Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers

Root DNSSEC KSK Ceremony 12

Tuesday February 12, 2013

ICANN KSK Facility@Equinix LA3
1920 East Maple Avenue, El Segundo, CA 90245

This ceremony is executed under the
DNSSEC Practices Statement for the Root Zone KSK Operator Version A Revision 1358

AbbreviationsDraft

TEB =	Tamper Evident Bag (AMPAC, item #GCS1013 small or #GCS1216 large or MMF Industries, item #2362010N20 small or #2362011N20 large)				
HSM =	Hardware Security Module	**FD =**	Flash Drive	**CA =**	Ceremony Administrator
IW =	Internal Witness	**CO=**	Crypto Officer	**SA =**	System Administrator
SSC =	Safe Security Controller	**MC =**	Master of Ceremony	**IKOS =**	ICANN KSK Operations Security
KSR=	Key Signing Request	**SKR=**	Signed Key Response	**RZM=**	Root Zone Maintainer

Participants

Instructions: At the end of the ceremony, participants sign on IW1's copy. IW1 records time upon completion.

Title	Printed Name/Citizenship	Signature	Date	Time
CA	Mehmet Akcin		12 February 2013	01:09
IW1	Francisco Arias			
SA1	Alexander Kulik			
SSC1	Selina Harrington			
SSC2	~~Geoff Bickers~~ Leo Vegoda FA			
SA2	Matt Childs			
CO1	Masato Minda / JP			
CO2	Dmitry Burkov / RU			
CO3	Joao Damas / PT			
CO5	Edward Lewis / US			
CO7	Subramanian Moonesamy / MU	* Not present FA		
EW1	Alejandro Bolivar / VeriSign			
EW2	Chenyan Huang / PricewaterhouseCoopers			
EW3	Exavier Chabata / PricewaterhouseCoopers			
EW4	Chris Griffiths / Comcast			
EW5	Martin Levy / Hurricane Electric	* Not present FA		
EW6	Dalini Khemlani / ICANN			
CA2	Richard Lamb			
IW2/IKOS	Tomofumi Okubo			
SA3	Brian Martin			
Locksmith	Mike Jacobs / Industrial Lock and Security	already left		
IW3	Kim Davies			

EW James Kovoumdjian PwC

Note: Dual Occupancy enforced. CA leads ceremony. Only CAs, IWs, or SAs can enter ceremony room and/or escort other participants. Only CA+IW can enter safe room and/or escort other participants. CAs, SAs or IWs may let individuals out of the ceremony room but only when CA+IW remain in the ceremony room. No one may leave when CA+IW are in safe room. Participants must sign in and out of ceremony room and leave any credentials assigned to them (keys, cards) in the ceremony room if leaving before completion of the ceremony. The SA starts filming before the participants enter the room.

Some steps during the ceremony require the participants to tell and/or confirm identifiers composed of numbers and letters. When spelling identifiers, the phonetic alphabet shown below will be used:

A	Alfa	AL-FAH
B	Bravo	BRAH-VOH
C	Charlie	CHAR-LEE
D	Delta	DELL-TAH
E	Echo	ECK-OH
F	Foxtrot	FOKS-TROT
G	Golf	GOLF
H	Hotel	HOH-TEL
I	India	IN-DEE-AH
J	Juliet	JEW-LEE-ETT
K	Kilo	KEY-LOH
L	Lima	LEE-MAH
M	Mike	MIKE
N	November	NO-VEM-BER
O	Oscar	OSS-CAH
P	Papa	PAH-PAH
Q	Quebec	KEH-BECK
R	Romeo	ROW-ME-OH
S	Sierra	SEE-AIR-RAH
T	Tango	TANG-GO
U	Uniform	YOU-NEE-FORM
V	Victor	VIK-TAH
W	Whiskey	WISS-KEY
X	Xray	ECKS-RAY
Y	Yankee	YANG-KEY
Z	Zulu	ZOO-LOO
1	One	WUN
2	Two	TOO
3	Three	TREE
4	Four	FOW-ER
5	Five	FIFE
6	Six	SIX
7	Seven	SEV-EN
8	Eight	AIT
9	Nine	NIN-ER
0	Zero	ZEE-RO

Act 1. Initiate Ceremony and Retrieve Equipments

Participants Arrive and Sign into Key Ceremony Room

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
1.	SA starts video recording and online streaming. SAs or IWs escort participants into the Ceremony Room and all participant sign into the Ceremony Room log.	FA	21:04

Emergency Evacuation Procedures

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
2.	CA or IW reviews emergency evacuation procedures with participants.	FA	21:04

Verify Time and Date

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
3.	IW1 enters UTC date (day/month/year) and time using a reasonably accurate wall clock visible to all in the Ceremony Room: Date and time: 12 February 2013 21:04 All entries into this script or any logs should follow this common source of time.	FA	21:04

Open Credential Safe #2

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
4.	CA and IW1 escort SSC2, COs and locksmith into the safe room together. CA brings a flashlight when entering the safe room.	FA	21:05
5.	SSC2, while shielding combination from camera, opens Safe #2.	FA	21:07
6.	SSC2 takes out safe log and prints name, date, time, signature, and reason (i.e. "open safe") in safe log. IW1 initials this entry. **Note: If log entry is pre-printed, verify the entry, record time of completion and sign.**	FA	21:08

COs extract OP Cards from safe deposit boxes

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
7.	One by one, the selected COs checks the SO cards and retrieves the OP cards following the steps shown below. a) With the assistance of CA (and his/her common key), opens her/his safe deposit box. **# Common Key is bottom lock and CO Key is top lock** b) Verifies integrity of contents by reading out box number and TEB # for OP and SO cards which should match below. c) Returns SO cards, retains OP TEB and locks box. d) Makes an entry in safe log indicating verification of integrity of contents and OP TEB removal with box #, printed name, date, time and signature. **Note: If log entry is pre-printed, verify the entry, record time of completion and sign.** Repeat these steps until all cards are removed. IW1 initials this entry when all CO have finished. **CO 1: Masato Minda** **Box # 1788** **OP TEB # BB21369028** **SO TEB # A13004340** **CO 2: Dmitry Burkov** **Box # 1793** **OP TEB # A14365424** **SO TEB # A13004336** ~~**CO 3: Joao Damas**~~ ~~**Box # 1071**~~ ~~**OP TEB # BB21369030**~~ ~~**SO TEB # A13004313**~~ **CO 5: Edward Lewis** **Box # 1790** **OP TEB # A14365388** **SO TEB # A13004326** ~~**CO 7: Subramanian-Moonesamy**~~ ~~**Box # 1792**~~ ~~**OP TEB # BB21369033**~~ ~~**SO TEB # A16608556**~~	FA	21:18

Remove out-of-order Safe Deposit Box Locks

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
8.	CA confirms that the boxes below are currently not in use then the locksmith removes the malfunctioning dual nose Mosler locks from the safe deposit box. The box that needs replacement is as below. **Box 1070** **Box 1789**	FA	21:25

Close Credential Safe #2

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
9.	Once all safe deposit boxes are closed and locked, SSC2 makes an entry that includes printed name, date, time and signature into the safe log indicating closing of the safe. IW1 initials this entry. **Note: If log entry is pre-printed, verify the entry, record time of completion and sign.**	FA	21:27
10.	SSC2 puts log back in safe and locks Safe #2 (spin dial at least two full revolutions each way, counter clock wise then clock wise). CA and IW1 verify that the safe is locked and card reader indicator is green.	FA	21:27
11.	IW1, CA, SSC2, and COs leave safe room, with OP cards in TEBs, closing the door behind them.	FA	21:28
12.	SA escorts the locksmith out of the key management facility	FA	21:30

Open Equipment Safe #1

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
13.	After a one (1) minute delay, CA, IW1 and SSC1 enter the safe room with an empty equipment cart.	FA	21:31
14.	SSC1, while shielding combination from camera, opens Safe #1.	FA	21:32
15.	SSC1 takes out safe log and prints name, date, time, signature and reason (i.e., "opened safe") in safe log. IW1 initials this entry. **Note: If log entry is pre-printed, verify the entry, record time of completion and sign.**	FA	21:33

Remove Equipment from Safe #1

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
16.	CA **CAREFULLY** removes **HSM1** (in TEB) from the safe and completes the entry in the safe log indicating "**HSM1** Removal," TEB # and serial number, printed name, date, time, and signature. CA places the item on the equipment cart. IW1 initials this entry. **HSM1: TEB# A2826760 / serial # K6002020** Verify the integrity of the other HSM that will not be in used this time. **HSM2: TEB# BB24049957 / serial # K6002018 (last used)**	FA	21:35

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
17.	CA takes out the items listed below from the safe and completes the entry in the safe log indicating each item, TEB#, serial number if available. Printed name, date, time and signature. CA places the item on the equipment cart. IW1 initials this entry. **Laptop1 (Dell ATG6400): TEB# BB24049956 / serial# 37240147333** **O/S DVD (Rev600) + HSMFD: TEB# BB21369041** Verify the integrity of the other Laptop that will not be used this time. **Laptop2: TEB# A2734916 / serial # 7292928457**	FA	21:37

