:00:00	2023-12-01T00:00:00	46780	20326(Klajeyz)/S
6	2023-11-20T00:00:00	2023-12-11T00:00:00	46780	20326(Klajeyz)/S
7	2023-11-30T00:00:00	2023-12-21T00:00:00	46780	20326(Klajeyz)/S
8	2023-12-10T00:00:00	2023-12-31T00:00:00	46780	20326(Klajeyz)/S
9	2023-12-20T00:00:00	2024-01-10T00:00:00	46780,30903	20326(Klajeyz)/S

Loaded KSR from file ksr-root-2024-q1-0.xml SHA-256 d31f96ec28d5296641aad3bcd5fec3675f9e7675a074032be83ab9070232af5 WORDS stapler businessman prefer unicorn breadline specialist breakup gossamer cranky pedigree stapler pyramid tunnel forever tumor congregate indulge Waterloo transit graduate enlist amusement crackdown component skydive Jamaica rhythm millionaire guidance cannonball brickyard visitor

Validating KSR using request policy:

```

_dataclass_placeholder: None
acceptable_domains: ['.']
approved_algorithms: ['RSASHA256']
check_bundle_intervals: True
check_bundle_overlap: True
check_chain_keys: True
check_chain_keys_in_hsm: True
check_chain_overlap: True
check_cycle_length: True
check_keys_match_ksk_operator_policy: True
check_keys_publish_safety: True
check_keys_retire_safety: True
dns_ttl: 172800
enable_unsupported_ecdsa: False
keys_match_zsk_policy: True
max_bundle_interval: 11 days, 0:00:00
max_cycle_inception_length: 81 days, 0:00:00
min_bundle_interval: 9 days, 0:00:00
min_cycle_inception_length: 79 days, 0:00:00
num_bundles: 9
num_different_keys_in_all_bundles: 3
num_keys_per_bundle: [2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2]
rsa_approved_exponents: [65537]
rsa_approved_key_sizes: [2048]
rsa_exponent_match_zsk_policy: True
signature_algorithms_match_zsk_policy: True
signature_check_expire_horizon: True
signature_horizon_days: 180
signature_validity_match_zsk_policy: True
validate_signatures: True

```

KSR-DOMAIN: Verified domain '.'

KSR-ID: Will be checked later, when SKR is available

KSR-BUNDLE-UNIQUE: All 9 bundles have unique ids

KSR-BUNDLE-KEYS: All 3 unique keys in the bundles accepted by policy

KSR-BUNDLE-POP: All 9 bundles contain proof-of-possession

KSR-BUNDLE-COUNT: Number of bundles (9) accepted

KSR-BUNDLE-CYCLE-DURATION: The cycle length is in accordance with the KSK operator policy

KSR-POLICY-KEYS: Validated number of keys per bundle, and for all bundles

KSR-POLICY-ALG: All 1 ZSK operator signature algorithms accepted by policy

KSR-POLICY-SIG-OVERLAP: All bundles overlap in accordance with the stated ZSK operator policy

KSR-POLICY-SIG-VALIDITY: All 9 bundles have 21 days <= validity >= 21 days

KSR-POLICY-SIG-HORIZON: All signatures expire in less than 180 days

KSR-POLICY-BUNDLE-INTERVALS: All bundles intervals in accordance with the KSK operator policy

Request:

#	Inception	Expiration	ZSK Tags	KSK (CKA_LABEL)
1	2024-01-01T00:00:00	2024-01-22T00:00:00	46780,30903	
2	2024-01-11T00:00:00	2024-02-01T00:00:00	30903	
3	2024-01-21T00:00:00	2024-02-11T00:00:00	30903	
4	2024-01-31T00:00:00	2024-02-21T00:00:00	30903	

```

5 2024-02-10T00:00:00 2024-03-02T00:00:00 30903
6 2024-02-20T00:00:00 2024-03-12T00:00:00 30903
7 2024-03-01T00:00:00 2024-03-22T00:00:00 30903
8 2024-03-11T00:00:00 2024-04-01T00:00:00 30903
9 2024-03-21T00:00:00 2024-04-11T00:00:00 5613,30903

```

Initializing PKCS#11 module aep using /opt/Keyper/PKCS11Provider/pkcs11.linux\_gcc\_4\_1\_2\_glibc\_2\_5\_x86\_64.so.5.02

```

HSM First slot:      ICANNKSK
HSM ManufacturerID: Ultra Electronics AEP Networks
HSM Model:          Keyper 9860-2
HSM Serial:         H2110009

```

Checking coherence between SKR(n-1) and this KSR

KSR-CHAIN-KEYS: The last keys in SKR(n-1) matches the first keys in this KSR

KSR-CHAIN-OVERLAP: Overlap with last bundle in SKR(n-1) 9 days is in accordance with the KSR policy

KSR-CHAIN-KEYS: All 1 signatures in the last bundle of the last SKR were made with keys present in the HSM(s)

KSR-POLICY-SAFETY: PublishSafety validated

KSR-POLICY-SAFETY: RetireSafety validated

Generated SKR:

#	Inception	Expiration	ZSK Tags	KSK(CKA_LABEL)
1	2024-01-01T00:00:00	2024-01-22T00:00:00	46780,30903	20326(Klajeyz)/S
2	2024-01-11T00:00:00	2024-02-01T00:00:00	30903	20326(Klajeyz)/S
3	2024-01-21T00:00:00	2024-02-11T00:00:00	30903	20326(Klajeyz)/S
4	2024-01-31T00:00:00	2024-02-21T00:00:00	30903	20326(Klajeyz)/S
5	2024-02-10T00:00:00	2024-03-02T00:00:00	30903	20326(Klajeyz)/S
6	2024-02-20T00:00:00	2024-03-12T00:00:00	30903	20326(Klajeyz)/S
7	2024-03-01T00:00:00	2024-03-22T00:00:00	30903	20326(Klajeyz)/S
8	2024-03-11T00:00:00	2024-04-01T00:00:00	30903	20326(Klajeyz)/S
9	2024-03-21T00:00:00	2024-04-11T00:00:00	5613,30903	20326(Klajeyz)/S

Wrote SKR to file HSM7E-skr-root-2024-q1-0.xml SHA-256 0f2922c76d8ac758dedff603d0c2e44e13369c1938d56ef7509425abf8f0b48f WORDS artist certify blockade retraction goggles maverick soybean everyday tactics therapist village aggregate stagnate repellent tonic distortion Aztec congregate python bottomless classic specialist goldfish voyager drumbeat molecule bombast Pegasus Vulcan upcoming scenic midsummer

## Verify the KSR Hash for KSR 2024 Q1

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
17	The CA asks some participants to compare the hash in the email sent by the RZM representative prior to the ceremony and some participants to compare the hash in the terminal window, then asks the RZM representative to read aloud the PGP word list SHA-256 hash of the KSR file being used.	M	20:19
18	Participants confirm that the hash matches with the RZM representative's discourse, then CA asks "are there any objections?"	M	20:19
19	CA enters <b>Yes</b> in response to "Sign KSR?" to complete the KSR signing operation. The SKR is located in: /media/KSRFD/KSK51/HSM7E/HSM7E-skr-root-2024-q1-0.xml	M	20:19

## Print Copies of the KSR Signer log

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
20	CA executes the commands below using the terminal window to print the KSR Signer log: a) <code>printlog kskm-ksrsigner-202311*.log X</code> Note: Replace "X" with the amount of copies needed for the participants.	M	20:21
21	IW attaches a copy of the required ksr signer log to their script.	M	20:21

## SKR Comparison

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
22	CA executes the command below to display the XSL style sheet content: <code>cat style.xml</code>	M	20:22
23	CA executes the commands below using the terminal window to compare the SKRs: a) <code>xsltproc style.xml ../skr-root-2024-q1-0.xml   xmllint --format - &gt; current</code> b) <code>xsltproc style.xml HSM7E-skr-root-2024-q1-0.xml   xmllint --format - &gt; new</code> c) <code>diff -wu current new</code>	M	20:23
24	CA executes the command below in the terminal window to change directory: <code>cd ..</code>	M	20:23

## Disable/Deactivate the HSM (Tier 7)

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
25	<p>CA deactivates the HSM by performing the following steps:  <b>Note: CA will use OP cards not previously utilized in this ceremony if available.</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>CA selects the <b>HSM Output</b> terminal window.</li> <li>Utilize the HSM's keyboard to scroll through the menu using &lt; &gt;</li> <li>Select "<b>2.Set Offline</b>", press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>When "<b>Set Offline?</b>" is displayed, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>When "<b>Insert Card OP #X?</b>" is displayed, insert the OP card from the card holder.</li> <li>When "<b>PIN?</b>" is displayed, enter "<b>11223344</b>", then press <b>ENT</b>.</li> <li>When "<b>Remove Card?</b>" is displayed, remove the OP card.</li> <li>Repeat steps e) to g) for the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> OP cards.</li> </ol> <p>Confirm the "<b>READY</b>" LED on the <b>HSM</b> is <b>OFF</b>.                      IW records which cards were used below. Each card is returned to its designated card holder after use.</p> <p>Set # 1</p> <p>1<sup>st</sup> OP card <u>5</u> of 7                      2<sup>nd</sup> OP card <u>6</u> of 7                      3<sup>rd</sup> OP card <u>2</u> of 7</p> <p><b>Note: If a card is unreadable, gently wipe its metal contacts and try again.                      For a summary of card roles and their purpose see Appendix A number [14].</b></p>	M	20:25

## Place the HSM (Tier 7) into a TEB

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
26	<p>CA switches the HSM power to OFF, then disconnects the power, serial, and ethernet connections.  <b>Note: DO NOT unplug the cable connections on the laptop.</b></p>	M	20:26
27	<p>CA places the HSM into its designated new TEB, then seals it.</p>	M	20:27
28	<p>CA performs the following steps:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Read aloud the TEB number and HSM serial number, then show it to the audit camera above for participants to see.</li> <li>Confirm with IW that the TEB number and HSM serial number match below.</li> <li>Initial the TEB along with IW using a ballpoint pen.</li> <li>Give IW the sealing strips for post-ceremony inventory.</li> <li>Place the HSM TEB on the cart.</li> </ol> <p><b>HSM7E: TEB # BB51184251 / Serial # H2110009</b></p>	M	20:28

## HSM8E (Tier 7) Setup

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
29	<p>CA performs the following steps to prepare the HSM:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Remove the TEB from the cart and place it on the ceremony table.</li> <li>b) Inspect the TEB for tamper evidence.</li> <li>c) Read aloud the TEB number and the serial number while IW verifies the information using the previous ceremony script where it was last used.</li> <li>d) Remove and discard the TEB, then place the equipment on its designated area of the ceremony table.</li> </ul> <p><b>HSM8E: TEB # BB51184254 / Serial # H2110010</b> Last Verified: AT Ceremony 51 2023-11-29</p> <p>Note: "Last verified" indicates the last time a piece of equipment was placed in a new TEB during a ceremony. It is listed here for audit tracking purposes.</p>	<i>M</i>	20:30

## Power ON the HSM8E (Tier 7)

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
30	CA selects the <b>HSM Output</b> terminal window.	<i>M</i>	20:30
31	<p>CA performs the following steps to prepare the HSM:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Verify the label on the HSM reads <b>HSM8E</b>.</li> <li>b) Plug the null modem cable into the serial port of the HSM.</li> <li>c) Connect the power to the HSM, then switch it ON.</li> </ul> <p>Note: Status information should appear in the HSM output logging screen.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>d) Scroll up on the logging screen while IW verifies the displayed HSM serial number on the screen reads <b>H2110010</b>.</li> <li>e) Scroll down to the end of the logging screen.</li> <li>f) After the completion of the HSM self test the display should say <b>"Important Read Manual"</b> indicating the HSM is in the initialized state.</li> </ul> <p>Note: The date and time on the HSM is not used as a reference for logging and timestamp.</p>	<i>M</i>	20:31

## Import the AAK

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
32	<p>CA performs the following steps to import the Adapter Authorization Key (AAK):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Utilize the HSM's keyboard to scroll through the menu using &lt;&gt;</li> <li>b) Select <b>"2.Restore AAK"</b>, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>c) When <b>"Restore AAK?"</b> is displayed, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>d) When <b>"Insert Card #X?"</b> is displayed, insert the required AAK card and press <b>ENT</b>.</li> <li>e) When <b>"Remove Card?"</b> is displayed, remove the AAK card.</li> <li>f) Repeat steps d) to e) for the 2<sup>nd</sup> AAK card. <i>2 of 2 lot 2</i></li> <li>g) When <b>"Done AAK Imported"</b> is displayed, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> </ul> <p>Each card is returned to its designated card holder after use.</p> <p>Note: If a card is unreadable, gently wipe its metal contacts and try again. For a summary of card roles and their purpose see Appendix A number [14].</p>	<i>M</i>	20:32

## Configure the HSM to Secure State

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
33	<p>CA performs the following steps, ensuring that three cards from only one of the two SO card sets are utilized to configure the HSM to secure state:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Utilize the HSM's keyboard to scroll through the menu using &lt; &gt;</li> <li>b) Select <b>"3.Secure"</b>, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>c) When <b>"Secure?"</b> is displayed, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>d) When <b>"Insert Card SO #X?"</b> is displayed, insert the SO card.</li> <li>e) When <b>"PIN?"</b> is displayed, enter <b>"11223344"</b>, then press <b>ENT</b>.</li> <li>f) When <b>"Remove Card?"</b> is displayed, remove the SO card.</li> <li>g) Repeat steps d) to f) for the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> SO cards.</li> <li>h) When <b>"SMK AES Triple DES?"</b> is displayed, press <b>CLR</b> to skip.</li> <li>i) When <b>"SMK AES"</b> is displayed, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>j) When <b>"LAN Port Number?"</b> is displayed, press <b>CLR</b> to skip.</li> <li>k) When <b>"Enable IPv4/IPv6?"</b> is displayed, press <b>CLR</b> to skip.</li> <li>l) When <b>"LAN IPv4 Address?"</b> is displayed, press <b>CLR</b> to skip.</li> <li>m) When <b>"LAN IPv4 Mask?"</b> is displayed, press <b>CLR</b> to skip.</li> <li>n) When <b>"Set IPv4 Gateway?"</b> is displayed, press <b>CLR</b> to skip.</li> <li>o) When <b>"LAN IPv6 Address?"</b> is displayed, press <b>CLR</b> to skip.</li> <li>p) When <b>"LAN IPv6 Mask?"</b> is displayed, press <b>CLR</b> to skip.</li> <li>q) When <b>"Set IPv6 Gateway?"</b> is displayed, press <b>CLR</b> to skip.</li> <li>r) When <b>"Remote Mgmt Off Enable?"</b> is displayed, press <b>CLR</b> to skip.</li> <li>s) When <b>"Remote Mgmt Off"</b> is displayed, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>t) When <b>"Change Clock?"</b> is displayed, press <b>CLR</b> to skip.</li> <li>u) When <b>"Import Config?"</b> is displayed, press <b>CLR</b> to skip.</li> <li>v) When <b>"FIPS Mode On Disable?"</b> is displayed, press <b>CLR</b> to skip.</li> <li>w) When <b>"FIPS Mode On"</b> is displayed, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>x) When <b>"Global Key Export Enabled"</b> is displayed, press <b>CLR</b> to skip.</li> </ul> <p><b>Done Rebooting Device</b> will be displayed.</p> <p>IW records which cards were used below. Each card is returned to its designated card holder after use.</p> <p>Set # 1            1<sup>st</sup> SO card <u>5</u> of 7            2<sup>nd</sup> SO card <u>1</u> of 7            3<sup>rd</sup> SO card <u>6</u> of 7</p> <p><b>Note:</b> If a card is unreadable, gently wipe its metal contacts and try again.            For a summary of card roles and their purpose see Appendix A number [14].</p>	M	20:35

## Change the API Settings

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
34	<p>CA performs the following steps to change the API settings:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Utilize the HSM's keyboard to scroll through the menu using &lt; &gt;</li> <li>b) Select <b>"5.Key Mgmt"</b>, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>c) When <b>"Insert CO Card #X?"</b> is displayed, insert the CO card.</li> <li>d) When <b>"PIN?"</b> is displayed, enter <b>"11223344"</b>, then press <b>ENT</b>.</li> <li>e) When <b>"Remove Card?"</b> is displayed, remove the CO card.</li> <li>f) Repeat steps c) to e) for the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> CO card.</li> <li>g) Select <b>"5. API Settings"</b>, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>h) Select <b>"1.Key Import"</b>, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>i) When <b>"Key Import On Disable?"</b> is displayed, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>j) Select <b>"2.Key Export"</b>, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>k) When <b>"Key Export On Disable?"</b> is displayed, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>l) Select <b>"5.Sym Key Der"</b>, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>m) When <b>"Sym Key Der On Disable?"</b> is displayed, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>n) Press <b>CLR twice</b> to return to the main menu <b>"Secured"</b>.</li> </ul> <p>IW records which cards were used below. Each card is returned to its designated card holder after use.</p> <p>Set # 1</p> <p>1<sup>st</sup> CO card <u>1</u> of 7</p> <p>2<sup>nd</sup> CO card <u>4</u> of 7</p> <p>3<sup>rd</sup> CO card <u>5</u> of 7</p> <p><b>Note:</b> If a card is unreadable, gently wipe its metal contacts and try again. For a summary of card roles and their purpose see Appendix A number [14].</p>	<p><i>M</i></p>	<p>20:32</p>



## Verify API Settings

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
35	<p>CA performs the following steps to dump the status of the HSM:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Utilize the HSM's keyboard to scroll through the menu using &lt; &gt;</li> <li>Select <b>"4.HSM Info"</b>, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>Select <b>"8.Output Info"</b>, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>When <b>"Output Info?"</b> is displayed, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>Press <b>CLR</b> to return to the main menu <b>"Secured"</b>.</li> </ol> <p>CA selects the <b>HSM Output</b> terminal window and scrolls up to confirm with IW the output of the HSM configuration matches with the list below:</p> <pre>Modes: (1=Enabled 0=Disabled) Global Key Export 1 App Key Import 0 App Key Export 0 Asymmetric Key Gen 1 Symmetric Key Gen 1 Symmetric Key Derive 0 Signing 1 Signature Verify 1 MAC Generation 1 MAC Verification 1 Encrypt / Decrypt 1 Delete Asym Key 1 Delete Sym Key 1 Output Key Details 1 Output Key Summary 1 Suite B Algorithms 1 Non Suite B Algs 1 Auto Online 0 Remote Management 0 AES SMK Set Offline FIPS Mode</pre>	M	20:38

## Import the SMK and the KSK

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
36	<p>CA performs the following steps to access the Key Management menu:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Utilize the HSM's keyboard to scroll through the menu using &lt; &gt;</li> <li>Select <b>"5.Key Mgmt"</b>, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>When <b>"Insert CO Card #X?"</b> is displayed, insert the CO card.</li> <li>When <b>"PIN?"</b> is displayed, enter <b>"11223344"</b>, then press <b>ENT</b>.</li> <li>When <b>"Remove Card?"</b> is displayed, remove the CO card.</li> <li>Repeat steps c) to e) for the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> CO card.</li> </ol> <p>IW records which cards were used below. Each card is returned to its designated card holder after use.</p> <pre>Set # 1 1<sup>st</sup> CO card <u>5</u> of 7 2<sup>nd</sup> CO card <u>2</u> of 7 3<sup>rd</sup> CO card <u>4</u> of 7</pre> <p>Note: If a card is unreadable, gently wipe its metal contacts and try again. For a summary of card roles and their purpose see Appendix A number [14].</p>	M	20:40

