

Root DNSSEC KSK
Administrative Ceremony
Safe #2 Credentials Maintenance

Wednesday 29 November 2023

Root Zone KSK Operator Key Management Facility
18155 Technology Drive, Culpeper, VA 22701, USA

This ceremony is executed in accordance to the DNSSEC Practice Statement for the Root Zone KSK Operator 6th Edition (2020-11-04)













Abbreviations

AUD = Third Party Auditor	CA = Ceremony Administrator	CO = Crypto Officer
EW = External Witness	FD = Flash Drive	HSM = Hardware Security Module
IW = Internal Witness	KMF = Key Management Facility	KSR = Key Signing Request
OP = Operator	PTI = Public Technical Identifiers	RKSH = Recovery Key Share Holder
RKOS = RZ KSK Operations Security	RZM = Root Zone Maintainer	SA = System Administrator
SKR = Signed Key Response	SMK = Storage Master Key	SO = Security Officer
SSC = Safe Security Controller	SW = Staff Witness	TCR = Trusted Community Representative
TEB = Tamper Evident Bag (AMPAC: #GCS1013, #GCS0912, #GCS1216 or MMF Industries: #2362010N20, #2362011N20)		

Participants

Key Ceremony roles are described on <https://www.iana.org/help/key-ceremony-roles>

Instructions: At the end of the ceremony, participants sign IW's script. IW records the time of completion.

Title / Roles	Printed Name	Signature	Date	Time
CA	David Huberman / ICANN		2023 Nov 21	15:55
IW	Andy Newton / ICANN			
SSC2	Hope Shafer / ICANN			
CO5 Successor	Nomsa Mwayenga			
RKOS / CA Backup	Andres Pavez / PTI			
RKOS / IW Backup	Aaron Foley / PTI			
Locksmith	Frank Turner / Baldino's Lock & Key			
EW	Pia Gruvö			
EW	Robert Seastrom			
EW	Hugo Salgado			
EW	Robert Hoggarth			
EW	James Mitchell			

By signing this script, you are declaring that this document is a true and accurate record of the Root DNSSEC KSK ceremony to the best of your knowledge, and you agree that your personal data will be processed in accordance with the ICANN Privacy Policy available at <https://www.icann.org/privacy/policy>

Instructions for a Root DNSSEC KSK Administrative Ceremony

The Root DNSSEC Key Signing Key (KSK) Administrative Ceremony is a scripted meeting where individuals with specific roles perform tasks related to support the operation of the root zone KSK. Administrative Ceremonies include all ceremonies that do not require use of the private key component of the root zone DNSSEC KSK, such as enrollment or replacement of a trusted role, media deposit or extraction, equipment acceptance testing or maintenance, etc. The process is audited by a third party firm for compliance with SOC 3 framework. The script and recordings are published online for the wider Internet community to review.

Ceremony Guidelines:

- The CA leads the ceremony
- Only a CA, IW, or SA can enter and escort other participants into Tier 4 (Key Ceremony Room)
- Dual Occupancy is enforced. IW with CA or SA must remain inside Tier 4 (Key Ceremony Room) if participants are present in the room
- During a ceremony a CA, IW, or SA may escort participants out of Tier 4 (Key Ceremony Room) at the CA's discretion if Tier 5 (Safe Room) is not occupied
- All participants are required to sign in and out of Tier 4 (Key Ceremony Room) using the visitor log located in Tier 3
- The SA starts filming before the majority of participants enter Tier 4 (Key Ceremony Room)
- Ceremony participants follow the script step by step in order to attest to the ceremony's proper performance
- The CA reads each step aloud prior to its performance
- Upon the successful completion of a step, the IW will announce and record its time of completion, and initials that step in their script
- A ceremony participant who has cause for concern or detects an issue is encouraged to interrupt the ceremony for discussion. The issue is brought to resolution before the ceremony resumes
- Questions and suggestions for improvement are welcome and can be discussed at any time or after the ceremony during the ceremony debrief

Unplanned events (**exceptions**) during the ceremony are evaluated, documented, and acted upon. It is the CA's sole responsibility to decide on proper actions after consulting with the IW. In either case, an exception is regarded as an incident, and incident handling procedures are enacted.