Close Equipment Safe #1 and exit safe room

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
18.	SSC1 makes an entry including printed name, date, time and signature into the safe log indicating, "Close safe". IW1 initials this entry. **Note: If log entry is pre-printed, verify the entry, record time of completion and sign.**	FA	21:38
19.	SSC1 puts log back in safe and locks Safe #1 (spin dial at least two full revolutions each way, counter clock wise then clock wise). CA and IW1 verify that the safe is locked and door indicator light is green.	FA	21:38
20.	CA, SSC1 and IW1 leave the safe room with the equipment cart, closing the door to the safe room securely behind them.	FA	21:39

Act 2. Confirm and Sign the Key Signing Request

Set Up Laptop

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
1.	CA inspects the laptop TEB for tamper evidence; reads out TEB # and serial # while IW1 observes and matches it to the prior entry in most recent key ceremony or acceptance script for this site. IW1 confirms the TEB # and serial # below. **Laptop1 (Dell ATG6400): TEB# BB24049956 / serial# 37240147333**	FA	21:43
2.	CA inspects the O/S DVD + HSMFD TEB for tamper evidence; reads out TEB # while IW1 observes and matches it to the prior entry in most recent key ceremony script for this site. IW1 confirms the TEB # below. **O/S DVD (Rev600) + HSMFD: TEB# BB21369041**	FA	21:44
3.	CA takes the laptop out of TEB placing it on key ceremony table; discards TEBs; connects laptop power, external display, printer and boots laptop from O/S DVD.	FA	21:47
4.	CA presses "CTRL+ALT+F2" to get a console prompt and logs in as root.	FA	21:49

5.	CA enters the commands
	`system-config-display --noui`
	and
	`killall Xorg`
	CA ensures that external display works.
		FA	21:52

6.	CA logs in as root.	FA	21:52
7.	CA configures printer as default and prints test page by going to **System > Administration > Printing.**	FA	21:54
8.	CA opens a terminal window and maximizes its size for visibility by going to **Applications > Accessories > Terminal.**	FA	21:55
9.	CA checks and fixes date and time on laptop based on wall clock ensuring UTC time zone has been chosen by going to **System > Administration > Date and Time.**	FA	21:56
10.	CA inserts USB port expander into laptop.	FA	21:56

Format and label blank FD

Step	Activity	Initial	Time

11.	CA plugs a new FD into the laptop, then waits for it to be recognized by the O/S, closes the file system window and formats the drive by executing
	`dmesg | grep -A 5 usb-storage`
	to confirm the drive letter that is assigned to the blank USB drive (e.g. sda, sdb, sdc),
	`umount /dev/sda1`
	to unmounts the drive (change drive letter if necessary),
	`mkfs.vfat -n HSMFD -I /dev/sda`
	to execute a FAT32 format and label it as HSMFD.
		FA	21:58

12.	CA repeats step 29 for the 2nd blank FD	FA	21:59
13.	CA repeats step 29 for the 3rd blank FD	FA	22:00
14.	CA repeats step 29 for the 4th blank FD	FA	22:00
15.	CA repeats step 29 for the 5th blank FD	FA	22:00

Connect HSMFD

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
16.	CA plugs HSMFD into free USB slot on the laptop -**NOT EXPANDER-** and waits for O/S to recognize the FD. CA lets participants view file names in the HSMFD then closes the file system window.	FA	22:01

Start Logging Terminal Session

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
17.	CA changes the default directory to the HSMFD by executing `cd /media/HSMFD`	FA	22:02
18.	CA executes `script script-20130212.log` to start a capture of terminal output.	FA	22:03

Start Logging HSM Output

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
19.	CA connects a serial to USB null modem cable to laptop.	FA	22:04

20.	CA opens a second terminal screen and executes
	`cd /media/HSMFD`
	and executes
	`ttyaudit /dev/ttyUSB0`
	to start logging HSM serial port outputs. Note: **DO NOT** unplug USB serial port from laptop as this causes logging to stop.
		FA	22:05

Power Up HSM

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
21.	CA inspects the HSM TEB for tamper evidence; reads out TEB # and serial # while IW1 observes and matches it to the prior script entry. IW1 confirms TEB # and serial # below. **HSM1: TEB# A2826760 / serial # K6002020**	FA	22:07
22.	CA removes HSM from TEB; discards TEB and plugs ttyUSB0 null modem serial cable to the back.	FA	22:07
23.	CA switches to the ttyaudit terminal window and connects power to HSM. Status information should appear on the serial logging screen. IW1 matches displayed HSM serial number with above. (Time and date in the HSM may not match the time used for the ceremony logs, but there is no need to change it since the scripts that does the logging to the laptop adds a timestamp.)	FA	22:09

Enable/Activate HSM

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
24.	CA calls a CO, CO opens TEB with OP card and hands to CA who places card in cardholder visible to all.	FA	22:13
25.	Repeat the step above until all OP cards are placed on the cardholder.	FA	22:14
26.	CA inserts 3 cards into HSM to activate the unit (via "Set Online" menu item). Type in the default PIN "**11223344**" when prompted. IW1 records the used cards below. Each card is returned to cardholder after use. 1st OP card 1 of 7 2nd OP card 2 of 7 3rd OP card 5 of 7	FA	22:17

Check Network between Laptop and HSM

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
27.	CA connects HSM to laptop using Ethernet cable.	FA	22:17
28.	CA tests network connectivity between laptop and HSM by entering `ping 192.168.0.2` on the laptop terminal window and looking for responses. Ctrl-C to exit program.	FA	22:18

VERISIGN

12061 Bluemont Way
Reston, Va. 20190
T: 703-948-3200
F: 701-987-6543

Versigninc.com

February 1st, 2013

To Whom It May Concern:

This is a letter of Verification of Employment for Alejandro A. Bolivar. Verisign, Inc. has employed Alejandro A. Bolivar full-time since September 8th, 1997 as a Senior Engineer in our Info Services/Corporate Naming Resolution Operations department.

Verisign is the trusted provider of Internet infrastructure services for the networked world. Billions of times each day our identity protection and registry services allow companies and consumers all over the world to engage in trusted communications and commerce.

For over 10 years, Verisign Internet infrastructure has been at the very heart of the Internet, enabling key transactions and protecting valuable data. Verisign facilitates as many as 31 billion authoritative Domain Name System (DNS) queries a day, and has been providing this service since 1998 with 100% availability. Over the years the Verisign Internet infrastructure has scaled quickly and dramatically, and has the capacity to scale just as dramatically in the coming years, as the world moves to Internet-based transactions. Verisign's Network Intelligence and Availability team helps protect against distributed denial of service or DDoS attacks through an in-the-cloud monitoring and mitigation services. Verisign's iDefense Security Intelligence Services help identify and track vulnerabilities, malicious code, threats, and helps provide comprehensive intelligence to enable customers to proactively manage risk.

Should you have further questions, please contact me at the number below.

Sincerely,

David Carney
HR Services Consultant | Verisign, Inc. | 703-948-4143 | dcarney@verisign.com

VERISIGN

12061 Bluemont Way,
Reston, VA 20190
t: 703-948-3200
f: 703-987-6543

VerisignInc.com

12 February 2013

The SHA256 hash of the 2013 Q2 KSR file is:

e20491dba323dacbd74479b8d91e793d9b18d9f5348e5b984a8b150821572856
The PGP wordlist for the hash above is:

tiger alkali pheasant suspicious reform cannonball surmount revival stopwatch designing jawbone provincial sugar Burlington jawbone crucifix puppy borderline sugar visitor choking microwave erase narrative dogsled Medusa backfield antenna blackjack Eskimo breadline escapade

Attested on behalf of VeriSign by:

Alejandro Bolivar
Senior Engineer, Cryptographic Business Operations
VeriSign, Inc.

Insert Copy of KSR to be signed

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
29.	CA plugs FD labeled "KSR" with KSR to be signed into the laptop and waits for the O/S to recognize the FD. CA points out the KSR file to be signed then closes the file system window.	FA	22:23

Execute KSR signer

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
30.	CA identifies the KSR to be signed and runs, in the terminal window `ksrsigner Kjqmt7v /media/KSR/ksr-root-2013-q2-0.xml`	FA	22:24
31.	The KSR signer will ask whether the HSM is activated or not as below. `Activate HSM prior to accepting in the affirmative!! (y/N):` CA cofirms that the HSM is online and then enters "y" to proceed to verification. **Note: DO NOT enter "y" for the "Is this correct y/n?" yet.**	FA	22:24