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
37	<p>CA performs the following steps to import the SMK:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Utilize the HSM's keyboard to scroll through the menu using &lt; &gt;</li> <li>b) Select <b>"4.SMK"</b> from the current <b>"Key Mgmt"</b> menu, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>c) Select <b>"3.Restore SMK"</b>, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>d) When <b>"Restore SMK?"</b> is displayed, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>e) When <b>"Insert Card SMK #X?"</b> is displayed, insert the SMK card.</li> <li>f) When <b>"Remove Card?"</b> is displayed, remove the SMK card.</li> <li>g) Repeat steps e) to f) for the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> SMK card.</li> <li>h) When <b>"SMK Restored"</b> is displayed, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>i) Press <b>CLR</b> once to return to the menu <b>"Key Mgmt"</b>.</li> </ul> <p>IW records which cards were used below. Each card is returned to its designated card holder after use.</p> <p>Set # 1</p> <p>1<sup>st</sup> SMK card <u>1</u> of 7</p> <p>2<sup>nd</sup> SMK card <u>2</u> of 7</p> <p>3<sup>rd</sup> SMK card <u>6</u> of 7</p> <p><b>Note:</b> If a card is unreadable, gently wipe its metal contacts and try again. For a summary of card roles and their purpose see Appendix A number [14].</p>	M	20:41
38	<p>CA performs the following steps to import KSK:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Utilize the HSM's keyboard to scroll through the menu using &lt; &gt;</li> <li>b) Select <b>"3.App Keys"</b> from the current <b>"Key Mgmt"</b> menu, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>c) Select <b>"2.Restore"</b>, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>d) When <b>"Restore?"</b> is displayed, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>e) When <b>"Which Media?"</b> is displayed, select <b>"2. From Card"</b>, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>f) When <b>"Insert Card #X?"</b> is displayed, insert the required KSK card.</li> <li>g) When <b>"Remove Card?"</b> is displayed, remove the KSK card.</li> <li>h) When <b>"Restore Complete"</b> is displayed, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>i) Repeat steps c) to h) for any remaining App Key card listed below.</li> <li>j) Press <b>CLR twice</b> to return to the main menu <b>"Secured"</b>.</li> </ul> <p>CA uses the card listed below. Card is returned to its designated card holder after use.</p> <p><b>KSK-2017: Klajeyz</b> App Key card # 2</p> <p><b>KSK-2023: Kmrfl3b</b> App Key card # 2</p> <p><b>Note:</b> If a card is unreadable, gently wipe its metal contacts and try again. For a summary of card roles and their purpose see Appendix A number [14].</p>	M	20:44

### Enable/Activate the HSM (Tier 7)

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
39	<p>CA performs the following steps to activate the HSM:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Utilize the HSM's keyboard to scroll through the menu using &lt; &gt;</li> <li>b) Select "<b>1.Set Online</b>", press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>c) When "<b>Set Online?</b>" is displayed, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>d) When "<b>Insert Card OP #X?</b>" is displayed, insert the OP card.</li> <li>e) When "<b>PIN?</b>" is displayed, enter "<b>11223344</b>", then press <b>ENT</b>.</li> <li>f) When "<b>Remove Card?</b>" is displayed, remove the OP card.</li> <li>g) Repeat steps d) to f) for the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> OP cards.</li> </ul> <p>Confirm the "<b>READY</b>" LED on the <b>HSM</b> is <b>ON</b>.                      IW records which cards were used below. Each card is returned to its designated card holder after use.</p> <p>Set # 1</p> <p>1<sup>st</sup> OP card <u>4</u> of 7                      2<sup>nd</sup> OP card <u>1</u> of 7                      3<sup>rd</sup> OP card <u>6</u> of 7</p> <p>Note: If a card is unreadable, gently wipe its metal contacts and try again.                      For a summary of card roles and their purpose see Appendix A number [14].</p>	M	20:46

### Check the Network Connectivity Between Laptop and HSM

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
40	CA connects the HSM to the laptop using an ethernet cable in the LAN ports.	M	20:46
41	<p>CA performs the following steps to test the network connectivity between laptop and HSM:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Use the <b>Commands</b> terminal window</li> <li>b) Test connectivity by executing: <code>ping hsm</code></li> <li>c) Wait for responses, then exit by pressing: <code>Ctrl + C</code></li> </ul>	M	20:46

### Execute the KSR Signer for KSR 2024 Q1

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
42	CA executes the command below in the terminal window to change directory: <code>cd HSM8E/</code>	M	20:47
43	CA executes the command below in the terminal window to sign the KSR file: <code>kskm-ksrsigner</code>	M	20:47

Loaded configuration from file krsrsigner.yaml SHA-256 393blacd14c7dbdb975539ada03d4f7ce4822500c460f6f3603a7e4ae4fd20b9 WORDS classroom councilman beehive sandalwood baboon retraction suspense suspicious preshrunk equipment classroom perceptive ragtime crucifix dropper informant tonic Istanbul bombast a droitness snowslide fortitude village vertigo facial corrosion locale direction tonic Wyoming bison p roximate

Configuration validated

Loaded SKR from file skr-root-2023-q4-0.xml SHA-256 7d8087f4bdaf0c70f264a881eb07ec16ae15d8fb3764f05a9ff119e6cc5aed49 WORDS klaxon intention Neptune Virginia skullcap pharmacy ammo hesitate uproot getaway retouch inventive trouble amusement tumor bodyguard robust bifocals stormy Wichita clamshell getaway unearth existence quota vacancy bedlamp trombonist spigot existence tunnel dinosaur

Previous SKR:

#	Inception	Expiration	ZSK Tags	KSK (CKA_LABEL)
1	2023-10-01T00:00:00	2023-10-22T00:00:00	46780,11019	20326(Klajeyz)/S
2	2023-10-11T00:00:00	2023-11-01T00:00:00	46780	20326(Klajeyz)/S
3	2023-10-21T00:00:00	2023-11-11T00:00:00	46780	20326(Klajeyz)/S
4	2023-10-31T00:00:00	2023-11-21T00:00:00	46780	20326(Klajeyz)/S
5	2023-11-10T00:00:00	2023-12-01T00:00:00	46780	20326(Klajeyz)/S
6	2023-11-20T00:00:00	2023-12-11T00:00:00	46780	20326(Klajeyz)/S
7	2023-11-30T00:00:00	2023-12-21T00:00:00	46780	20326(Klajeyz)/S
8	2023-12-10T00:00:00	2023-12-31T00:00:00	46780	20326(Klajeyz)/S
9	2023-12-20T00:00:00	2024-01-10T00:00:00	46780,30903	20326(Klajeyz)/S

Loaded KSR from file ksr-root-2024-q1-0.xml SHA-256 d31f96ec28d5296641aad3bced5fec3675f9e7675a074032be83ab9070232af5 WORDS stapler businessman prefer unicorn breadline specialist breakup gossamer cranky pedigree stapler pyramid tunnel forever tumor congregate indulge Waterloo transit graduate enlist am usement crackdown component skydive Jamaica rhythm millionaire guidance cannonball brickyard visitor

Validating KSR using request policy:

```

_dataclass_placeholder: None
acceptable_domains: ['.']
approved_algorithms: ['RSASHA256']
check_bundle_intervals: True
check_bundle_overlap: True
check_chain_keys: True
check_chain_keys_in_hsm: True
check_chain_overlap: True
check_cycle_length: True
check_keys_match_ksk_operator_policy: True
check_keys_publish_safety: True
check_keys_retire_safety: True
dns_ttl: 172800
enable_unsupported_ecdsa: False
keys_match_zsk_policy: True
max_bundle_interval: 11 days, 0:00:00
max_cycle_inception_length: 81 days, 0:00:00
min_bundle_interval: 9 days, 0:00:00
min_cycle_inception_length: 79 days, 0:00:00
num_bundles: 9
num_different_keys_in_all_bundles: 3
num_keys_per_bundle: [2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2]
rsa_approved_exponents: [65537]
rsa_approved_key_sizes: [2048]
rsa_exponent_match_zsk_policy: True
signature_algorithms_match_zsk_policy: True
signature_check_expire_horizon: True
signature_horizon_days: 180
signature_validity_match_zsk_policy: True
validate_signatures: True

```

KSR-DOMAIN: Verified domain '.'

KSR-ID: Will be checked later, when SKR is available

KSR-BUNDLE-UNIQUE: All 9 bundles have unique ids

KSR-BUNDLE-KEYS: All 3 unique keys in the bundles accepted by policy

KSR-BUNDLE-POP: All 9 bundles contain proof-of-possession

KSR-BUNDLE-COUNT: Number of bundles (9) accepted

KSR-BUNDLE-CYCLE-DURATION: The cycle length is in accordance with the KSK operator policy

KSR-POLICY-KEYS: Validated number of keys per bundle, and for all bundles

KSR-POLICY-ALG: All 1 ZSK operator signature algorithms accepted by policy

KSR-POLICY-SIG-OVERLAP: All bundles overlap in accordance with the stated ZSK operator policy

KSR-POLICY-SIG-VALIDITY: All 9 bundles have 21 days <= validity >= 21 days

KSR-POLICY-SIG-HORIZON: All signatures expire in less than 180 days

KSR-POLICY-BUNDLE-INTERVALS: All bundles intervals in accordance with the KSK operator policy

Request:

#	Inception	Expiration	ZSK Tags	KSK (CKA_LABEL)
1	2024-01-01T00:00:00	2024-01-22T00:00:00	46780,30903	
2	2024-01-11T00:00:00	2024-02-01T00:00:00	30903	
3	2024-01-21T00:00:00	2024-02-11T00:00:00	30903	
4	2024-01-31T00:00:00	2024-02-21T00:00:00	30903	

5 2024-02-10T00:00:00 2024-03-02T00:00:00 30903  
 6 2024-02-20T00:00:00 2024-03-12T00:00:00 30903  
 7 2024-03-01T00:00:00 2024-03-22T00:00:00 30903  
 8 2024-03-11T00:00:00 2024-04-01T00:00:00 30903  
 9 2024-03-21T00:00:00 2024-04-11T00:00:00 30903,5613

Initializing PKCS#11 module aep using /opt/Keyper/PKCS11Provider/pkcs11.linux\_gcc\_4\_1\_2\_glibc\_2\_5\_x86\_64.so.5.02

HSM First slot: ICANNKSK  
 HSM ManufacturerID: Ultra Electronics AEP Networks  
 HSM Model: Keyper 9860-2  
 HSM Serial: H2110010

Checking coherence between SKR(n-1) and this KSR  
 KSR-CHAIN-KEYS: The last keys in SKR(n-1) matches the first keys in this KSR  
 KSR-CHAIN-OVERLAP: Overlap with last bundle in SKR(n-1) 9 days is in accordance with the KSR policy  
 KSR-CHAIN-KEYS: All 1 signatures in the last bundle of the last SKR were made with keys present in the HSM(s)

KSR-POLICY-SAFETY: PublishSafety validated  
 KSR-POLICY-SAFETY: RetireSafety validated  
 Generated SKR:

#	Inception	Expiration	ZSK Tags	KSK (CKA_LABEL)
1	2024-01-01T00:00:00	2024-01-22T00:00:00	46780,30903	20326(Klajeyz)/S
2	2024-01-11T00:00:00	2024-02-01T00:00:00	30903	20326(Klajeyz)/S
3	2024-01-21T00:00:00	2024-02-11T00:00:00	30903	20326(Klajeyz)/S
4	2024-01-31T00:00:00	2024-02-21T00:00:00	30903	20326(Klajeyz)/S
5	2024-02-10T00:00:00	2024-03-02T00:00:00	30903	20326(Klajeyz)/S
6	2024-02-20T00:00:00	2024-03-12T00:00:00	30903	20326(Klajeyz)/S
7	2024-03-01T00:00:00	2024-03-22T00:00:00	30903	20326(Klajeyz)/S
8	2024-03-11T00:00:00	2024-04-01T00:00:00	30903	20326(Klajeyz)/S
9	2024-03-21T00:00:00	2024-04-11T00:00:00	30903,5613	20326(Klajeyz)/S

Wrote SKR to file HSM8E-skr-root-2024-q1-0.xml SHA-256 0f2922c76d8ac758dedff603d0c2e44e13369c1938d56e  
 f7509425abf8f0b48f WORDS artist certify blockade retraction goggles maverick soybean everyday tactics  
 therapist village aggregate stagnate repellent tonic distortion Aztec congregate python bottomless c  
 lassic specialist goldfish voyager drumbeat molecule bombast Pegasus Vulcan upcoming scenic midsummer

## Verify the KSR Hash for KSR 2024 Q1

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
44	The CA asks some participants to compare the hash in the email sent by the RZM representative prior to the ceremony and some participants to compare the hash in the terminal window, then asks the RZM representative to read aloud the PGP word list SHA-256 hash of the KSR file being used.	M	20:48
45	Participants confirm that the hash matches with the RZM representative's discourse, then CA asks "are there any objections?"	M	20:48
46	CA enters <b>Yes</b> in response to "Sign KSR?" to complete the KSR signing operation. The SKR is located in: /media/KSRFD/KSK51/HSM8E/HSM8E-skr-root-2024-q1-0.xml	M	20:48

## Print Copies of the KSR Signer log

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
47	CA executes the commands below using the terminal window to print the KSR Signer log: a) <code>printlog kskm-ksrsigner-202311*.log X</code> Note: Replace "X" with the amount of copies needed for the participants.	M	20:50
48	IW attaches a copy of the required ksr signer log to their script.	M	20:50

## SKR Comparison

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
49	CA executes the command below to display the XSL style sheet content: <code>cat style.xml</code>	M	20:51
50	CA executes the commands below using the terminal window to compare the SKRs: a) <code>xsltproc style.xml ../skr-root-2024-q1-0.xml   xmllint --format - &gt; current</code> b) <code>xsltproc style.xml HSM8E-skr-root-2024-q1-0.xml   xmllint --format - &gt; new</code> c) <code>diff -wu current new</code>	M	20:51
51	CA executes the command below in the terminal window to change directory: <code>cd /media/HSMFD</code>	M	20:51

## Copy the Newly Generated SKR

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
52	<p>CA executes the following commands using the terminal window:</p> <p>a) List the contents of the KSRFD by executing:  <code>ls -ltrR /media/KSRFD</code></p> <p>b) Copy the contents of the KSRFD to the HSMFD by executing:  <code>cp -pR /media/KSRFD/* .</code></p> <p>Note: Confirm overwrite by entering "y" if prompted.</p> <p>c) List the contents of the HSMFD by executing:  <code>ls -ltrR</code></p> <p>d) Verify it has been copied successfully by executing:  <code>diff -qr /media/HSMFD/KSK51/ /media/KSRFD/KSK51/</code></p> <p>e) Unmount the KSRFD by executing:  <code>umount /media/KSRFD</code></p>	M	20:53
53	<p>CA removes the <b>KSRFD</b> containing the SKR files, then gives it to the RZM representative.</p> <p>Note: If the RZM representative is participating remotely, RKOS will take custody of the KSRFD instead.</p>	M	20:53

## Disable/Deactivate the HSM (Tier 7)

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
54	<p>CA deactivates the HSM by performing the following steps:</p> <p>Note: CA will use OP cards not previously utilized in this ceremony if available.</p> <p>a) CA selects the <b>HSM Output</b> terminal window.</p> <p>b) Utilize the HSM's keyboard to scroll through the menu using &lt; &gt;</p> <p>c) Select "<b>2.Set Offline</b>", press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</p> <p>d) When "<b>Set Offline?</b>" is displayed, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</p> <p>e) When "<b>Insert Card OP #X?</b>" is displayed, insert the OP card from the card holder.</p> <p>f) When "<b>PIN?</b>" is displayed, enter "<b>11223344</b>", then press <b>ENT</b>.</p> <p>g) When "<b>Remove Card?</b>" is displayed, remove the OP card.</p> <p>h) Repeat steps e) to g) for the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> OP cards.</p> <p>Confirm the "<b>READY</b>" LED on the <b>HSM</b> is <b>OFF</b>.                      IW records which cards were used below. Each card is returned to its designated card holder after use.</p> <p>Set # 1                      1<sup>st</sup> OP card <u>2</u> of 7                      2<sup>nd</sup> OP card <u>5</u> of 7                      3<sup>rd</sup> OP card <u>1</u> of 7</p> <p>Note: If a card is unreadable, gently wipe its metal contacts and try again.                      For a summary of card roles and their purpose see Appendix A number [14].</p>	M	20:55

## Clear and Destroy AAK Cards

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
55	<p>CA performs the following steps to clear Adapter Authorization Key (AAK) cards:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Utilize the HSM's keyboard to scroll through the menu using &lt; &gt;</li> <li>Select <b>"7.Role Mgmt"</b>, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>When <b>"Insert Card SO #X?"</b> is displayed, insert the SO card.</li> <li>When <b>"PIN?"</b> is displayed, enter <b>"11223344"</b>, then press <b>ENT</b>.</li> <li>When <b>"Remove Card?"</b> is displayed, remove the SO card.</li> <li>Repeat steps d) to f) for the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> SO card.</li> <li>Select <b>"5.Clear AAK Card"</b>, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>When <b>"Clear AAK Card?"</b> is displayed, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>When <b>"Num Cards?"</b> is displayed, enter <b>"2"</b>, then press <b>ENT</b>.</li> <li>When <b>"Insert Card AAK #X?"</b> is displayed, take the <b>AAK #X</b> card from the cardholder, show the <b>AAK #X</b> card to the audit camera and then insert the <b>AAK #X</b> card into the HSM's card reader.</li> <li>When <b>"Are you sure?"</b> is displayed, press <b>ENT</b> to confirm.</li> <li>When <b>"Remove Card?"</b> is displayed, remove the AAK card.</li> <li>Repeat steps j) to l) for the 2<sup>nd</sup> AAK card.</li> <li>Press <b>CLR</b> to return to the main menu <b>"Secured"</b>.</li> </ol> <p>IW records which cards were used below. Each card is returned to its designated card holder after use.</p> <p>Set # 1            1<sup>st</sup> SO card <u>4</u> of 7            2<sup>nd</sup> SO card <u>1</u> of 7            3<sup>rd</sup> SO card <u>6</u> of 7</p> <p>Note: If a card is unreadable, gently wipe its metal contacts and try again.            For a summary of card roles and their purpose see Appendix A number [14].</p>	M	20:57
56	<p>CA uses the shredder to destroy the cleared AAK cards. Use scissors to slice through the center of the chip before inserting cards into the shredder.</p>	M	21:00

## Place the HSM (Tier 7) into a TEB

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
57	<p>CA switches the HSM power to OFF, then disconnects the power, serial, and ethernet connections.</p> <p>Note: DO NOT unplug the cable connections on the laptop.</p>	M	21:01
58	<p>CA places the HSM into its designated new TEB, then seals it.</p>	M	21:02
59	<p>CA performs the following steps:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Read aloud the TEB number and HSM serial number, then show it to the audit camera above for participants to see.</li> <li>Confirm with IW that the TEB number and HSM serial number match below.</li> <li>Initial the TEB along with IW using a ballpoint pen.</li> <li>Give IW the sealing strips for post-ceremony inventory.</li> <li>Place the HSM TEB on the cart.</li> </ol> <p><b>HSM8E: TEB # BB51184252 / Serial # H2110010</b></p>	M	21:03



## Return the KSK into a TEB

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
60	CA places the KSK and the backup HSMFD into its designated new TEB, then seals it.	<i>AL</i>	21:07
61	<p>CA performs the following steps:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Read aloud the TEB number, then show it to the audit camera above for participants to see.</li> <li>b) Confirm with IW that the TEB number matches below.</li> <li>c) Initial the TEB along with IW using a ballpoint pen.</li> <li>d) Give IW the sealing strips for post-ceremony inventory.</li> <li>e) Place the KSK TEB on the cart.</li> </ul> <p><b>KSK-2017: TEB # BB02638662</b>  <b>KSK-2023: TEB # BB02638661</b></p>	<i>AL</i>	21:08

## Root DNSSEC Script Exception

### Exception Details

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
1	IW writes the details of the ceremony exception: Act: <u>0</u> Step(s): <u>61</u> Page(s): <u>40</u> Date and Time: <u>30 Nov 2023 21:08</u> <small>Note: IW describes the exception(s) and action(s) below.</small>	<i>W</i>	<i>21:08</i>

*Bio Brake for all participants*

HSMFD SHA-256 HASH

2023/11/30

```
# find -P /media/HSMFD/ -type f -print0 | LC_COLLATE=POSIX sort -z | xargs -0 cat | sha2wo  
rdlist
```

```
SHA-256: 5c9ad14c8628b3176a841379f9cf1d7c37213a8669b69d6dabecf77292e53c37  
PGP Words: escape newsletter stairway disbelief necklace cellulose scallion bookseller Gei  
ger Jupiter Aztec inertia waffle Saturday Belfast informant clamshell Camelot cleanup lette  
rhead gazelle potato quadrant hazardous rhythm unicorn virus holiness physique travesty cob  
ra consensus
```

