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n/aPolicy Development Process (PDP) on Privacy & Proxy Services Accreditation IssuesADOPTED12Y, 0N, 0AAlan Greenberg17.04.201423.04.2014 20:00 UTC24.04.2014 00:00 UTC24.04.2014 00:00 UTC30.04.201401.05.2014 23:59 UTC*23.04.2014 22:00 UTC

Glen de Saint Gery gnso.secretariat@gnso.icann.org

AL-ALAC-ST-0414-03-01-EN

For information about this PC, please click here

FINAL VERSION TO BE SUBMITTED IF RATIFIED

Please click here to download of the copy of the pdf below. 


FINAL DRAFT VERSION TO BE VOTED UPON BY THE ALAC

The ALAC strongly supports amending the Privacy Proxy Specification such that:

  • It is applicable to all Privacy and Proxy providers.
  • The personal details of the beneficial user are verified in accordance with verification requirements in the 2013 RAA. The process should ensure that, at least when the information is collected, that the proposed beneficial user is a real person/organisation and that the contact details are those of the proposed beneficial user.
  • Limits on access to the personal information of the beneficial user must be clear and balance the legitimate privacy requirements of the beneficial user as against the legitimate needs of law enforcement agencies and UDRP providers.

The ALAC further advises that in the case where a beneficial user is revealed during the process of a UDRP, and that UDRP proceeding finds in favour of the registrant and not the entity filing the UDRP, the identity and contact information of the beneficial user must NOT be revealed in any public document resulting from the UDRP.

FIRST DRAFT SUBMITTED

The ALAC strongly supports amending the Privacy Proxy Specification such that:

  • It is applicable to all Privacy and Proxy providers.
  • The personal details of the beneficial user are verified in accordance with verification requirements in the 2013 RAA. The process should ensure that, at least when the information is collected, that the proposed beneficial user is a real person/organisation and that the contact details are those of the proposed beneficial user.
  • Limits on access to the personal information of the beneficial user must be clear and balance the legitimate privacy requirements of the beneficial user as against the legitimate needs of law enforcement agencies and UDRP providers.

One further thought. The current UDRP process requires that the beneficial user be reported in the results of the UDRP, regardless of outcome. This allows a beneficial user to be revealed publicly even if the win the dispute and if the UDRP was filed with the explicit intent of revealing the beneficial user. I would suggest that in the interest of protecting registrants who opt for privacy, we recommend that the PDP WG consider the possibility of the beneficial user not be revealed in the case of a failed UDRP. It is unclear (to me) if this is strictly within the scope of the PDP, but if not, the WG could make a recommendation that this be done when the UDRP is revised (scheduled in the near future).

 

 

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4 Comments

  1. Both Carlton and I are members of the P/P WG, and so won't hold the pen on this.  However, for those who have not been following the discussions and are not involved in this WG, a bit of background:

    ALAC has, for a very long time, been concerned with the accuracy of Whois data and, particularly, with Whois data sitting behind privacy/proxy services.  ALAC welcomed many of the amendments to the RAA in 2013 as they strengthened requirements that would lead to a more accurate Whois data based.  Those amendments included a specification for Whois accuracy and a specification for privacy/proxy services - and the WG that is seeking these comments is the WG that is working through the details of what should be required under the privacy/proxy services. What ALAC welcomed in the 2013 changes:

    Resellers:

    Welcomed expanded definition of Reseller (1.22) to cover any entity that participates in the Registrar’s distribution channel for domain name registrations.

    Whois Accuracy – requirement

    The requirement for registrar validation/verification of the accuracy of Whois  information has been significantly strengthened through the specific requirement (3.7.8)  for registrar compliance with the Whois  Accuracy Program specification and the specification itself).   The missing piece is registrar response to public complaints about inaccurate whois data.

    WHOIS ACCURACY PROGRAM SPECIFICATION

    Validation of data now must happen within 15 days. Validation must include:

    • that there is data in all the Whois information fields,
    • that it is in proper form for the relevant country or territory,
    • that email addresses, and telephone numbers and postal addresses are in the proper format.
    • Postal addresses must also be consistent with relevant country requirements
    • Verification must be either by calling the party – who must response with a unique code, or by SMS with response.