Final Verification of the Hash (validity) of the KSR

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
32.	When the program requests verification of the KSR hash, CA asks the Root Zone Maintainer (RZM) representative to identify him/herself, present identification document for IW1 to retain and read out the SHA256 hash in PGP wordlist format for the KSR previously sent to ICANN. IW1 enters RZM representative's name here: Alejandro Bolivar	FA	22:26
33.	Participants match the hash read out with that displayed on the terminal. CA asks, "are there are any objections"?	FA	22:26
34.	CA then enters "`y`" in response to "`Is this correct y/n?`" to complete KSR signing operation. Sample output should look like Figure 1. The signed KSR (SKR) will be found in `/media/KSR/skr-root-2013-q2-0.xml`	FA	22:27

```
$ ksrsigner Kjqmt7v ksr-root-2010-q4-1.xml

Starting: ksrsigner Kjqmt7v /media/KSR/ksr-root-2010-q4-1.xml (at Mon Jul 12 22:44:26 2010 UTC)
Use HSM /opt/dnssec/aep.hsmconfig?
Activate HSM prior to accepting in the affirmative!! (y/N): y

HSM /opt/dnssec/aep.hsmconfig activated.
[debug] setenv KEYPER_LIBRARY_PATH=/opt/dnssec
[debug] setenv PKCS11_LIBRARY_PATH=/opt/Keyper/PKCS11Provider/pkcs11.GCC4.0.2.so.4.07
Found 1 slots on HSM /opt/Keyper/PKCS11Provider/pkcs11.GCC4.0.2.so.4.07
HSM slot 0 included
Loaded /opt/Keyper/PKCS11Provider/pkcs11.GCC4.0.2.so.4.07 Slot=0
HSM Information:
    Label:           ICANNKSK
    ManufacturerID:  AEP Networks
    Model:           Keyper Pro 0405
    Serial:          K6002010

Validating last SKR with HSM...
#  Inception           Expiration          ZSK Tags      KSK Tag(CKA_LABEL)
1  2010-07-01T00:00:00 2010-07-15T23:59:59 55138,41248  19036
2  2010-07-11T00:00:00 2010-07-25T23:59:59 41248         19036
3  2010-07-21T00:00:00 2010-08-04T23:59:59 41248         19036
4  2010-07-31T00:00:00 2010-08-14T23:59:59 41248         19036
5  2010-08-10T00:00:00 2010-08-24T23:59:59 41248         19036
6  2010-08-20T00:00:00 2010-09-03T23:59:59 41248         19036
7  2010-08-30T00:00:00 2010-09-13T23:59:59 41248         19036
8  2010-09-09T00:00:00 2010-09-24T00:00:00 41248         19036
9  2010-09-20T00:00:00 2010-10-05T23:59:59 40288,41248   19036
...VALIDATED.

Validate and Process KSR /media/KSR/ksr-root-2010-q4-1.xml...
#  Inception           Expiration          ZSK Tags      KSK Tag(CKA_LABEL)
1  2010-10-01T00:00:00 2010-10-15T23:59:59 40288,41248
2  2010-10-11T00:00:00 2010-10-25T23:59:59 40288
3  2010-10-21T00:00:00 2010-11-04T23:59:59 40288
4  2010-10-31T00:00:00 2010-11-14T23:59:59 40288
5  2010-11-10T00:00:00 2010-11-24T23:59:59 40288
6  2010-11-20T00:00:00 2010-12-04T23:59:59 40288
7  2010-11-30T00:00:00 2010-12-14T23:59:59 40288
8  2010-12-10T00:00:00 2010-12-25T00:00:00 40288
9  2010-12-21T00:00:00 2011-01-05T23:59:59 21639,40288
...PASSED.

SHA256 hash of KSR:
A17E539793B2611112C4F591A06AF4FBC2221DDDD71794BC72D5AEE910C72543
>> ratchet insurgent dwelling mosquito playhouse pioneer fallout Babylon atlas reproduce vapor miracle
ragtime hamburger upshot Wichita snapshot candidate Belfast tambourine stopwatch bookseller Pluto
pyramid highchair specialist robust ultimate assume retraction bombast decimal <<
Is this correct (y/N)? y

Generated new SKR in /media/KSR/skr-root-2010-q4-1.xml
#  Inception           Expiration          ZSK Tags      KSK Tag(CKA_LABEL)
1  2010-10-01T00:00:00 2010-10-15T23:59:59 40288,41248  19036
2  2010-10-11T00:00:00 2010-10-25T23:59:59 40288         19036
3  2010-10-21T00:00:00 2010-11-04T23:59:59 40288         19036
4  2010-10-31T00:00:00 2010-11-14T23:59:59 40288         19036
5  2010-11-10T00:00:00 2010-11-24T23:59:59 40288         19036
6  2010-11-20T00:00:00 2010-12-04T23:59:59 40288         19036
7  2010-11-30T00:00:00 2010-12-14T23:59:59 40288         19036
8  2010-12-10T00:00:00 2010-12-25T00:00:00 40288         19036
9  2010-12-21T00:00:00 2011-01-05T23:59:59 40288,21639   19036

SHA256 hash of SKR:
00CC341B7B3BAEE2E62B1AA6A58DEF07F02E4950E959E6A6ACBD7CEFF2741257
>> aardvark revolver choking bravado kickoff councilman robust tomorrow tracker Cherokee beehive
paragon reindeer microscope uncut amusement unearth coherence deckhand embezzle treadmill examine
tracker paragon ribcage quantity kiwi unravel uproot hydraulic atlas Eskimo <<
Unloaded /opt/Keyper/PKCS11Provider/pkcs11.GCC4.0.2.so.4.07 Slot=0

********** Log output in ./ksrsigner-20100712-224426.log **********
```

Figure 1

```
Starting: ksrsigner Kjqmt7v /media/KSR/ksr-root-2013-q2-0.xml (at Tue Feb 12 22:24:29 2
013 UTC)
Use HSM /opt/dnssec/aep.hsmconfig?
HSM /opt/dnssec/aep.hsmconfig activated.
setenv KEYPER_LIBRARY_PATH=/opt/dnssec
setenv PKCS11_LIBRARY_PATH=/opt/Keyper/PKCS11Provider/pkcs11.GCC4.0.2.so.4.07
Found 1 slots on HSM /opt/Keyper/PKCS11Provider/pkcs11.GCC4.0.2.so.4.07
HSM slot 0 included
Loaded /opt/Keyper/PKCS11Provider/pkcs11.GCC4.0.2.so.4.07 Slot=0
HSM Information:
    Label:           ICANNKSK
    ManufacturerID:  AEP Networks
    Model:           Keyper Pro 0405
    Serial:          K6002020

Validating last SKR with HSM...
#  Inception            Expiration           ZSK Tags      KSK Tag(CKA_LABEL)
1  2013-01-01T00:00:00 2013-01-15T23:59:59  24220,40323   19036
2  2013-01-11T00:00:00 2013-01-25T23:59:59  40323         19036
3  2013-01-21T00:00:00 2013-02-04T23:59:59  40323         19036
4  2013-01-31T00:00:00 2013-02-14T23:59:59  40323         19036
5  2013-02-10T00:00:00 2013-02-24T23:59:59  40323         19036
6  2013-02-20T00:00:00 2013-03-06T23:59:59  40323         19036
7  2013-03-02T00:00:00 2013-03-16T23:59:59  40323         19036
8  2013-03-12T00:00:00 2013-03-26T23:59:59  40323         19036
9  2013-03-21T00:00:00 2013-04-05T23:59:59  20580,40323   19036
...VALIDATED.

Validate and Process KSR /media/KSR/ksr-root-2013-q2-0.xml...
#  Inception            Expiration           ZSK Tags      KSK Tag(CKA_LABEL)
1  2013-04-01T00:00:00 2013-04-15T23:59:59  20580,40323
2  2013-04-11T00:00:00 2013-04-25T23:59:59  20580
3  2013-04-21T00:00:00 2013-05-05T23:59:59  20580
4  2013-05-01T00:00:00 2013-05-15T23:59:59  20580
5  2013-05-11T00:00:00 2013-05-25T23:59:59  20580
6  2013-05-21T00:00:00 2013-06-04T23:59:59  20580
7  2013-05-31T00:00:00 2013-06-14T23:59:59  20580
8  2013-06-10T00:00:00 2013-06-24T23:59:59  20580
9  2013-06-20T00:00:00 2013-07-05T23:59:59  49656,20580
...PASSED.

SHA256 hash of KSR:
E20491DBA323DACBD74479B8D91E793D9B18D9F5348E5B984A8B150821572856
>> tiger alkali pheasant suspicious reform cannonball surmount revival stopwatch design
ing jawbone provincial sugar Burlington jawbone crucifix puppy borderline sugar visitor
 choking microwave erase narrative dogsled Medusa backfield antenna blackjack Eskimo br
eadline escapade <<

Generated new SKR in /media/KSR/skr-root-2013-q2-0.xml
#  Inception            Expiration           ZSK Tags      KSK Tag(CKA_LABEL)
1  2013-04-01T00:00:00 2013-04-15T23:59:59  20580,40323   19036
```

```
2  2013-04-11T00:00:00 2013-04-25T23:59:59  20580          19036
3  2013-04-21T00:00:00 2013-05-05T23:59:59  20580          19036
4  2013-05-01T00:00:00 2013-05-15T23:59:59  20580          19036
5  2013-05-11T00:00:00 2013-05-25T23:59:59  20580          19036
6  2013-05-21T00:00:00 2013-06-04T23:59:59  20580          19036
7  2013-05-31T00:00:00 2013-06-14T23:59:59  20580          19036
8  2013-06-10T00:00:00 2013-06-24T23:59:59  20580          19036
9  2013-06-20T00:00:00 2013-07-05T23:59:59  20580,49656    19036

SHA256 hash of SKR:
1B7A09BB40C409A0E409ECAD8B53E45976016938441222B7A7354240FAECBC66
>> beeswax infancy Algol publisher crackdown reproduce Algol Orlando tonic applicant tu
mor perceptive obtuse enterprise tonic examine inverse adviser gazelle consulting crump
led backwater blockade processor repay conformist crowfoot Dakota wallet unicorn showgi
rl gossamer <<
Unloaded /opt/Keyper/PKCS11Provider/pkcs11.GCC4.0.2.so.4.07 Slot=0
```