11/30/23  
21:28:56

script-20231130.log

1

```

Script started on 2023-11-30 19:00:48+00:00 [TERM="xterm-256color" TTY="/dev/pica/1" COLU
NS=101" LINES=33"]
0031[22004h(kskm) root@ecoen:/media/HSKRD# ping ham
R80B[R80B04132.168.0.2] 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from ham (192.168.0.2): icmp_seq=1 ttl=255 time=0.906 ms
64 bytes from ham (192.168.0.2): icmp_seq=2 ttl=255 time=0.758 ms
64 bytes from ham (192.168.0.2): icmp_seq=3 ttl=255 time=0.700 ms
64 bytes from ham (192.168.0.2): icmp_seq=4 ttl=255 time=0.730 ms
^C
-- ham ping statistics --
4 packets transmitted, 4 received, 0% packet loss, time 3017ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 0.700/0.773/0.906/0.079 ms
0031[22004h(kskm) root@ecoen:/media/HSKRD# cd /media/KSRRD/KSK51/
0031[22004h(kskm) root@ecoen:/media/KSRRD/KSK51# kskm-karsigner
2023-11-30 19:20:47,849: kskm.common.config: INFO Loaded configuration from file karsigne
r-Yam1 SHA-256 0F716d1970db983479735e132e858eae2da63e250f0cecca41335e94cd43350 WORDS are
list hideaway goggles bottonless guidance suspicious printer confidence jawbone hurricane
eyeglass barbecue buzzard leprosy orca universe rebirth surrender tissue tomorrow dumbba
le upcoming spyglass revolver regaln barbecue chopper ultimate drainage souvenir chisel em
berle
2023-11-30 19:20:47,602: kskm.common.config: INFO Configuration validated
2023-11-30 19:20:47,603: kskm.skr.load: INFO Loaded SKR from file skr-root-2023-q4-0.xml
SHA-256 7d8087fbdaf0c70f2f64a881db07ce16ae15d8fb374f05a9ff1196cccaed9 WORDS kaxon int
ention Neptune Virginia skullcap pharmacy ammo hesitate uproot getaway touch inventur
trouble amusement tumor bodyguard robust bifocals stormy Wichita clamshell gateway uneartr
h existence quota vacancy bedlamp ergonomist splurge existence tunnel dinosaur
2023-11-30 19:20:47,844: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO Previons SKR:
2023-11-30 19:20:47,845: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO # Inception
ZSK Tags KSK (CKA LABEL)
2023-11-30 19:20:47,845: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 1 2023-10-01T00:00:00 2023-10-22T00:
00:00 11019.46780 20326(KIajeyz)/S
2023-11-30 19:20:47,845: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 2 2023-10-11T00:00:00 2023-11-01T00:
00:00 46780
2023-11-30 19:20:47,845: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 3 2023-10-21T00:00:00 2023-11-11T00:
00:00 46780
2023-11-30 19:20:47,845: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 4 2023-10-31T00:00:00 2023-11-21T00:
00:00 46780
2023-11-30 19:20:47,845: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 5 2023-11-10T00:00:00 2023-12-01T00:
00:00 46780
2023-11-30 19:20:47,845: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 6 2023-11-20T00:00:00 2023-12-11T00:
00:00 46780
2023-11-30 19:20:47,845: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 7 2023-11-30T00:00:00 2023-12-21T00:
00:00 46780
2023-11-30 19:20:47,845: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 8 2023-12-10T00:00:00 2023-12-31T00:
00:00 46780
2023-11-30 19:20:47,845: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 9 2023-12-20T00:00:00 2024-01-10T00:
00:00 30903,46780
2023-11-30 19:20:47,846: kskm.kar.load: INFO Loaded SKR from file kar-root-2024-q1-0.xml
SHA-256 d31f96cc28d5296641aad3cfd563519e675a074032be93ab9070232af5 WORDS stapler bu
sinesman prefer unicorn breadline specialist breakup gossamer cranky pedigre tagler py
ramid tunnel forever tumor conglomerate indulge Waterloo transit graduate enlist amusement
crackdown component skydive Jamaica rhythm millionaire guidance cannonball brickyard visi
tor
2023-11-30 19:20:47,849: kskm.kar.validate: INFO Validating KSK using request policy:
2023-11-30 19:20:47,849: kskm.kar.validate: INFO _dataclass.placencider: None
2023-11-30 19:20:47,849: kskm.kar.validate: INFO acceptable_domains: ['*']
2023-11-30 19:20:47,849: kskm.kar.validate: INFO approved_algorithms: ['SSA256']
2023-11-30 19:20:47,849: kskm.kar.validate: INFO check_bundle_intervals: True
2023-11-30 19:20:47,849: kskm.kar.validate: INFO check_chain_overlaps: True
2023-11-30 19:20:47,849: kskm.kar.validate: INFO check_chain_keys: True
2023-11-30 19:20:47,849: kskm.kar.validate: INFO check_chain_keys_in_ham: True
2023-11-30 19:20:47,849: kskm.kar.validate: INFO check_chain_overlaps: True
2023-11-30 19:20:47,849: kskm.kar.validate: INFO check_cycle_integrity: True
2023-11-30 19:20:47,849: kskm.kar.validate: INFO check_keys_match_ksk_operator_policy:
True
2023-11-30 19:20:47,849: kskm.kar.validate: INFO check_keys_publish_safety: True
2023-11-30 19:20:47,849: kskm.kar.validate: INFO check_keys_retire_safety: True
2023-11-30 19:20:47,849: kskm.kar.validate: INFO dns_ttl: 172800
2023-11-30 19:20:47,849: kskm.kar.validate: INFO enable_unsupported_ecdsa: False
2023-11-30 19:20:47,849: kskm.kar.validate: INFO key_match_policy: True
2023-11-30 19:20:47,849: kskm.kar.validate: INFO max_bundle_interval: 11 days, 0:00:00
2023-11-30 19:20:47,850: kskm.kar.validate: INFO max_cycle_inception_length: 81 days, 0
:00:00
2023-11-30 19:20:47,850: kskm.kar.validate: INFO min_bundle_interval: 9 days, 0:00:00
2023-11-30 19:20:47,850: kskm.kar.validate: INFO min_cycle_inception_length: 79 days, 0
:00:00
2023-11-30 19:20:47,850: kskm.kar.validate: INFO num_bundles: 9
2023-11-30 19:20:47,850: kskm.kar.validate: INFO num_different_keys_in_all_bundles: 3
2023-11-30 19:20:47,850: kskm.kar.validate: INFO num_keys_per_bundle: [2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1
, 1, 1, 2]
2023-11-30 19:20:47,850: kskm.kar.validate: INFO rsa_approved_exponents: [65537]
2023-11-30 19:20:47,850: kskm.kar.validate: INFO rsa_approved_key_sizes: [2048]
2023-11-30 19:20:47,850: kskm.kar.validate: INFO rsa_exponent_match_zsk_policy: True
2023-11-30 19:20:47,850: kskm.kar.validate: INFO signature_algorithm_match_zsk_policy:
True
2023-11-30 19:20:47,850: kskm.kar.validate: INFO signature_check_expire_horizon: True
2023-11-30 19:20:47,850: kskm.kar.validate: INFO signature_horizon_days: 180
2023-11-30 19:20:47,850: kskm.kar.validate: INFO signature_validity_match_zsk_policy: T
rue
2023-11-30 19:20:47,850: kskm.kar.validate: INFO validate_signatures: True
2023-11-30 19:20:47,850: kskm.kar.validate: INFO KSK-DOMAIN: Verified domain '*'
2023-11-30 19:20:47,850: kskm.kar.validate: INFO KSK-ID: Will be checked later, when SKR
is available
2023-11-30 19:20:47,850: kskm.kar.validate: INFO KSR-BUNDLE-UNIQUE: All 9 bundles have un
ique ids
2023-11-30 19:20:47,850: kskm.kar.validate: INFO KSR-BUNDLE-KEYS: All 3 unique keys in th
e bundles accepted by policy
2023-11-30 19:20:47,852: kskm.kar.validate: INFO KSR-BUNDLE-POP: All 9 bundles contain pr
of-of-possession
2023-11-30 19:20:47,852: kskm.kar.validate: INFO KSR-POLICY-COUNT: Number of bundles (9)
accepted
2023-11-30 19:20:47,852: kskm.kar.validate: INFO KSR-BUNDLE-CYCLE-DURATION: The cycle len
gth is in accordance with the KSK operator policy
2023-11-30 19:20:47,852: kskm.kar.validate: INFO KSR-POLICY-KEYS: Validated number of key
s per bundle, and for all bundles
2023-11-30 19:20:47,852: kskm.kar.validate: INFO KSR-POLICY-MIG: All 1 ZSK operator signa
ture algorithms accepted by policy
2023-11-30 19:20:47,852: kskm.kar.validate: INFO KSR-POLICY-SIG-OVERLAP: All bundles over
lap in accordance with the stated ZSK operator policy
2023-11-30 19:20:47,852: kskm.kar.validate: INFO KSR-POLICY-SIG-VALIDITY: All 9 bundles h
ave 21 days <= validity >= 21 days
2023-11-30 19:20:47,852: kskm.kar.validate: INFO KSR-POLICY-SIG-HORIZON: All signatures e
xpire in less than 180 days
2023-11-30 19:20:47,852: kskm.kar.validate: INFO KSR-POLICY-BUNDLE-INTERVALS: All bundles
intervals in accordance with the KSK operator policy
2023-11-30 19:20:47,853: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO Request:
ZSK Tags KSK (CKA LABEL)
2023-11-30 19:20:47,853: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO # Inception
Expiration
2023-11-30 19:20:47,853: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 1 2024-01-01T00:00:00 2024-01-22T00:
00:00 30903,46780
2023-11-30 19:20:47,853: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 2 2024-01-11T00:00:00 2024-02-01T00:
00:00 30903
2023-11-30 19:20:47,853: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 3 2024-01-21T00:00:00 2024-02-11T00:
00:00 30903
2023-11-30 19:20:47,853: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 4 2024-01-31T00:00:00 2024-02-21T00:
00:00 30903
2023-11-30 19:20:47,853: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 5 2024-02-10T00:00:00 2024-03-02T00:
00:00 30903

```

```

2023-11-30 19:20:47,853: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 6 2024-02-20T00:00:00 2024-03-12T00:
00:00 30903
2023-11-30 19:20:47,853: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 7 2024-03-01T00:00:00 2024-03-22T00:
00:00 30903
2023-11-30 19:20:47,853: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 8 2024-03-11T00:00:00 2024-04-01T00:
00:00 30903
2023-11-30 19:20:47,853: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 9 2024-03-21T00:00:00 2024-04-11T00:
00:00 30903
2023-11-30 19:20:47,833: kskm.misc.ham: INFO Initializing PKCS#11 module aep using /opt/K
eypcr/PKCS11Provider/pkcs11_linux_gcc_4.1.2_glibc_2.5_x86_64.so.5.02
2023-11-30 19:20:48,078: kskm.misc.ham: INFO HSM First slot: ICANNR5K
2023-11-30 19:20:48,078: kskm.misc.ham: INFO HSM ManufacturerID: Ultra Electronics AEP N
eKeycrKa
2023-11-30 19:20:48,078: kskm.misc.ham: INFO HSM ModelID: Keyper 9660-2
2023-11-30 19:20:48,078: kskm.misc.ham: INFO HSM Serial: H1903018
2023-11-30 19:20:48,078: kskm.signer.verify.chain: INFO Checking coherence between SKR(n-
1) and this SKR
2023-11-30 19:20:48,078: kskm.signer.verify.chain: INFO SKR-CHAIN-KEYS: The last keys in
SKR(n-1) matches the first keys in this SKR
2023-11-30 19:20:48,079: kskm.signer.verify.chain: INFO SKR-CHAIN-OVERLAP: Overlap with 1
aep bundle in SKR(n-1) 9 days is in accordance with the SKR POLICY
2023-11-30 19:20:48,079: kskm.signer.verify.chain: INFO SKR-CHAIN-KEYS: All 1 signatures
in the last bundle of the last SKR were made with keys present in the HSM(s)

FILENAME: kar-root-2024-q1-0.xml
SHA-256 WORDS: d31f96ec2885296641aad3b0ed5fec3675f9e67675a074032be83ab970232af5
cranky pedagogue stapler businessman prefer unicorn breadline specialist breakup gossamer
graduate enlist amusement crackdown component skydive Jamaica rhythm millionaire guidance
cannonball brickyard visitor

Sign SKR? Confirm with "Yes" (exactly) or anything else to abort: Yes
2023-11-30 19:24:02,048: kskm.signer.policy: INFO SKR-POLICY-SAFETY: PublicSafety validat
ed
2023-11-30 19:24:02,049: kskm.signer.policy: INFO SKR-POLICY-SAFETY: Retiresafety validat
ed
2023-11-30 19:24:02,049: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO Generated SKR:
2023-11-30 19:24:02,049: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO # Inception Expiration
ZSR Tags KSK (CRA, IABE1)
2023-11-30 19:24:02,049: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 1 2024-01-01T00:00:00 2024-01-22T00:
00:00 30903 46780 20326(KIajeyz)/S
2023-11-30 19:24:02,049: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 2 2024-01-11T00:00:00 2024-02-01T00:
00:00 30903 20326(KIajeyz)/S
2023-11-30 19:24:02,049: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 3 2024-01-21T00:00:00 2024-02-11T00:
00:00 30903 20326(KIajeyz)/S
2023-11-30 19:24:02,049: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 4 2024-01-31T00:00:00 2024-02-21T00:
00:00 30903 20326(KIajeyz)/S
2023-11-30 19:24:02,049: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 5 2024-02-10T00:00:00 2024-03-02T00:
00:00 30903 20326(KIajeyz)/S
2023-11-30 19:24:02,049: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 6 2024-02-20T00:00:00 2024-03-12T00:
00:00 30903 20326(KIajeyz)/S
2023-11-30 19:24:02,049: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 7 2024-03-01T00:00:00 2024-03-22T00:
00:00 30903 20326(KIajeyz)/S
2023-11-30 19:24:02,049: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 8 2024-03-11T00:00:00 2024-04-01T00:
00:00 30903 20326(KIajeyz)/S
2023-11-30 19:24:02,049: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 9 2024-03-21T00:00:00 2024-04-11T00:
00:00 30903 20326(KIajeyz)/S
2023-11-30 19:24:02,178: kskm.signer: INFO Wrote SKR to file skr-root-2024-q1-0.xml SHA-2
56 019292c76d8ac75d6d6f603dc0c4e3396a1938d56eF7509425abf8DB48F WORDS atlas certifi
blobcode retracton goggles maverick soybean everyday tactics therapist village aggregate
saagrate repellent tonic distortion atlas congregate python botlomoless classic specialist
t goldfish voyager drumbeat molecule bombast Pegasus Vulcan upcoming scenic misadventur
1033172004h(kskm) root@con:/media/KSRD/KSK51# printlog kskm-karsigner-20231130-192047-8

94.1log
1033gag604k 1 copy | sent to printer
6 Lines were wrapped
1033172004h(kskm) root@con:/media/KSRD/KSK51# printlog kskm-karsigner-20231130-192047-8
94.1log 66
1023gag604k 1 copy | sent to printer
6 Lines were wrapped
1033172004h(kskm) root@con:/media/KSRD/KSK51# df -B1 /dev/ada
K8A3g90604 1B-blocks Used Available Use% Mounted on
/dev/sda 375431168 375431168 0 100% /run/live/medium
1033172004h(kskm) root@con:/media/KSRD/KSK51# head -c 375431168 ddev/sda | sha256sum
SHA256SUM041 405d1c76c114feb933c65345e13850e8d86341a09161207d8ebc395410c13a
PGF WORDS: crackdown filament Kiwi Impetus snapple Kiwi Impetus around woodlark proximate comb
11 revolver dwelling detector lampet consulting drumbeat travesty quadrant letterhead ch
oking Bradbury amless bodyguard atlas amusement stormy underfoot offload cooperate eatin
g autopsy snapple corrosion
1033172004h(kskm) root@con:/media/KSRD/KSK51# ping ham
PING:64(64)192.168.0.2) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from ham (192.168.0.2): icmp_seq=1 ttl=255 time=0.924 ms
64 bytes from ham (192.168.0.2): icmp_seq=2 ttl=255 time=0.583 ms
64 bytes from ham (192.168.0.2): icmp_seq=3 ttl=255 time=0.727 ms
64 bytes from ham (192.168.0.2): icmp_seq=4 ttl=255 time=0.743 ms
^C
--- ham ping statistics ---
4 packets transmitted, 4 received, 0% packet loss, time 3030ms
rtt: min/avg/max/mdev = 0.583/0.744/0.924/0.121 ms
1033172004h(kskm) root@con:/media/KSRD/KSK51# cd HSMR/
1033172004h(kskm) root@con:/media/KSRD/KSK51# HSMR# kskm-karsigner
X023172004120:17:30,875: kskm.common.config: INFO Loaded configuration from file karsigne
r.yaml SHA-256 4a2a3a13b007acccfe9a705bcecfca01736dd34d00e0ca0d62d7abc3a69388 WORDS cru
cial chambermaid drunken councilman aardvark infamy spigot maverick treatall11 hesitate e
lightball pyramid spyglass Wilhelmsson ragtime businessman Christmas tambourine chase1 disr
uptible aardvark truncated speedbird recipe cubic clergyman upset Pegasus snowcap paragon
playhouse merkitime
2023-11-30 20:17:30,915: kskm.common.config: INFO Configuration validated
2023-11-30 20:17:30,916: kskm.skr.load: INFO Loaded SKR from file skr-root-2023-q4-0.xml
SHA-256 7d8087f4bdac10c70f264a881e07c616ae15d8b764f05a9ff119ecccbae4d9 WORDS Klaxon int
eraction Neptune Virginia skullcap pharmacy ammo hesitate uproot getaway rouch inventiv
e trouble amusement tumor bodyguard trombit bifocals stormy Wichita clamsHELL getaway unreati
h existence quota vacancy bedlamp troubant spigot existence tunnel dinosaur
2023-11-30 20:17:30,954: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO Previous SKR:
2023-11-30 20:17:30,954: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO # Inception Expiration
ZSR Tags KSK (CRA, IABE1)
2023-11-30 20:17:30,954: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 1 2023-10-01T00:00:00 2023-10-22T00:
00:00 46780 20326(KIajeyz)/S
2023-11-30 20:17:30,954: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 2 2023-10-11T00:00:00 2023-11-01T00:
00:00 46780 20326(KIajeyz)/S
2023-11-30 20:17:30,954: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 3 2023-10-21T00:00:00 2023-11-11T00:
00:00 46780 20326(KIajeyz)/S
2023-11-30 20:17:30,954: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 4 2023-10-31T00:00:00 2023-11-21T00:
00:00 46780 20326(KIajeyz)/S
2023-11-30 20:17:30,955: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 5 2023-11-10T00:00:00 2023-12-01T00:
00:00 46780 20326(KIajeyz)/S
2023-11-30 20:17:30,955: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 6 2023-11-20T00:00:00 2023-12-11T00:
00:00 46780 20326(KIajeyz)/S
2023-11-30 20:17:30,955: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 7 2023-11-30T00:00:00 2023-12-21T00:
00:00 46780 20326(KIajeyz)/S
2023-11-30 20:17:30,955: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 8 2023-12-10T00:00:00 2023-12-31T00:
00:00 46780 20326(KIajeyz)/S
2023-11-30 20:17:30,955: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 9 2023-12-20T00:00:00 2024-01-10T00:
00:00 46780 20326(KIajeyz)/S
2023-11-30 20:17:30,956: kskm.skr.load: INFO Loaded SKR from file kar-root-2024-q1-0.xml
SHA-256 d31f96ec2885296641aad3b0ed5fec3675f9e67675a074032be83ab970232af5 WORDS stapler bu
sinesman prefer unicorn breadline specialist breakup cranky pedagogue