Key Management Facility Tiers:

- Tiers 1-3: Consist of the facility areas between the outside environment and the Key Ceremony Room
- Tier 4: Consists of the Key Ceremony Room and is subject to Dual Occupancy
- Tier 5: Consists of the Safe Room (a cage only accessible from the Key Ceremony Room) and is subject to Dual Occupancy
- Tier 6: Consists of Safe #1 (Equipment Safe) and Safe #2 (Credentials Safe)
- Tier 7: Consists of the HSM stored in Safe #1 (Equipment Safe) and the safe deposit boxes installed in Safe #2 (Credentials Safe)

Some steps during the ceremony may require the participants to recite and/or confirm identifiers comprised of numbers and letters. When spelling identifiers, the phonetic alphabet shown below should be used:

Character	Code Word	Pronunciation
A	Alfa	AL-FAH
B	Bravo	BRAH-VOH
C	Charlie	CHAR-LEE
D	Delta	DELL-TAH
E	Echo	ECK-OH
F	Foxtrot	FOKS-TROT
G	Golf	GOLF
H	Hotel	HOH-TEL
I	India	IN-DEE-AH
J	Juliet	JEW-LEE-ETT
K	Kilo	KEY-LOH
L	Lima	LEE-MAH
M	Mike	MIKE
N	November	NO-VEM-BER
O	Oscar	OSS-CAH
P	Papa	PAH-PAH
Q	Quebec	KEH-BECK
R	Romeo	ROW-ME-OH
S	Sierra	SEE-AIR-RAH
T	Tango	TANG-GO
U	Uniform	YOU-NEE-FORM
V	Victor	VIK-TAH
W	Whiskey	WISS-KEY
X	Xray	ECKS-RAY
Y	Yankee	YANG-KEY
Z	Zulu	ZOO-LOO
1	One	WUN
2	Two	TOO
3	Three	TREE
4	Four	FOW-ER
5	Five	FIFE
6	Six	SIX
7	Seven	SEV-EN
8	Eight	AIT
9	Nine	NIN-ER
0	Zero	ZEE-RO

Root DNSSEC Script Exception

Exception Details

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
1	IW writes the details of the ceremony exception: Act: <u>1</u> Step(s): <u>2</u> Page(s): <u>5</u> Date and Time: <u>29 Nov 2023 15:06</u> Note: IW describes the exception(s) and action(s) below.	<i>IW</i>	15:06

Hugo Salgado was unable to be present for Administrative Ceremony

Trusted Community Representative Declaration

I understand that I will hold a trusted role in the Root Zone DNSSEC Key Signing Key operations, undertaken as a joint effort by the Root Zone Management Partners; Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), Public Technical Identifiers and Verisign.

Aside from background checks that were performed as part of the requirement from the DNSSEC Practice Statement (DPS) and the "trust" notion in becoming a Trusted Community Representative, I, **Nomsa Mwayenga** uphold the highest honesty and integrity and hereby declare the following:

1. Within the past fifteen years, I have not been investigated for or convicted of a crime in any jurisdiction around the world related to fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, theft of funds or other tangible or intangible property of others, conspiracy to commit a crime, or any other similar type of dishonest activity.
2. Within the past fifteen years, I have not been judged by any court or been the subject of any judicial determination, or in any type of dispute resolution proceeding, to have committed fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, theft of funds or other tangible or intangible property of others, conspiracy to commit a crime, or any other similar type of dishonest activity.
3. Within the past fifteen years, I have not been disciplined by any government for conduct involving dishonesty, including, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, theft of funds or other tangible or intangible property of others, conspiracy to commit a crime, or any other similar type of dishonest activity.
4. I am currently not involved in any governmental, judicial, or regulatory proceeding or investigation that could result in a conviction, judgment, determination, or discipline of the type specified in 1, 2 or 3 above.