Print Copies of the Operation for Participants

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
35.	CA prints out a sufficient number of copies for participants using `printlog ksrsigner-20130212-*.log N` where ksrsigner-**20130212-***.log is replaced by log output file displayed by program. (this example generates **N** copies) and hands copies to participants.	FA	22:31
36.	IW1 attaches a copy to his/her script.	FA	22:31

Backup Newly Created SKR

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
37.	CA copies the contents of the KSR FD by running `cp -p /media/KSR/* .` for posting back to RZM. Confirm overwrite by entering "y" when prompted.	FA	22:32

38.	CA lists contents of KSR FD which should now have an SKR by running
	`ls -ltr /media/KSR`
	and then unmounts the KSR FD using
	`umount /media/KSR`
		FA	22:33

39.	CA removes **KSR** FD containing SKR and gives it to the RZM representative.	FA	22:33

Disable/Deactivate HSM

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
40.	CA inserts 3 cards into HSM to deactivate the unit (via "Set Offline" menu item). Type in the default PIN "**11223344**" when prompted. IW1 records the used cards below. Each card is returned to cardholder after use. CA makes sure the card(s) NOT used to activate are used to deactivate the HSM. 1st OP card 1 of 7 2nd OP card 2 of 7 3rd OP card 5 of 7 Confirm the ready light turns off.	FA	22:35

3bad0dd220813fbdeab6f9360bfa9020 -

Act. 3 Secure Hardware and Close the Ceremony

Return HSM to a TEB

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
1.	CA disconnects HSM from power and laptop (serial and Ethernet) if connected, placing HSM into a new TEB and seals.	FA	22:37
2.	CA reads out TEB # and HSM serial #, shows item to participants and IW1 confirms TEB # and HSM serial # below. **HSM1: TEB# BB24706821 / serial # K6002020** IW1 initials the TEB and keep the sealing strips for later inventory. CA places item on equipment cart.	FA	22:38

Stop Recording Serial Port Activity and Logging Terminal Output

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
3.	**Closing ttyaudit terminal window** CA terminates the HSM serial output capture by disconnecting the USB serial adaptor from laptop. CA then exits out of **ttyaudit terminal window** by typing "exit".	FA	22:39
4.	**Terminating the logging script** CA stops logging terminal output by entering "exit" in the other terminal window. This only stops the script logging and will **NOT** close window.	FA	22:39