```

1/30/23  
21:28:56

script-20231130.log

```
randid tunnel forever tumor congregate Indluge Waterloo transit graduate enlist amusement  
crackdown component skydive Jamaica rhythm millionaire guidance cannonball brickyard visit  
for  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,958: kskm.ksr.validate: INFO Validating KSR using request policy:  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,958: kskm.ksr.validate: INFO _acceptables_placeholder: None  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,958: kskm.ksr.validate: INFO _acceptable_domains: ['*']  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,959: kskm.ksr.validate: INFO approved_algorithms: ['RSASHA256']  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,959: kskm.ksr.validate: INFO check_bundle_overlap: True  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,959: kskm.ksr.validate: INFO check_chain_keys: True  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,959: kskm.ksr.validate: INFO check_chain_keys_in_ham: True  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,959: kskm.ksr.validate: INFO check_cycle_overlap: True  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,959: kskm.ksr.validate: INFO check_keys_match_ksk_operator_policy:  
True  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,959: kskm.ksr.validate: INFO check_keys_publish_safety: True  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,959: kskm.ksr.validate: INFO check_keys_reliability_safety: True  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,959: kskm.ksr.validate: INFO dns_ttl: 172800  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,959: kskm.ksr.validate: INFO enable_unsupported_ecdsa: False  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,959: kskm.ksr.validate: INFO keys_match_zsk_policy: True  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,959: kskm.ksr.validate: INFO max_bundle_interval: 11 days, 0:00:00  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,959: kskm.ksr.validate: INFO max_cycle_inception_length: 81 days, 0  
:00:00  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,959: kskm.ksr.validate: INFO min_bundle_interval: 9 days, 0:00:00  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,959: kskm.ksr.validate: INFO min_cycle_inception_length: 79 days, 0  
:00:00  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,959: kskm.ksr.validate: INFO num_bundles: 9  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,959: kskm.ksr.validate: INFO num_different_keys_in_all_bundles: 3  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,959: kskm.ksr.validate: INFO num_keys_per_bundle: [2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1,  
1, 1, 2]  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,960: kskm.ksr.validate: INFO rsa_approved_exponents: [65537]  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,960: kskm.ksr.validate: INFO rsa_approved_key_sizes: [2048]  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,960: kskm.ksr.validate: INFO rsa_exponent_match_zsk_policy: True  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,960: kskm.ksr.validate: INFO signature_algorithm_match_zsk_policy:  
True  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,960: kskm.ksr.validate: INFO signature_check_expiry_horizon: True  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,960: kskm.ksr.validate: INFO signature_horizon_matches: 180  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,960: kskm.ksr.validate: INFO signature_validity_match_zsk_policy: T  
rue  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,960: kskm.ksr.validate: INFO validate_signatures: True  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,960: kskm.ksr.validate: INFO KSR-DOMAIN: Verified domain '  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,960: kskm.ksr.validate: INFO KSR-ID: Will be checked later, when SKR  
is available  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,960: kskm.ksr.validate: INFO KSR-BUNDLE-UNITID: All 9 bundles have un  
ique ids  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,960: kskm.ksr.validate: INFO KSR-BUNDLE-KEYS: All 3 unique keys in th  
e bundles accepted by policy  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,961: kskm.ksr.validate: INFO KSR-BUNDLE-POP: All 9 bundles contain pr  
ot-of-possession  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,962: kskm.ksr.validate: INFO KSR-BUNDLE-COUNT: Number of bundles (9)  
accepted  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,962: kskm.ksr.validate: INFO KSR-BUNDLE-CYCLE-DURATION: The cycle len  
gth is in accordance with the KSR operator policy  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,962: kskm.ksr.validate: INFO KSR-POLICY-KEYS: Validated number of key  
s per bundle, and for all bundles  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,962: kskm.ksr.validate: INFO KSR-POLICY-ALG: All 1 ZSK operator signa  
ture algorithms accepted by policy  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,962: kskm.ksr.validate: INFO KSR-POLICY-SIG-OVERRIDE: All bundles over  
lap in accordance with the stated ZSK operator policy  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,962: kskm.ksr.validate: INFO KSR-POLICY-SIG-VALIDITY: All 9 bundles h  
ave 21 days <= validity >= 21 days  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,962: kskm.ksr.validate: INFO KSR-POLICY-SIG-HORIZON: All signatures e  
xpire in less than 180 days  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,962: kskm.ksr.validate: INFO KSR-POLICY-BUNDLE-INTERVALS: All bundles
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intervals in accordance with the KSR operator policy  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,962: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO Request:  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,963: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO # Inception Expiration  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,963: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO # Inception Expiration  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,963: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 1 2024-01-01T00:00:00 2024-01-22T00:  
00:00 46780,30903  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,963: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 2 2024-01-11T00:00:00 2024-02-01T00:  
00:00 30903  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,963: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 3 2024-01-21T00:00:00 2024-02-11T00:  
00:00 30903  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,963: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 4 2024-01-31T00:00:00 2024-02-21T00:  
00:00 30903  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,963: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 5 2024-02-10T00:00:00 2024-03-02T00:  
00:00 30903  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,963: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 6 2024-02-20T00:00:00 2024-03-12T00:  
00:00 30903  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,963: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 7 2024-03-01T00:00:00 2024-03-22T00:  
00:00 30903  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,963: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 8 2024-03-11T00:00:00 2024-04-01T00:  
00:00 30903  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,963: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 9 2024-03-21T00:00:00 2024-04-11T00:  
00:00 5613,30903  
2023-11-30 20:17:30,963: kskm.misc.ham: INFO Initializing PKCS#11 module app using /opt/k  
eypcr/BKCS11Provider/Okcall1.linux.gcc_4.1.2.glibc-2.5.x86_64.so.3.02  
2023-11-30 20:17:31,126: kskm.misc.ham: INFO HSM First Slot: ICANNRSK  
2023-11-30 20:17:31,126: kskm.misc.ham: INFO HSM Manufacturer-ID: Ultra Electronics APN N  
etworkKa  
2023-11-30 20:17:31,126: kskm.misc.ham: INFO HSM Model: Keyper 9660-2  
2023-11-30 20:17:31,126: kskm.misc.ham: INFO HSM Serial: H211009  
2023-11-30 20:17:31,127: kskm.signer.verify_chain: INFO Checking coherence between SKR(n-  
1) and this SKR  
2023-11-30 20:17:31,127: kskm.signer.verify_chain: INFO SKR(n-1) matches the first keys in this SKR  
2023-11-30 20:17:31,127: kskm.signer.verify_chain: INFO SKR-CHAIN-OVERRIDE: Overlap with 1  
ast bundle in SKR(n-1) 9 days is in accordance with the KSR policy  
2023-11-30 20:17:31,128: kskm.signer.verify_chain: INFO KSR-CHAIN-KEYS: All 1 signatures  
in the last bundle of the last SKR were made with keys present in the HSM(s)  
FILENAME: ksr-cook-2024-q1-0.xml  
SHA-256 HEX: d3196ec28d5296641aad3bced5fec3675f9e7675a074032be83ab9070232a6f5  
SHA-256 WORDS: stapler businessmen prefer unicorn breadline specialist breakup gossamer  
cranky pedgree stapler pyramid tunnel forever tumor congregate Indluge Waterloo transit  
graduate enlist amusement crackdown component skydive Jamaica rhythm millionaire guidance  
cannonball brickyard visitor  
Sign KSR? Confirm with "Yes" (exactly) or anything else to abort: Yes  
2023-11-30 20:19:41,974: kskm.signer.policy: INFO KSR-POLICY-SAFETY: PublishSafety valida  
ted  
2023-11-30 20:19:41,974: kskm.signer.policy: INFO KSR-POLICY-SAFETY: RetireSafety validat  
ed  
2023-11-30 20:19:41,975: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO Generated SKR:  
2023-11-30 20:19:41,975: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO # Inception Expiration  
2023-11-30 20:19:41,975: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 1 2024-01-01T00:00:00 2024-01-22T00:  
00:00 ZSK Tags KSK(CKA_LABEL)  
2023-11-30 20:19:41,975: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 2 2024-01-11T00:00:00 2024-02-01T00:  
00:00 46780,30903 20326(KIAjeyz)/S  
2023-11-30 20:19:41,975: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 3 2024-01-21T00:00:00 2024-02-11T00:  
00:00 30903 20326(KIAjeyz)/S  
2023-11-30 20:19:41,975: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 4 2024-01-31T00:00:00 2024-02-21T00:  
00:00 30903 20326(KIAjeyz)/S  
2023-11-30 20:19:41,975: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 5 2024-02-10T00:00:00 2024-02-21T00:  
00:00 30903 20326(KIAjeyz)/S  
2023-11-30 20:19:41,975: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 6 2024-02-20T00:00:00 2024-03-02T00:  
00:00 30903 20326(KIAjeyz)/S  
2023-11-30 20:19:41,975: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 7 2024-03-01T00:00:00 2024-03-22T00:  
00:00 30903 20326(KIAjeyz)/S  
2023-11-30 20:19:41,975: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 8 2024-03-11T00:00:00 2024-04-01T00:  
00:00 30903 20326(KIAjeyz)/S  
2023-11-30 20:19:41,975: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 9 2024-03-21T00:00:00 2024-04-11T00:  
00:00 30903 20326(KIAjeyz)/S
```



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2023-11-30 20:47:16,493: kskm.kar.validate: INFO signature horizon days: 180
2023-11-30 20:47:16,493: kskm.kar.validate: INFO signature_validity_match_zsk_policy: True
2023-11-30 20:47:16,493: kskm.kar.validate: INFO validate_signatures: True
2023-11-30 20:47:16,493: kskm.kar.validate: INFO KSR-DOMAIN: Verified domain ' '
2023-11-30 20:47:16,493: kskm.kar.validate: INFO KSR-ID: Will be checked later, when SKR is available
2023-11-30 20:47:16,493: kskm.kar.validate: INFO KSR-BUNDLE-UNIQUE: All 9 bundles have unique ids
2023-11-30 20:47:16,493: kskm.kar.validate: INFO KSR-BUNDLE-KEYS: All 3 unique keys in the bundles accepted by policy
2023-11-30 20:47:16,493: kskm.kar.validate: INFO KSR-BUNDLE-POP: All 9 bundles contain proof-of-possession
2023-11-30 20:47:16,493: kskm.kar.validate: INFO KSR-BUNDLE-COUNT: Number of bundles (9) accepted
2023-11-30 20:47:16,495: kskm.kar.validate: INFO KSR-BUNDLE-CYCLE-DURATION: The cycle length is in accordance with the KSR operator policy
2023-11-30 20:47:16,495: kskm.kar.validate: INFO KSR-POLICY-KEYS: Validated number of keys per bundle, and for all bundles
2023-11-30 20:47:16,495: kskm.kar.validate: INFO KSR-POLICY-ALG: All 1 ZSK operator signature algorithms accepted by policy
2023-11-30 20:47:16,495: kskm.kar.validate: INFO KSR-POLICY-SIG-OVERLAP: All bundles overlap in accordance with the stated ZSK operator policy
2023-11-30 20:47:16,495: kskm.kar.validate: INFO KSR-POLICY-SIG-VALIDITY: All 9 bundles have 21 days <= validity >= 21 days
2023-11-30 20:47:16,495: kskm.kar.validate: INFO KSR-POLICY-SIG-HORIZON: All signatures expire in less than 180 days
2023-11-30 20:47:16,495: kskm.kar.validate: INFO KSR-POLICY-BUNDLE-INTERVALS: All bundles intervals in accordance with the KSR operator policy
2023-11-30 20:47:16,496: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO Request:
2023-11-30 20:47:16,496: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO # Inception:
2023-11-30 20:47:16,496: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO # Expiration
2023-11-30 20:47:16,496: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 1 2024-01-01T00:00:00 2024-01-22T00:00:00 46790,30903
2023-11-30 20:47:16,496: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 2 2024-01-11T00:00:00 2024-02-01T00:00:00 30903
2023-11-30 20:47:16,496: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 3 2024-01-21T00:00:00 2024-02-11T00:00:00 30903
2023-11-30 20:47:16,496: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 4 2024-01-31T00:00:00 2024-02-21T00:00:00 30903
2023-11-30 20:47:16,496: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 5 2024-02-10T00:00:00 2024-03-02T00:00:00 30903
2023-11-30 20:47:16,496: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 6 2024-02-20T00:00:00 2024-03-12T00:00:00 30903
2023-11-30 20:47:16,496: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 7 2024-03-01T00:00:00 2024-03-22T00:00:00 30903
2023-11-30 20:47:16,496: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 8 2024-03-11T00:00:00 2024-04-01T00:00:00 30903
2023-11-30 20:47:16,496: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 9 2024-03-21T00:00:00 2024-04-11T00:00:00 30903,5613
2023-11-30 20:47:16,496: kskm.misc.hsm: INFO Initializing PKCS#11 module aep using /opt/kasper/PKCS11Provider/pkcs11_linux_gcc_4.1.2_glibc_2.5_x86_64.so.5.02
2023-11-30 20:47:16,666: kskm.misc.hsm: INFO HSM First slot: ICANNSK
2023-11-30 20:47:16,666: kskm.misc.hsm: INFO HSM ManufacturerID: Ultra Electronics AEP Network
2023-11-30 20:47:16,666: kskm.misc.hsm: INFO HSM Model: Keyper 9860-2
2023-11-30 20:47:16,666: kskm.misc.hsm: INFO HSM Serial: H2110010
2023-11-30 20:47:16,666: kskm.signer.verify_chain: INFO Checking coherence between SKR(n-1) and this SKR
2023-11-30 20:47:16,667: kskm.signer.verify_chain: INFO SKR-CHAIN-KEYS: The last keys in SKR(n-1) matches the first keys in this SKR
2023-11-30 20:47:16,667: kskm.signer.verify_chain: INFO KSR-CHAIN-OVERLAP: Overlap with 1 set bundle in SKR(n-1) 9 days is in accordance with the KSR policy
```

```
2023-11-30 20:47:16,668: kskm.signer.verify_chain: INFO KSR-CHAIN-KEYS: All 1 signatures in the last bundle of the last SKR were made with keys present in the HSM(s)
```

```
FILENAME: ksr-root-2024-q1-0.xml
SHA-256 HEX: d3f96e28d45296641aad3ced5fec3675f9e7675a074032be83ab9070232af5
SHA-256 MORIS: stapler.business.prior unicorn broadcast specialise breakup gosamer cranky peddle stapler pyramid tunnel forever tumor congregate indulge Waterloo Uramir graduate enlist armament crackdown component shydive Jamaica rhythm millionaire guidance cannonball brickyard visitor
```

```
Sign KSR? Confirm with "yes" (exactly) or anything else to abort: Yes
2023-11-30 20:48:41,774: kskm.signer.policy: INFO KSR-POLICY-SMERTY: PublishSafety validated
2023-11-30 20:48:41,774: kskm.signer.policy: INFO KSR-POLICY-SMERTY: PublishSafety validated
2023-11-30 20:48:41,774: kskm.signer.policy: INFO KSR-POLICY-SMERTY: ReclResafety validated
```

```
2023-11-30 20:48:41,774: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO Generated SKR:
2023-11-30 20:48:41,774: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO # Inception:
2023-11-30 20:48:41,774: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 1 2024-01-01T00:00:00 2024-01-22T00:00:00 46790,30903
2023-11-30 20:48:41,774: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 2 2024-01-11T00:00:00 2024-02-01T00:00:00 30903
2023-11-30 20:48:41,775: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 3 2024-01-21T00:00:00 2024-02-11T00:00:00 30903
2023-11-30 20:48:41,775: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 4 2024-01-31T00:00:00 2024-02-21T00:00:00 30903
2023-11-30 20:48:41,775: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 5 2024-02-10T00:00:00 2024-03-02T00:00:00 30903
2023-11-30 20:48:41,775: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 6 2024-02-20T00:00:00 2024-03-12T00:00:00 30903
2023-11-30 20:48:41,775: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 7 2024-03-01T00:00:00 2024-03-22T00:00:00 30903
2023-11-30 20:48:41,775: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 8 2024-03-11T00:00:00 2024-04-01T00:00:00 30903
2023-11-30 20:48:41,775: kskm.tools.karsigner: INFO 9 2024-03-21T00:00:00 2024-04-11T00:00:00 30903,5613
```

```
033172004h(kskm) root@ecceen:/media/KSRFP/KSKS1/HSW8E# printlog kskm-karsigner-20231130-204716-1058.log 8
1023689888 i copy i sent to printer
6 lines were wrapped
033172004h(kskm) root@ecceen:/media/KSRFP/KSKS1/HSW8E# cat style.xml
<?xml:stylesheet type="text/css" href="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL-Transform">
<xsl:output method="xml" indent="yes" omit-xml-declaration="yes"/>
<xsl:template match="*" node="/">
  <xsl:copy>
    <xsl:apply-templates select="*" node="*" />
  </xsl:copy>
</xsl:template>
<xsl:template match="ResponseBundle">
  <xsl:copy>
    <xsl:apply-templates select="Inception"/>
    <xsl:apply-templates select="Expiration"/>
    <xsl:sort select="Expiration" />
    <xsl:apply-templates select="Signature"/>
  </xsl:copy>
</xsl:template>
```



</xel:styleSheet>

```

V03172004h(Kskm) root@cccn:/media/KSRFP/KSK51/HSM8F xaltproc style.xsl /./sk\007r-root-
88a4e-g-9.mnt:rmllint --f
V03172004h(Kskm) root@cccn:/media/KSRFP/KSK51/HSM8F xaltproc style.xsl HEM8F-sk-root-2
694c9a8b_m3d_hemllint
V03172004h(Kskm) root@cccn:/media/KSRFP/KSK51/HSM8F diff -wu current now
V03172004h(Kskm) root@cccn:/media/KSRFP/KSK51/HSM8F cd /media/HSMFD/
V03172004h(Kskm) root@cccn:/media/HSMFD# ls -ltr /media/KSRFP/
total 16
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 16394 Nov 30 19:24 V0310m\V03101\34mKSK51\V0310m

```

/media/KSRFP/KSK51:

```

total 160
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 24833 Nov 17 22:23 sk-root-2023-q4-0.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 11501 Nov 17 22:23 karsigner.yaml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 19598 Nov 17 22:23 ksr-root-2024-q1-0.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 24832 Nov 30 19:24 ksr-root-2024-q1-0.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 11079 Nov 30 19:24 kskm-karsigner-20231130-192047-994.log
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 16394 Nov 30 20:23 V03101\34mHSM8F\V0310m
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 16394 Nov 30 20:23 V03101\34mHSM8F\V0310m

```

/media/KSRFP/KSK51/HSM7E:

```

total 208
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 652 Nov 17 22:23 style.xsl
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 24833 Nov 17 22:23 ksr-root-2023-q4-0.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 11501 Nov 17 22:23 karsigner.yaml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 19598 Nov 17 22:23 ksr-root-2024-q1-0.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 24832 Nov 30 20:19 HSM7E-ksr-root-2024-q1-0.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 11091 Nov 30 20:19 kskm-karsigner-20231130-201730-997.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 22205 Nov 30 20:23 current
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 22205 Nov 30 20:23 new

```

/media/KSRFP/KSK51/HSM8E:

```

total 208
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 652 Nov 17 22:23 style.xsl
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 24833 Nov 17 22:23 sk-root-2023-q4-0.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 11501 Nov 17 22:23 karsigner.yaml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 19598 Nov 17 22:23 ksr-root-2024-q1-0.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 24832 Nov 30 20:48 kskm-karsigner-20231130-204716-1058.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 24832 Nov 30 20:48 HSM8E-ksr-root-2024-q1-0.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 22205 Nov 30 20:31 current
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 22205 Nov 30 20:31 new
V03172004h(Kskm) root@cccn:/media/HSMFD# cp p3a3e4e4pKSK51/HSM8F/*
V03172004h(Kskm) root@cccn:/media/HSMFD# ls -ltr
19331720041
total 3400

```