By signing this declaration, the undersigned attests that the aforementioned statements are true and accurate.

Date: 2023/11/29

Signature: 

Print name: **Nomsa Mwayenga**

Act 1: Initiate Ceremony

The CA initiates the ceremony by performing the steps below:

- Verify that the audit cameras are recording
- Confirm that all of the ceremony attendees have signed in using the visitor log in Tier 3
- Review emergency evacuation procedures
- Explain the use of personal devices and the purpose of this ceremony
- Verify the time and date so that all entries into the script follow a common time source

Sign into Tier 4 (Key Ceremony Room)

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
1	CA confirms that required audit cameras are recording.	M	15:04
2	CA confirms that all participants are signed into Tier 4 (Key Ceremony Room) log, then performs a roll call using the participants list on page 2.	M	15:05
3	CA asks that any first time ceremony participants in the room introduce themselves.	M	15:07

Emergency Evacuation Procedures and Electronics Policy

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
4	CA reviews emergency evacuation procedures with onsite participants.	M	15:08
5	CA explains the use of personal electronic devices during the ceremony.	M	15:08
6	CA summarizes the purpose of the ceremony.	M	15:09

Verify the Time and Date

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
7	IW enters UTC date (YYYY-MM-DD) and time (HH:MM) using a reasonably accurate clock visible to all in Tier 4 (Key Ceremony Room): Date and time: <u>2023-11-29 15:09 UTC</u> Note: All entries into this script or any logs should follow this common source of time.	M	15:09

Trusted Community Representative Declaration

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
8	CA confirms that Trusted Community Representative Declaration forms are signed by all CO Successors. IW retains all original copies. CO5 Successor: Nomsa Mwayenga	M	15:10

Act 2: Safe #2 Credentials Maintenance

The CA will oversee the safe maintenance by executing the following steps:

Open Safe #2 (Tier 6, Credentials Safe)

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
1	CA and IW transport a flashlight, phillips screwdriver and escort required personnel into Tier 5 (Safe Room.)	<i>AM</i>	15:13
2	SSC2 opens Safe #2 while shielding the combination from the camera. Note: SSC begins by rapidly spinning the dial counter-clockwise 15-20 revolutions in order to charge it before stopping at the first number in the combination.	<i>AM</i>	15:14
3	Complete the safe log by following the steps below: a) SSC2 removes the existing safe log, then shows the most recent page to the audit camera. b) IW provides the pre-printed safe log to SSC2. c) SSC2 writes the date and time, then signs the safe log where "Open Safe" is indicated. d) IW verifies this entry then initials it.	<i>AM</i>	15:16

Replace Safe Deposit Box Lock Assemblies

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
4	CA reads aloud TEB(s) #BB91951409 and along with IW checks for tamper evidence, then opens TEBs and places all contents on top of Safe 2 (Credentials Safe) for pending installation.	<i>M</i>	15:17
5	Recover the Crypto Officer Safe Deposit Box by following the steps below: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> CA confirms the safe deposit box number listed below that needs to be drilled. Locksmith carefully drills and opens the safe deposit box. Locksmith removes the drilled safe deposit box lock assembly and installs a new safe deposit box lock assembly. Locksmith verifies proper operation of the newly replaced safe deposit box lock assembly. After the CA operates the guard key in the bottom lock, the CA closes the first safe deposit box listed below, leaving the tenant keys installed in the lock. If not already present, CA applies a green circular sticker to the door of the safe deposit box to denote the corresponding guard key. <p>Box # 1262</p>	<i>M</i>	15:46
6	COs perform the following steps sequentially to access the listed TEBs: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> After the CA operates the guard key in the bottom lock, CO reads aloud their safe deposit box number then uses their tenant key to operate the top lock. CO opens their safe deposit box, verifies its integrity, then removes the TEBs. CO reads aloud the TEB numbers, then verifies integrity of TEBs while showing them to the audit camera above. CO returns the TEB(s) specified below, then locks their safe deposit box and retrieve their new safe deposit box keys. CO writes the date and time, then signs the safe log. IW verifies the completed safe log entries, then initials them. <p>CO5 Successor: Nomsa Mwayenga Box # 1262 (Retrieve keys from lock) SET1 TEB # BB02639496 (Check and Return) SET2 TEB # BB02639548 (Check and Return)</p>	<i>M</i>	15:50
7	CA collects all removed safe deposit box lock assemblies for future disposal.	<i>M</i>	15:51
8	CA writes the date and time, then signs the safe log where " Replace Safe Deposit Box Lock Assemblies " is indicated. IW verifies the safe log entries, then initials it.	<i>M</i>	15:51