    The Specification also says that when a registrant wilfully provides ‘inaccurate or unreliable’ information, or fails to respond for 15 days to registrar inquiries about the accuracy of contact details, the registrar must either suspend or terminate the registration until the registrar has validation of the information.

    SPECIFICATION ON PRIVACY AND PROXY REGISTRATIONS

    The basic requirements are that privacy/proxy services must only be offered in accordance with the specification, that there must be full disclosure of terms (including circumstances under which information will be revealed and the process followed, having an abuse point of contact available 24/7, and ‘well founded’ must be followed up within 24 hours.  The contact details must be held in escrow and allegations of malicious conduct, cybersquatting  and other illegal activities must be forwarded within 5 business days.

    Working Group Discussions

    The issues that have been most discussed (very heatedly at times) include:

    •  a recognition that while p/p services can by used to hide the miscreants who are abusing the DNS, they also have quite legitimate uses including protecting the privacy of individuals/organisations in genuine need of protection - there is a balance to be struck
    • level of verification. registrars are arguing that, with amendments to the RAA, verification levels of Whois information have been addressed, and those are the same levels that should apply for all registrants - other argue that, given the possibility (likelihood - take your pick) of miscreans hiding behind p/p services, there should be a higher verification requirement
    • accreditation - what should the tests be?
    • under what circumstances should a p/p respond to a request for information about the REAL registrant - only from LEA/others?
    • Alternatively, should the response of a p/p provider be - when faced with allegations/proven allegations of misuse of the DNS by their client - to reveal their details, or just shut them off without revealing details.

    The number of charter questions listed above is daunting; most of them raise important issues that deserve significant thought and discussion.  However, if ALAC is to have input, my suggestion (wearing a WG hat) is to highlight the issues that have been important to ALAC -

    have an accreditation system that means that, somewhere, registrant details are collected, verified, and retained

    registrants using p/p services must have their details verified - whether or not they are ever displayed

    there must clearly be limits on access to that personal information - which raises important issues law enforcement vs privacy

     

     

     

  2. I agree with Holly that at the very least the ALAC needs to respond on the most important aspect of the issue.  Here is a simple statement based on Holly's suggestion:

     

    The ALAC strongly believes that there must be a Proxy and Privacy Services Accreditation System that allows for registration information to be collected, verified and retained.  Registrants using proxy and privacy services must have their information verified regardless of whether the information is displayed or made public.  Limits on access to that information must be made clear by balancing the needs of law enforcement agencies and the privacy needs of the registrants.  

     

    Best regards,

     

    Rinalia

  3. Suggested final comments.

     

    The ALAC strongly supports amending the Privacy Proxy Specification such  that:

     

    •  The personal details of the beneficial user are verified in accordance with verification requirements in the 2013 RAA. The process should ensure that, at least when the information is collected, that the proposed beneficial user is a real person/organisation and that the contact details are those of the proposed user
    • Limits on access to the personal information of the beneficial user must be clear and balance the legitimate privacy requirements of the beneficial user as against the legitimate needs of law enforcement agencies

     

     

     

  4. Slightly revised:

    The ALAC strongly supports amending the Privacy Proxy Specification such that:

    • It is applicable to all Privacy and Proxy providers.
    • The personal details of the beneficial user are verified in accordance with verification requirements in the 2013 RAA. The process should ensure that, at least when the information is collected, that the proposed beneficial user is a real person/organisation and that the contact details are those of the proposed beneficial user.
    • Limits on access to the personal information of the beneficial user must be clear and balance the legitimate privacy requirements of the beneficial user as against the legitimate needs of law enforcement agencies and UDRP providers.

    One further thought. The current UDRP process requires that the beneficial user be reported in the results of the UDRP, regardless of outcome. This allows a beneficial user to be revealed publicly even if the win the dispute and if the UDRP was filed with the explicit intent of revealing the beneficial user. I would suggest that in the interest of protecting registrants who opt for privacy, we recommend that the PDP WG consider the possibility of the beneficial user not be revealed in the case of a failed UDRP. It is unclear (to me) if this is strictly within the scope of the PDP, but if not, the WG could make a recommendation that this be done when the UDRP is revised (scheduled in the near future).