```

-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 15547 Jun 9 2010 ksr-root-2010-q3-2.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 40555 Jun 9 2010 ksr-20100517-172720.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 190 Jun 16 2010 KSK10DB.conf:db
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 2668 Jun 16 2010 kskgen-20100616-211906.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 765 Jun 16 2010 Kyqnt7v.csr
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 36864 Jun 16 2010 tyuadit-tyUSB1-20100616-182157.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 45056 Jun 16 2010 tyuadit-tyUSB0-20100616-182157.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 18364 Jun 16 2010 ksr-root-2010-q3-2.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 4473 Jun 16 2010 karsigner-20100616-213929.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 196608 Jun 16 2010 scrip-20100616-1209utcc.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 7674 Jun 16 2010 scrip-20100616-209utcc.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 18364 Oct 31 2010 ksr.xml.20101101181303
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 15547 Oct 31 2010 ksr-root-2011-q1-0.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 18402 Nov 1 2010 ksr-root-2011-q1-0.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 5504 Nov 1 2010 karsigner-20101101-181303.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 14005 Nov 1 2010 tyuadit-tyUSB0-20101101-175457.log

```

```

-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 7161 Nov 1 2010 scrip-20101101.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 18402 Feb 7 2011 ksr.xml.20110511181632
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 15547 Apr 25 2011 ksr-root-2011-q3-0.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1400 May 11 2011 karsigner-20110511-181303.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 18402 May 11 2011 ksr-root-2011-q3-0.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 5510 May 11 2011 karsigner-20110511-181632.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 14374 May 11 2011 tyuadit-tyUSB0-20110511-180559.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 9133 May 11 2011 scrip-20110511.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 18404 Jul 20 2011 ksr.xml.20110930181607
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 15587 Sep 23 2011 ksr-root-2012-q1-0.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 18422 Sep 30 2011 ksr-root-2012-q1-0.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 5609 Sep 30 2011 karsigner-20110930-181607.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 12034 Sep 30 2011 tyuadit-tyUSB0-20110930-180703.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 7270 Sep 30 2011 scrip-20110930.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 18424 Feb 2 2012 ksr.xml.2012052151741
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 15571 May 9 2012 ksr-root-2012-q3-0.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 18414 May 22 2012 ksr-root-2012-q3-0.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 5528 May 22 2012 karsigner-20120522-151741.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 12034 May 22 2012 tyuadit-tyUSB0-20120522-150621.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 13817 May 22 2012 scrip-20120522.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 18324 Jul 26 2012 ksr.xml.20121112155152
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 15371 Oct 12 2012 ksr-root-2013-q1-0.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 5529 Nov 12 2012 ksr-root-2013-q1-0.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 12044 Nov 12 2012 karsigner-20121112-155152.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 12249 Nov 12 2012 tyuadit-tyUSB0-20121112-154229.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 12249 Nov 12 2012 scrip-20121112.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 18314 Feb 12 2013 ksr.xml.201305021906633
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 15371 Apr 5 2013 ksr-root-2013-q3-0.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 4004 May 2 2013 karsigner-20130502-190252.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 18314 May 2 2013 ksr-root-2013-q3-0.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 5502 May 2 2013 karsigner-20130502-190633.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 12397 May 2 2013 tyuadit-tyUSB0-20130502-185222.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 21494 May 2 2013 scrip-20130502.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 18314 Aug 7 2013 ksr.xml.201310241946168
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 15371 Oct 4 2013 ksr-root-2014-q1-0.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 18314 Oct 24 2013 ksr-root-2014-q1-0.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 5512 Oct 24 2013 karsigner-20131024-184618.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 12044 Oct 24 2013 tyuadit-tyUSB0-20131024-182843.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 9167 Oct 24 2013 scrip-20131024.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 18314 Feb 13 2014 ksr.xml.201404171891604
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 15353 Apr 3 2014 ksr-root-2014-q3-0.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 18314 Apr 17 2014 ksr-root-2014-q3-0.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 5511 Apr 17 2014 karsigner-20140417-183604.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 12034 Apr 17 2014 tyuadit-tyUSB0-20140417-182117.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 5853 Apr 17 2014 scrip-20140417.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 18314 Nov 10 2014 ksr.xml.20141120201132
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 15371 Nov 10 2014 ksr-root-2015-q1-0.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 18314 Nov 20 2014 ksr-root-2015-q1-0.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 5490 Nov 20 2014 karsigner-20141120-2001132.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 12042 Nov 20 2014 tyuadit-tyUSB0-20141120-200407.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 3462 Nov 20 2014 scrip-20141120-1.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 15353 Nov 20 2014 ksr-root-2015-q3-0.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 18314 Apr 9 2015 ksr.xml.20150409183038
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 18314 Apr 9 2015 ksr-root-2015-q3-0.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 5621 Apr 9 2015 karsigner-20150409-183038.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 15774 Apr 9 2015 tyuadit-tyUSB0-20150409-180743.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 5636 Apr 9 2015 karsigner-20150409-183635.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 33966 Apr 9 2015 tyuadit-tyUSB0-20150409-190117.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 3636 Apr 9 2015 karsigner-20150409-205227.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 34895 Apr 9 2015 tyuadit-tyUSB0-20150409-202837.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 19175 Apr 9 2015 scrip-20150409.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 18314 Nov 4 2015 ksr.xml.20151112199232
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 15371 Nov 4 2015 ksr-root-2016-q1-0.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 18314 Nov 12 2015 ksr-root-2016-q1-0.xml

```





```
total 128  
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 24928 Oct 13 2017 skr.xml.20171018181941  
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 19556 Oct 13 2017 ksr-root-2018-q1-0-d_to_e.xml  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 1344 Oct 13 2017 kskchedule.json  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 24928 Oct 18 2017 skr.xml  
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 24928 Oct 18 2017 skr-root-2018-q1-0-d_to_e.xml  
./KSK31-1-E_to_D:  
total 128  
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 24928 Oct 13 2017 skr.xml.20171018182803  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 19556 Oct 13 2017 ksr-root-2018-q1-1-e_to_d.xml  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 1344 Oct 13 2017 kskchedule.json  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 24928 Oct 18 2017 skr.xml  
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 24928 Oct 18 2017 skr-root-2018-q1-1-e_to_d.xml  
./KSK31-2-D_to_D:  
total 128  
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 24928 Oct 13 2017 skr.xml.20171018183150  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 19556 Oct 13 2017 ksr-root-2018-q1-2-d_to_d.xml  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 1344 Oct 13 2017 kskchedule.json  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 24928 Oct 18 2017 skr.xml  
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 24928 Oct 18 2017 skr-root-2018-q1-2-d_to_d.xml  
./KSK31-3-C_to_C:  
total 112  
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 24928 Oct 13 2017 skr.xml.20171018183453  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 19556 Oct 13 2017 ksr-root-2018-q1-3-c_to_c.xml  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 1148 Oct 13 2017 kskchedule.json  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 20347 Oct 18 2017 skr.xml  
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 20347 Oct 18 2017 skr-root-2018-q1-3-c_to_c.xml  
./KSK33-0-D_to_E:  
total 128  
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 24928 Apr 4 2018 skr.xml.20180411183203  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 19554 Apr 4 2018 ksr-root-2018-q3-0-d_to_e.xml  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 1344 Apr 4 2018 kskchedule.json  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 24928 Apr 11 2018 skr.xml  
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 24928 Apr 11 2018 skr-root-2018-q3-0-d_to_e.xml  
./KSK33-1-E_to_D:  
total 128  
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 24928 Apr 4 2018 skr.xml.20180411183607  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 19554 Apr 4 2018 ksr-root-2018-q3-1-e_to_d.xml  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 1344 Apr 4 2018 kskchedule.json  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 24928 Apr 11 2018 skr.xml  
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 24928 Apr 11 2018 skr-root-2018-q3-1-e_to_d.xml  
./KSK33-2-D_to_D:  
total 128  
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 24928 Apr 4 2018 skr.xml.20180411183814  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 19534 Apr 4 2018 ksr-root-2018-q3-2-d_to_d.xml  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 1344 Apr 4 2018 kskchedule.json  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 24928 Apr 11 2018 skr.xml  
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 24928 Apr 11 2018 skr-root-2018-q3-2-d_to_d.xml  
./KSK33-3-C_to_C:  
total 112  
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 24928 Apr 4 2018 skr.xml.20180411184001  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 19534 Apr 4 2018 ksr-root-2018-q3-3-c_to_c.xml  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 1148 Apr 4 2018 kskchedule.json  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 20347 Apr 11 2018 skr.xml  
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 20347 Apr 11 2018 skr-root-2018-q3-3-c_to_c.xml  
./KSK35-0-E_to_F:  
total 128  
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1678 Nov 12 2018 kskchedule.json  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 19594 Nov 9 2018 ksr-root-2019-q1-0-e_to_f.xml  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 24930 Nov 9 2018 skr.xml.20181115194236  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 29640 Nov 15 2018 skr.xml  
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 29640 Nov 15 2018 skr-root-2019-q1-0-e_to_f.xml  
./KSK35-1-F_to_G:  
total 112  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 1148 Oct 12 2018 kskchedule.json  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 19594 Nov 9 2018 ksr-root-2019-q1-1-f_to_g.xml  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 24930 Nov 9 2018 skr.xml.20181115195208  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 20367 Nov 15 2018 skr.xml  
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 20367 Nov 15 2018 skr-root-2019-q1-1-f_to_g.xml  
./KSK35-2-E_to_E:  
total 128  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 1345 Oct 12 2018 kskchedule.json  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 19594 Nov 9 2018 ksr-root-2019-q1-2-e_to_e.xml  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 24930 Nov 9 2018 skr.xml.20181115195448  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 24948 Nov 15 2018 skr.xml  
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 24948 Nov 15 2018 skr-root-2019-q1-2-e_to_e.xml  
./KSK35-3-D_to_D:  
total 128  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 1344 Oct 12 2018 kskchedule.json  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 19594 Nov 9 2018 ksr-root-2019-q1-3-d_to_d.xml  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 24930 Nov 9 2018 skr.xml.20181115195652  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 24948 Nov 15 2018 skr.xml  
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 24948 Nov 15 2018 skr-root-2019-q1-3-d_to_d.xml  
./KSK37:  
total 104  
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 20369 May 8 2019 skr.xml.20190516190831  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 19600 May 8 2019 ksr-root-2019-q3-0.xml  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 1148 May 6 2019 kskchedule.json  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 20369 May 16 2019 skr.xml  
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 20369 May 16 2019 skr-root-2019-q3-0.xml  
./KSK39:  
total 104  
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 20369 Nov 6 2019 skr.xml.20191114190143  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 19600 Nov 6 2019 ksr-root-2020-q1-0.xml  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 1148 Nov 6 2019 kskchedule.json  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 20369 Nov 14 2019 skr.xml  
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 20369 Nov 14 2019 skr-root-2020-q1-0.xml  
./KSK43:  
total 104  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 20369 Oct 2 2021 skr.xml.20211014175632  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 19582 Oct 2 2021 ksr-root-2022-q1-0.xml  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 1148 Oct 2 2021 kskchedule.json  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 20369 Oct 14 2021 skr.xml  
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 20369 Oct 14 2021 skr-root-2022-q1-0.xml  
./KSK45:  
total 104  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 20369 Apr 27 2022 skr.xml.20220512193033  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 19600 Apr 27 2022 ksr-root-2022-q3-0.xml  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 1148 Apr 27 2022 kskchedule.json  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 20369 May 12 2022 skr.xml  
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 20369 May 12 2022 skr-root-2022-q3-0.xml  
./KSK47:  
total 128  
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 20369 May 12 2022 skr.xml.20220512193033  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 19600 Apr 27 2022 ksr-root-2022-q3-0.xml  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 1148 Apr 27 2022 kskchedule.json  
-w-r--r-- 1 root root 20369 May 12 2022 skr.xml  
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 20369 May 12 2022 skr-root-2022-q3-0.xml
```

11/30/23  
21:28:36

script-20231130.log

KB38[720041

Script done on 2023-11-30 21:28:56+00:00 [COMMAND\_EXIT\_CODE=0\*]

```
total 104
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 20369 Jul 11 2018 skr.xml.20221103181823
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 19564 Jul 11 2018 kar-root-2023-q1-0.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1148 Jul 11 2018 kakschedule.json
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 20369 Nov 3 2022 skr.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 20369 Nov 3 2022 skr-root-2023-q1-0.xml

./KSK49:
total 120
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 20369 Apr 18 2023 skr.xml.20230427181450
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 11189 Apr 18 2023 karsigner.yaml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 19600 Apr 18 2023 kar-root-2023-q3-0.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1148 Apr 18 2023 kakschedule.json
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 20369 Apr 27 2023 skr.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 20369 Apr 27 2023 skr-root-2023-q3-0.xml

./tmp:
total 80
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 880 May 2 2013 karsigner_20130502190252_5048_tmp_skr.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1768 Apr 27 2023 skr.keybundle.8
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1392 Apr 27 2023 skr.keybundle.7
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1392 Apr 27 2023 skr.keybundle.6
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1392 Apr 27 2023 skr.keybundle.5
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1392 Apr 27 2023 skr.keybundle.4
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1392 Apr 27 2023 skr.keybundle.3
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1392 Apr 27 2023 skr.keybundle.2
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1392 Apr 27 2023 skr.keybundle.1
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1768 Apr 27 2023 skr.keybundle.0

./KSK51:
total 136
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 24833 Nov 17 22:23 skr-root-2023-q4-0.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 11501 Nov 17 22:23 karsigner.yaml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 19598 Nov 17 22:23 kar-root-2024-q1-0.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 24832 Nov 30 19:24 skr-root-2024-q1-0.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 11079 Nov 30 19:24 kskm-karsigner-20231130-192047-8941.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 8192 Nov 30 20:23 033[01:34]HSMTPE03310m
-rwxr-xr-x 2 root root 8192 Nov 30 20:51 033[01:34]HSMTPE03310m

./KSK51/HSMTPE:
total 176
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 652 Nov 17 22:23 style.xsl
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 24833 Nov 17 22:23 skr-root-2023-q4-0.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 11507 Nov 17 22:23 karsigner.yaml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 19598 Nov 17 22:23 kar-root-2024-q1-0.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 24832 Nov 30 20:19 HSM7E-skr-root-2024-q1-0.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 11097 Nov 30 20:19 kskm-karsigner-20231130-201730-9971.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 22205 Nov 30 20:23 current
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 22205 Nov 30 20:23 new

./KSK51/HSMTBE:
total 176
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 652 Nov 17 22:23 style.xsl
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 24833 Nov 17 22:23 skr-root-2023-q4-0.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 11507 Nov 17 22:23 karsigner.yaml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 19598 Nov 17 22:23 kar-root-2024-q1-0.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 11096 Nov 30 20:48 kskm-karsigner-20231130-204716-10581.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 24832 Nov 30 20:48 HSM8E-skr-root-2024-q1-0.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 22205 Nov 30 20:51 current
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 22205 Nov 30 20:51 new
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 22205 Nov 30 20:51 new
033[720041(kakm) root@con:/media/HSMTD# diff -qr /media/HSMTD/K\007SK51/ /media/KSRFD/K
SK51/
033[720041(kakm) root@con:/media/HSMTD# umount /media/KSRFD/
033[720041(kakm) root@con:/media/HSMTD#
```



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ttyaudi-tyUSB0-20231130-190131.log

2

```
2023-11-30T19:02:41+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:02:41+0000 ttyUSB0 Running cryptoApplication at 0x8FB00000
2023-11-30T19:02:42+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:02:42+0000 ttyUSB0 Jumping to startup @ 0x001037BA
2023-11-30T19:02:42+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:02:42+0000 ttyUSB0 Board is P2020RDB
2023-11-30T19:02:42+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:02:42+0000 ttyUSB0 board_smp_init: 2 cpu
2023-11-30T19:02:42+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:02:42+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:02:42+0000 ttyUSB0 Cpu_clk=100000000, Sys_clk=100000000, CCB=500000000
2023-11-30T19:02:42+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:02:43+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:02:43+0000 ttyUSB0 System page at phys:0000b000 user:0000b000 kern:0000b000
2023-11-30T19:02:43+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:02:43+0000 ttyUSB0 Starting next program at v0015183c
2023-11-30T19:02:43+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:02:43+0000 ttyUSB0 Starting K-Series Kernel
2023-11-30T19:02:43+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:02:43+0000 ttyUSB0 Copyright Ultra Electronics AEP. All Rights Reserved.
2023-11-30T19:02:43+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:02:43+0000 ttyUSB0 Sat Aug 17 03:22:19 1974
2023-11-30T19:02:43+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:02:43+0000 ttyUSB0 Starting audid v2.0 ... started.
2023-11-30T19:02:44+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:02:44+0000 ttyUSB0 Interface 0 configured for IPv6.
2023-11-30T19:02:44+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:02:44+0000 ttyUSB0 Interface 0 configured for IPv4.
2023-11-30T19:02:44+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:02:44+0000 ttyUSB0 Interface 1 configured for IPv6.
2023-11-30T19:02:44+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:02:44+0000 ttyUSB0 Interface 1 configured for IPv4.
2023-11-30T19:02:45+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:02:45+0000 ttyUSB0 router: writing to routing socket: Network is unreachable
2023-11-30T19:02:45+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:02:45+0000 ttyUSB0 add net default: gateway ::: Network is unreachable
2023-11-30T19:02:45+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:02:45+0000 ttyUSB0 router: writing to routing socket: Network is unreachable
2023-11-30T19:02:45+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:02:45+0000 ttyUSB0 add net default: gateway 0.0.0.0: Network is unreachable
2023-11-30T19:02:45+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:02:45+0000 ttyUSB0 Starting USB driver...
2023-11-30T19:02:45+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:02:45+0000 ttyUSB0 9860 v3.4 Keyper Application - May 19 2017 15:48:58
2023-11-30T19:02:45+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:02:45+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:02:45+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:02:47+0000 ttyUSB0 Running DES POST Test
2023-11-30T19:02:47+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:02:47+0000 ttyUSB0 Running Triple DES POST Test
2023-11-30T19:02:47+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:02:47+0000 ttyUSB0 Running AES POST Test
2023-11-30T19:02:47+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:02:47+0000 ttyUSB0 Running AES POST Test
2023-11-30T19:02:47+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:02:47+0000 ttyUSB0 AES POST Test Passed
2023-11-30T19:02:47+0000 ttyUSB0
```







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tyaudit-tyUSB0-20231130-190131.log