Backup HSMFD Contents

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
5.	Set dotglob by executing `shopt -s dotglob` This allows copying everything in the original HSMFD.	FA	22:40
6.	Calculate the md5hash of the contents on the original HSMFD. `find -P /media/HSMFD -type f -print0 | sort -z | xargs -0 cat | md5sum`	FA	22:40
7.	Copy and paste the md5hash and paste it on Text Editor by going to **Applications > Accessories > Text Editor** Print two copies. One for the audit bundle and the other for the HSMFD package.	FA	22:46
8.	CA displays contents of HSMFD by executing `ls -ltr`	FA	22:46
9.	CA plugs a blank FD labeled HSMFD into the laptop, then waits for it to be recognized by the O/S (as HSMFD_); and copies the contents of the HSMFD to the blank drive for backup by executing `cp -Rp * /media/HSMFD_`	FA	22:47

```
Script started on Tue 12 Feb 2013 10:03:12 PM UTC
\033]0;root@localhost:/media/HSMFD\007[root@localhost HSMFD]# ls
\033[00m\033[00;32mKjqmt7v.csr\033[00m
\033[00;32mkskgen-20100616-211906.log\033[00m
\033[00;32mKSKSlotDB.config.db\033[00m
\033[00;32mKSKSlotDB.db\033[00m
\033[00;32mksr-root-2010-q3-2.xml\033[00m
\033[00;32mksr-root-2010-q4-1.xml\033[00m
\033[00;32mksr-root-2011-q2-0.xml\033[00m
\033[00;32mksr-root-2011-q4-0.xml\033[00m
\033[00;32mksr-root-2012-q2-0.xml\033[00m
\033[00;32mksr-root-2012-q4-0.xml\033[00m
\033[00;32mksrsigner-20100616-214329.log\033[00m
\033[00;32mksrsigner-20100712-224252.log\033[00m
\033[00;32mksrsigner-20100712-224426.log\033[00m
\033[00;32mksrsigner-20110207-223245.log\033[00m
\033[00;32mksrsigner-20110207-223256.log\033[00m
\033[00;32mksrsigner-20110720-205839.log\033[00m
\033[00;32mksrsigner-20120202-222928.log\033[00m
\033[00;32mksrsigner-20120726-185458.log\033[00m
\033[00;32mscript-20100616-2209utc.log\033[00m
\033[00;32mscript-20100616.log\033[00m
\033[00;32mscript-20100712.log\033[00m
\033[00;32mscript-20110207.log\033[00m
\033[00;32mscript-20110720.log\033[00m
\033[00;32mscript-20120202.log\033[00m
\033[00;32mscript-20120726.log\033[00m
\033[00;32mscript-20130212.log\033[00m
\033[00;32mskr-root-2010-q3-2.xml\033[00m
\033[00;32mskr-root-2010-q4-1.xml\033[00m
\033[00;32mskr-root-2011-q2-0.xml\033[00m
\033[00;32mskr-root-2011-q4-0.xml\033[00m
\033[00;32mskr-root-2012-q2-0.xml\033[00m
\033[00;32mskr-root-2012-q4-0.xml\033[00m
\033[00;32mskr.xml\033[00m
\033[00;32mskr.xml.20100712224426\033[00m
\033[00;32mskr.xml.20110207223256\033[00m
\033[00;32mskr.xml.20110720205839\033[00m
\033[00;32mskr.xml.20120202222928\033[00m
\033[00;32mskr.xml.20120726185458\033[00m
\033[00;34mtmp\033[00m
\033[00;32mttyaudit-ttyUSB0-20100616-182157.log\033[00m
\033[00;32mttyaudit-ttyUSB0-20100712-212549.log\033[00m
\033[00;32mttyaudit-ttyUSB0-20110207-221818.log\033[00m
\033[00;32mttyaudit-ttyUSB0-20110720-205011.log\033[00m
\033[00;32mttyaudit-ttyUSB0-20120202-221813.log\033[00m
\033[00;32mttyaudit-ttyUSB0-20120726-184435.log\033[00m
\033[00;32mttyaudit-ttyUSB1-20100616-182157.log\033[00m
\033[00;32mttyaudit-ttyUSB1-20100712-212549.log\033[00m
\033[00;32mwksr_1_20100708144111_14165_198.41.3.50_ksr-root-2010-q4-1.xml\033[00m
\033[00;32mwksr-20100517-172720.log\033[00m
\033[00;32mwksr-20100708-144111.log\033[00m
\033[m\033]0;root@localhost:/media/HSMFD\007[root@localhost HSMFD]# ping 192.168.0.2
PING 192.168.0.2 (192.168.0.2) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from 192.168.0.2: icmp_seq=1 ttl=255 time=0.699 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.0.2: icmp_seq=2 ttl=255 time=0.262 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.0.2: icmp_seq=3 ttl=255 time=0.254 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.0.2: icmp_seq=4 ttl=255 time=0.261 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.0.2: icmp_seq=5 ttl=255 time=0.255 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.0.2: icmp_seq=6 ttl=255 time=0.257 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.0.2: icmp_seq=7 ttl=255 time=0.253 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.0.2: icmp_seq=8 ttl=255 time=0.254 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.0.2: icmp_seq=9 ttl=255 time=0.236 ms

--- 192.168.0.2 ping statistics ---
9 packets transmitted, 9 received, 0% packet loss, time 8000ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 0.236/0.303/0.699/0.140 ms
\033]0;root@localhost:/media/HSMFD\007[root@localhost HSMFD]# ksrsigne\033[Kr \033[KK
\033[Kjqmt7v /media/KSR/ksr-root-2013-q2-0.
Starting: ksrsigner Kjqmt7v /media/KSR/ksr-root-2013-q2-0.xml (at Tue Feb 12 22:24:29
2013 UTC)
Use HSM /opt/dnssec/aep.hsmconfig?
Activate HSM prior to accepting in the affirmative!! (y/N): y

HSM /opt/dnssec/aep.hsmconfig activated.
[debug] setenv KEYPER_LIBRARY_PATH=/opt/dnssec
[debug] setenv PKCS11_LIBRARY_PATH=/opt/Keyper/PKCS11Provider/pkcs11.GCC4.0.2.so.4.07
Found 1 slots on HSM /opt/Keyper/PKCS11Provider/pkcs11.GCC4.0.2.so.4.07
HSM slot 0 included
Loaded /opt/Keyper/PKCS11Provider/pkcs11.GCC4.0.2.so.4.07 Slot=0
HSM Information:
    Label:           ICANNKSK
    ManufacturerID:  AEP Networks
    Model:           Keyper Pro 0405
    Serial:          K6002020

Validating last SKR with HSM...
#  Inception            Expiration           ZSK Tags        KSK Tag(CKA_LABEL)
1  2013-01-01T00:00:00  2013-01-15T23:59:59  24220,40323     19036
2  2013-01-11T00:00:00  2013-01-25T23:59:59  40323           19036
3  2013-01-21T00:00:00  2013-02-04T23:59:59  40323           19036
4  2013-01-31T00:00:00  2013-02-14T23:59:59  40323           19036
5  2013-02-10T00:00:00  2013-02-24T23:59:59  40323           19036
6  2013-02-20T00:00:00  2013-03-06T23:59:59  40323           19036
7  2013-03-02T00:00:00  2013-03-16T23:59:59  40323           19036
8  2013-03-12T00:00:00  2013-03-26T23:59:59  40323           19036
9  2013-03-21T00:00:00  2013-04-05T23:59:59  20580,40323     19036
...VALIDATED.

Validate and Process KSR /media/KSR/ksr-root-2013-q2-0.xml...
#  Inception            Expiration           ZSK Tags        KSK Tag(CKA_LABEL)
1  2013-04-01T00:00:00  2013-04-15T23:59:59  20580,40323
2  2013-04-11T00:00:00  2013-04-25T23:59:59  20580
3  2013-04-21T00:00:00  2013-05-05T23:59:59  20580
4  2013-05-01T00:00:00  2013-05-15T23:59:59  20580
5  2013-05-11T00:00:00  2013-05-25T23:59:59  20580
6  2013-05-21T00:00:00  2013-06-04T23:59:59  20580
7  2013-05-31T00:00:00  2013-06-14T23:59:59  20580
8  2013-06-10T00:00:00  2013-06-24T23:59:59  20580
9  2013-06-20T00:00:00  2013-07-05T23:59:59  49656,20580
...PASSED.

SHA256 hash of KSR:
E20491DBA323DACBD74479B8D91E793D9B18D9F5348E5B984A8B150821572856
>> tiger alkali pheasant suspicious reform cannonball surmount revival stopwatch desi
ning jawbone provincial sugar Burlington jawbone crucifix puppy borderline sugar visi
or choking microwave erase narrative dogsled Medusa backfield antenna blackjack Eskim
 breadline escapade <<
Is this correct (y/N)? y

Generated new SKR in /media/KSR/skr-root-2013-q2-0.xml
#  Inception            Expiration           ZSK Tags        KSK Tag(CKA_LABEL)
1  2013-04-01T00:00:00  2013-04-15T23:59:59  20580,40323     19036
2  2013-04-11T00:00:00  2013-04-25T23:59:59  20580           19036
```

```
3  2013-04-21T00:00:00 2013-05-05T23:59:59  20580          19036
4  2013-05-01T00:00:00 2013-05-15T23:59:59  20580          19036
5  2013-05-11T00:00:00 2013-05-25T23:59:59  20580          19036
6  2013-05-21T00:00:00 2013-06-04T23:59:59  20580          19036
7  2013-05-31T00:00:00 2013-06-14T23:59:59  20580          19036
8  2013-06-10T00:00:00 2013-06-24T23:59:59  20580          19036
9  2013-06-20T00:00:00 2013-07-05T23:59:59  20580,49656    19036

SHA256 hash of SKR:
1B7A09BB40C409A0E409ECAD8B53E4597601693844122 2B7A7354240FAECBC66
>> beeswax infancy Algol publisher crackdown reproduce Algol Orlando tonic applicant t
umor perceptive obtuse enterprise tonic examine inverse adviser gazelle consulting cru
mpled backwater blockade processor repay conformist crowfoot Dakota wallet unicorn sho
wgirl gossamer <<
Unloaded /opt/Keyper/PKCS11Provider/pkcs11.GCC4.0.2.so.4.07 Slot=0

********** Log output in ./ksrsigner-20130212-222429.log **********
\033]0;root@localhost:/media/HSMFD\007[root@localhost HSMFD]# ls -l\033[K /media/KSR
\033[00mtotal 76
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 15371 Jan 20 19:39 \033[00;32mksr-root-2013-q2-0.xml\033[00m
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 18314 Feb 12 22:26 \033[00;32mskr-root-2013-q2-0.xml\033[00m
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 18314 Feb 12 22:26 \033[00;32mskr.xml\033[00m
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 18314 Nov 12 15:55 \033[00;32mskr.xml.20130212222429\033[00m
\033[m\033]0;root@localhost:/media/HSMFD\007[root@localhost HSMFD]# printlog ksr\007s
\007igner-20130212-222429.log 15\033[K
[ 2 pages * 15 copy ] sent to printer
3 lines were wrapped
\033]0;root@localhost:/media/HSMFD\007[root@localhost HSMFD]# cp -p /media/KSR/* .
cp: overwrite './skr.xml'? y
\033]0;root@localhost:/media/HSMFD\007[root@localhost HSMFD]# ls -ltr /media/KSR
\033[00mtotal 76
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 18314 Nov 12 15:55 \033[00;32mskr.xml.20130212222429\033[00m
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 15371 Jan 20 19:39 \033[00;32mksr-root-2013-q2-0.xml\033[00m
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 18314 Feb 12 22:26 \033[00;32mskr.xml\033[00m
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 18314 Feb 12 22:26 \033[00;32mskr-root-2013-q2-0.xml\033[00m
\033[m\033]0;root@localhost:/media/HSMFD\007[root@localhost HSMFD]# umount /media/KSR
\033[K\033]0;root@localhost:/media/HSMFD\007[root@localhost HSMFD]#
exit

Script done on Tue 12 Feb 2013 10:39:13 PM UTC
```

```
2013-02-12T22:08:42+0000        ttyUSB0 Application Boot Loader - Feb 25 2010 11:08:16
2013-02-12T22:08:42+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:43+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:43+0000        ttyUSB0 Battery OK!
2013-02-12T22:08:43+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:43+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:43+0000        ttyUSB0 No Tamper Counts in BBRAM!
2013-02-12T22:08:43+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:44+0000        ttyUSB0  Loading Application (APP)
2013-02-12T22:08:44+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:45+0000        ttyUSB0  Starting loaded code.
2013-02-12T22:08:45+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:45+0000        ttyUSB0 \000Application - Feb 25 2010 11:08:02
2013-02-12T22:08:45+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:46+0000        ttyUSB0 wdog started
2013-02-12T22:08:46+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:49+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:49+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:49+0000        ttyUSB0 Running DES POST Test
2013-02-12T22:08:49+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:49+0000        ttyUSB0 DES POST Test Passed
2013-02-12T22:08:49+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:49+0000        ttyUSB0 Running Triple DES POST Test
2013-02-12T22:08:49+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:49+0000        ttyUSB0 Triple DES POST Test Passed
2013-02-12T22:08:49+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0 Running AES POST Test
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0 AES POST Test Passed
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0 Running SHA1 POST Test
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0 SHA1 POST Test Passed
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0 Running SHA2 POST Test
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0 SHA2 POST Test Passed
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0 Running RandomGen SHA1 POST Test
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0 Randomgen SHA1 POST Test Passed
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0 Running RSA POST Test
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0 RSA POST Test Passed
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0 Running DSA POST Test
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0 DSA POST Test Passed
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0 Running RandomGen POST Test
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0 RandomGen POST Test Passed
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0 Additional RandomGen POST Test Passed
```

```
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0 12/2/2013 at 20:49:00
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0  0x100008
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0 App Details Response:
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0 Additional RandomGen POST Test Passed
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0 Additional RandomGen POST Test Passed
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0 Additional RandomGen POST Test Passed
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0 Additional RandomGen POST Test Passed
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0 Additional RandomGen POST Test Passed
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0 Additional RandomGen POST Test Passed
2013-02-12T22:08:50+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0 Additional RandomGen POST Test Passed
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0 Additional RandomGen POST Test Passed
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0 Additional RandomGen POST Test Passed
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0 Additional RandomGen POST Test Passed
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0 Additional RandomGen POST Test Passed
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0 Additional RandomGen POST Test Passed
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0 Additional RandomGen POST Test Passed
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0 Additional RandomGen POST Test Passed
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0 Additional RandomGen POST Test Passed
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0 Part Number: Keyper Pro 0405
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0 Serial Number: Serial K6002020
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0 App Build Number: App 020
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0 ABL Build Number: ABL 029
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0 AL Build Number: AL 02A
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0 CS Build Number: CS 029
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0
```

```
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0 Total Private Memory 4173377
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0 Free Private Memory 4173377
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0 Total Dynamic Memory 14569472
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0 Free Dynamic Memory 14569472
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0 Date and Time: 20:49:00 on 12/02/2013
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0 Created socket 1 on port 3000.
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0 12/2/2013 at 20:49:01
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0  0x100003
2013-02-12T22:08:51+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:15:54+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:15:54+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:15:54+0000        ttyUSB0 12/2/2013 at 20:56:04
2013-02-12T22:15:54+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:15:54+0000        ttyUSB0  0x200023 0A400000B706296E
2013-02-12T22:15:54+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:16:23+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:16:23+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:16:23+0000        ttyUSB0 12/2/2013 at 20:56:32
2013-02-12T22:16:23+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:16:23+0000        ttyUSB0  0x200023 0A4000009D06296E
2013-02-12T22:16:23+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:17:00+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:17:00+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:17:00+0000        ttyUSB0 12/2/2013 at 20:57:10
2013-02-12T22:17:00+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:17:00+0000        ttyUSB0  0x200023 0A4000009D86296E
2013-02-12T22:17:00+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:17:03+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:17:03+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:17:03+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:17:03+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:17:03+0000        ttyUSB0 Created socket 1 on port 5000.
2013-02-12T22:17:03+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:17:03+0000        ttyUSB0 12/2/2013 at 20:57:12
2013-02-12T22:17:03+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:17:03+0000        ttyUSB0  0x100002
2013-02-12T22:17:03+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:24:57+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:24:57+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:24:57+0000        ttyUSB0 Accepted connection on address 210.247.192.168.0.1.
2013-02-12T22:24:57+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:24:57+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:24:57+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:24:57+0000        ttyUSB0 ================================================================
2013-02-12T22:24:57+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:24:57+0000        ttyUSB0 Free memory down from 14569472 to 11843072 (last mechanism 0)!
```

```
2013-02-12T22:24:57+0000          ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:24:57+0000          ttyUSB0 21:05:06 on 12-02-2013
2013-02-12T22:24:57+0000          ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:24:57+0000          ttyUSB0 ===================================================================
2013-02-12T22:24:57+0000          ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:26:50+0000          ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:26:50+0000          ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:26:50+0000          ttyUSB0 Closing connection on address 210.247.192.168.0.1.
2013-02-12T22:26:50+0000          ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:34:39+0000          ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:34:39+0000          ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:34:39+0000          ttyUSB0 12/2/2013 at 21:14:49
2013-02-12T22:34:39+0000          ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:34:39+0000          ttyUSB0  0x200023 0A400000B706296E
2013-02-12T22:34:39+0000          ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:09+0000          ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:09+0000          ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:09+0000          ttyUSB0 12/2/2013 at 21:15:19
2013-02-12T22:35:09+0000          ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:09+0000          ttyUSB0  0x200023 0A4000009D06296E
2013-02-12T22:35:09+0000          ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:35+0000          ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:35+0000          ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:35+0000          ttyUSB0 12/2/2013 at 21:15:44
2013-02-12T22:35:35+0000          ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:35+0000          ttyUSB0  0x200023 0A4000009D86296E
2013-02-12T22:35:35+0000          ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000          ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000          ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000          ttyUSB0 Closed socket 1 on port 5000.
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000          ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000          ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000          ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000          ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000          ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000          ttyUSB0 Closing connection; address unavailable (errno 5009).
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000          ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000          ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000          ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000          ttyUSB0 Closing connection; address unavailable (errno 5009).
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000          ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000          ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000          ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000          ttyUSB0 Closing connection; address unavailable (errno 5009).
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000          ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000          ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000          ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000          ttyUSB0 Closing connection; address unavailable (errno 5009).
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000          ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000          ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000          ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000          ttyUSB0 Closing connection; address unavailable (errno 5009).
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000          ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000          ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000          ttyUSB0
```

```
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000        ttyUSB0 Closing connection; address unavailable (errno 5009).
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000        ttyUSB0 Closing connection; address unavailable (errno 5009).
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000        ttyUSB0 Closing connection; address unavailable (errno 5009).
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000        ttyUSB0 Closing connection; address unavailable (errno 5009).
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000        ttyUSB0 Closing connection; address unavailable (errno 5009).
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000        ttyUSB0 Closing connection; address unavailable (errno 5009).
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000        ttyUSB0 Closing connection; address unavailable (errno 5009).
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000        ttyUSB0 Closing connection; address unavailable (errno 5009).
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:42+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:43+0000        ttyUSB0 Closing connection; address unavailable (errno 5009).
2013-02-12T22:35:43+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:43+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:43+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:43+0000        ttyUSB0 Closing connection; address unavailable (errno 5009).
2013-02-12T22:35:43+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:43+0000        ttyUSB0 12/2/2013 at 21:15:51
2013-02-12T22:35:43+0000        ttyUSB0
2013-02-12T22:35:43+0000        ttyUSB0  0x100003
2013-02-12T22:35:43+0000        ttyUSB0
```