Close Safe #2 (Tier 6, Credentials Safe)

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
9	SSC2 writes the date and time, then signs the safe log where " Close Safe " is indicated. IW verifies the safe log entry, then initials it.	<i>M</i>	15:52
10	SSC2 returns the safe log to Safe #2, closes the safe door, pulls up on the handle, and ensures it's locked by spinning the dial at least two full revolutions each way, counter-clockwise then clockwise. CA and IW verify that the safe is locked and the " WAIT " light indicator is off.	<i>M</i>	15:52
11	CA, IW, and any escorted personnel leave Tier 5 (Safe Room), returning to Tier 4 (Key Ceremony Room).	<i>M</i>	15:53

Act 3: Close the Administrative Ceremony

The CA will finish the ceremony by performing the following steps:

- Read any exceptions that occurred during the ceremony
- Call the ceremony participants to sign the IW's script
- Stop the video recording
- Ensure that all participants are signed out of Tier 4 (Key Ceremony Room) log and escorted out
- Prepare the audit bundle materials

Participants Sign IW's Script

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
1	CA reads all exceptions that occurred during the ceremony.	<i>M</i>	15:54
2	CA calls each attendee on the participants list to proceed to the ceremony table and sign IW's participants list. All signatories declare that this script is a true and accurate record of the ceremony.	<i>M</i>	15:55
3	CA reviews IW's script, then signs the participants list.	<i>M</i>	15:56
4	IW signs the list and records the completion time.	<i>M</i>	15:56

Sign Out of Tier 4 (Key Ceremony Room) and Stop Recording

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
5	CA stops the audit camera video recording.	<i>M</i>	15:57
6	CA and IW ensures that all participants are signed out of Tier 4 (Key Ceremony Room) log and escorted out of Tier 4 (Key Ceremony Room.)	<i>IW</i>	16:00

Bundle Audit Materials

Step	Activity	Initials	Time
7	<p>IW makes a copy of their script for off-site audit bundle containing:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Copy of IW's administrative ceremony script. b) Audio-visual recording. c) IW's attestation (See Appendix B on page 10). <p>All TEBs are labeled Root DNSSEC Administrative Ceremony Safe #2 Credentials Maintenance, dated and signed by IW and CA. An off-site audit bundle is delivered to an off-site storage.</p>	<i>M</i>	16:07

Appendix A: Audit Bundle Checklist

1. Administrative Ceremony Script (by IW)

Hard copies of the IW's administrative ceremony script, including notes and attestation. See Appendix B on page 10.

2. Audio-Visual Recordings from the Administrative Ceremony (by CA)

One set for the audit bundle.

3. Other items


If applicable.

Appendix B: Administrative Ceremony Script (by IW)

I hereby attest that the Administrative Ceremony was conducted in accordance to this script.
Any exceptions that occurred were accurately and properly documented.

IW: **Andy Newton**

Signature:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'AN', is written over a horizontal line.

Date: 2023 Nov 29