```
2023-11-30T19:17:50+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:17:50+0000 tyUSB0 TopListener: Created IPv6 socket 20 on port 5000.
2023-11-30T19:17:50+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:17:50+0000 tyUSB0 Audit on 17/8/1974 03:57:26 00100002
2023-11-30T19:17:50+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:20:47+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:20:47+0000 tyUSB0 TopListener: Accepted connection on socket 21 from address 192.168.0.1.
2023-11-30T19:20:47+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:20:47+0000 tyUSB0 Cryptotask: Closing connection on socket 21 from address 192.168.0.1.
2023-11-30T19:20:47+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:20:47+0000 tyUSB0 TopListener: Accepted connection on socket 23 from address 192.168.0.1.
2023-11-30T19:24:02+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:24:02+0000 tyUSB0 Cryptotask: Closing connection on socket 23 from address 192.168.0.1.
2023-11-30T19:24:02+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:28:29+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:28:29+0000 tyUSB0 Audit on 17/8/1974 03:48:04 00200069 4780000082602972
2023-11-30T19:28:29+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:28:52+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:28:52+0000 tyUSB0 Audit on 17/8/1974 03:48:27 00200069 3980011621672A76
2023-11-30T19:29:14+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:29:14+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:29:18+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:29:18+0000 tyUSB0 TopListener: Closed IPv4 socket 19 on port 5000.
2023-11-30T19:29:18+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:29:18+0000 tyUSB0 TopListener: Closed IPv6 socket 20 on port 5000.
2023-11-30T19:29:18+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:29:18+0000 tyUSB0 Audit on 17/8/1974 03:48:53 00100003
2023-11-30T19:33:25+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:33:25+0000 tyUSB0 Audit on 17/8/1974 03:53:00 00200023 4780000081AD2972
2023-11-30T19:33:52+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:34:24+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:34:24+0000 tyUSB0 Audit on 17/8/1974 03:53:27 00200023 388000004AA32A76
2023-11-30T19:37:04+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:37:04+0000 tyUSB0 Audit on 17/8/1974 03:56:39 00200023 4780000081BD2972
2023-11-30T19:37:59+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:37:59+0000 tyUSB0 Audit on 17/8/1974 03:57:34 00200023 00800002A48F156D
2023-11-30T19:38:56+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:38:56+0000 tyUSB0 Audit on 17/8/1974 03:58:32 00200023 09800004A83B3296D
2023-11-30T19:42:43+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:42:43+0000 tyUSB0 Audit on 17/8/1974 04:02:19 00200023 38800000D58632A76
2023-11-30T19:43:11+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:43:11+0000 tyUSB0 Audit on 17/8/1974 04:02:46 00200023 47800000816D2972
2023-11-30T19:43:45+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:43:45+0000 tyUSB0 Audit on 17/8/1974 04:03:20 00200023 3880000004AA32A76
2023-11-30T19:44:43+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:44:43+0000 tyUSB0 Audit on 17/8/1974 04:04:18 00200023 39800011654A72A76
2023-11-30T19:45:16+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:45:16+0000 tyUSB0 Audit on 17/8/1974 04:04:51 00200023 398001161E272A76
2023-11-30T19:45:28+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:45:28+0000 tyUSB0 Audit on 17/8/1974 04:05:03 00200010 398001161E272A76
2023-11-30T19:52:35+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:35+0000 tyUSB0
```



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tyaudit-ty USB0-20231130-1901311.log

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```
2023-11-30T19:52:36+0000 tyUSB0 Running cryptocApplication at 0xERF000000
2023-11-30T19:52:36+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:36+0000 tyUSB0 Jumping to startup @ 0x001037B4
2023-11-30T19:52:36+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:36+0000 tyUSB0 Board is P2020RDB
2023-11-30T19:52:36+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:36+0000 tyUSB0 board_smp_init: 2 cpu
2023-11-30T19:52:36+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:36+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:36+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:36+0000 tyUSB0 cpu_clk=100000000, Sys_clk=100000000, CCB=500000000
2023-11-30T19:52:36+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:38+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:38+0000 tyUSB0 System page at phys:000b000 user:000b000 kern:000b000
2023-11-30T19:52:38+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:38+0000 tyUSB0 Starting next program at v0015193c
2023-11-30T19:52:38+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:38+0000 tyUSB0 Starting K-Series Kernel
2023-11-30T19:52:38+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:38+0000 tyUSB0 Copyright Ultra Electronics AEP. All Rights Reserved.
2023-11-30T19:52:38+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:38+0000 tyUSB0 Sat Jun 20 06:29:42 1970
2023-11-30T19:52:38+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:38+0000 tyUSB0 Starting audited v2.0 ... started.
2023-11-30T19:52:38+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:38+0000 tyUSB0 interface 0 configured for IPv6.
2023-11-30T19:52:38+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:39+0000 tyUSB0 interface 0 configured for IPv4.
2023-11-30T19:52:39+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:39+0000 tyUSB0 interface 1 configured for IPv6.
2023-11-30T19:52:39+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:39+0000 tyUSB0 interface 1 configured for IPv4.
2023-11-30T19:52:40+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:40+0000 tyUSB0 route: writing to routing socket: Network is unreachable
2023-11-30T19:52:40+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:40+0000 tyUSB0 add net default: gateway :: Network is unreachable
2023-11-30T19:52:40+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:40+0000 tyUSB0 route: writing to routing socket: Network is unreachable
2023-11-30T19:52:40+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:40+0000 tyUSB0 add net default: gateway 0.0.0.0: Network is unreachable
2023-11-30T19:52:40+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:40+0000 tyUSB0 Starting USB driver...
2023-11-30T19:52:40+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:40+0000 tyUSB0 9860 v3.4 Keyper Application - May 19 2017 15:48:58
2023-11-30T19:52:40+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:40+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000 tyUSB0 DES POST Test Passed
2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000 tyUSB0 Running Triple DES POST Test
2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000 tyUSB0 Triple DES POST Test Passed
2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000 tyUSB0 Running AES POST Test
2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000 tyUSB0 AES POST Test Passed
2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000 tyUSB0 Running SHA1 POST Test
2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000 tyUSB0
```

2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000	tyUSB0	SHA1 POST Test Passed	
2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000	tyUSB0	Running SHA2 POST Test	
2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000	tyUSB0	SHA2 POST Test Passed	
2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000	tyUSB0	Running RandomGen POST Test	
2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000	tyUSB0	RandomGen POST Test Passed	
2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000	tyUSB0	Running RSA POST Test	
2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000	tyUSB0	RSA POST Test Passed	
2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000	tyUSB0	Running DSA POST Test	
2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000	tyUSB0	DSA POST Test Passed	
2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000	tyUSB0	Running SEED POST Test	
2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000	tyUSB0	SEED POST Test Passed	
2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000	tyUSB0	Running RIPPMD160 POST Test	
2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000	tyUSB0	RIPPMD160 POST Test Passed	
2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000	tyUSB0	Running ECC POST Test	
2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000	tyUSB0	ECC POST Test Passed	
2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000	tyUSB0	Running HMAC POST Tests	
2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000	tyUSB0	HMAC POST Tests Passed	
2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000	tyUSB0	Audit on 20/6/1970 06:29:45 00100008	
2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000	tyUSB0		
2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000	tyUSB0		
2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000	tyUSB0		
2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000	tyUSB0		
2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000	tyUSB0	Memory Usage:	
2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000	tyUSB0	RAM (Free/total)	192Kb/256Kb
2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000	tyUSB0	Flash (Free/total)	127Kb/128Kb
2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000	tyUSB0	black store	41b
2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000	tyUSB0	statistics	112b
2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000	tyUSB0	other	116b
2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000	tyUSB0	RedStore (Free/total)	107Kb/128Kb
2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000	tyUSB0		
2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000	tyUSB0	Network Configuration:	
2023-11-30T19:52:41+0000	tyUSB0		



```

2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0 Interface 0:
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0 IPv4: enabled
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0 IPv6: enabled
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0 MAC/IP addresses): 00:ED:6C:00:C9:4E / 192.168.0.2/24 , 2001::2e0:6cfe:f00:c94e/64
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0 Interface 1:
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0 IPv4: enabled
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0 IPv6: enabled
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0 MAC/IP addresses): 00:ED:6C:00:C9:4F / 192.168.1.2/24 , 2001::12e0:6cfe:f00:c94f/64
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0 HSM Port 0: 05000
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0 HSM Port 1: 03000
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0 Default Gateway(s): 0.0.0.0 ::
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0 Software Versions:
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0 BHL 030 ABL 021 App 034
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0 CPUID Version:
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0 i.9
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0 SCR Firmware Version:
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0 OROS-R2_99-R1.20
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0 Audit on 20/6/1970 06:29:47 00100001
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0 Audit on 20/6/1970 06:31:17 00200035 398001161F272A76
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0 Audit on 20/6/1970 06:31:18 0020000e 398001161F272A76
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0 Audit on 20/6/1970 06:32:35 00200023 4780000816D2972
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0 Audit on 20/6/1970 06:32:35 00200023 4780000816D2972
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0 Audit on 20/6/1970 06:32:58 00200023 478000081AD2972
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0 Audit on 20/6/1970 06:33:22 00200023 3980000058632A76
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0 Audit on 20/6/1970 06:33:34 00200056
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0 Audit on 20/6/1970 06:34:04 00200081
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0 Audit on 20/6/1970 06:34:13 00200054
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0 Audit on 20/6/1970 06:34:15 00200028
2023-11-30T19:52:43+0000 ttyUSB0

```





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20:58:48

tyaudit-tyUSB0-20231130-190131.log

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```
2023-11-30T19:57:22+0000 tyUSB0 route: writing to routing socket: Network is unreachable
2023-11-30T19:57:22+0000 tyUSB0 add net default: gateway 0.0.0.0: Network is unreachable
2023-11-30T19:57:22+0000 tyUSB0 Starting USB driver...
2023-11-30T19:57:22+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:57:22+0000 tyUSB0 9860 v3.4 Keyper Application - May 19 2017 15:48:58
2023-11-30T19:57:22+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0 Running DES POST Test
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0 DES POST Test Passed
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0 Running Triple DES POST Test
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0 Triple DES POST Test Passed
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0 Running AES POST Test
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0 AES POST Test Passed
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0 Running SHA1 POST Test
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0 SHA1 POST Test Passed
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0 Running SHA2 POST Test
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0 SHA2 POST Test Passed
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0 Running Randomgen POST Test
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0 Randomgen POST Test Passed
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0 Running RSA POST Test
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0 RSA POST Test Passed
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0 Running USA POST Test
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0 DSA POST Test Passed
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0 Running SEED POST Test
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0 SEED POST Test Passed
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0 Running RIPEMD160 POST Test
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0 RIPEMD160 POST Test Passed
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0 Running ECC POST Test
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0 ECC POST Test Passed
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0 Running HMAC POST Tests
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0 HMAC POST Tests Passed
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T19:57:24+0000 tyUSB0
```







```
2023-11-30T20:01:36+0000 tyUSB0 Memory Usage:
2023-11-30T20:01:36+0000 tyUSB0 RAM (free/total) 192Kb/256Mb
2023-11-30T20:01:36+0000 tyUSB0 Flash (free/total) 127Kb/128Mb
2023-11-30T20:01:36+0000 tyUSB0 black store 452b
2023-11-30T20:01:36+0000 tyUSB0 statistics 112b
2023-11-30T20:01:36+0000 tyUSB0 other 116b
2023-11-30T20:01:36+0000 tyUSB0 RedScore (free/total) 107Kb/128Kb
2023-11-30T20:01:36+0000 tyUSB0 Network Configuration:
2023-11-30T20:01:36+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:01:36+0000 tyUSB0 Interface 0:
2023-11-30T20:01:36+0000 tyUSB0 IPv4: enabled
2023-11-30T20:01:36+0000 tyUSB0 IPv6: enabled
2023-11-30T20:01:36+0000 tyUSB0 MAC/IP address(es): 00:E0:6C:00:C9:4E / 192.168.0.2/24 , 2001::1:2e0:6cff:fe00:c94e/64
2023-11-30T20:01:36+0000 tyUSB0 tsec0: flags=8a43<UP,BROADCAST,RUNNING,ALLMULTI,SIMPLEX,MULTICAST> mtu 1500
2023-11-30T20:01:36+0000 tyUSB0 capabilities rx-<IP4CSUM,TCP4CSUM,UDP4CSUM>
2023-11-30T20:01:36+0000 tyUSB0 capabilities tx=0
2023-11-30T20:01:36+0000 tyUSB0 enabled=0
2023-11-30T20:01:36+0000 tyUSB0 address: 00:e0:6c:00:c9:4e
2023-11-30T20:01:36+0000 tyUSB0 media: Ethernet none
2023-11-30T20:01:36+0000 tyUSB0 inet 192.168.0.2 netmask 0xfffff00 broadcast 192.169.0.255
2023-11-30T20:01:36+0000 tyUSB0 inet6 2001::2e0:6cff:fe00:c94e prefixlen 64
2023-11-30T20:01:36+0000 tyUSB0 inet6 fe80::2e0:6cff:fe00:c94e%tsec0 prefixlen 64 scopeid 0x2
2023-11-30T20:01:36+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:01:36+0000 tyUSB0 Interface 1:
2023-11-30T20:01:36+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:01:36+0000 tyUSB0 IPv4: enabled
2023-11-30T20:01:36+0000 tyUSB0 IPv6: enabled
2023-11-30T20:01:36+0000 tyUSB0 MAC/IP address(es): 00:E0:6C:00:C9:4F / 192.168.1.2/24 , 2001::1:2e0:6cff:fe00:c94f/64
2023-11-30T20:01:36+0000 tyUSB0 tsec1: flags=8a43<UP,BROADCAST,RUNNING,ALLMULTI,SIMPLEX,MULTICAST> mtu 1500
2023-11-30T20:01:36+0000 tyUSB0 capabilities rx-<IP4CSUM,TCP4CSUM,UDP4CSUM>
2023-11-30T20:01:36+0000 tyUSB0 capabilities tx=0
2023-11-30T20:01:36+0000 tyUSB0 enabled=0
2023-11-30T20:01:36+0000 tyUSB0
```





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tyaudit-tyUSB0-20231130-190131.log

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```
2023-11-30T20:14:13+0000 tyUSB0 Audit on 20/6/1970 06:51:18 00200016 Kmrf13b
2023-11-30T20:14:13+0000 tyUSB0 Audit on 20/6/1970 06:51:18 00200015 3F400031F8CA2A77
2023-11-30T20:14:13+0000 tyUSB0 Audit on 20/6/1970 06:51:18 00200018
2023-11-30T20:14:14+0000 tyUSB0 Audit on 20/6/1970 06:52:26 00200069 3990011621672A76
2023-11-30T20:15:22+0000 tyUSB0 Audit on 20/6/1970 06:52:48 00200069 4790000080602972
2023-11-30T20:15:43+0000 tyUSB0 Audit on 20/6/1970 06:53:11 00200069 4790000082602972
2023-11-30T20:16:07+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:16:09+0000 tyUSB0 TopListener: Created IPv4 socket 20 on port 5000.
2023-11-30T20:16:09+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:16:09+0000 tyUSB0 TopListener: Created IPv6 socket 21 on port 5000.
2023-11-30T20:16:09+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:16:09+0000 tyUSB0 Audit on 20/6/1970 06:53:13 00100002
2023-11-30T20:17:30+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:17:30+0000 tyUSB0 Cryptotask: Closing connection on socket 22 from address 192.168.0.1.
2023-11-30T20:17:30+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:17:30+0000 tyUSB0 TopListener: Accepted connection on socket 22 from address 192.168.0.1.
2023-11-30T20:17:30+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:17:30+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:17:30+0000 tyUSB0 TopListener: Accepted connection on socket 23 from address 192.168.0.1.
2023-11-30T20:19:42+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:19:42+0000 tyUSB0 Cryptotask: Closing connection on socket 23 from address 192.168.0.1.
2023-11-30T20:19:42+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:19:42+0000 tyUSB0 Audit on 20/6/1970 07:01:57 00200069 4790000080602972
2023-11-30T20:24:53+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:24:53+0000 tyUSB0 Audit on 20/6/1970 07:02:19 00200069 479000018FED2972
2023-11-30T20:25:15+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:25:15+0000 tyUSB0 Audit on 20/6/1970 07:02:39 00200069 4790000082602972
2023-11-30T20:25:35+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:25:41+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:25:41+0000 tyUSB0 TopListener: Closed IPv4 socket 20 on port 5000.
2023-11-30T20:25:41+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:25:41+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:25:41+0000 tyUSB0 Audit on 20/6/1970 07:02:45 00100003
2023-11-30T20:25:41+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:06+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:06+0000 tyUSB0 H2110010 011397 BBL 030 : Factory Software Verification Key : CPID version 1.9 : Hardware revision 2870-G2
2023-11-30T20:31:06+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:06+0000 tyUSB0 BBL CRC32: 0xDBC9B9F2
2023-11-30T20:31:06+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:06+0000 tyUSB0 Running applicationBootloader at 0xPFD00000
2023-11-30T20:31:06+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:06+0000 tyUSB0
```







```
2023-11-30T20:31:13+0000 tyUSB0 Randomgen POST Test Passed
2023-11-30T20:31:13+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:13+0000 tyUSB0 Running RSA POST Test
2023-11-30T20:31:13+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:13+0000 tyUSB0 RSA POST Test Passed
2023-11-30T20:31:13+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:13+0000 tyUSB0 Running DSA POST Test
2023-11-30T20:31:13+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:13+0000 tyUSB0 DSA POST Test Passed
2023-11-30T20:31:13+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:13+0000 tyUSB0 Running SEED POST Test
2023-11-30T20:31:13+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:13+0000 tyUSB0 SEED POST Test Passed
2023-11-30T20:31:13+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:13+0000 tyUSB0 Running RIPEMD160 POST Test
2023-11-30T20:31:13+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:13+0000 tyUSB0 RIPEMD160 POST Test Passed
2023-11-30T20:31:13+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:13+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:13+0000 tyUSB0 Running ECC POST Test
2023-11-30T20:31:13+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:13+0000 tyUSB0 Running ECC POST Test
2023-11-30T20:31:13+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:13+0000 tyUSB0 ECC POST Test Passed
2023-11-30T20:31:13+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:13+0000 tyUSB0 Running HMAC POST Tests
2023-11-30T20:31:13+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:13+0000 tyUSB0 HMAC POST Tests Passed
2023-11-30T20:31:13+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000 tyUSB0 Audit on 20/6/1970 07:26:01 00100008
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000 tyUSB0 Memory Usage:
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000 tyUSB0 RAM (Free/total) 192Mb/256Mb
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000 tyUSB0 Flash (Free/total) 127Mb/128Mb
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000 tyUSB0 black store 4kb
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000 tyUSB0 statistics 112b
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000 tyUSB0 other 116b
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000 tyUSB0 Redstore (Free/total) 107KB/128KB
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000 tyUSB0 Network Configuration:
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000 tyUSB0 Interface 0:
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000 tyUSB0 IPv4: enabled
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000 tyUSB0 IPv6: enabled
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000 tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000 tyUSB0 MAC/IP address(es): 00:80:6c:00:c9:51 / 192.168.0.2/24 , 2001::2a0:6cfff:fe00:c951/64
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000 tyUSB0
```

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tyaudi-tyUSB0-20231130-190131.log

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```
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000    tyUSB0 Interface 1:
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000    tyUSB0 IPv4: enabled
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000    tyUSB0 IPv6: enabled
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000    tyUSB0 MAC/IP address(es) : 00:ED:6C:00:C9:52 / 192.168.1.2/24 , 2001::1:26c:6cfe:f60:c952/64
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000    tyUSB0 HSM Port 0: 05000
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000    tyUSB0 HSM Port 1: 03000
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000    tyUSB0 Default Gateway(s) : 0.0.0.0 ::
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000    tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000    tyUSB0 Software Versions:
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000    tyUSB0 BHL 030 ABL 021 App 034
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000    tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000    tyUSB0 CPUD Version:
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000    tyUSB0 1.9
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000    tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000    tyUSB0 SCR Firmware Version:
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000    tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000    tyUSB0 Audit on 20/6/1970 07:26:59 00200035 398001161F272A76
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000    tyUSB0 Audit on 20/6/1970 07:27:14 00200035 3980011654A72A76
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000    tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000    tyUSB0 Audit on 20/6/1970 07:27:15 0020000e 3980011654A72A76
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000    tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000    tyUSB0 Audit on 20/6/1970 07:28:11 00200023 4780000081AD2972
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000    tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000    tyUSB0 Audit on 20/6/1970 07:28:32 00200023 398000000AAA32A76
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000    tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000    tyUSB0 Audit on 20/6/1970 07:28:53 00200023 4780000081ED2972
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000    tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000    tyUSB0 Audit on 20/6/1970 07:29:05 00200056
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000    tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000    tyUSB0 Audit on 20/6/1970 07:29:53 00200081
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000    tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000    tyUSB0 Audit on 20/6/1970 07:30:01 00200054
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000    tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000    tyUSB0 Audit on 20/6/1970 07:30:03 00200028
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000    tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000    tyUSB0 Hmcl1stener: Created IPv4 socket 9 on port 3000.
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000    tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000    tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000    tyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000    tyUSB0 Hmcl1stener: Created IPv6 socket 11 on port 3000.
2023-11-30T20:31:14+0000    tyUSB0
```