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
10.	CA displays contents of HSMFD_ by executing `ls -ltr /media/HSMFD_`	FA	22:47
11.	Calculate the md5hash of the contents on the copied HSMFD. `find -P /media/HSMFD_ -type f -print0 | sort -z | xargs -0 cat | md5sum` Confirm that it matches the md5hash of the original HSMFD	FA	22:49
12.	CA unmounts new FD using `umount /media/HSMFD_`	FA	22:49
13.	CA removes **HSMFD_** and places on table.	FA	22:49
14.	CA repeats step 9 to 13 for the 2nd copy	FA	22:50
15.	CA repeats step 9 to 13 for the 3rd copy	FA	22:51
16.	CA repeats step 9 to 13 for the 4th copy	FA	22:52
17.	CA repeats step 9 to 13 for the 5th copy	FA	22:53

Print Logging Information

Step	Activity	Initial	Time

18.	CA prints out hard copies of logging information by executing
	`enscript -2Gr -# 2 script-20130212.log`
	`enscript -Gr -# 2 --font="Courier8" ttyaudit-ttyUSB*-20130212-*.log`
	for attachment to IW1 and CA scripts.
	Note: Ignore the error regarding non-printable characters if prompted.
		FA	22:56

Returning HSMFD and O/S DVD to a TEB

Step	Activity	Initial	Time

19.	CA unmounts HSMFD by executing
	`cd /tmp`
	then
	`umount /media/HSMFD`
	CA removes HSMFD.
		FA	22:57

20.	After all print jobs are complete, CA a) Turns off the laptop by pressing the power switch b) Turns on the laptop by pressing the power switch c) Remove the O/S DVD from the drive d) Turns off the laptop again by pressing the power switch	FA	22:58
21.	CA places two HSMFDs and OS/DVD in TEB; writes date, time and "HSMFD" in amount field; and seals; reads out TEB #; shows item to participants and IW1 confirms TEB # below. **O/S DVD (Rev600) + HSMFD: TEB# BB21820463** IW1 initials the TEB. CA places TEB on equipment cart.	FA	23:01

Distribute HSMFDs

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
22.	Remaining HSMFDs are distributed to IW1 (2 for audit bundles, 1 for himself), IKOS(1) to post SKR to RZM, and to review, analyze and improve on procedures.	FA	23:02

Returning Laptop to a TEB

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
23.	CA disconnects printer, display, power, and any other connections from laptop and puts laptop in prepared TEB and seals; reads out TEB #, serial # laptop # and shows item to participants and IW1 confirms TEB #, serial # laptop # below. **Laptop1 (Dell ATG6400): TEB# BB24706822 / serial# 37240147333** IW1 initials the TEB and keep the sealing strips for later inventory. CA places TEB on equipment cart.	FA	23:04

Returning OP Smartcards to TEBs

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
24.	CA calls each CO to the front of the room one at a time and repeats the steps below. a) CA takes a TEB prepared for the CO and reads out the number and description while showing the bag to IW1 and CO. Figure 2 below for an example. b) CA places OP into TEB, seals in front of IW1 and CO then initials bag and strip. c) IW1 inspects the TEB, confirms description in table below and initials TEB and strip. IW1 keeps sealing strips for later inventory. d) CA hands the TEB containing the OP card to the CO. CO inspects and verifies TEB #s and contents then initials his/her bag. e) CO enters completion time and signs for each TEB in the table below in IW1's script. IW1 initials table entry. f) CO returns to his/her seat with the TEB, being careful not to poke or puncture TEB.	FA	23:11

CO#	Card Type	TEB #	Printed Name	Signature	Date	Time	IW1
CO 1	OP 1 of 7	BB21820464	Masato Minda		12 February 2013	23:07	FA
CO 2	OP 2 of 7	BB21820459	Dmitry Burkov		12 February 2013	23:08	FA
CO 3	OP 3 of 7	BB21820460	Joao Damas		12 February 2013	—	FA
CO 5	OP 5 of 7	BB21820461	Edward Lewis		12 February 2013	2311	FA
CO 7	OP 7 of 7	BB21820462	Subramanian Moonesamy		12 February 2013	—	FA


DO NOT OPEN AND NOTIFY SENDER IMMEDIATELY IF ANY OF THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS APPEAR ON THIS BAG! THE FOLLOWING INDICATORS MAY SIGNIFY TAMPERING:
1. SIGNS APPEARING IN TAPE CLOSURE MAY INDICATE TAMPERING.
2. CHANGE IN COLOR APPEARING IN WHITE STRIP.
3. DISCOLORATION, DISTORTION, OR SMEARING OF GREEN KEEPSAFE TEXT.
SEALING INSTRUCTIONS:
1. Use ball point pen to complete all information BEFORE loading bag.
2. Remove tear-off receipt and keep with copy of deposit documentation.
3. Remove trapped air; peel off release liner over sealing strip.
4. Press down firmly from center to edges.
DATE: 26 July 2012
SAID TO CONTAIN: $ CO.1 of 7
1. $
2. $
3. $
4. $
5. $
6. $
FROM: Root DNSSEC KSK Ceremony 10
TO: Masato Minda
BB21369028
BB21369028
AMPAC
ampaconline.com
STOCK # GC81013
PATENT NO. 6,471,058 • 6,270,256
LDPE
MADE IN USA
TO REMOVE CONTENTS–CUT ALONG THIS DOTTED LINE
KEEPSAFE gold
KEEPSAFE – DO NOT CUT HERE TO OPEN

