# A quick review of DNSSEC Validation in today's Internet

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## What is being measured?

- Clients who will perform DNSSEC validation of a domain name
  - Using RSA/SHA-1 as the crypto algorithm
  - Who will not resolve a badly-signed domain name


- We are NOT measuring:
  - Validating resolvers
  - Signed domains

## What is not being measured?


### We are NOT measuring:

- Validating resolvers
  - Its actually quite a challenge to isolate the DNSSEC validation behaviour of a recursive resolver from query logs.
  - And if the aim is to measure the user impact here, then it makes more sense to measure the number of users who use DNSSEC validating resolvers rather than the resolvers themselves
- Signed domains
  - This has its own challenges relating to zone enumeration in the DNS, and we are not undertaking that here!

## The Global Validation Picture




## The Global Validation Picture




## The Global Picture

#### Use of DNSSEC Validation for World (XA)




## The Global Picture

#### Use of DNSSEC Validation for World (XA)




## Some have been Validating for many years


#### Use of DNSSEC Validation for Sweden (SE)




DNSSEC Per-Country Deployment for AS7922: COMCAST-7922 - Comcast Cable Communications, Inc., United States of America (US)



#### Use of DNSSEC Validation for Estonia (EE)




#### Use of DNSSEC Validation for Romania (RO)




## Recent DNSSEC Validation


#### DNSSEC Per-Country Deployment for AS28573: CLARO S.A., Brazil (BR)




DNSSEC Per-Country Deployment for AS6677: ICENET-AS1 Siminn hf, Iceland (IS)



Use of DNSSEC Validation for Faroe Islands (FO)




#### Use of DNSSEC Validation for New Zealand (NZ)



## Finland

#### Use of DNSSEC Validation for Finland (FI)



## Finland - Top 10 ISPs

	ASN	AS Name	<b>DNSSEC Validates</b>	Uses Google PDNS	Samples ▼	1
	AS16086	DNA DNA Oy	0.86%	1.47%	315,616	
	AS719	FLISA-AS Elisa Ovi	0.61%	0.59%	271,716	
_	AS1759	TSF-IP-CORE TeliaSonera Finland Oyj	95.40%	3.57%	246,397	
	AS790	EUNETFI Elica Ovi	0.12%	0.21%	121,194	
	AS15527	ANVIA Anvia Oyj	23.06%	23.80%	12,730	
	AS1741	FUNE IAS CSC - Tietech tietotekniikan keskus Oy	31.17%	7.32%	8,581	
	AS29422	NBLNETWORKS-AS Nebula Oy	86.33%	14.27%	4,967	
	AS39699	SSPOT-AS Louriea Palvelut Cy	2.98%	4.26%	4,934	
	AS24751	MULTIFI-AS Jakobstadsnejdens Telefon Ab	85.11%	23.11%	4,400	
	AS3238	ALCOM Alands Datakommunikation Ab	37.23%	59.65%	4,392	
	AS24751	MULTIFI-AS Jakobstadsnejdens Telefon Ab	85.11%	23.11%	4,40	00

## The Bigger Picture

- Much of the African continent and parts of Asia still show high DNSSEC validation rates due to their use of Google's Public DNS service (which currently receives 12% of the Internet's query load)
- Comcast resolvers are a major validation system in North America and this resolver collection performs the second highest volume of validation
- Recent areas of switching on DNSSEC validation in DNS resolvers are in Iceland, Norway, Brazil, Nepal, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea

## But

- Growth of validation deployment has slowed
  - 80% of all current queries request DNSSEC credentials
  - 26% of all current queries perform DNSSEC validation
  - 11% of current queries turn to a non-validating resolver upon SERVFAIL
  - 15% of current queries will perform validation and live with the outcome

Thanks!

DNSSEC Reports: http://stats.labs.apnic.net/dnssec