```
2023-11-30T20:35:20+0000 tyUSBD
2023-11-30T20:35:20+0000 tyUSBD Current tamper bitmaps:
2023-11-30T20:35:20+0000 tyUSBD
2023-11-30T20:35:20+0000 tyUSBD
2023-11-30T20:35:20+0000 tyUSBD currentTamper bitmap: 0x0000 0b .....
2023-11-30T20:35:20+0000 tyUSBD lastTamper bitmap: 0x0000 0b ..... |EXT_POWER_DOWN
2023-11-30T20:35:20+0000 tyUSBD
2023-11-30T20:35:20+0000 tyUSBD
2023-11-30T20:35:20+0000 tyUSBD Bitmapped Change Record (most recent first):
2023-11-30T20:35:20+0000 tyUSBD
2023-11-30T20:35:20+0000 tyUSBD
2023-11-30T20:35:20+0000 tyUSBD
2023-11-30T20:35:22+0000 tyUSBD Running cryptoApplication at 0x8BF00000
2023-11-30T20:35:22+0000 tyUSBD
2023-11-30T20:35:22+0000 tyUSBD Jumping to startup @ 0x001037B4
2023-11-30T20:35:22+0000 tyUSBD
2023-11-30T20:35:22+0000 tyUSBD Board is P2020RDB
2023-11-30T20:35:22+0000 tyUSBD
2023-11-30T20:35:22+0000 tyUSBD board_smp_init: 2 cpu
2023-11-30T20:35:22+0000 tyUSBD
2023-11-30T20:35:22+0000 tyUSBD
2023-11-30T20:35:22+0000 tyUSBD Cpu_clk=1000000000, Sys_clk=1000000000, CGB=500000000
2023-11-30T20:35:23+0000 tyUSBD
2023-11-30T20:35:23+0000 tyUSBD
2023-11-30T20:35:23+0000 tyUSBD System page at phys:0000b000 user:0000b000 kern:0000b000
2023-11-30T20:35:23+0000 tyUSBD
2023-11-30T20:35:23+0000 tyUSBD Starting next program at v0015193c
2023-11-30T20:35:23+0000 tyUSBD
2023-11-30T20:35:23+0000 tyUSBD Starting K-Series Kernel
2023-11-30T20:35:23+0000 tyUSBD
2023-11-30T20:35:23+0000 tyUSBD Copyright Ultra Electronics AEP. All Rights Reserved.
2023-11-30T20:35:23+0000 tyUSBD
2023-11-30T20:35:23+0000 tyUSBD
2023-11-30T20:35:23+0000 tyUSBD Sat Jun 20 07:30:12 1970
2023-11-30T20:35:23+0000 tyUSBD
2023-11-30T20:35:23+0000 tyUSBD Starting auditd v2.0 ... started.
2023-11-30T20:35:24+0000 tyUSBD
2023-11-30T20:35:24+0000 tyUSBD Interface 0 configured for IPv6.
2023-11-30T20:35:24+0000 tyUSBD
2023-11-30T20:35:24+0000 tyUSBD Interface 0 configured for IPv4.
2023-11-30T20:35:24+0000 tyUSBD
2023-11-30T20:35:24+0000 tyUSBD Interface 1 configured for IPv6.
2023-11-30T20:35:24+0000 tyUSBD
2023-11-30T20:35:25+0000 tyUSBD Interface 1 configured for IPv4.
2023-11-30T20:35:25+0000 tyUSBD
2023-11-30T20:35:25+0000 tyUSBD route: writing to routing socket: Network is unreachable
2023-11-30T20:35:25+0000 tyUSBD
2023-11-30T20:35:25+0000 tyUSBD add net default: gateway ::: Network is unreachable
2023-11-30T20:35:25+0000 tyUSBD
2023-11-30T20:35:25+0000 tyUSBD route: writing to routing socket: Network is unreachable
2023-11-30T20:35:25+0000 tyUSBD
2023-11-30T20:35:25+0000 tyUSBD add net default: gateway 0.0.0.0: Network is unreachable
2023-11-30T20:35:25+0000 tyUSBD
2023-11-30T20:35:25+0000 tyUSBD Starting USB driver...
2023-11-30T20:35:25+0000 tyUSBD
2023-11-30T20:35:25+0000 tyUSBD
2023-11-30T20:35:25+0000 tyUSBD
2023-11-30T20:35:25+0000 tyUSBD 9660 v3.4 Keyper Application - May 19 2017 15:48:58
2023-11-30T20:35:25+0000 tyUSBD
```

```
2023-11-30T20:35:25+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:35:25+0000 ttyUSBC
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 Running DES POST Test
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 DES POST Test Passed
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 Running Triple DES POST Test
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 Triple DES POST Test Passed
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 Running AES POST Test
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 AES POST Test Passed
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 Running SHA1 POST Test
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 SHA1 POST Test Passed
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 Running SHA2 POST Test
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 SHA2 POST Test Passed
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 Running Randomgen POST Test
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 Randomgen POST Test Passed
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 Running RSA POST Test
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 RSA POST Test Passed
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 Running DSA POST Test
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 DSA POST Test Passed
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 Running SEED POST Test
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 SEED POST Test Passed
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 Running ECC POST Test
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 ECC POST Test Passed
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 Running HMAC POST Tests
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 HMAC POST Tests Passed
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:35:27+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:35:28+0000 Keyper 9860-2 Serial Number H2110010
2023-11-30T20:35:28+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:35:28+0000 Memory Usage:
2023-11-30T20:35:28+0000 ttyUSB0
```



```
2023-11-30T20:35:28+0000 tyUSB0 HmcIstener: Created IPv6 socket 10 on port 3900.  
2023-11-30T20:35:28+0000 tyUSB0 Audit on 20/6/1970 07:30:16 00100003  
2023-11-30T20:35:28+0000 tyUSB0  
2023-11-30T20:36:01+0000 tyUSB0 Audit on 20/6/1970 07:30:49 0020006b 3880000c2d232a76  
2023-11-30T20:36:21+0000 tyUSB0 Audit on 20/6/1970 07:31:09 0020006b 3880000c2e232a76  
2023-11-30T20:36:42+0000 tyUSB0 Audit on 20/6/1970 07:31:31 0020006b 3880000c41232a76  
2023-11-30T20:37:01+0000 tyUSB0 Audit on 20/6/1970 07:31:49 00200039  
2023-11-30T20:37:06+0000 tyUSB0 Audit on 20/6/1970 07:31:55 0020003b  
2023-11-30T20:37:13+0000 tyUSB0  
2023-11-30T20:37:13+0000 tyUSB0 Audit on 20/6/1970 07:32:01 00200041  
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 tyUSB0  
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 tyUSB0  
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 tyUSB0  
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 tyUSB0 HSM Status  
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 tyUSB0  
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 tyUSB0  
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 tyUSB0 Keyper 9860-2  
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 tyUSB0  
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 tyUSB0 Serial Number H2110010  
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 tyUSB0 Date (dd/mm/yyyy) 20/6/1970 Time 7:32:28  
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 tyUSB0  
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 tyUSB0 Software Versions:  
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 tyUSB0  
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 tyUSB0 BBL 030 ABL 021 App 034  
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 tyUSB0  
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 tyUSB0  
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 tyUSB0 CPID Version:  
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 tyUSB0 1.9  
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 tyUSB0  
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 tyUSB0  
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 tyUSB0  
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 tyUSB0  
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 tyUSB0 SCR Firmware Version:  
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 tyUSB0  
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 tyUSB0 OROS-R2.99-R1.20  
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 tyUSB0  
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 tyUSB0  
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 tyUSB0  
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 tyUSB0 Memory Usage:  
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 tyUSB0  
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 tyUSB0 RAM (free/total) 192Kb/256Kb  
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 tyUSB0  
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 tyUSB0 Flash (free/total) 127Kb/128Kb  
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 tyUSB0  
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 tyUSB0 Black store 452b  
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 tyUSB0  
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 tyUSB0 statistics 112b  
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 tyUSB0
```

```
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 ttyUSB0 other 116b
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 ttyUSB0 RedScore (frec/total) 107Kb/128Kb
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 ttyUSB0 Network Configuration:
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 ttyUSB0 Interface 0:
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 ttyUSB0 IPv4: enabled
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 ttyUSB0 IPv6: enabled
2023-11-30T20:37:39+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:37:40+0000 MAC/IP address(es) : 00:80:6c:00:c9:51 / 192.168.0.2/24 , 2001::1:2e0:6cff:fe00:c951/64
2023-11-30T20:37:40+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:37:40+0000 tsec0: flags=8a43<UP,BROADCAST,RUNNING,ALINKMULTI,SIMPLEX,MULTICAST> mtu 1500
2023-11-30T20:37:40+0000 ttyUSB0 capabilities rx=7<IP4CSUM,TCP4CSUM,UDP4CSUM>
2023-11-30T20:37:40+0000 ttyUSB0 capabilities tx=0
2023-11-30T20:37:40+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:37:40+0000 ttyUSB0 enabled=0
2023-11-30T20:37:40+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:37:40+0000 ttyUSB0 address: 00:e0:6c:00:c9:51
2023-11-30T20:37:40+0000 ttyUSB0 media: Ethernet none
2023-11-30T20:37:40+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:37:40+0000 ttyUSB0 IPv4: enabled
2023-11-30T20:37:40+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:37:40+0000 ttyUSB0 IPv6: enabled
2023-11-30T20:37:40+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:37:40+0000 MAC/IP address(es) : 00:80:6c:00:c9:52 / 192.168.1.2/24 , 2001::1:2e0:6cff:fe00:c952/64
2023-11-30T20:37:40+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:37:40+0000 tsec1: flags=8a43<UP,BROADCAST,RUNNING,ALINKMULTI,SIMPLEX,MULTICAST> mtu 1500
2023-11-30T20:37:40+0000 ttyUSB0 capabilities rx=7<IP4CSUM,TCP4CSUM,UDP4CSUM>
2023-11-30T20:37:40+0000 ttyUSB0 capabilities tx=0
2023-11-30T20:37:40+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:37:40+0000 ttyUSB0 enabled=0
2023-11-30T20:37:40+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:37:40+0000 ttyUSB0 address: 00:e0:6c:00:c9:52
2023-11-30T20:37:40+0000 ttyUSB0 media: Ethernet none
2023-11-30T20:37:40+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:37:40+0000 ttyUSB0 inet 192.168.1.2 netmask 0xfffff00 broadcast 192.168.1.255
2023-11-30T20:37:40+0000 ttyUSB0 inet6 2001::1:2e0:6cff:fe00:c952 prefixlen 64
2023-11-30T20:37:40+0000 ttyUSB0
2023-11-30T20:37:40+0000 inet6 fe80::2e0:6cff:fe00:c952%tsec1 prefixlen 64 scopeid 0x3
2023-11-30T20:37:40+0000 ttyUSB0
```









## Act 7: Secure Hardware

The CA will secure the ceremony hardware by performing the steps below:

- Copy the HSMFD contents
- Print log information
- Place the equipment and CO credentials inside of TEBs
- Along with IW, escort SSC1 and equipment cart into Tier 5 (Safe Room) to return equipment to Safe #1
- Along with IW, escort SSC2 and COs into Tier 5 (Safe Room) to return COs' cards to Safe #2

### Stop Logging the Serial Output and the Terminal Session

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
1	CA performs the following steps to stop logging: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Perform the following steps using the <b>HSM Output</b> terminal window to stop logging the serial output (<b>ttyaudit</b>):               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Press <b>Ctrl + C</b></li> <li>Execute <b>exit</b></li> </ol> </li> <li>Execute the command below using the <b>Commands</b> terminal window to stop logging the terminal session: <b>exit</b></li> </ol> <p>Note: The <b>Commands</b> terminal session window will remain open.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Disconnect the null modem and ethernet cables from the laptop.</li> </ol>	M	21:29

### Print Logging Information

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
2	CA executes the following commands to print a copy of the logging information: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>print-script script-202311*.log</b></li> <li><b>print-ttyaudit ttyaudit-tty*-202311*.log</b></li> </ol> <p>Attach the printed copies to IW script.</p> <p>Note: Ignore the error regarding non-printable characters if prompted.</p>	M	21:32

### Prepare blank FDs and Copy the HSMFD Contents

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
3	CA executes the following command to print <b>two</b> copies of the hash for the HSMFD content: <pre>hsmfd-hash -p</pre> <p>Note: One copy for audit bundle and one copy for HSMFD package.</p>	M	21:33
4	CA executes the command below to display the contents of the HSMFD: <pre>ls -ltrR</pre>	M	21:33
5	CA executes the command below to set the <b>copy-hsmfd</b> script to verbose mode: <pre>sed -i '4i set -x' /opt/icann/bin/copy-hsmfd</pre>	M	21:33
6	CA executes the command below to create <b>five</b> HSMFDs copies: <pre>copy-hsmfd</pre> <p>Note: Wait for the activity light on the copy HSMFD to stop flashing before removal.</p>	M	21:40

## Place HSMFDs and OS Media into a TEB






Step	Activity	Initials	Time
7	CA executes the following commands using the terminal window to unmount the HSMFD: a) <code>cd /tmp</code> b) <code>umount /media/HSMFD</code> CA removes the HSMFD, then places it on the holder. <b>Note: Wait for the activity light on the copy HSMFD to stop flashing before removal.</b>	M	21:4
8	CA performs the following steps to switch OFF the laptop and remove the OS media: a) Turn OFF the laptop by pressing the power button. b) Disconnect all connections from the laptop. c) Remove the OS media from the laptop.	M	21:41
9	CA places 2 HSMFDs, 2 OS media SD cards enclosed in their plastic cases, 2 OS media DVDs, and 1 sheet of paper with the printed HSMFD hash into its designated new TEB, then seals it.	M	21:43
10	CA performs the following steps to verify the TEB: a) Read aloud the TEB number, then show it to the audit camera above for participants to see. b) Confirm with IW that the TEB number matches with the information below. c) Initial the TEB along with IW using a ballpoint pen. d) Give IW the sealing strips for post-ceremony inventory. e) Place the OS media TEB on the cart.  <b>OS media (release coen-1.0.0) + HSMFD: TEB # BB02638663</b>	M	21:44
11	CA distributes the following HSMFDs: 2 for IW (for audit bundles). 2 for RKOS (for SKR exchange with RZM and process review).	M	21:44

## Place the Laptop into a TEB

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
12	CA places the laptop into its designated new TEB, then seals it.	M	21:46
13	CA performs the following steps: a) Read aloud the TEB number and laptop serial number, then show it to the audit camera above for participants to see. b) Confirm with IW that the TEB number and laptop serial number matches with the information below. c) Initial the TEB along with IW using a ballpoint pen. d) Give IW the sealing strips for post-ceremony inventory. e) Place the laptop TEB on the cart.  <b>Laptop4: TEB # BB81420078 / Service Tag # 58SVSG2</b>	M	21:47

## Place Crypto Officers' Credentials into TEBs

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
14	<p>The CA calls each of the COs listed below sequentially to the ceremony table to perform the following steps:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) CA takes the TEB and plastic case prepared for the CO.</li> <li>b) CO takes their cards from the card holder and places them inside the plastic case.</li> <li>c) CO gives the plastic case containing the cards to the CA.</li> <li>d) CA places the plastic case into its designated new TEB, reads aloud the TEB number and description, then seals it.</li> <li>e) CA initials the TEB with a ballpoint pen, then IW keeps the sealing strips for post-ceremony inventory.</li> <li>f) IW inspects the TEB, confirms the TEB number with the list below, then initials it with a ballpoint pen.</li> <li>g) CA gives the TEB containing the cards to the CO.</li> <li>h) CO inspects the TEB, verifies its contents, then initials it with a ballpoint pen.</li> <li>i) CO writes the date and time, then signs the table of the IW's script, then the IW initials the entry.</li> <li>j) CO returns to their seat with their TEBs, being especially careful not to compromise any TEB.</li> <li>k) Repeat steps for all the remaining COs' credentials on the list.</li> </ul> <p><b>CO1: Frederico Neves</b> Set # 1 TEB # BB02638669</p> <p><b>CO2: Pia Gruvö</b> Set # 1 TEB # BB02638668</p> <p><b>CO4: Robert Seastrom</b> Set # 1 TEB # BB02638667</p> <p><b>CO5: Nomsa Mwayenga</b> Set # 1 TEB # BB02638666 Set # 2 TEB # BB02638665 (CO reviews the card set prior to placing into TEB)</p> <p><b>CO6: Hugo Salgado</b> Set # 1 TEB # BB02638664</p>	<p><i>M</i></p>	<p>22:00</p>

CO	TEB #	Printed Name	Signature	Date	Time	IW Initials
C01	Set # 1 TEB # BB02638669	Frederico Neves		2023 Nov 30	21:50	FN
C02	Set # 1 TEB # BB02638668	Pia Gruvö		2023 Nov 30	21:52	PG
C04	Set # 1 TEB # BB02638667	Robert Seastrom		2023 Nov 30	21:54	RS
C05	Set # 1 TEB # BB02638666 Set # 2 TEB # BB02638665	Nomsa Mwayenga		2023 Nov 30	22:00	NM
C06	Set # 1 TEB # BB02638664	Hugo Salgado		2023 Nov 30	22:01	HS

## Return the Equipment to Safe #1 (Tier 6, Equipment Safe)

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
15	CA and IW transport a cart and escort SSC1 into Tier 5 (Safe Room.)	<i>M</i>	22:03
16	SSC1 opens Safe #1 while shielding the combination from the camera. Note: SSC begins by rapidly spinning the dial counter-clockwise 15-20 revolutions in order to charge it before stopping at the first number in the combination.	<i>M</i>	22:04
17	SSC1 removes the safe log, then writes the date and time, then signs the safe log where "Open Safe" is indicated. IW verifies this entry, then initials it. Note: If log entry is pre-printed, verify the entry, record time of completion and sign.	<i>M</i>	22:05
18	CA performs the following steps to return each piece of equipment to the safe: a) CAREFULLY remove the equipment TEB from the cart. b) Read aloud the TEB number while showing it to the audit camera above, then place it inside Safe #1 c) Write the date, time, and signature on the safe log where "Return" is indicated. d) IW verifies the safe log entry, then initials it.  HSM5E: TEB # BB51184250 HSM7E: TEB # BB51184251 HSM8E: TEB # BB51184252 Laptop4: TEB # BB81420078 OS media (release coen-1.0.0) + HSMFD: TEB # BB02638663 KSK-2017: TEB # BB02638662 KSK-2023: TEB # BB02638661	<i>M</i>	22:08

## Close Safe #1 (Tier 6, Equipment Safe)

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
19	SSC1 writes the date and time, then signs the safe log where "Close Safe" is indicated. IW verifies the entry, then initials it.	<i>M</i>	22:10
20	SSC1 returns the safe log to Safe #1, closes the safe door, pulls up on the handle, and ensures it's locked by spinning the dial at least two full revolutions each way, counter-clockwise then clockwise. CA and IW verify that the safe is locked and the "WAIT" light indicator is off.	<i>M</i>	22:10
21	CA, SSC1, and IW leave Tier 5 (Safe Room) transporting the cart and returning to Tier 4 (Key Ceremony Room).	<i>M</i>	22:11

## Open Safe #2 (Tier 6, Credentials Safe)

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
22	CA transports the guard key and a flashlight, and with IW escort SSC2 and the COs into Tier 5 (Safe Room.)	<i>M</i>	22:12
23	SSC2 opens Safe #2 while shielding the combination from the camera. Note: SSC begins by rapidly spinning the dial counter-clockwise 15-20 revolutions in order to charge it before stopping at the first number in the combination.	<i>M</i>	22:13
24	SSC2 removes the safe log, then writes the date and time, then signs the safe log where "Open Safe" is indicated. IW verifies this entry, then initials it. Note: If log entry is pre-printed, verify the entry, record time of completion and sign.	<i>M</i>	22:14



## COs Return the Credentials to Safe Deposit Boxes (Tier 7)

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
25	<p>COs perform the following steps sequentially to return the listed TEBs:</p> <p>a) CO reads aloud the TEB number(s), then verifies integrity while showing the TEB(s) to the audit camera above</p> <p>b) After the CA operates the guard key in the bottom lock, CO reads aloud the safe deposit box number and uses their tenant key to operate the top lock.</p> <p><b>Note: The COs will retrieve their new safe deposit box keys when specified below.</b></p> <p>c) CO opens their safe deposit box, places their TEB(s) inside, then closes and locks the safe deposit box.</p> <p>d) CO writes the date and time, then signs the safe log where <b>"Return"</b> is indicated.</p> <p>e) IW verifies the completed safe log entry, then initials it.</p> <p><b>CO1: Frederico Neves</b>  <b>Box # 1239</b>  <b>Set # 1 TEB # BB02638669</b></p> <p><b>CO2: Pia Gruvö</b>  <b>Box # 1264</b>  <b>Set # 1 TEB # BB02638668</b></p> <p><b>CO4: Robert Seastrom</b>  <b>Box # 1243</b>  <b>Set # 1 TEB # BB02638667</b></p> <p><b>CO5: Nomsa Mwayenga</b>  <b>Box # 1262</b>  <b>Set # 1 TEB # BB02638666</b>  <b>Set # 2 TEB # BB02638665</b></p> <p><b>CO6: Hugo Salgado</b>  <b>Box # 1242</b>  <b>Set # 1 TEB # BB02638664</b></p>	<i>[Handwritten Signature]</i>	

## Close Safe #2 (Tier 6, Credentials Safe)

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
26	Once all safe deposit boxes are closed and locked, SSC2 writes the date and time, then signs the safe log where <b>"Close Safe"</b> is indicated. IW verifies the safe log entry, then initials it.	<i>[Handwritten Signature]</i>	22:22
27	SSC2 returns the safe log to Safe #2, closes the safe door, pulls up on the handle, and ensures it's locked by spinning the dial at least two full revolutions each way, counter-clockwise then clockwise. CA and IW verify that the safe is locked and the <b>"WAIT"</b> light indicator is off.	<i>[Handwritten Signature]</i>	22:23
28	CA, IW, SSC2, and COs leave Tier 5 (Safe Room) returning to Tier 4 (Key Ceremony Room).	<i>[Handwritten Signature]</i>	22:23

## Act 8: Close the Key Signing Ceremony

The CA will finish the ceremony by performing the following steps:

- Read any exceptions that occurred during the ceremony
- Call the ceremony participants to sign the IW's script
- Stop the online streaming and video recording
- Ensure that all participants are signed out of Tier 4 (Key Ceremony Room) log and escorted out
- Prepare the audit bundle materials

### Participants Sign IW's Script

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
1	CA reads all exceptions that occurred during the ceremony.	<i>M</i>	22:05
2	CA calls each attendee on the participants list to proceed to the ceremony table and sign IW's participants list. <b>All signatories declare that this script is a true and accurate record of the ceremony.</b>	<i>M</i>	22:28
3	CA reviews IW's script, then signs the participants list.	<i>M</i>	22:32
4	IW signs the list and records the completion time.	<i>M</i>	22:32

### Stop Online Streaming and Recording

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
5	CA acknowledges the participation of the online participants, then notifies the SA to stop the online streaming.	<i>M</i>	22:33
6	CA requests that an SA stop the audit camera video recording.	<i>M</i>	22:33
7	CA informs onsite participants of post ceremony activities.	<i>M</i>	22:34
8	Ceremony participants take a group photo.	<i>M</i>	22:37

### Sign Out of Tier 4 (Key Ceremony Room)

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
9	RKOS ensure that all participants are signed out of Tier 4 (Key Ceremony Room) log and escorted out of Tier 4 (Key Ceremony Room.) SA, IW, and CA must remain in Tier 4 (Key Ceremony Room.)	<i>M</i>	22:44

### Bundle Audit Materials

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
10	<p>IW makes a copy of their script for off-site audit bundle containing:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Output of signer system - HSMFD.</li> <li>b) Copy of IW's key ceremony script.</li> <li>c) Audio-visual recording from the audit cameras.</li> <li>d) Logs from the Physical Access Control System and Intrusion Detection System: Range: <b>20230427 00:00:00 to 20231131 00:00:00 UTC</b></li> <li>e) IW's attestation (See Appendix C on page 51).</li> <li>f) SA's attestation (See Appendix D on page 52 and Appendix E on page 53).</li> </ul> <p>All TEBs are labeled <b>Root DNSSEC KSK Ceremony 51</b>, dated and initialed by IW and CA. An off-site audit bundle is delivered to an off-site storage.</p>	<i>M</i>	22:48

## Appendix A: Glossary

- [1] **COEN**: The Ceremony Operating ENvironment (COEN) is a Reproducible ISO image consisting of a live operating system. More information and the OS image source code can be found at:

`https://github.com/iana-org/coen`

- [2] **configure-printer**:\* A bash script used to install the HP LaserJet print driver from the command line instead of **system-config-printer**.
- [3] **copy-hsmfd**:\* A bash script used to copy HSMFD contents to new flash drives; includes verification via hash comparison.
- [4] **hsmfd-hash**:\* A bash script used to calculate, print, and compare SHA-256 checksums for the HSMFD flash drives.  
**Note: The sort command has different behavior depending on the locale settings specified by environment variables. Current OS locale setting is LC\_COLLATE="POSIX"**
- [5] **kskm-keymaster**:\*\* An application that creates and deletes keys and performs a key inventory.
- [6] **kskm-ksrsigner**:\*\* An application that uses the KSK private key stored in the HSM to generate digital signatures for the ZSK.
- [7] **ksrsigner**: A legacy application that uses the KSK private key stored in the HSM to generate digital signatures for the ZSK.

The source code is available at `https://github.com/iana-org/dnssec-keytools-legacy`

- [8] **ping hsm**: The HSM static IP address `192.168.0.2` has been included in the `/etc/hosts` file.
- [9] **printlog**:\* A bash script used to print the Key Signing Log output from **ksrsigner** application.
- [10] **print-script**:\* A bash script used to print the terminal commands.
- [11] **print-ttyaudit**:\* A bash script used to print the HSM logs.
- [12] **sha2wordlist**: An application that reads data from STDIN and outputs a SHA-256 checksum as hex and PGP words in STDOUT.

The source code is available at `https://github.com/kirei/sha2wordlist`

- [13] **ttyaudit**:\* A perl script used to capture and log the HSM output.

---

\* The source code is available at `https://github.com/iana-org/coen/blob/master/tools/packages/ksk-tools-1.0.0coen_amd64.deb`

A debian package is an **ar** archive. To extract data from a deb package, use the command **ar -x ksk-tools-1.0.0coen\_amd64.deb**

Then extract the files with **tar -xvf data.tar.xz**

The file will be located in the directory: `./opt/icann/bin/`

---

\*\* The source code is available at `https://github.com/iana-org/dnssec-keytools`

[14] **Keyper HSM Role Cards:**

- a) **OP (Operator)**: Configures the HSM to an online or offline state toggling communication through its ethernet adapter. Required for communication with the laptop for key signing operations.
- b) **SO (Security Officer)**: Used for HSM administrative operations. Required to create other role cards (OP and CO), and the introduction or zeroization of an HSM.
- c) **CO (Crypto Officer)**: Used for the key management functions in an HSM. Required for adding or deleting keys stored in an HSM.
- d) **SMK (Storage Master Key)**: Allows an HSM to read an encrypted APP key backup. Required for initial migration of keys and disaster recovery.
- e) **AAK (Adapter Authorization Key)**: Configures an HSM to use previously generated OP, CO, and SO cards. Required for the introduction of an HSM.
- f) **APP (Application Key)**: An encrypted backup copy of one or more keys stored in an HSM, which can only be decoded by its corresponding SMK. Required for migrating keys and disaster recovery.

## **Appendix B: Audit Bundle Checklist**

### **1. Output of Signer System (by CA)**

Each audit bundle will contain one HSMFD. All bundles will be placed inside TEBs that are pre-labeled Audit Original and Audit Copy

### **2. Key Ceremony Script (by IW)**

Hard copies of the IW's key ceremony script, notes generated during the ceremony, and attestation. See Appendix C on page 51.

### **3. Audio-Visual Recordings from the KSK Ceremony (by SA)**

Two sets of the audit camera footage - One for the original audit bundle and the other for the duplicate audit bundle.

### **4. Logs from the Physical Access Control System and Intrusion Detection System (by SA)**

Two electronic copies of the following:

1. Firewall configuration
2. Configuration reports
3. Personnel/cardholder reports
4. Activity and audit log reports

These files will be placed inside two separate Flash Drives that are labeled "Audit".

The contents of the Flash Drive will be confirmed by the IW before placing each of them inside the original and the duplicate audit bundles.

### **5. Configuration review of the Physical Access Control System and Intrusion Detection System (by SA)**

SA's attestation and hard copies of the screen shots and configuration audit log from the review process. See Appendix D on page 52.

### **6. Configuration review of the Firewall System (by SA)**

SA's attestation and hard copies of the firewall configuration from the review process. See Appendix E on page 53. Ensure the scrambled passwords are eliminated from the configuration before publishing it.

### **7. Other items**


If applicable.

## Appendix C: Key Ceremony Script (by IW)

I hereby attest that the Key Ceremony was conducted in accordance with this script.  
Any exceptions that occurred were accurately and properly documented.

IW: **Andy Newton**

Signature:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'AN', written over a horizontal line.

Date: 2023 Nov 30

## Appendix D: Access Control System Configuration Review (by SA)

In my review of the KMF's Access Control System, I attest that the following are true and correct to the best of my knowledge:

- a) There were NO discrepancies found in the system configurations, assigned authorizations, and audit logs.
- b) Aside from the date filter that is applicable to some reports, there were NO other filters applied.

Below are the reports that were generated from the access control system:

1. List of Personnel with assigned Access Group.
2. Configuration of Areas and Access Groups.
3. Logs for Access Event activities and Configuration activities.

Range: **20230427 00:00:00 to 20231131 00:00:00 UTC.**

SA: Darren Kera


Signature: 

Date: 2023 Nov 20

## Appendix E: Firewall Configuration Review (by SA)

I have reviewed and confirmed that the firewall configuration satisfies the requirements of the DNSSEC Practice Statement with version 6th Edition (2020-11-04). No part of the signer system making use of the Hardware Security Module (HSM) is connected to any communication network.

SA: Darren Kera

Signature: 

Date: 2023 Nov 30



## Last changed: 2022-05-13 15:26:15 UTC  
version 19.4R3-S1.3;