Figure 2

Returning Equipment to Safe #1

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
25.	CA, IW1, SSC1 open safe room and enter with equipment cart.	FA	23:13
26.	SSC1 opens Safe #1 shielding combination from camera.	FA	23:14
27.	SSC1 removes the safe log and fills the next entry with printed name, date, time, and signature indicating the opening of the safe. IW1 initials the entry. **Note: If log entry is pre-printed, verify the entry, record time of completion and sign.**	FA	23:14
28.	CA records return of **HSM** in next entry field of safe log with TEB # and HSM serial #, printed name, date, time, and signature. CA **CAREFULLY** places the HSM into Safe #1 and IW1 initials the entry. **HSM1: TEB# BB24706821 / serial # K6002020**	FA	23:15
29.	CA records return of **laptop** in next entry field of safe log with TEB #, serial #, laptop #, printed name, date, time, and signature; places the laptop into Safe #1 and IW1 initials the entry. **Laptop1 (Dell ATG6400): TEB# BB24706822 / serial# 37240147333**	FA	23:15
30.	CA records return of **O/S DVD + HSMFD** in next entry field of safe log with TEB #, printed name, date, time, and signature; places the **O/S DVD + HSMFD** into Safe #1 and IW1 initials the entry. **O/S DVD (Rev600) + HSMFD: TEB# BB21820463**	FA	23:15

Close Equipment Safe #1

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
31.	SSC1 makes an entry including printed name, date, time, signature and notes "closing safe" in the safe log. IW1 initials the entry. **Note: If log entry is pre-printed, verify the entry, record time of completion and sign.**	FA	23:16
32.	SSC1 places log back in safe and locks Safe #1 (spin dial at least two full revolutions each way, counter clock wise then clock wise). IW1 and CA verify safe is locked and door indicator light is green.	FA	23:16
33.	IW1, CA, and SSC1 return to ceremony room with equipment cart closing the door behind them.	FA	23:17

Open Credential Safe #2

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
34.	After a one (1) minute delay, CA, IW1, SSC2, and COs enter the safe room. CA brings a flashlight and the CO brings their OP card TEB with them.	FA	23:19
35.	SSC2 opens Safe #2 while shielding combination from camera.	FA	00:53
36.	SSC2 removes the safe log and fills in the next entry with printed name, date, time, and signature indicating the opening of the safe. IW1 initials the entry. **Note: If log entry is pre-printed, verify the entry, record time of completion and sign.**	FA	00:54

CO returns OP cards to Safe #2

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
37.	One by one, each CO along with the CA (using his/her common key): a) Open his/her respective safe deposit box and read out box number inside Safe #2. b) CO makes an entry into the safe log indicating the return of OP card including Box #, TEB #, card type, printed name, date, time, and signature. IW1 initials the entry after verifying contents and integrity of the TEB and comparing TEB# s and card type to his/her script. **Note: If log entry is pre-printed, verify the entry, record time of completion and sign.** c) CO **shows the bag to the camera** and then places his/her TEB into his/her box and locks the safe deposit box with the help of the CA. Repeat the steps above until all cards are returned to the deposit box. **CO 1: Masato Minda** **Box # 1788** **OP TEB # BB21820464** **CO 2: Dmitry Burkov** **Box # 1793** **OP TEB # BB21820459** ~~**CO 3: Joao Damas**~~ ~~**Box # 1071**~~ ~~**OP TEB # BB21820460**~~ **CO 5: Edward Lewis** **Box # 1790** **OP TEB # BB21820461** ~~**CO 7: Subramanian Moonesamy**~~ ~~**Box # 1792**~~ ~~**OP TEB # BB21820462**~~	FA	01:03

Close Credential Safe #2

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
38.	Once all safe deposit boxes are closed, SSC2 makes an entry including printed name, date, time, and signature and notes "Close safe" into the safe log. IW1 initials the entry. **Note: If log entry is pre-printed, verify the entry, record time of completion and sign.**	FA	01:04
39.	SSC2 puts log back in safe and locks Safe #2 (spin dial at least two full revolutions each way, counter clock wise then clock wise). IW1 and CA verify safe is locked and door indicator light is green.	FA	01:04
40.	CA, IW1, SSC2, and COs leave safe room closing the door behind them making sure it is locked.	FA	01:05

Participant Signing of IW1's Script

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
41.	All participants enter printed name, date, time, and signature on IW1's script coversheet.	FA	01:09
42.	CA reviews IW1's script and signs it.	FA	01:05

Signing out of Ceremony Room

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
43.	IW2 ensures that all participants sign out of Ceremony Room log and are escorted out of the Ceremony Room. SA, IW1 and CA remain in the Ceremony Room.	FA	01:16

Filming Stops

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
44.	SA stops filming and makes 2 copies of film, one for on-site and one for off-site storage along with IW1 script copies made below.	FA	01:35

Copying and Storing the Script

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
45.	IW1 makes at least 4 copies of his/her script: one for off-site audit bundle, one for IW1, one for IKOS and copies for other participants, as requested. Audit bundles each contain 1) Output of signer system – HSMFD 2) Copy of IW1's key ceremony script 3) Audio-visual recording 4) Logs from the Physical Access Control and Intrusion Detection System (Range is **07/26/2012 – 02/12/2013**) 5) The IW attestation (A.1 below) 6) SA attestation (A.2, A.3 below) All in a TEB labeled "**Key Ceremony 12**", dated and signed by **IW1 and CA**. Off-site audit bundle is delivered to off-site storage. **The CA holds the ultimate responsibility for finalizing the audit bundle.**	FA	02:46

All remaining participants sign out of ceremony room log and leave.

Audit Bundle Checklist:

1. Output of Signer System (CA)
One electronic copy (physical flash drive) of the HSMFD in each audit bundle, each placed within a tamper-evident bag, labeled, dated and signed by the CA and the IW1

2. Key Ceremony Scripts (IW1)
Hard copies of the IW1's key ceremony scripts, including the IW's notes and the IW's attestation. See Appendix A.1.

3. Audio-visual recordings from the key ceremony (SA)
One set for the original audit bundle and the other for duplicate.

4. Logs from the Physical Access Control and Intrusion Detection System (SA)
One electronic copy (physical flash drive) of the firewall configuration, the screenshots from the PAC-IDS configuration review, the list of the enrolled users, the event log file and the configuration audit log file in each audit bundle, each placed in a tamper-evident bag, labeled, dated and signed by the SA and the IW.

IW confirms the contents of the logs before placing the logs in the audit bundle.

5. Configuration review of the Physical Access Control and Intrusion Detection System (SA)
SA's attestation and hard copies of the screen shots and configuration audit log from the review process. See Appendix A.2.

6. Configuration review of the Firewall System (SA)
SA's attestation and hard copies of the firewall configuration from the review process. See Appendix A.3.

7. Other items
If applicable.

A.1 Key Ceremony Script (by IW)

I hereby attest that the Key Ceremony was conducted in accordance with this script and any exceptions that may have occurred were accurately and properly documented.

Francisco Arias

Date: 12 February 2013

A.2 Access Control System Configuration Review (by SA)

I have reviewed the access control system configuration, the configuration audit log and the assigned authorizations from the other KMF and not found any discrepancies or anything else out of the ordinary.

Enclosed are the configuration audit log, the list of assigned authorizations and the screenshots of the roles configurations.

Enclosed is also an electronic copy of the event log from the access control system ranging from the last log extraction on [date, time UTC] Feb 13, 2013 02-24 to now.

Alexander Kulik

Date: 12 February 2013

A.3 Firewall Configuration Review (by SA)

I have reviewed the firewall configuration from the other KMF and not found any discrepancies or anything else out of the ordinary.

Enclosed is the configuration extract from the firewall unit.

Alexander Kulik



Date: 12 February 2013

```
--- JUNOS 10.1R1.8 built 2010-02-12 18:31:54 UTC
akulik@srx> show configuration | no-more
## Last commit: 2012-02-03 09:41:48 UTC by root
version 10.1R1.8;
system {
    host-name srx;
    domain-name ksk.lax.dns.icann.org;
    location {
        country-code US;
        postal-code 90245;
        building Equinix-LA3;
        floor 1;
        rack 1;
    }
    ports {
        console {
            log-out-on-disconnect;
            type vt100;
        }
    }
    root-authentication {
        encrypted-password "$1$XlzwmIYq$i50YWAfS7h4SW4U27m.qM."; ## SECRET-
DATA
    }
    name-server {
        199.4.28.18;
        199.4.28.28;
    }
    login {
        user akulik {
            full-name "Alex Kulik";
            uid 2002;
            class super-user;
            authentication {
                encrypted-password "$1$209TLzzv$v9GNTNKqLHj9snvqUHZD21"; ##
SECRET-DATA
            }
        }
        user reed {
            full-name "Reed Quinn";
            uid 2003;
            class super-user;
            authentication {
                encrypted-password "$1$KqBOyZR6$6S3oixOhSklN/j1TUXK210"; ##
SECRET-DATA
            }
        }
```

```
    }
    services;
    syslog {
        archive size 100k files 3;
        user * {
            any emergency;
        }
        host 199.4.28.21 {
            any any;
            match RT_FLOW_SESSION;
            log-prefix SRX-KSK-LAX;
        }
        file messages {
            any critical;
            authorization info;
        }
        file interactive-commands {
            interactive-commands error;
        }
        source-address 199.4.28.145;
    }
    max-configurations-on-flash 5;
    max-configuration-rollbacks 20;
    archival {
        configuration {
            transfer-on-commit;
            archive-sites {
                "scp://srxkskcjr@199.4.28.21:/home/srxkskcjr" password
"$9$GHiHmpu1ylM36reW8Vbs24Ji.Qz6"; ## SECRET-DATA
            }
        }
    }
    license {
        autoupdate {
            url https://ae1.juniper.net/junos/key_retrieval;
        }
    }
    ntp {
        server 199.4.28.17;
        server 199.4.28.27;
        source-address 10.4.28.1;
    }
}
interfaces {
    interface-range interfaces-trust {
        member ge-0/0/1;
        member fe-0/0/2;
```

```
        member fe-0/0/3;
        member fe-0/0/4;
        member fe-0/0/5;
        member fe-0/0/6;
        member fe-0/0/7;
        unit 0 {
            family ethernet-switching {
                vlan {
                    members vlan-trust;
                }
            }
        }
    }
    ge-0/0/0 {
        unit 0 {
            family inet {
                address 199.4.28.145/26;
            }
        }
    }
    vlan {
        unit 0 {
            family inet {
                address 10.4.28.1/24;
            }
        }
    }
}
snmp {
    community dnss3c {
        clients {
            10.4.28.253/32;
        }
    }
    trap-options {
        source-address 199.4.28.145;
        agent-address outgoing-interface;
    }
    trap-group kskwest {
        categories {
            authentication;
            link;
            routing;
            startup;
            configuration;
            services;
        }
```

```
        targets {
            199.4.28.21;
        }
    }
}
routing-options {
    static {
        route 0.0.0.0/0 next-hop 199.4.28.129;
    }
}
security {
    ssh-known-hosts {
        host 199.4.28.21 {
            rsa-key
AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAQEAuMQSnC2+tk7W4nBHLZFk1FfFlSTiYP2w/5XR/
x2hxxP2soZ4uFppRdaB+G9DICkvm27ovL/QsEtR2holMK2C+ilAwPaqgPfo9XFQby/
cwS400sYQHZAXqAV2wM4eGF8l7eGI2BKJcjgpWmD+YTZ
+d9jOd7bVd6248xIPF4eQmsyXsxwT2ecm2e2I9q99G5M5+aR15NTXLJ4fTYgLmODMZlIThER2zdnZY
YxUh7cD2BTij9RQwfk8oVJipGZc0q4eNNZyrUKArBXRqcuNOjQAqVzktS+BByI4JBfq/
nlXzKdvd8rXkPoavCe9lNP0zAEbAKhKgfPc6QlfTFycpI34Ew==;
        }
    }
    nat {
        source {
            rule-set trust-to-untrust {
                from zone trust;
                to zone untrust;
                rule source-nat-rule {
                    match {
                        source-address 0.0.0.0/0;
                    }
                    then {
                        source-nat {
                            interface;
                        }
                    }
                }
            }
        }
    }
    zones {
        security-zone trust {
            address-book {
                address localnet 10.4.28.0/24;
            }
            host-inbound-traffic {
                system-services {
```

```
                    all;
                }
                protocols {
                    all;
                }
            }
            interfaces {
                vlan.0;
            }
        }
        security-zone untrust {
            address-book {
                address icanndns 199.4.28.0/22;
            }
            interfaces {
                ge-0/0/0.0 {
                    host-inbound-traffic {
                        system-services {
                            ping;
                        }
                    }
                }
            }
        }
    }
    policies {
        from-zone trust to-zone untrust {
            policy trust-to-untrust {
                match {
                    source-address localnet;
                    destination-address icanndns;
                    application any;
                }
                then {
                    permit;
                    log {
                        session-close;
                    }
                }
            }
        }
    }
}
vlans {
    vlan-trust {
        vlan-id 3;
        l3-interface vlan.0;
```

```
    }
}

akulik@srx>
```

ICANN DNSSEC Script Exception

(1)

Abbreviations

TEB = Tamper Evident Bag
HSM = Hardware Security Module
FD = Flash Drive
CA = Ceremony Administrator
IW = Internal Witness
SA = System Administrator
SSC = Safe Security Controller

Instructions: Initial each step that has been completed below, e.g., *BTS*. Note time.

Note Exception Time

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
1	IW notes date and time of key ceremony exception and signs here:	FA	21:4
2	IW Describes exception and action below		

- João Damas will not be participating as CO only as EW

– End of DNSSEC Script Exception –

ICANN DNSSEC Script Exception

2

Abbreviations

TEB = Tamper Evident Bag
HSM = Hardware Security Module
FD = Flash Drive
CA = Ceremony Administrator
IW = Internal Witness
SA = System Administrator
SSC = Safe Security Controller

Instructions: Initial each step that has been completed below, e.g., *BTB*. Note time.

Note Exception Time

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
1	IW notes date and time of key ceremony exception and signs here:	FA	21:7
2	IW Describes exception and action below		

– SM will not be participating as CO, only EW

– End of DNSSEC Script Exception –

ICANN DNSSEC Script Exception

Abbreviations

TEB = Tamper Evident Bag
HSM = Hardware Security Module
FD = Flash Drive
CA = Ceremony Administrator
IW = Internal Witness
SA = System Administrator
SSC = Safe Security Controller

3

Instructions: Initial each step that has been completed below, e.g., *BTS*. Note time.

Note Exception Time

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
1	IW notes date and time of key ceremony exception and signs here:	FA	21:26
2	IW Describes exception and action below		

At step 9, boxes 1070 and 1784 were not closed since their locks were removed

– End of DNSSEC Script Exception –

ICANN DNSSEC Script Exception

4

Abbreviations

TEB = Tamper Evident Bag
HSM = Hardware Security Module
FD = Flash Drive
CA = Ceremony Administrator
IW = Internal Witness
SA = System Administrator
SSC = Safe Security Controller

Instructions: Initial each step that has been completed below, e.g., *BTS*. Note time.

Note Exception Time

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
1	IW notes date and time of key ceremony exception and signs here:	FA	22:53
2	IW Describes exception and action below		

Before Step 3 on Act 3 we stop the ceremony temporarily for a bio break

– End of DNSSEC Script Exception –

ICANN DNSSEC Script Exception

Abbreviations

TEB = Tamper Evident Bag
HSM = Hardware Security Module
FD = Flash Drive
CA = Ceremony Administrator
IW = Internal Witness
SA = System Administrator
SSC = Safe Security Controller

5

Instructions: Initial each step that has been completed below, e.g., *BTS*. Note time.

Note Exception Time

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
1	IW notes date and time of key ceremony exception and signs here:	FA	23:30
2	IW Describes exception and action below		

At step 35, of Act 3 the safe #2 couldn't be opened by the SSC2. Everyone left the saferoom for a few mints.

– End of DNSSEC Script Exception –

ICANN DNSSEC Script Exception

6

Abbreviations

TEB = Tamper Evident Bag
HSM = Hardware Security Module
FD = Flash Drive
CA = Ceremony Administrator
IW = Internal Witness
SA = System Administrator
SSC = Safe Security Controller

Instructions: Initial each step that has been completed below, e.g., *BTB*. Note time.

Note Exception Time

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
1	IW notes date and time of key ceremony exception and signs here:	FA	23:46
2	IW Describes exception and action below		

We retried opening the safe 2 but it didn't work again. We all left the safe room.

We re-entred at 23:50, Tomofumi joined this time to help.

– End of DNSSEC Script Exception –

ICANN DNSSEC Script Exception

7

Abbreviations

TEB = Tamper Evident Bag
HSM = Hardware Security Module
FD = Flash Drive
CA = Ceremony Administrator
IW = Internal Witness
SA = System Administrator
SSC = Safe Security Controller

Instructions: Initial each step that has been completed below, e.g., *BTS*. Note time.

Note Exception Time

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
1	IW notes date and time of key ceremony exception and signs here: 13 February 2013	FA	00:06
2	IW Describes exception and action below		

Everyone left the safe room after failing again to open the safe. We are waiting for the lock to power off. SSC2 left the KMF to talk with the other SSC2. We took a break and a few people left the room for a bio break.

The three COs left their OP cards in the table in order to take a bio break.

At 00:46 everyone and Tomofumi entered the safe room again.

– End of DNSSEC Script Exception –