```
system {  
  host-name srx;  
  root-authentication {  
    encrypted-password "XXXXXXXXXX";  
  }  
  login {  
    user bmartin {  
      full-name "Brian Martin";  
      uid 2003;  
      class super-user;  
      authentication {  
        encrypted-password "XXXXXXXXXX";  
      }  
    }  
    user charthold {  
      full-name "Connor A. Barthold";  
      uid 2004;  
      class super-user;  
      authentication {  
        encrypted-password "XXXXXXXXXX";  
      }  
    }  
    user dkara {  
      full-name "Darren Kara";  
      uid 2000;  
      class super-user;  
      authentication {  
        encrypted-password "XXXXXXXXXX";  
      }  
    }  
    user jjenkins {  
      full-name "Josh Jenkins";  
      uid 2007;  
      class super-user;  
      authentication {  
        encrypted-password "XXXXXXXXXX";  
      }  
    }  
    user mcirilo {  
      full-name "Moises D. Cirilo";  
      uid 2006;  
      class super-user;  
      authentication {  
        encrypted-password "XXXXXXXXXX";  
      }  
    }  
    user ptudor {  
      full-name "Patrick Tudor";  
      uid 2001;  
      class super-user;  
      authentication {  
        encrypted-password "XXXXXXXXXX";  
      }  
    }  
    user rquinn {  
      full-name "Reed Quinn";  
      uid 2003;  
      class super-user;  
      authentication {  
        encrypted-password "XXXXXXXXXX";  
      }  
    }  
    user sfreeark {  
      full-name "Sean Freeark";  
      uid 2002;  
      class super-user;  
      authentication {  
        encrypted-password "XXXXXXXXXX";  
      }  
    }  
  }  
  password {  
    format sha512;  
  }  
}  
services {  
  ssh {  
    root-login deny;  
  }  
}  
domain-name sks.cjr.dns.icann.org;  
location {  
  country-code US;  
  postal-code 22701;  
  building Terramark-Admin;  
  floor 1;  
  rack 1;  
}  
ports {  
  console {  
    log-out-on-disconnect;  
    type vtl00;  
  }  
}  
name-server {  
  192.0.42.53;  
}  
syslog {  
  archive size 100k files 3;  
  user * {  
    any emergency;  
  }  
  file messages {  
    any critical;  
    authorization info;  
  }  
  file interactive-commands {  
    interactive-commands error;  
  }  
}  
max-configurations-on-flash 5;  
max-configuration-rollback 20;  
license {
```

```

    autoupdate {
        url https://aef.juniper.net/junos/key_retrieval;
    }
}
ntp {
    server 129.6.15.28;
    server 129.6.15.29;
}
}
chassis {
    config-button no-rescue no-clear;
    aggregated-devices {
        ethernet {
            device-count 2;
        }
    }
}
}
security {
    pki {
        ca-profile root-ca {
            ca-identity "ICANN Root CA";
            revocation-check {
                crl {
                    disable on-download-failure;
                }
            }
            administrator {
                email-address "cbo-team@iana.org";
            }
        }
        ca-profile intermediate-ca {
            ca-identity "ICANN SSL CA";
            revocation-check {
                crl {
                    disable on-download-failure;
                }
            }
        }
    }
}
}
ike {
    proposal ike-proposal-KMF {
        authentication-method rsa-signatures;
        dh-group group24;
        authentication-algorithm sha-256;
        encryption-algorithm aes-256-cbc;
    }
    policy ike-policy-KMF {
        proposals ike-proposal-KMF;
        certificate {
            local-certificate ksk-cjr;
        }
    }
    gateway Gateway-to-KMF-West {
        ike-policy ike-policy-KMF;
        address 192.0.35.202;
        local-identity distinguished-name;
        remote-identity distinguished-name;
        external-interface ge-0/0/15;
        version v2-only;
    }
}
}
ipsec {
    proposal IPSecProposal {
        protocol esp;
        authentication-algorithm hmac-sha-256-128;
        encryption-algorithm aes-256-cbc;
        lifetime-seconds 7200;
    }
    policy defaultPolicy {
        perfect-forward-secrecy {
            keys group5;
        }
        proposals IPSecProposal;
    }
    vpn vpn-to-KMF-West {
        bind-interface st0.1;
        ike {
            gateway Gateway-to-KMF-West;
            ipsec-policy defaultPolicy;
        }
        establish-tunnels immediately;
    }
}
}
screen {
    ids-option external-screen {
        icmp {
            ping-death;
        }
        ip {
            source-route-option;
            tear-drop;
        }
        tcp {
            syn-flood {
                alarm-threshold 1024;
                attack-threshold 200;
                source-threshold 1024;
                destination-threshold 2048;
                timeout 20;
            }
            land;
        }
    }
}
}
}
nat {
    source {
        rule-set internal-to-external {
            from zone [ access guest wifi ];
            to zone untrust;
            rule source-nat-rule {
                match {
                    source-address 0.0.0.0/0;
                }
            }
            then {

```



```

        destination-address any;
        application junos-icmp-ping;
    }
    then {
        permit;
    }
}
policy allow-access-access {
    match {
        source-address kmf_west_access;
        destination-address kmf_east_access;
        application any;
    }
    then {
        permit;
    }
}
}
from-zone video to-zone ipsec {
    policy allow-video-to-ipsec {
        match {
            source-address VSS;
            destination-address kmf_west_vss;
            application any;
        }
        then {
            permit;
            log {
                session-close;
            }
        }
    }
}
policy allow-access-video {
    match {
        source-address kmf_east_video;
        destination-address kmf_west_video;
        application any;
    }
    then {
        permit;
    }
}
}
from-zone guest to-zone untrust {
    policy allow-guest-to-untrust {
        match {
            source-address kmf_east_guest;
            destination-address any;
            application any;
        }
        then {
            permit;
        }
    }
}
}
from-zone wifi to-zone untrust {
    policy allow-wifi-to-untrust {
        match {
            source-address kmf_east_wifi;
            destination-address any;
            application any;
        }
        then {
            permit;
        }
    }
}
}
from-zone ipsec to-zone video {
    policy allow-ipsec-to-video {
        match {
            source-address kmf_west_vss;
            destination-address VSS;
            application any;
        }
        then {
            permit;
            log {
                session-close;
            }
        }
    }
}
policy allow-access-video {
    match {
        source-address kmf_west_video;
        destination-address kmf_east_video;
        application any;
    }
    then {
        permit;
    }
}
}
}
from-zone access to-zone access {
    policy allow-access {
        match {
            source-address any;
            destination-address any;
            application any;
        }
        then {
            permit;
        }
    }
}
}
from-zone video to-zone untrust {
    policy allow-mail {
        match {
            source-address VSS;
            destination-address icann;
            application junos-smtp;
        }
        then {
            permit;
            log {

```

```

        session-close;
    }
}
}
}
default-policy {
    deny-all;
}
}
zones {
    security-zone access {
        address-book {
            address ACS 10.4.29.203/32;
            address ACC 10.4.29.202/32;
            address IDF 10.4.29.201/32;
            address EVM 10.4.29.200/32;
            address IMS 10.4.29.204/32;
            address E1 10.4.29.210/32;
            address E2 10.4.29.211/32;
            address E3 10.4.29.212/32;
            address E4 10.4.29.213/32;
            address kmf_east_access 10.4.29.192/26;
            address localnet 10.4.29.0/24;
            address-set iris-scanners {
                address E1;
                address E2;
                address E3;
                address E4;
            }
        }
        interfaces {
            irb.0 {
                host-inbound-traffic {
                    system-services {
                        ping;
                        ntp;
                        ssh;
                    }
                }
            }
        }
    }
    security-zone untrust {
        address-book {
            address icann 192.0.32.0/20;
            address icann-dns 192.0.42.53/32;
            address googledns1 8.8.8.8/32;
            address googledns2 8.8.4.4/32;
            address simplex1 216.224.218.31/32;
            address simplex2 216.224.218.32/32;
            address simplex3 216.224.218.33/32;
            address simplex4 216.224.218.34/32;
            address-set google-dns {
                address googledns1;
                address googledns2;
            }
            address-set simplex {
                address simplex1;
                address simplex2;
                address simplex3;
                address simplex4;
            }
        }
        screen external-screen;
        interfaces {
            ge-0/0/15.0 {
                host-inbound-traffic {
                    system-services {
                        ping;
                    }
                }
            }
        }
    }
    security-zone video {
        address-book {
            address kmf_east_video 10.4.29.128/26;
            address VSS 10.4.29.150/32;
            address C1 10.4.29.151/32;
            address C2 10.4.29.152/32;
            address C3 10.4.29.153/32;
            address-set cameras {
                address C1;
                address C2;
                address C3;
            }
        }
        interfaces {
            irb.1 {
                host-inbound-traffic {
                    system-services {
                        ping;
                    }
                }
            }
        }
    }
    security-zone guest {
        address-book {
            address STR 10.4.29.20/32;
            address VCC 10.4.29.22/32;
            address kmf_east_guest 10.4.29.0/25;
        }
        interfaces {
            irb.2 {
                host-inbound-traffic {
                    system-services {
                        ping;
                    }
                }
            }
        }
    }
    security-zone ipsec {

```



```

policy-options {
  prefix-list resolver-servers {
    apply-path "system name-server <*>";
  }
  prefix-list local-prefixes {
    10.4.29.0/24;
  }
  prefix-list ntp-servers {
    129.6.15.28/32;
    129.6.15.29/32;
  }
  prefix-list remote-ike-peers {
    apply-path "security ike gateway <*> address <*>";
  }
}
firewall {
  family inet {
    filter route-engine-filter {
      term deny-icmp-redirects {
        from {
          protocol icmp;
          icmp-type redirect;
        }
        then {
          discard;
        }
      }
      term allow-icmp {
        from {
          protocol icmp;
          icmp-type [ echo-request echo-reply unreachable time-exceeded ];
        }
        then {
          policer small-bw-limit;
          accept;
        }
      }
      term allow-traceroute {
        from {
          protocol udp;
          port 33434-33534;
        }
        then {
          policer small-bw-limit;
          accept;
        }
      }
      term allow-dns {
        from {
          source-prefix-list {
            resolver-servers;
          }
          protocol udp;
          source-port domain;
        }
        then {
          policer small-bw-limit;
          accept;
        }
      }
      term allow-ntp {
        from {
          source-prefix-list {
            local-prefixes;
            ntp-servers;
          }
          protocol udp;
          port ntp;
        }
        then {
          policer small-bw-limit;
          accept;
        }
      }
      term allow-establish {
        from {
          protocol tcp;
          tcp-established;
        }
        then accept;
      }
      term allow-ipsec-esp {
        from {
          source-prefix-list {
            remote-ike-peers;
          }
          protocol esp;
        }
        then accept;
      }
      term allow-ipsec-udp {
        from {
          source-prefix-list {
            remote-ike-peers;
          }
          protocol udp;
          port 500;
        }
        then accept;
      }
      term allow-ike-fragments {
        from {
          source-prefix-list {
            remote-ike-peers;
          }
          is-fragment;
          protocol udp;
        }
        then {
          policer small-bw-limit;
          accept;
        }
      }
      term allow-ssh {

```

